Further, § 24-02-32, N.D.C.C., provides that arbitration must be commenced "within six months after the right thereto has arisen". Appellee contends that the court is the proper forum for deciding the issue of timeliness and relies on our court's holding in Lamb v. Northern Imp. Co., 71 N.D. 481, 3 N.W.2d 77 (1942). The Lamb case is not directly in point.
Every case cited by Lee in support of his argument that Phyllis' claim is a collateral attack on the parties' 1982 divorce judgment is distinguishable on two bases: either the party bringing the independent action was in some manner attacking issues which had been rendered res judicata in a prior proceeding through an action for damages, without attempting to vacate the holding in the prior judgment, or the party initiating the independent action attempted to obtain relief from the previous judgment by initiating a separate action under a different title but involving issues which had previously been decided on the merits. See Gruebele v. Gruebele, 338 N.W.2d at 810; Jensen v. Schwartz, 90 N.W.2d 716, 719 (N.D. 1958); Harchenko v. Harchenko, supra, 43 N.W.2d at 202; Lamb v. Northern Improvement Company, 71 N.D. 481, 3 N.W.2d 77 (1942); Lamb v. King, supra, 296 N.W. at 187; Olson v. Donnelly, supra, 294 N.W. at 671; Tuttle v. Tuttle, supra, 181 N.W. at 900. Not one of the cases cited by Lee involved or construed in any manner the separate legal claim we have referred to as an "independent action in equity to obtain relief from judgment."