The reasoning in Boender suggests that it would be inappropriate to decide that Defendant's notice was reasonable as a matter of law. This demonstrates the inappropriateness of Defendant's reliance on general, out-of-context language in Lake Shore Nat'l Bank v. McCann, 78 Ill. App.3d 580, 33 Ill.Dec. 577, 396 N.E.2d 1301 (1979). Defendant quotes the passage in that opinion where the court states that because "the notice specified the place, date and time of the sale, it complied with the requirements of section 9-504 for reasonable notification of a public sale of collateral."

This view has been followed in a majority of the cases in which the appellate court has considered the question. See, e.g. National Boulevard Bank v. Jackson (1981), 92 Ill. App.3d 928; Chicago City Bank Trust Co. v. Wilson (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 452; Lakeshore National Bank v. McCann (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 580; National Republic Bank v. Proctor (1978), 66 Ill. App.3d 534; Commercial Discount Corp. v. Bayer (1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 295; General Foods Corp. v. Hall (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 147; Tauber v. Johnson (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 789. Section 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides for the right of the creditor to dispose of collateral upon default of the debtor and requires that the disposition of collateral be made in a "commercially reasonable" manner.

Kobuk Eng'r Contracting Servs. v. Superior Tank Constr. Co-Alaska, 568 P.2d 1007, 1013-14 (Alaska 1977); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37, 39-40 (1970); Community Management Ass'n v. Tousley, 32 Colo. App. 33, 505 P.2d 1314, 1316-17 (1973); Savings Bank of New Britain v. Booze, 34 Conn. Sup. 632, 382 A.2d 226, 228-29 (1977); Bank of Oklahoma v. Little Judy Inds., 387 So.2d 1002, 29 U.C.C.Rep.Serv. 1454, 1457 (Fla.App. 1980); Mack Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 100 Idaho 889, 606 P.2d 993, 995-96 (Idaho 1980); Lake Shore Nat'l Bank v. McCann, 78 Ill. App.3d 580, 33 Ill.Dec. 577, 580-581, 396 N.E.2d 1301, 1304-05 (Ill.App. 1979); Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918, 928 (Ind.App. 1978); Fedders Corp. v. Taylor, 473 F. Supp. 961, 977-78 (D.Minn. 1979) (applying Minnesota law); Walker v. V.M. Box Motor Co., 325 So.2d 905, 906 (Miss. 1976); Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 268-69 (Mo.App. 1974); U.C. Leasing, Inc. v. Laughlin, 606 P.2d 167, 171 (Nev. 1980); Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402, 404-05 (Dist.Ct. 1971), aff'd, 118 N.J. Super. 521, 288 A.2d 872 (App.Div. 197 2); Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077, 1081-82 (1975); Security Trust Co. v. Thomas, 59 A.D.2d 242, 399 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (1977); Hodges v. Norton, 29 N.C. App. 193, 223 S.E.2d 848, 851-52 (1976); State Bank of Burleigh County v. All-American Sub., Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772, 780 (N.D. 1980); All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 42 Or. App. 319, 600 P.2d 899, 906-07 (1979); Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 195 Pa. Super. 601, 171 A.2d 548, 550 (1961) (not clear, but

However, in those cases the notice otherwise contained sufficient information from which this could be ascertained. (See, e.g., Lake Shore Nat. Bank v. McCann (Ill.App. 1979) 396 N.E.2d 1301, 1305 [notice which said sale would be held "at 605 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois on July 1, 1975 at 9 a.m." was deemed to be notice of a public sale]; All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs (Or.App. 1979) 600 P.2d 899, 906 [notice which indicated several offers had been received and creditor would sell at highest offer if no reply was received from debtor within 10 days was deemed to be notice of a private sale].

The purpose of that notice is to enable the debtor to protect his interest in the secured property by paying the debt, finding a buyer or being present at the sale to bid on the property. ( Lake Shore National Bank v. McCann (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 580, 396 N.E.2d 1301.) The Code also provides that, if the secured party is not complying with the statute, the debtor may seek judicial relief before the sale takes place.

Thus, the content of the notice here sufficiently informed VFW that the bank had opted to use private proceedings. See Lake Shore National Bank v. McCann, 78 Ill. App.2d 580, 396 N.E.2d 1301 (1979). We therefore agree with the trial court's ruling that the letters to Post 8103 and the individual defendants complied with the notice requirements of § 4-9-504(3).

Plaintiff's argument that the notice given here was reasonable and adequate finds some support in the case of Contois Motor Co. v.Saltz (1977), 198 Neb. 455, 253 N.W.2d 290, and Bondurant v. Beard Equipment Co. (Fla. App. 1977), 345 So.2d 806. Plaintiff's good faith and effective effort to maximize the amount realized for the collateral, and defendants' lack of interest in the sale and apparent lack of injury by not receiving further notice, create the temptation to uphold the notice given. But, the purpose of the Code, which enables a debtor to protect his interest in the property by finding a buyer or by being present to bid ( Lake Shore National Bank v. McCann (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 580, 396 N.E.2d 1301), would not be protected thereby. • 2 Having held the notice to defendants to have been insufficient, we turn to the question of the consequences of that insufficiency.

From the above-quoted passage, other Illinois courts have apparently inferred that Illinois follows the rebuttable presumption approach. (See Chicago City Bank Trust Co. v. Wilson (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 452, 407 N.E.2d 964; Lake Shore National Bank v. McCann (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 580, 396 N.E.2d 1301; General Foods Corp. v. Hall (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 147, 349 N.E.2d 573; National Boulevard Bank v. Jackson (1981), 92 Ill. App.3d 928, 416 N.E.2d 358.) None of these cases, however, contain a comparative analysis of the two approaches. Moreover, in McCann and Chicago City Bank, the courts found that adequate notice had been given; therefore, the question of the legal consequences of a secured party's failure to give presale notice was obviated.

Defendants appeal from the denial of their counterclaim only. • 1 Noting first that State courts have jurisdiction to enforce the Act ( 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1976); Lake Shore National Bank v. McCann (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 580, 396 N.E.2d 1301; Ninth Liberty Loan Corp. v. Hardy (1977), 53 Ill. App.3d 601), we believe that a threshold consideration is whether borrowers' counterclaim is barred by section 1640(e) of the Act, which provides that actions under section 1640(e) may be brought "within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation." ( 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1976); Allensworth v. Ben Franklin Savings Loan Association (1979), 71 Ill. App.3d 1041, 1045, 389 N.E.2d 684.) Borrowers place great emphasis on Wood Acceptance Co. v. King (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 149, 309 N.E.2d 403, in support of their contention that the Federal statute of limitations is inapplicable to the case at bar.

• 3 The established rule in Illinois is that the creditor bears the burden of proving compliance with the notice provisions of section 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 26, par. 9-504) before recovering a deficiency judgment. ( Lake Shore National Bank v. McCann (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 580, 584, 396 N.E.2d 1301; General Foods Corp. v. Hall (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 147, 153, 349 N.E.2d 573; Tauber v. Johnson (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 789, 793-94, 291 N.E.2d 180.) Although a creditor's failure to provide adequate notice does not necessarily bar a deficiency judgment, such failure has been held to raise a presumption that the value of the secured collateral is equal to the amount of the debt and to place on the creditor the additional burden of rebutting the presumption and proving that the amount collected from the sale was commercially reasonable. ( Lake Shore National Bank; General Foods Corp.; Tauber.) Additionally, section 9-507(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 26, par. 9-507(1)) provides that the debtor has a right to recover from the secured party any loss caused by the failure to comply with the notice provisions.