Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-11014.
November 10, 2004.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, John Reese, Judge, Superior Court No. 3AN-97-2572 Civil.
Tom Lakosh, pro se, Anchorage. Alex M. Swiderski, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation.
Kevin Callahan, Patton Boggs, LLP, Anchorage, for Appellee SeaRiver Maritime, Inc.
Charles P. Flynn, Michael W. Seville, Burr, Pease Kurtz, Anchorage, for Appellees Polar Tankers, Inc. (f/k/a ARCO Marine, Inc.), and BP Oil Shipping Company.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tom Lakosh sought a declaratory judgment invalidating certain regulations promulgated by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. This court held the regulations were invalid and remanded to the superior court for entry of judgment ( Lakosh I). Following our opinion, the legislature adopted a statutory amendment which explicitly validated the challenged regulations. On remand, Lakosh sought to amend his complaint to challenge the statutory amendment and moved for the superior court to compel discovery and impose sanctions. After holding a status conference in which the court determined that the pending motions lacked merit, the superior court entered final judgment that the superceded regulations challenged in Lakosh I were invalid. Lakosh appeals the denial of his motion to amend his complaint, the denial of his motion to compel discovery and the failure of the superior court to consider sanctions. He also seeks restitution or an equitable remedy denied by the superior court. We affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This is the second time this case has come before this court. In Lakosh I, Tom Lakosh sought a declaratory judgment invalidating certain regulations issued by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). The superior court ruled on summary judgment that the challenged regulations were valid. This court reversed, holding that the challenged regulations were invalid because they did not meet statutory requirements. Our concluding language was:
Lakosh v. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 49 P.3d 1111 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1113.
Because the definition of best available technology in 18 AAC 75.445(k)(1) and (2) is contrary to AS 46.04.030(e), we REVERSE the superior court's summary judgment order and REMAND for entry of judgment declaring the regulation invalid.
Id. at 1120.
This court issued its initial opinion in Lakosh I on February 1, 2002. Appellees BP Oil Shipping Company, USA, Polar Tankers, Inc., f/k/a ARCO Marine, Inc., and SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., (collectively "Shippers") — who had intervened below — filed a petition for rehearing before this court to correct certain issues of nomenclature. This court granted the petition for rehearing and replaced Opinion No. 5531 with Opinion No. 5589 on June 28, 2002.
2002 WL 126935, Op. No. 5531.
Lakosh, 49 P.3d at 1111.
While the petition for rehearing was pending, the legislature amended the contingency planning statute rendering the regulations at issue in Lakosh I and the permits granted under those regulations valid.
Ch. 9, SLA 2002.
While this court was considering the petition for rehearing and the subsequent motions by Lakosh, DEC, and Shippers, Lakosh filed three additional motions before the superior court. Prior to the legislative amendment, Lakosh filed a "Motion for Status Conference, or in the alternative, Motion for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief" and a "Motion to Compel Discovery" before the superior court.
After the passage of the amendment, Chapter 9, SLA 2002, Lakosh filed a motion to amend his initial complaint. Lakosh sought to include a claim that the amendment was invalid. As the basis for his challenge, Lakosh claimed that his "interests are adversely affected by promulgation and application of the unlawful statute because the SB 343 amendment of AS 46.04.030(e) failed to satisfy its own integral technology quality standards and therefore could not cure DEC's failure to implement [best available technology] standards otherwise applicable." Lakosh also claimed that the legal and factual issues in a challenge to the amendment would be "substantially similar to matters pending and anticipated to be pursued in the instant case," and that he should be allowed to try these claims in a single forum.
DEC and Shippers opposed Lakosh's motions before the superior court on the grounds that the superior court did not have jurisdiction. They also opposed the motion to compel discovery on the grounds that Lakosh had earlier filed a motion to compel discovery that was denied and was not reversed on appeal.
The superior court did not address Lakosh's motions while the appeal was still pending before this court. When we remanded the case, the superior court held a status conference to address Lakosh's pending motions and gave Lakosh the opportunity to explain why the court "should do something other than just enter judgment," given our mandate in Lakosh I and subsequent events.
Lakosh argued that our invalidation of the regulations required the superior court to "address the injury and remedy . . . to plaintiff in the public interest for DEC's failure to properly apply the statutory mandates in review of its contingency plans clear back to April 4, [19]97." Lakosh claimed that DEC's lack of compliance with the law required the superior court to entertain his motions "for not only discovery but sanctions, injunctive relief, and restitution — relief in the form of restitution for disgorgement of ill gotten gains."
