Opinion
No. C 00-3729 SI
February 21, 2003
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On February 21, 2003, this Court heard argument on defendant's motion for summary judgment. Having carefully considered the arguments of counsel and the papers submitted, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are representatives of a class of flight attendants who previously worked for Republic Airlines ("Republic") and are presently employed by Northwest Airlines ("Northwest"). Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") ¶¶ 51, 53, 67. Northwest acquired Republic in 1986 and hired plaintiffs to join its staff of flight attendants. Shortly after the acquisition, plaintiffs and all other Northwest flight attendants held a representation election, resulting in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("IBT") becoming the certified exclusive bargaining representative for all Northwest flight attendants. SAC ¶ 54. Plaintiffs bring this action against IBT on a claim that the union breached its duty of fair representation in negotiating and executing a collective bargaining agreement affecting plaintiffs' pension benefits.
In June 1988, IBT entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Northwest to equalize pension plans between the former Republic attendants and Northwest attendants. SAC ¶¶ 55-56. IBT and Northwest agreed to institute a unitary defined monthly benefit plan to cover all post-merger Northwest flight attendants from June 1, 1988 onward. SAC ¶¶ 55, 68. Under this plan all flight attendants would receive a pension benefit partially based on their years of service. SAC ¶ 70. Former Republic attendants also received lump sum payments for accumulated contributions under their prior pension plans. SAC ¶¶ 57, 71. Northwest and IBT believed that these lump sum payments could be invested just like a normal pension account. SAC ¶ 58. Consequently, in order to equalize pension benefits among all Northwest flight attendants, a discount was applied against some former Republic attendants. SAC ¶ 59. Other former Republic attendants were not subject to a discount but were not credited for years of service prior to 1988. SAC ¶ 70.
Flight attendants who joined Republic Airlines as a result of its acquisition of Hughes Airwest in 1980 ("Republic West attendants"), lost credit for their years of service prior to 1988. SAC ¶ 67. Former Republic flight attendants who did not come from Hughes Airwest ("Republic East attendants"), were subject to the discount against their pension benefits. SAC ¶ 51.
Plaintiffs allege that the discount and refusal to credit for years of service was arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable, and the lump sum payments amounted to a return of deferred salary rather than pension benefits. SAC ¶¶ 60, 72, 103. They claim that defendant promised that remedial measures would be taken to correct the alleged pension inequities. SAC ¶ 94. Yet no action was taken until June 1, 2000, when Northwest and IBT executed a new collective bargaining agreement. SAC ¶ 102. Although the new agreement failed to reinstate credit for service prior to 1988, it did reduce the discount affecting some of plaintiffs' pension benefits by 40 percent. SAC ¶¶ 99, 101. Plaintiffs claim that IBT's actions in 2000 did not remedy the inequities but instead reflected the union's continued hostility and ill-will toward former Republic flight attendants. SAC ¶ 104. This lawsuit involves plaintiffs' claims that the IBT breached its duty of fair representation in negotiating and executing the 2000 collective bargaining agreement.
Similar contentions about the 1988 agreement, which contentions were originally included in plaintiffs' complaint, are time barred.
On June 12, 2001, this Court denied defendant IBT's motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and granted defendant Northwest Airline's motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Now before the Court is defendant IBT's motion for summary judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
In a motion for summary judgment, "[if] the moving party for summary judgment meets its initial burden of identifying for the court those portions of the materials on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact, the burden of production then shifts so that "the non-moving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" See T.W. Elec. Service, Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 317(1986)).
In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.See T.W. Electric, 809 F.2d at 630-31 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd, v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 So. Ct. 1348 (1986)); Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1509 (9th Cir. 1991). The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1985); Thornhill Publ'g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Hearsay statements found in affidavits are inadmissible. See, e.g.,Fong v. American Airlines, Inc., 626 F.2d 759, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1980).
DISCUSSION
A. IBT's Duty of Fair RepresentationDefendant maintains that, contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, it did not breach its duty of fair representation to the plaintiff class in negotiating and executing the 2000 collective bargaining agreement. IBT states that there is no evidence that would support the plaintiffs' claims that it breached this duty, and that plaintiffs have not met their burden, under Airline Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991), to show that the union's actions were either arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Plaintiffs respond that the definition of arbitrary conduct is not as restrictive as defendant suggests, and assert that under the definition that they propound, they have produced ample evidence to support their claims that defendant breached its duty of fair representation.
In O'Neill, the Supreme Court clearly stated the standard governing a claim that a union has breached its duty of fair representation:
[A] union breaches its duty of fair representation if its actions are either "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith" [This rule] applies to all union activity, including contract negotiation. We further hold that a union's actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a "wide range of reasonableness" as to be irrational.O'Neill 499 U.S. at 67 (internal citations omitted). That standard was further discussed by the Ninth Circuit in Bautista v. Pan American World Airlines, 828 F.2d 546, 549 (9th Cir. 1987), and in Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Assoc., 897 F.2d 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 1990). In Bautista, the court stated:
In the context of representing its members at the bargaining table, a union must be allowed a "wide range of reasonableness" because it must be able to focus on the needs of its membership as a whole without undue fear of lawsuits from individual members disgruntled by the result of the collective process.Bautista, 828 F.2d at 549 (internal citations omitted). InBarthelemy, the court wrote:
The Supreme Court has long recognized that unions must retain wide discretion to act in what they perceive to be their members' best interests. To that end, we have "stressed the importance of preserving union discretion by narrowly construing the unfair representation doctrine." A union's representation of its members "need not be error free." We have concluded repeatedly that mere negligent conduct on the part of a union does not constitute a breach of the union's duty of fair representation.Barthelemy, 897 F.2d at 1005.
