Opinion
24A-DC-30
11-19-2024
Amanda Marie Lamanna, Appellant-Petitioner v. Zachary Lamanna, Appellee-Respondent
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT DONNA J. JAMESON GREENWOOD, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE ERIC K. DOYLE BARROW BROWN CARRINGTON, PLLC INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA CHARLES D. BROWN, JR. BARROW BROWN CARRINGTON, PLLC LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Johnson Superior Court The Honorable Marla K. Clark, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 41D04-2204-DC-236
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT DONNA J. JAMESON GREENWOOD, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE ERIC K. DOYLE BARROW BROWN CARRINGTON, PLLC INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA CHARLES D. BROWN, JR. BARROW BROWN CARRINGTON, PLLC LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Foley, Judge
[¶1] Amanda Marie Lamanna ("Mother") appeals the trial court's order granting Zachary Lamanna ("Father") primary physical custody and sole legal custody of P.L. ("Child"). Mother raises the following two issues for our review:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that modification was in Child's best interest, ultimately awarding physical and legal custody of Child to Father; and
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Mother to participate in individual therapy.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] Mother and Father were married and are the parents of Child, who was born on March 1, 2014. Mother has two older daughters from prior relationships ("halfsisters"). During their marriage, Mother and Father lived in Kentucky along with Child and half-sisters. In 2020, Mother and Father divorced in Jefferson County, Kentucky and entered into a marital settlement agreement addressing custody, parenting time, and child support for Child. Under the terms of their agreement, Mother and Father shared legal custody of Child, Mother had primary physical custody of Child, Father was awarded liberal parenting time according to the Kentucky parenting time guidelines, and Father was responsible for all transportation of Child for parenting time purposes with the exchange of Child occurring at Mother's house because Mother was unable to drive at the time ("Custody Agreement"). At the time of dissolution, Father continued to have a relationship with half-sisters. However, the relationship "soured at some point . . . because of . . . ongoing disputes" between Mother and Father. Tr. Vol. II p. 16.
[¶4] Subsequently, Mother moved to Greenwood, Indiana. Father remarried and moved to Charlestown, Indiana, "an hour and a half" drive from Mother's residence. Id. at 106. Father lives with his wife and step-daughter. Mother filed a motion to domesticate the Custody Agreement in Indiana, which the trial court granted on April 22, 2022.
[¶5] On April 29, 2022, by which point Child was eight years old, Father filed a motion to modify the Custody Agreement, requesting "a more equal parenting schedule" and that Child be exchanged "approximately halfway between" Mother's and Father's residences because "the distance between [Mother and Father had] been significantly reduced" and Father "ha[d] reason to believe that [Mother was] now able to drive." Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 37-38. Father also filed a motion requesting to renew counseling for Child due to Child "experiencing serious issues arising from both the . . . divorce and custody proceedings, as well as bullying [Child] is experiencing in school and at home" from one of her half-sisters. Id. at 39. The trial court granted Father's motion to renew counseling for Child. Father filed a motion to appoint a guardian ad litem, which the trial court granted, appointing Lisa Fears as Child's guardian ad litem ("GAL").
[¶6] Before the trial court ruled on Father's petition to modify the Custody Agreement, Father filed an additional petition requesting that "he be awarded legal and physical custody" of Child subject to Mother's reasonable parenting time. Id. at 66.
[¶7] On July 17, 2023, the report from the GAL was filed ("GAL Report"). The GAL Report revealed that Child's counselor and Father reported that:
[Child] became very anxious about expressing her feelings or talking about what goes on at home because Mother blamed [Child] for being in court, that Mother has to spend money on court and it makes [Child] feel guilty, and that Mother told [Child] that she knew everything [Child] told counselor and the GAL.Ex. Vol. III p. 18. The GAL Report stated, in pertinent part, that:
[Child's] maternal grandmother lives approximately 4 minutes from Mother's home . . . and according to Mother, [Child's maternal grandmother] is very involved in [Child's] life.
4.... Mother regularly includes [Child] in conversations inappropriate for her to participate in regarding court activities [and] uses intimidation, guilt, and fear to manipulate the behavior of [Child] and attempts to alienate [Child] from Father.