After attempting to clarify what law Lakosh was referring to — the superceded statute or the new amendment — and what injury and remedy Lakosh was claiming, the superior court determined that Lakosh's motion to amend his complaint and discovery motions lacked merit and did not "make sense." The superior court proposed to enter final judgment but Lakosh objected, claiming that we had only instructed the entry of judgment, not final judgment. The superior court stated that its interpretation of our mandate was that it was required to enter final judgment but allowed Lakosh additional time to contact an attorney to review the proposed judgment.
Following the status conference, Lakosh filed a document titled, "Objections to Entry of the Proposed Final Judgment; Motion for Sanctions and Other Appropriate Relief Including Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, and Restitution." DEC and Shippers opposed this motion, and the superior court entered final judgment declaring the contested regulations invalid.
Lakosh appeals claiming the superior court erred when it entered final judgment. In his points on appeal, Lakosh argues that the superior court erred when it failed to allow him to amend his complaint to address the validity of Chapter 9, SLA 2002; that the superior court erred in failing to provide unspecified relief which Lakosh had requested; that the superior court erred when it sua sponte raised the issue of final judgment during the status conference without prior notice to Lakosh; that the superior court erred in failing to consider sanctions; and that the superior court erred by failing to compel discovery. Lakosh seeks an equitable remedy fashioned by this court to address DEC's alleged longstanding failure to comply with certain statutory or regulatory requirements.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review the denial of a motion to amend a complaint for an abuse of discretion. Discovery rulings are also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. We will reverse a ruling for an abuse of discretion only when left with the definite and firm conviction, after reviewing the whole record, that the trial court erred in its ruling.
Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group, 742 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Alaska 1987).
Willoya v. State, Dep't of Corr., 53 P.3d 1115, 1119 (Alaska 2002).
Betz, 742 P.2d at 1348.
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err when It Denied Lakosh's Motion to Amend His Complaint.
Lakosh argues that the superior court erred when it failed to allow him to amend his compliant "to address the unconstitutional provisions of Chapter 9 SLA 2002." He asserts that the superior court's entry of judgment was arbitrary since this court "did not rule upon the final disposition of this case and only issued its Opinion on the legitimacy of the contested regulations as litigated in summary judgment." (Emphasis omitted.)
Generally, leave to amend pleadings under Civil Rule 15 should be liberally granted. However, the superior court has broad discretion to determine whether to grant or deny a motion to amend a complaint. A trial court must balance the degree of prejudice to the party opposing the amendment against the hardship to the movant if the amendment is denied. We have held that factors to be considered in determining whether prejudice will occur include "added expense and delay, a longer or more burdensome trial, or if the issues being raised in the amendment are remote from the scope of the original case." Furthermore, we recognize that courts are generally hesitant to allow amendments after summary judgment motions and other dispositive motions have been filed.
Grimm v. Wagoner, 77 P.3d 423, 437 (Alaska 2003). See Alaska R. Civ. P. 15(a) ("leave shall be freely given when justice so requires").
Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 458 (Alaska 1983).
Id.
O'Callaghan v. Rue, 996 P.2d 88, 101 (Alaska 2000) (quotation omitted).
Id.
Here, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lakosh's motion to amend. Lakosh sought to add a claim that was remote from the scope of the original case. The two claims — the validity of the original regulations and the validity of the statutory amendment — involve different legal questions and different factual premises. The legal issues surrounding the invalidation of an agency regulation are distinct from those surrounding a challenge to an act of the legislature. Likewise, the factual evidence required to prove the claims is distinct. Chapter 9, SLA 2002 did not even exist when Lakosh brought his first claim.
We note that Lakosh suffered little hardship as a result of the denial of his motion to amend. There is no reason Lakosh could not file a separate action challenging the validity of Chapter 9, SLA 2002. Because the claim Lakosh sought to add was at best tangentially related to his original claim and Lakosh suffered little or no hardship as a result of the denial of the amendment, we hold the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lakosh's motion to amend his complaint.
C. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Its Discovery Orders.
Lakosh claims the superior court erred by failing to consider sanctions and by failing to require defendants to produce discoverable evidence. These claims lack merit.
