Lalekos v. Manset

20 Citing cases

  1. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation

    463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972)   Cited 39 times
    In Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 150 U.S. App. D.C. 17, 463 F.2d 853 (1972), a residential tenant appealed from a summary judgment in favor of the landlord in the landlord's possessory action.

    In situations where the landlord is able but unwilling to repair the premises, he has, by hypothesis, made them uninhabitable and hence constructively deprived the tenant of possession. See Goldsmith v. Gisler, D.C.Mun.App., 150 A.2d 462 (1959); Ackerhalt v. Smith, supra, 141 A.2d 187; Lalekos v. Manset, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 617 (1946). It should be obvious that a landlord may no more constructively evict a tenant for retaliatory purposes than he may actually so evict him. It follows that if the tenant is entitled to possession, he is also entitled to have the premises made habitable through a code enforcement action by housing authorities or a proper suit by the tenant.

  2. In re Cafe Partners/Washington 1983

    81 B.R. 175 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1988)   Cited 4 times

    Finally, the third reason why the Landlord is not entitled to any payment of postpetition "administrative rent" (or "use and occupancy" payments) arises under the local law of the District of Columbia. Under that law, "when suit is brought for rent due, or for possession for non-payment of rent, [a tenant whom the Landlord has wrongfully deprived of possession] . . . may defend on the ground that he does not owe . . . the rent claimed." Lalekos v. Manset, 47 A.2d 617, 620 (Mun.App.D.C. 1946).See also Peoples Mortgage Corp. v. Bedrosian, 154 F.2d 332, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1946), holding that "a lessee who is completely deprived, by the fault of the lessor, of enjoying any part of the term to which his lease entitled him" may recover as damages against the landlord "the difference between the fair market value of the lease and the rental reserved therein, plus any sums paid by the lessee to the lessor." (Footnote omitted.)

  3. Griffith v. Butler

    571 A.2d 1161 (D.C. 1990)   Cited 8 times
    Stating that the effect of the debt acknowledgment is that "... the creditor's remedy is not barred by the statute of limitations period until the lapse of the full period commencing with the time of the new promise"

    Id. at 369-70, 88 F.2d at 751-52, quoting Winder v. Caldwell, 55 U.S. (How.) 434, 443, 14 L.Ed. 487 (1852) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). Accord, George Worthington Son Mgt. Corp. v. Levy, 204 A.2d 334, 335-36 (D.C. 1964); Antonelli v. Smith, 113 A.2d 570, 571-72 (D.C. 1955); Seidenberg v. Burka, 106 A.2d 499, 500 (D.C. 1954); Bellmore v. Baum, 68 A.2d 588, 592 (D.C. 1949); Zindler v. Buchanan, 61 A.2d 616, 618 n. 9 (D.C. 1948); Mitchell v. David, 51 A.2d 375, 379 (D.C. 1947); Lalekos v. Manset, 47 A.2d 617, 620 (D.C. 1946). Moreover, functionally, what the Griffiths sought was no different than the rent abatement which the tenant sought by way of counterclaim in Hines, supra, 449 A.2d at 1093.

  4. Bernstein v. Noble

    487 A.2d 231 (D.C. 1985)   Cited 6 times
    Explaining that one element of a bailment relationship is that "possession and control over an object pass from the bailor to the bailee"

    Such clauses are, however, construed against the landlord. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES, ยง 17.1 at 914-15 (2d ed. 1983); see also Lalekos v. Manset, 47 A.2d 617, 619 (D.C. 1946) (language of lease construed against draftsman). In the instant case the landlords provided the locked room for packages received for tenants. Thus the relationship between the landlords and Noble with respect to the package in the room was that of bailor and bailee.

  5. Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten

    361 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1976)   Cited 24 times

    Moreover, the majority's attempt to engraft such a limitation on the right to set-off flies in the face of established case law in this jurisdiction. George Y. Worthington Son Management Corp. v. Levy, D.C.App., 204 A.2d 334 (1964); Seidenberg v. Burka, D.C.Mun.App., 106 A.2d 499 (1954); Zindler v. Buchanon, D.C.Mun.App., 61 A.2d 616 (1948); Lalekos v. Manset, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 617 (1946). In Lalekos, a landlord brought suit for possession for nonpayment of rent of an entire building leased to defendant.

  6. St. Luke's House v. DiGiulian

    274 Md. 317 (Md. 1975)   Cited 8 times

    Although the holdings in Perry, supra, might be considered as authority for the proposition that had a "special exception" been granted to St. Luke's such zoning action would have no effect upon the enforcement of the restrictive covenant, we do not read it, as has the appellant, as holding that the issuance of the ex parte injunction rendered the lease "voidable." Nor does appellant's reliance upon Schwartz v. Westbrook, 154 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1946) and Lalekos v. Manset, 47 A.2d 617 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1946) change the result we reach. Both cases are cited as authority for the contention that Mrs. DiGiulian's alleged failure to inform Mrs. Henrickson and Dearden of the existence of the restrictive covenant and her failure to defend the ex parte injunction constituted a breach of her implied warranty of quiet enjoyment.

  7. Wood v. Wood

    309 A.2d 103 (D.C. 1973)   Cited 2 times

    We note at the outset that while subsequent to the trial court's determination the note was paid off, this does not preclude review here. It is an established rule that compliance with a judgment or decree by payment thereof does not bar an appeal where repayment may be enforced. Lalekos v. Manset, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 617 (1946). This is especially true in a situation such as the present where the interest rate on the note exceeded the earnings that Mrs. Wood was receiving from the collateral securing it and the easiest thing to do financially was to conserve her assets by paying it off. Albeit the wife is not precluded from appealing on this point, a careful review of the record discloses more than ample evidence to sustain the lower court's holding, and it therefore will not be overturned.

  8. Safeway Stores v. Gibson

    118 A.2d 386 (D.C. 1955)   Cited 16 times

    Clearly there was sufficient conflict as to whether the corporation authorized or ratified the agent's act, and the trial court was required to accept as true the evidence in favor of the party against whom the motion was directed. Lalekos v. Manset, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 617; Washington Realty Co. v. Harding, D.C.Mun.App., 45 A.2d 785; Baltimore O.R. Co. v. Postom, supra. Also, the question of whether retention of a servant in one's employ after an assault occurs is sufficient evidence of ratification cannot be ignored and should be considered.

  9. Seidenberg v. Burka

    106 A.2d 499 (D.C. 1954)   Cited 6 times

    But he introduced no testimony as to the cost of making these repairs to the ceiling. Code 1951, ยง 13-214, 16-1901; Mitchell v. David, D.C.Mun.App., 51 A.2d 375; Lalekos v. Manset, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 617. In lieu of such proof the tenant argues that a judgment for a party presupposes that all findings of fact are consistent with the judgment, and this would apply to damages as well as to liability.

  10. Morning Star Lodge No. 40 v. Harris

    93 A.2d 288 (D.C. 1952)   Cited 1 times

    We conclude that the defendant is liable in the amount found by the trial court for rent overcharges. That being more than sufficient to offset the rent due the defendant, the trial court was right in denying defendant's claim for possession. Lalekos v. Manset, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 617. Affirmed.