12.... Mother acknowledges past anger, resentment and bad behavior toward Father .... [T]hese behaviors continue in
present day, and [Mother] would benefit from individual counseling focused on managing anxieties, anger management, and separating familiesId. at 11, 19. Under the circumstances, the GAL made the pertinent recommendations that: "Father be awarded primary physical custody of [Child], and said transfer of physical custody of [Child] occur before the . . . school year . . . [and] Mother participate[] in individual counseling before [she] is able to petition the court for any additional parenting time." Id. at 23-24. On October 5, 2023, a hearing on all pending matters was held. The GAL, Mother, and Father all testified at the hearing, at which point Child was nine years old.
[¶8] The GAL testified that Child knew "a lot about the court proceedings . . . what's occurring" because she was regularly "brought into adult discussions" by Mother, who "attempt[ed] to sabotage the relationship" between Child and Father by telling Child "about [Father's] actions . . . to make [Father] appear to be a bad guy." Tr. Vol. II pp. 17-18. At times, the GAL believed that Mother was "[t]hwarting" the relationship between Father and Child by "not allowing [F]ather liberal parenting time while he's in the area" and cancelling plans last minute, causing Father and Child to not spend time together during "events that [Child] was participating in that [Father] could . . . [and] was prepared to participate in." Id. at 19. The GAL had concerns about Child's relationship with one of her half-sisters because Child would tell her that she "sometimes felt bullied by her sister that is closest to her in age." Id. at 17. The bullying was due to some resentment between the siblings given that Father "is very involved with [Child] . . . [and half-sisters] were at one point very close to [Father] . . . and . . . felt that he was . . . a father role for them." Id. at 15. Because Father was "no longer in" Child's half-sisters' lives, there was some "contention between [Child and half-sisters.]" Id. at 16-17. The GAL also had concerns regarding Child's mental health, which stemmed from how Child was often "in the middle of adult disputes" between both Mother and Father. Id. at 13. Based on a conversation the GAL had with Child's therapist, there were concerns "about [Child's] ability to set appropriate boundaries . . ., body image, and . . . a potential for self-harm." Id. The GAL testified that Mother "in particular . . . could benefit from mental or . . . emotional help"-"support just stemming from the separation and the ending of the marriage and the transitioning to different family structures." Id. at 17. The GAL recommended that Father be awarded primary physical custody and sole legal custody due to the communication issues between Mother and Father, and "the difference in what appears . . . to be the parents' sense of . . . what is necessary for [Child] in regards to . . . at least [Child's] mental or emotional health." Id. at 20; see also id. at 21 (observing that, when Child had an emotional outburst, Father wanted to work with Mother to cooperatively address the issue, but Mother's response was "[e]verything's fine and nothing needs to occur").
[¶9] Father testified that Child is "interested in coloring . . . reading books . . . [and] likes to cook . . . [and] paint." Id. at 24. Additionally, Child has a very good relationship with his step-daughter and wife. Father said he moved closer to Mother's house and that the drive is "an hour, round trip" closer. Id. at 105. Where Father resides now is near Child's paternal grandparents, paternal greatgrandparents, and Child's aunt along with Child's two cousins. The aforementioned family members live between "25 to . . . 40 minutes away" from Father's house, and Father testified that they visit Child's paternal grandparents "very regularly." Id. at 25. Due to Child's extensive knowledge regarding adult matters at only nine years old, Father testified that he was "concerned [about] what's to come, especially as [Child] gets older." Id. at 58. At the time of the Custody Agreement, Father wanted primary physical custody of Child because he "thought it was what would be best for her" despite ultimately agreeing for Mother to have primary physical custody of Child. Id. at 93. However, Father was now requesting primary physical custody due to concerns pertaining to the living conditions at Mother's house. There was picture evidence admitted, depicting (1) Child laying in a pile of trash and (2) piles of clothes blocking an exit door in Mother's home. See id. pp. 44-45; see also Ex. Vol. III pp. 33-38. Father also raised concerns regarding Child's cleanliness, testifying that she often showed up at his house "very dirty[,]" "smell[ing] terrible[,]" and wearing dirty clothes. Tr. Vol. II pp. 46, 48; see also Ex. Vol. III pp. 47-50. There was one point when Child's hair was matted as a result of "buildup that had . . . not been washed out in the shower." Tr. Vol. II p. 47; see also Ex. Vol. III pp. 43-46.