Lakosh's argument for discovery and sanctions revolves around his assertion that DEC has failed to implement certain regulatory requirements and has made misrepresentations regarding its failure to comply. Lakosh argues that DEC never implemented 18 AAC 75.447, which required DEC to sponsor a technology conference once every five years, and never implemented the "winnowing process" that this court found to be required under AS 46.04.030(e) in Lakosh I. He further asserts that DEC made intentional misrepresentations regarding the technology conference requirement and failed to make mandatory Rule 26 discovery submissions which would have "exposed this DEC malfeasance."
Lakosh sought discovery on a claim — DEC's noncompliance with 18 AAC 75.447 — which was not pled in his complaint and was not part of this case. He also sought discovery on a claim — DEC's failure to comply with the "winnowing process" required by Lakosh I — which was rendered moot by the legislature's adoption of Chapter 9, SLA 2002. Both of these claims were beyond the scope of his original complaint because his action, by statute, was only a facial challenge to the validity of DEC's regulations. For this reason the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying them.
Furthermore, Lakosh did not comply with the requirements of Civil Rule 37 which governs motions to compel discovery and discovery sanctions. Rule 37(a)(2)(A) provides:
If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26.1(b), any other party may move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action.
Lakosh failed below and before this court to identify any specific failure on the part of DEC to make a required Rule 26 disclosure. Lakosh has provided no evidence of misrepresentations or documents being withheld by DEC beyond his personal assertions made in his motions before the superior court and in his briefing to this court. There was not a proper discovery request by Lakosh pending when Lakosh made his motion to compel discovery. Because the superior court seems to have had no basis to compel discovery or order sanctions, its failure to do so was not an abuse of discretion.
D. The Superior Court Did Not Err when It Failed To Award Restitution and Other Relief to Lakosh.
Lakosh claims the superior court erred when it failed to "provide relief as pleaded and requested in motion action." Though Lakosh does not specify the relief he is referring to, his original complaint includes in its prayer for relief requests for invalidation of DEC regulations, restoration of a former DEC definition, an injunction against DEC from issuing permits, costs and other relief "as is just and proper." Lakosh also argued during the status conference and in his Objections to Entry of the Proposed Final Judgment, that DEC should pay restitution for unjust enrichment it received from the issuance of illegal permits under the challenged regulations.
Lakosh obtained declaratory relief under AS 44.62.290 when we ruled in Lakosh I that the challenged regulations were invalid, and the superior court entered final judgment. Though his victory was reversed by the legislature's adoption of Chapter 9, SLA 2002, Lakosh is not entitled to further relief on his claims.
Additionally, Lakosh has failed to make out even a prima facie case of unjust enrichment that would justify awarding restitution. In order to sustain a claim of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must show that the defendant received a benefit from the plaintiff and that defendant's retention of the benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its value would be inequitable. Lakosh has not shown that he conferred any benefit on DEC. The benefit conferred on DEC that he complains of is the profit made from the issuance of permits under the challenged regulations. But this does not justify an award of restitution. Therefore Lakosh's claim for restitution has no basis.
Crittell v. Bingo, 83 P.3d 532, 538 (Alaska 2004).
In the alternative, Lakosh requests that this court fashion an equitable remedy to avoid stagnation in technology development in the area of oil spill planning and response. Lakosh argues that a complete remedy requires "a mechanism for funding of further research and development of selected technologies defined in 18 AAC 75.445(k)(1) and (k)(2)" and a "mandated assessment of technologies" to be ordered by and overseen by this court throughout the "entire assessment and repermitting process in order to insure that Mr. Lakosh's pleaded claims are satisfied."
Lakosh's request for an equitable remedy fashioned by this court is without merit. Lakosh has obtained full and appropriate relief under his original complaint. His request requires analysis of factual and legal issues — i.e., DEC's noncompliance with statutory and regulatory requirements and the constitutionality of Chapter 9, SLA 2002 — which were not pled or ruled on below. The action Lakosh seeks to accomplish, as Shippers argue, is a review of specific agency decisions. This must be accomplished through the administrative appeal process. There is no basis for us to fashion the equitable remedy that Lakosh requests.
Lakosh's final point raised on appeal is "whether the superior court erred in presenting its sua sponte motion, from the bench, for entry of final judgment and in allowing Defendant DEC to file a proposed order of final judgment at the status conference without motion or prior notice?" The argument lacks merit. The superior court did not enter final judgment sua sponte. Rather, we instructed it to do so in Lakosh I. And Lakosh was not without notice that judgment would be entered, he was on notice from our opinion. The superior court did not err in the fashion that it conducted the status conference.
IV. CONCLUSION
The entry of final judgment by the superior court is AFFIRMED.