From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Lamar v. Hill Int'l, Inc.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Aug 16, 2017
153 A.D.3d 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)

Opinion

2015-12660. Index No. 19723/11.

08-16-2017

Willie LAMAR, appellant, v. HILL INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., respondents (and a third-party action).

Rosenberg Minc Falkoff & Wolff, LLP, New York, NY (Steven C. Falkoff and Gary Silverstein of counsel), for appellant. Fabiani Cohen & Hall, LLP, New York, NY (John V. Fabiani, Jr., of counsel), for respondents.


Rosenberg Minc Falkoff & Wolff, LLP, New York, NY (Steven C. Falkoff and Gary Silverstein of counsel), for appellant.

Fabiani Cohen & Hall, LLP, New York, NY (John V. Fabiani, Jr., of counsel), for respondents.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., SANDRA L. SGROI, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Martin, J.), entered December 22, 2015, as denied his motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) and granted that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff, an employee of a joint venture hired by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (hereinafter MTA) to carry out the number 7 train subway extension project on the west side of Manhattan, commenced this action against the defendants, the construction managers for the project, contending that he was injured when he fell from the top of a stack of blasting mats more than 10 feet high. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on his Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action, and the defendants cross-moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that they were not liable under the Labor Law because they did not have the authority to supervise or control the plaintiff's work.

The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) and properly granted that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In order to impose liability on a construction manager for a violation of Labor Law § 200, § 240(1), or § 241(6), the plaintiff must show that the defendant had the authority to exercise supervision and control over the work that brought about the injury so as to enable the defendant to avoid or correct an unsafe condition (see Walls v. Turner Constr. Co., 4 N.Y.3d 861, 863–864, 798 N.Y.S.2d 351 ; Russin v. Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 N.Y.2d 311, 317–318, 445 N.Y.S.2d 127, 429 N.E.2d 805 ; Marquez v. L & M Dev. Partners, Inc., 141 A.D.3d 694, 697–698, 35 N.Y.S.3d 700 ; Myles v. Claxton, 115 A.D.3d 654, 655, 981 N.Y.S.2d 447 ; Rodriguez v. JMB Architecture, LLC, 82 A.D.3d 949, 950, 919 N.Y.S.2d 40 ; Linkowski v. City of New York, 33 A.D.3d 971, 975, 824 N.Y.S.2d 109 ).

A construction manager of a work site is generally not responsible for injuries under Labor Law § 200, § 240(1), or § 241(6) unless it functions as an agent of the property owner or general contractor in circumstances where it has the ability to control the activity which brought about the injury (see Walls v. Turner Constr. Co., 4 N.Y.3d at 863–864, 798 N.Y.S.2d 351, 831 N.E.2d 408 ; Bennett v. Hucke, 131 A.D.3d 993, 994, 16 N.Y.S.3d 261, affd. 28 N.Y.3d 964, 38 N.Y.S.3d 834, 60 N.E.3d 1200 ; McLaren v. Turner Constr. Co., 105 A.D.3d 1016, 1017, 963 N.Y.S.2d 386 ; Rodriguez v. JMB Architecture, LLC, 82 A.D.3d at 950, 919 N.Y.S.2d 40 ). "A party is deemed to be an agent of an owner or general contractor under the Labor Law when it has supervisory control and authority over the work being done where a plaintiff is injured" ( Linkowski v. City of New York, 33 A.D.3d at 974–975, 824 N.Y.S.2d 109 ; see Walls v. Turner Constr. Co., 4 N.Y.3d at 863–864, 798 N.Y.S.2d 351, 831 N.E.2d 408 ; Russin v. Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 N.Y.2d at 318, 445 N.Y.S.2d 127, 429 N.E.2d 805 ; Rodriguez v. JMB Architecture, LLC, 82 A.D.3d at 951, 919 N.Y.S.2d 40 ; Delahaye v. Saint Anns School, 40 A.D.3d 679, 683, 836 N.Y.S.2d 233 ). An agent's liability is limited "to those areas and activities within the scope of the work delegated or, in other words, to the particular agency created" ( Russin v. Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 N.Y.2d at 318, 445 N.Y.S.2d 127, 429 N.E.2d 805 ; see Bennett v. Hucke, 131 A.D.3d at 994, 16 N.Y.S.3d 261 ).

Here, the construction management services contract between the defendants and the MTA provided that the defendants were responsible for coordinating the work relating to the number 7 train subway extension project, namely liaising with contractors to ensure that the project was completed in accordance with cost, time, safety, and quality control requirements and reporting to the MTA. However, the contract did not confer upon the defendants the authority to control the methods used by the contractors, including the plaintiff's employer, to complete their work. The defendants were authorized only to review and monitor safety programs and requirements and make recommendations, provide direction to contractors regarding corrective action to be taken if an unsafe condition was detected, and stop work only in the event of an emergency. The parties' deposition testimony also demonstrated that the defendants did not have control or a supervisory role over the plaintiff's day-to-day work and that they did not assume responsibility for the manner in which that work was conducted. The defendants, therefore, made a prima facie showing that they had no control or supervisory authority over the plaintiff's work so as to enable them to prevent or correct any unsafe conditions (see Blake v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 N.Y.3d 280, 293, 771 N.Y.S.2d 484, 803 N.E.2d 757 ; Russin v. Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 N.Y.2d at 318, 445 N.Y.S.2d 127, 429 N.E.2d 805 ; Vazquez v. Humboldt Seigle Lofts, LLC, 145 A.D.3d 709, 709–710, 42 N.Y.S.3d 333 ; Marquez v. L & M Dev. Partners, Inc., 141 A.D.3d at 697–699, 35 N.Y.S.3d 700; Rodriguez v. JMB Architecture, LLC, 82 A.D.3d at 951, 919 N.Y.S.2d 40 ; Linkowski v. City of New York, 33 A.D.3d at 975, 824 N.Y.S.2d 109 ). The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

For the same reasons, the Supreme Court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on his causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) was proper (see Myles v. Claxton, 115 A.D.3d at 656, 981 N.Y.S.2d 447 ).


Summaries of

Lamar v. Hill Int'l, Inc.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Aug 16, 2017
153 A.D.3d 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)
Case details for

Lamar v. Hill Int'l, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:Willie LAMAR, appellant, v. HILL INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., respondents…

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Date published: Aug 16, 2017

Citations

153 A.D.3d 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)
153 A.D.3d 685
2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 6167

Citing Cases

Giannas v. 100 3rd Ave. Corp.

Court's determination denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the…

Lopez v. Eastport S. Manor Cent. Sch. Dist.

However, in opposing a summary judgment motion, mere conclusions, unsubstantiated allegations or assertions…