[¶10] Father was also concerned that Child was experiencing bullying at school and in Mother's home. As to the bullying at school, Father testified that Child "wears dirty clothes so she'll get bullied for wearing dirty clothes." Tr. Vol. II p. 58. As to the bullying in Mother's home, Father testified that the bullying from Child's older half-sister started prior to the divorce. See id. at 92. Child's mental health and Mother's ability to care for Child's mental health concerned Father because Mother subjected Child to different situations that damaged Child's mental health such as demanding that Father "bring full sets of clothes for [Child] to change into before she comes to [his] house." Id. at 52. Father and Mother often argue about Child's clothing which sometimes leads to Mother "tak[ing] pictures of [Child] and [has Child] pose for pictures where she is clearly distressed and not wanting pose for a picture[.]" Id. Father testified about another instance when Mother purposefully had Child go to Father's home for parenting time without her tablet, commenting in front of Child that "[Child is] going to be bored and miserable all weekend[.]" Id. at 53. Mother's "lack of interest in participating in [Child's] mental health [also] concern[ed Father]" in addition to the "bullying that [Child] is experiencing." Id. at 32.
[¶11] Father further testified that he and Mother have communication issues. For instance, Father wanted to attend Child's basketball game but was unable due to various reasons provided by Mother including "[t]here was no game . . . [Mother] was sick . . . [Child] did not want to go . . . [Mother's older daughters] were going to go, but [Child] was going to be excluded." Id. at 35; Ex. Vol. III pp. 28-31. Another instance was when Mother refused to give Father additional parenting time when he was about thirty minutes away from Mother's residence because Mother did not trust that Father would bring Child back. See Ex. Vol. III p. 32. There were also communication issues regarding doctor appointments. When Father and Mother lived together, Father was "responsible for doing medical appointments because [Mother] didn't have her driver's license." Tr. Vol. II p. 39. After the divorce, Father continued to take Child to doctor's appointments because Mother had various reasons-such as lack of funds and insurance-for why she could not take Child to the appointments. Father explained that when he would ask Mother "an adult question," Mother will tell him to "[a]sk [Child or talk to [Child]." Id. at 33. When Child needed a new doctor, allergist, and an orthodontist, Father asked Mother to meet him in Columbus-"which was thirty minutes from [Mother's] house and an hour from [his] house"- to take care of the appointments, but Mother "absolutely refused that" option. Id. at 39. At that time, Mother had not scheduled any orthodontist appointments for Child, so Father ended up scheduling them.
[¶12] As to Child's education, Father testified that he enrolled Child into school as a "precautionary measure" so that Child could have a "smooth transition" just in case custody were to change given that the "last trial date was the day before school started." Id. at 59. When asked if he told Mother prior to enrolling Child, Father answered, "No." Id. at 60. However, Father was not "trying to hide it from her" because he included Mother "on the forms for the school." Id. Father testified that Child "primarily living at . . . [M]other's house is a barrier at the time" because he believes that Mother "holds some resentment towards" him. Id. at 41. If the two of them can get past Mother's resentment of Father, Father believes that "a lot on [their] co-parenting relationship" could be improved. Id. Father has taken measures such as enrolling in "personal counseling" to improve his communication skills. Father invited Mother to "co-parenting counseling on multiple occasions[, but Mother] denied the invite." Id. at 40.
[¶13] Mother testified that Child and her half-sister, the one closest to her in age, "bicker sometimes or fight over toys, like kids do . . . [b]ut [she has not] seen any . . . bullying that [she] should be concerned about" and that no one "defined 'bullying.'" Id. at 148. Mother revealed that co-parenting with Father is "very difficult" due to "miscommunications" that began "from the beginning" of the divorce. Id. at 148, 163. When asked if Mother "noticed that [Child] has issues believing she's overweight," Mother answered in the affirmative, stating that "every once in a while" Child brought up her weight because "her older [half-]sister[, the one closest to her in age,] is a little slimmer than she is." Id. at 173. As to Child's mental health, Mother testified that she does not see any emotional issues with Child "most of the time" and believes that Child is "just like any other 9-year-old kid" who sometimes "gets mad at if her squishy toy breaks" or "things like that." Id. When asked if she thought it was necessary for Child to keep attending counseling, Mother responded: "I honestly don't know because I have not been involved in any of the information from [Father] or the counselor. So, I'm not even sure what's going on with counseling." Id. at 181.
