Defendants maintain that the order was not arbitrary, unreasonable or unrelated to the requirements of the sheriff's service. (See Lakin v. Gorris (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 1034, 1039, 448 N.E.2d 215, 219.) Disobedience of a proper order, contends defendants, constitutes a cause for suspension.

• 1 A court's review of an administrative agency's decision regarding suspension is a two-step process. First, the court must determine if the agency's findings of fact are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and then it must determine if the findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for the agency's conclusion that cause for suspension does or does not exist. ( Department of Mental Health Developmental Disabilities v. Civil Service Comm'n (1981), 85 Ill.2d 547, 426 N.E.2d 885; Lakin v. Gorris (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 1034, 448 N.E.2d 215.) In deciding if the findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for the agency's conclusion that cause for suspension does or does not exist, the test is whether the conclusion is arbitrary, unreasonable or unrelated to the requirements of the service.

• 7 Plaintiff further contends that his suspension was excessive. Disregarding the jurisdictional issue, we must determine the excessive issue under the standards for discharge set forth in Department of Mental Health Developmental Disabilities v. Civil Service Comm'n (1981), 85 Ill.2d 547, 426 N.E.2d 885. ( Lakin v. Gorris (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 1034, 448 N.E.2d 215.) A court is not restricted to determine whether the fact findings were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, but is also authorized to determine whether cause to suspend existed.

earing officer under section 3B-4, has been defined by our courts as some substantial shortcoming which renders the employee's continuance in office in some way detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service and which the law and sound public policy recognize as good reason for his or her no longer holding that position. ( Fantozzi v. Board of Fire Police Commissioners (1963), 27 Ill.2d 357, 360, 189 N.E.2d 275; Kreiser v. Police Board (1977), 69 Ill.2d 27, 30, 370 N.E.2d 511; Board of Education v. Epstein (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 723, 725, 391 N.E.2d 114; Burgett v. City of Collinsville Board of Fire Police Commissioners (1986), 149 Ill. App.3d 420, 424, 500 N.E.2d 951.) It was the function of the hearing officer to determine whether the tenured employee's violations constituted cause for discharge ( e.g., Christenson v. Board of Fire Police Commissioners (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 472, 476, 404 N.E.2d 339, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill.2d 590), subject to judicial review. ( Lakin v. Gorris (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 1034, 1038, 448 N.E.2d 215, appeal denied (1985), 101 Ill.2d 589; Thomas v. Police Board (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 1101, 1105, 414 N.E.2d 11.) Based upon the evidence before him, the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer were neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. The circuit court correctly affirmed his decision and must itself be affirmed.

This determination is necessarily a question of fact. A court on review of an administrative decision will not disturb such findings of fact unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Lakin v. Gorris (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 1034, 1037, 448 N.E.2d 215, 217; see also Frye v. County of Iroquois (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 749, 751, 489 N.E.2d 406, 408. CASE No. 5-85-0128

However, an agency's decision that cause to suspend for five days or less exists will not be reversed unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unrelated to the requirements of service. ( Wagner v. Kramer (1984), 125 Ill. App.3d 12, 22, 465 N.E.2d 547, aff'd (1985), 108 Ill.2d 413, 484 N.E.2d 1073; Lakin v. Gorris (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 1034, 1040, 448 N.E.2d 215, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 540.) Deference is generally to be accorded by decision of an agency on administrative review, but courts will not hesitate to intervene when the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, or where the decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. ( Gatica v. Department of Public Aid (1981), 98 Ill. App.3d 101, 106, 423 N.E.2d 1292, 1296.) Interpretations given by an administrative agency to its own rules and regulations are entitled to respectful consideration and will not be overruled unless plainly erroneous.

• 4 It is the function of the board to determine whether an officer's violations constitute cause for discharge. ( E.g., Christenson v. Board of Fire Police Commissioners (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 472, 476, 404 N.E.2d 339, 341.) the board's determination is, however, subject to judicial review. ( E.g., Lakin v. Gorris (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 1034, 1038, 448 N.E.2d 215, 218; Thomas v. Police Board (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 1101, 1105, 414 N.E.2d 11, 15.) When the board's findings are so trivial as to be unreasonable or arbitrary or are so unrelated to the requirements of the service, we must reverse the board's decision.

Since demotion represents a less serious sanction than discharge, we do not believe that the same test for reviewing the reasonableness of a discharge should govern review of a demotion. (See Lakin v. Gorris (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 1034, 1039, 448 N.E.2d 215 (application of the "substantial shortcoming" test should be limited to discharge cases).) Indeed, the courts have intimated that demotion may be an appropriate sanction in circumstances that would not warrant discharge.