Plaintiffs do not challenge this standard, but argue that it is not as restrictive as defendant suggests. Plaintiffs cite to page 6 of this Court's June 12, 2001 opinion denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, citing Caudle v. Pam American World Airways, 676 F. Supp. 314, 318 (D.D.C. 1987) for the proposition that a union cannot "act on the basis of arbitrary factors — such as race, personal animosity or sheer numbers of employees in a given group. . . ." Plaintiffs assert that the differential treatment that was shown to the Republic East and West attendants on the one hand, and the Northwest Originals on the other, "can constitute (without necessarily constituting) a DFR violation based on being `arbitrary' conduct." Pltfs Opp. 12:23-27. Therefore, plaintiffs argue, this Court should deny defendant's motion for summary judgment.
However, plaintiffs do not and cannot point to facts in the record that support their claim that defendant engaged in such arbitrary conduct or that defendant's actions were discriminatory or in bad faith. While it is true that, as plaintiffs state, a union cannot act on the basis of arbitrary factors, plaintiffs provide no evidence that defendant did so. In their discussion of the 2000 labor agreement, the facts that plaintiffs claim demonstrate arbitrary treatment are as follows: Norman Weintraub was biased toward the 1988 agreement, as he had helped negotiate it, and he therefore did not present the best arguments for changing the 1988 agreement during the 2000 negotiations with Northwest's chief negotiator Robert Brodin; IBT's chief negotiator, Roland Wilder, told Brodin on the last day of negotiations that Wilder was not even interested in discussing the issue of movement of the pre-1975 years of service credit ("YOSC") for the West; Wilder refused to go back to Brodin on the issues of the failure of the first tentative agreement ("TA-1") to provide any YOSC remediation for the West and 20% amelioration of an East offset, because Wilder's personal reputation as a negotiator would be harmed by what Brodin would view as reneging on a deal that Wilder had made; Wilder stated that if East and West attendants had invested their lump sums as they should have in retirement accounts, they would now have equal pension benefits; and Local 2000 President Billie Davenport stated that East and West attendants did not get any real change in the 2000 labor negotiations because there were too few Republic attendants to really matter. Braden Decl., Exh. A at 141, Braden Decl. Exh. F Answer Nos 7 and 8; Braden Decl., Exh. A at 163-166; Braden Decl., Exh. A at 183; Braden Decl. Exh. F Answer No. 6; Braden Decl. Exh. F Answer No. 6.
However, even if all of these allegations by plaintiffs are true, none of them show arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith action on the part of defendant. The alleged bias of Norman Weintraub in favor of the 1988 agreement is not enough to breach the duty of fair representation, even assuming arguendo that the 1988 agreement was not fair; this alleged bias would be, at most, mere negligence on the part of IBT. Wilder's alleged statement to Brodin that he was not interested in discussing the issue of movement of the YOSC for the West could easily be explained as a strategic move as a part of the negotiations, as could Wilder's refusal to go back to Brodin on this issue after TA-1. Wilder's alleged statement that East and West attendants should have invested their lump sums is neither arbitrary, discriminatory, nor a show of bad faith. Finally, President Davenport's alleged statement that the East and West attendants got no movement because there were not enough of them to really matter does not necessarily show bad faith on the part of the defendant, it simply illustrates the political reality, "in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions," that when the union was negotiating for the entire group of Northwest flight attendants, it simply could not sacrifice elements of the agreement that would benefit the whole group of Northwest attendants in order to benefit the small group of East and West attendants.
Plaintiffs also argue that defendant should have instead argued to change the offset to a simple docking of four YOSC for the East, and that defendant should have presented a side by side case study of representative West flight attendants hired in a given year, compared with representative Northwest Originals hired in the same year. Plaintiffs contend that the failure to present this analysis shows bad faith. However, while plaintiffs may now, years after the fact, believe that these arguments should have been presented in the course of the 2000 contract negotiations, this inaction by defendant is not "far outside a wide range of reasonableness" as is required for this Court to find that defendant has breached its duty of fair representation to plaintiffs.
Defendant has "articulated a reasoned and legitimate rationale for the challenged action," and plaintiffs have produced no facts sufficient to overcome this rationale. Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11948, *37 (N.D. Cal. 1998). Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment.
B. The Timeliness of Plaintiffs' Action
Defendant asserts that any alleged breach asserted by plaintiffs is inextricably dependent on time barred events occurring in 1988, and that this action is therefore untimely. As the Court has granted defendant's motion on other grounds, the Court need not consider this argument.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT
Defendant's motion for summary judgment has been granted. Accordingly, judgment is entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiffs.IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.