[¶14] On December 21, 2023, the trial court entered its Order on All Pending Matters ("the Order"). The trial court concluded that modification of custody was in Child's best interest and awarded Father sole legal custody and primary physical custody of Child based on the following pertinent findings and conclusions:
13. The Court has considered all of the statutory factors and finds and concludes that a modification of custody is in [Child's] best interest.
14....[T]here has been a substantial change in circumstances that warrant a modification of custody, including the age of the child, the wishes of the child's parents, the interaction of [Child] with her half[-]siblings in Mother's home . . ., [Child's] adjustment to her home and community, and [Child's] mental health. Specifically:
d. [Child] is older now.
e. [Child's] mental health has deteriorated since the dissolution and she is experiencing bullying in Mother's home.
g. Mother has demonstrated a lack of concern with [Child's] mental health.
h. [Child] has demonstrated poor hygiene in Mother's care.
16. After a consideration of all of the statutory factors and the best interest of the child, the Court concludes that based on the poor communication between the parties and the physical distance between them, an award of joint legal custody would not be appropriate. Therefore, Father shall have sole legal custody of [Child].
27. [Child] shall continue in individual counseling until released by her counselor.
28. Mother shall enroll and participate in individual therapy until she is released by her provider.Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 21-23. Mother now appeals
Discussion and Decision
I. Modification of Custody
[¶15] Mother argues that the trial court erred when it granted Father's Petition to modify the Custody Agreement. We review custody modifications for an abuse of discretion. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d 282, 288 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), trans. denied. "There is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting significant latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters." Id. (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016)). Appellate courts "are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence." Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002). Therefore, on appeal we will not "reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment." Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011). We will reverse the trial court's custody determination only if the decision is "clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d at 288 (quoting In re Paternity of C.S., 964 N.E.2d 879, 883 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012), trans. denied). "[I]t is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal." Kirk, 770 N.E.2d at 307.
[¶16] Indiana Code section 31-17-2-21 provides that a trial court may not modify an existing custody order unless (1) the modification is in the best interests of the child, and (2) there has been a substantial change in one or more statutory factors that are outlined in Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8. Those factors are:
(1) The age and sex of the child.
(2) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
(A) the child's parent or parents;
(B) the child's sibling; and
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests.
(5) The child's adjustment to the child's:
(A) home;
(B) school; and
(C) community.
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.
(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian ....Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8.
[¶17] Here, neither party requested special findings under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), and the trial court entered its findings sua sponte. "As to the issues covered by the findings, we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment." In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). "We accept unchallenged findings as true." Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). We review any remaining issues under the general judgment standard, where the judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory consistent with the evidence. Id. "[W]e may look both to other findings and beyond the findings to the evidence of record to determine if the result is against the facts and circumstances before the court." Stone v. Stone, 991 N.E.2d 992, 998 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), aff'd on reh'g, 4 N.E.3d 666 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). Clear error occurs when the appellate court's review of the evidence most favorable to the trial court's judgment leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Quinn v. Quinn, 62 N.E.3d 1212, 1220 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016). "However, we must give due regard to the trial court's ability to assess the credibility of witnesses and will not reweigh the evidence, and must consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment along with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment." Stone, 991 N.E.2d at 999. Moreover, we will affirm the trial court's custody determination so long as "any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court's judgment." Kirk, 770 N.E.2d at 307. Mother claims that the evidence did not demonstrate that modification of custody was in Child's best interest and that the evidence did not reveal that there was a substantial change in the circumstances considered by the trial court.
A. Physical Custody
[¶18] Although Mother claims that the evidence did not support that the modification of child custody was in Child's best interests, her arguments focus solely on whether evidence of a substantial change in circumstances was presented. In challenging the trial court's finding a substantial change in a number of circumstances that warrant modification of Child's physical custody, Mother directs us to the trial court's findings pertaining to Child's age, the wishes of Child's parent or parents, the interaction of Child with her half-siblings, Child's adjustment to her home and community, and Child's mental health. According to Mother, none of the trial court's findings are supported by the record. See Appellant's Br. pp. 11-14.
