Courts have consistently concluded that a blanket restriction on inmate speech in a specific location within a prison is a reasonable restriction and does not constitute a deprivation of an inmate's First Amendment right to free speech. See Lamar v. Coffield, 353 F. Supp. 1081, 1083 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Wheeler v. Maddox, 2017 WL 9440399, at *8 (N.D. Fla. June 27, 2017); Riley v. Muhammad, 2015 WL 10433469, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2015); Holmes v. Dalrymple, 2013 WL 504690, at * 3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 15, 2013); Taylor v. Ozmint, 2011 WL 441934, at * 2-3 (D. S.C. Feb. 7, 2011); Duncan v. Quarterman, 2009 WL 2614395, at * 3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2009); see also Wall v. Mefford, 2018 WL 9458209, at *5 (W.D. Va. Mar. 19, 2018) (recognized in dicta). They also have held that such a restriction does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); see also Pittman v. Hutto, 594 F.2d 407, 410 (4th Cir. 1979). Based on penological interests, courts have held that prisons may ban interviews by the media with specific inmates, see Pell, 417 U.S. 817, mailings between prison inmates, see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), and even any talking by and among prisoners while in corridors, sidewalks and dining halls or while working without violating prisoners' free speech rights, see Lamar v. Coffield, 353 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D. Texas 1972); Taylor v. Ozmint, 2011 WL 286133 (D. S.C. Jan. 7, 2011); Duncan v. Quarterman, 2009 WL 2614395 (N.D. Texas Aug. 26, 2009). Despite numerous recognized restrictions, it, nonetheless, appears clearly established that prisoners retain the right to freely communicate with counsel.
Nonetheless, this Court feels that the majority of courts which have considered this question and the better reasoning support the proposition that confrontation and cross-examination are not absolutely required. Sostre, supra; Braxton, supra; Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir., 1973); Griggs v. Liethliter, 355 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D.Ill., 1973); Banks v. Norton, 346 F. Supp. 917 (D.Conn., 1972); Lathrop v. Brewer, 340 F. Supp. 873, 881 (S.D.Iowa, 1972); United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, supra; Lamar v. Coffield, 353 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.Texas, 1972). Thus, the Court concludes that confrontation and cross-examination are not constitutionally mandated.