Lambertson v. Williams

5 Citing cases

  1. City of Jacksonville v. Stokes

    74 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1954)   Cited 44 times

    In the case of Miller v. Shull, supra, the same doctrine was applied. In the case of Earley v. Morrison Cafeteria Co. of Orlando, supra, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts said [ 61 So.2d 478]: "`* * * The duty which the plaintiff owes to herself is to observe the obvious and apparent condition of the premises.'"

  2. Brownlow v. Earthman

    220 So. 2d 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 1 times

    Upon such a showing, a modification of the prior custody award is authorized only if a modification would be in the best interests of the children. Frazier v. Frazier, 1933, 109 Fla. 164, 147 So. 464; Frye v. Frye, Fla.App. 1967, 205 So.2d 310; Lambertson v. Williams, Fla. 1952, 61 So.2d 478; Willson v. Willson, Fla. 1951, 55 So.2d 905; and Carrier v. Vermeulen, Fla.App. 1959, 114 So.2d 192. The testimony in the present case shows that after the Tennessee divorce, the petitioner remarried and moved to Palm Beach County where she has established her residence and owns a home.

  3. Mirras v. Mirras

    202 So. 2d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 11 times
    In Mirras the court ruled the Florida trial court did not have to give any weight under the doctrine of comity, because of the absence of relevant facts bearing upon the best interest and welfare of the child before the New York court at the time of its decree.

    DOES THE NEW YORK COURT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD CUSTODY OF A MINOR CHILD WHEN SAID MINOR CHILD IS PHYSICALLY OUTSIDE THE STATE OF NEW YORK DURING THE ENTIRE PROCEEDING, AND IF SO, MAY THE FLORIDA COURT DISREGARD SUCH CUSTODY AWARD OF THE NEW YORK COURT BASED ON NEW FACTS OR OLD FACTS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE NEW YORK COURT AT THE TIME OF ENTRY OF ITS ORDER? This question, we think, has been clearly resolved by several decisions of our appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, although some confusion appears to have crept into its consideration because of a misconstruction of the rule enunciated by the First District Court of Appeal in the case of Rhoades v. Bhon, 114 So.2d 493, which was confirmed by the Florida Supreme Court as reported in 121 So.2d 777. The rule, also pronounced and applied in Lambertson v. Williams, Fla., 61 So.2d 478; In Re Vermeulen's Petition, Fla.App., 114 So.2d 192; and Neal v. State, Fla.App., 135 So.2d 891, as stated by the First District and quoted by the Supreme Court, is as follows: "* * * once a court acquires jurisdiction of a minor as an ancillary phase of a divorce proceeding and enters an order or decree touching its custody, that court has continuing jurisdiction, upon proper supplementary proceedings, to amend such order or decree by changing the custody of the minor as may comport with its best interest and welfare.

  4. Rhoades v. Bohn

    114 So. 2d 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)   Cited 17 times

    Under these circumstances Florida will recognize and enforce a custody decree of a foreign state although the minor was neither domiciled nor physically present in the foreign state at any time during the course of the proceeding. Lambertson v. Williams, Fla. 1952, 61 So.2d 478. Appellant contends that the rule in Dorman has no application to the facts in this case and should not control the decision.

  5. Modacsi v. Taylor

    104 So. 2d 664 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)   Cited 12 times

    Such a decree carrying with it, as it does, all the rights of a natural parent, including that of custody and control, is totally sufficient until such time as a lack of qualification to continue in the exercise of those rights is fully proved by whoever challenges it. The love and affection of another, no matter how great, is not sufficient to deprive a fit and proper parent of his child. See note 1, supra; Cf.: Lambertson v.v. Williams, Fla. 1952, 61 So.2d 478; Digirogio v. Digirogio, 153 Fla. 24, 13 So.2d 596. There is contained in the record before us no testimony or evidence from which could be drawn the slightest inference that either the adoptive father or the natural mother have been, since the entry of the final decree of adoption, guilty of any conduct that would justify a removal of the child from their custody and control.