[¶19] We note that the custody modification statute requires a change in at least one factor, and the factors are not weighted or ranked. See I.C. § 31-17-2-21(a)(2); see also I.C. § 31-17-2-8(1)-(9). That is, as long as the record supports the trial court's finding that there was a substantial change in any one of the enumerated factors, the trial court will have committed no error. Here, the trial court found a substantial change in the following factors:
a. Father moved to Indiana after the dissolution.
b. Father remarried and has a step-daughter in his home that is well-bonded with [Child].
c. Father began working day shift so he is available to provide care for [Child] in the evenings.
d. [Child] is older now.
e. [Child's] mental health has deteriorated since the dissolution and she is experiencing bullying in Mother's home.
f. Mother has obtained her driver's license and employment. g. Mother has demonstrated a lack of concern with [Child's] mental health.
h. [Child] has demonstrated poor hygiene in Mother's care.Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21. Mother only takes issue with five of these.
[¶20] As to the wishes of Mother and Father, a number of concerns caused Father to file the petition to modify primary physical custody of Child. The living conditions at Mother's house were not healthy or safe for Child as depicted by the photographs of (1) Child laying in a pile of trash and (2) an exit door blocked by piles of clothes. Cleanliness of Child under Mother's care was also of great concern as Child was often dirty, smelled terrible, and wore dirty clothes when Father picked her up for parenting time. At one point, Child's hair was matted due to buildup that had not been washed out in the shower while under Mother's care. The evidence supported the trial court's finding that, at the very least, the wishes of Father had significantly changed since the Custody Agreement. See Rea v. Shroyer, 797 N.E.2d 1178, 1182 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003) (noting that "we have previously held when determining whether a change in circumstances has occurred that the trial court may consider changes that have occurred since the last custody determination").
[¶21] As to the interaction of Child with her half-siblings, there was extensive evidence presented demonstrating the bullying Child experienced from her halfsister closest to her in age. Although some of the bullying stemmed from Father's absence from half-sisters' lives since the dissolution, the evidence indicated that the bullying began before Mother and Father divorced. What is more concerning is Mother characterizing the bullying as mere "bickering" and "fight[ing] over toys" like kids do, despite the GAL's testimony revealing that Child felt bullied by her half-sister. Tr. Vol. II p. 148. This evidence supported the trial court's finding.
[¶22] As to Child's adjustment to her home and community, we reiterate that Child is experiencing bullying in Mother's home, the living conditions at Mother's house are not safe or healthy for Child, and Child's cleanliness under Mother's care is concerning. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrated that Mother attempted to sabotage Child's relationship with Father by painting Father in a negative light and cancelling scheduled events for Child and Father at the last minute. Moreover, Child has a good relationship with Father's wife and stepdaughter, and Father has several family members that not only live nearby but are also involved in Child's life. The evidence supported the trial court's finding.
[¶23] As to Child's mental health, the evidence revealed that Child is often in the middle of adult disputes from both Mother and Father, with Mother blaming Child for Mother having to appear in court and the money Mother had to spend for court proceedings. Mother often subjected Child to different situations that damaged Child's mental health. There was also evidence that Mother told Child that she knew everything Child told counselor and the GAL, which made Child feel guilty and very anxious about expressing her feelings and talking about what goes on at Mother's home. Child's therapist reported that she had concerns about Child's ability to set appropriate boundaries, body image, and the potential that Child would self-harm. Both the GAL and Father testified that Child experienced bullying in Mother's home, and the GAL reported that Child was forthcoming about feeling bullied by her half-sister due to some contention stemming from Father no longer being involved in half-sister's life despite still being involved with Child. Moreover, Father's concerns about Mother's ability to care for Child's mental health were supported by Mother's own testimony which revealed that Mother was not involved in Child's counseling even though Child has exhibited mental health issues in front of Mother. The evidence supported the trial court's finding.
[¶24] Finally, Mother argues that the record fails to support that any changes in Child's age in the three years between the Custody Agreement and the modification proceedings was substantial, and therefore sufficient, to support modification. However, because we find sufficient support for the trial court's other findings, any error with respect to the finding of Child's age as a factor in support of the modification of custody is of no moment.
[¶25] We cannot say the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous in light of evidence supporting each of the findings demonstrating that a substantial change in several of the statutory factors warranted modification of Child's physical custody. Therefore, because we find that sufficient evidence was presented to support that there was a substantial change in one or more of the statutory factors and because Mother does not challenge that the trial court's finding that modification was in Child's best interest, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified physical custody of Child.
B. Legal Custody
[¶26] Mother claims that the trial court erred when it modified legal custody of Child, awarding Father sole legal custody rather than maintaining shared legal custody under the Custody Agreement. "The court may award legal custody of a child jointly if the court finds that an award of joint legal custody would be in the best interest of the child." I.C. § 31-17-2-13. A parent awarded legal custody has the authority to make "the major decisions concerning the child's upbringing, including the child's education, health care, and religious training." I.C. § 31-92-67. Indiana Code section 31-17-2-15 provides:
In determining whether an award of joint legal custody under section 13 of this chapter would be in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider it a matter of primary, but not determinative, importance that the persons awarded joint custody have agreed to an award of joint legal custody. The court shall also consider:
(2) whether the persons awarded joint custody are willing and able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child's welfare;
(5) whether the persons awarded joint custody:
(A) live in close proximity to each other ....
[¶27] Mother appears to argue that the evidence pertaining to the communication issues between Mother and Father, and the distance between Mother's and Father's homes, was insufficient to support modification of legal custody. Where the evidence showed that the parties "displayed neither the willingness nor the ability to communicate and cooperate for the best interests of [Child]," we have held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sole legal custody to one parent. Kakollu v. Vadlamudi, 175 N.E.3d 287, 297 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021), trans. denied.
[¶28] As to the communication issues, Mother appears to conflate who is to blame for the lack of communication or that the failure to communicate is no worse than the time the Custody Agreement was instated, rather than the fact that Mother and Father are unable to communicate. See Appellant's Br. p. 17. As to the distance between Mother's and Father's homes, Mother contends that the "record is [de]void as to how a [one-and-a-half]-hour round trip between [Mother and Father] would have an [e]ffect on [their] ability to share legal custody." Id. at 15-16. We disagree.
[¶29] The record reveals that Mother and Father's inability to communicate impairs their ability to effectively co-parent Child as they cannot engage in basic discussions about Child's education, medical appointments, extracurricular activities, and mental and emotional health. As to distance, the trial court considered the physical distance between Mother and Father. The evidence revealed that Mother and Father live an hour and a half apart in different communities. Father testified that Child's primary residence with Mother impedes their co-parenting relationship due to Mother's perceived resentment toward Father. The GAL Report similarly noted that Mother's resentment toward Father undermined their ability to co-parent effectively. Given this evidence, the trial court properly concluded that joint custody was not appropriate. See Carmichael v. Siegel, 754 N.E.2d 619, 636 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001) (concluding that the trial court awarding sole legal custody to Father was not clearly erroneous due to the parents' "inability to communicate and work together").
II. Mother's Participation in Individual Therapy
[¶30] Mother contends that the trial court erred by ordering Mother to undergo therapy. We "give considerable deference to the findings of the trial court in family law matters." MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 940 (Ind. 2005). "Whether reviewing a case for 'clear error' or 'abuse of discretion,' this appellate deference is, first and foremost, a reflection that the trial court is in the best position to judge the facts, ascertain family dynamics, and judge witness credibility and the like. Stone, 991 N.E.2d at 999. "Secondly, appeals that change the results below are especially disruptive in the family law setting." Id. "But to the extent a ruling is based on an error of law or is not supported by the evidence, it is reversible, and the trial court has no discretion to reach the wrong result." Id.
[¶31] Mother asserts that the "only mention of therapy for [Mother] was in the GAL report" and not at trial. Appellant's Br. p. 17. Therefore, Mother argues that the trial court ordered her participation in individual counseling without hearing evidence supporting this requirement nor specifying the type of therapy Mother should participate in. We disagree. There was evidence that Mother had unresolved emotional struggles stemming from the dissolution of marriage, and Mother's unresolved struggles were manifesting in her relationship with Child, with Mother exposing Child to inappropriate remarks about Father and taking other actions that detrimentally impacted Child's relationship with him, with some evidence that Child had her own emotional struggles as a result. The GAL's testimony and the accompanying report spoke to how Mother's participation in therapy would benefit the family. Indeed, the GAL testified that she believed that Mother could benefit from mental or emotional health support from issues that stemmed from the dissolution of her marriage with Father and the transition to different family structures. In the GAL Report, the GAL specifically recommended that Mother participate in individual counseling "focused on managing anxieties, anger management, and separating families." See Ex. Vol. III pp. 22, 24. Given the evidence demonstrating that Mother's participation in individual therapy would help Mother and Father coparent Child, the trial court's judgment was not clearly erroneous.
Conclusion
[¶32] Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying custody or in ordering Mother to participate in individual therapy to avoid further detrimental impacts on Child.
[¶33] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.