Opinion
A132565
04-26-2012
In re V.R., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LAKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.S., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Lake County Super. Ct. No. JV320229)
INTRODUCTION
This case involves an original petition filed pursuant to section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code in June 2009 by respondent Lake County Department of Social Services in regard to mother's three children, her son V.R., daughter S.R. and son V.R. III. At the time the original petition was filed, V.R. was 8 years old, S.R. was 4 years old, and V.R. III was 15 months old. "After mother successfully completed six months of reunification services addressing the problems identified in the original petition (principally abuse of controlled substances and unsanitary living conditions),but before the 12-month review on the section 300 petition, respondent filed a subsequent petition pursuant to section 342, alleging an incident of sexual abuse by mother on S.R. during an unsupervised visit.[]" (S.R., supra, at pp. *1-2.) "The petition alleged mother inserted a pencil into S.R.'s vagina." (S.R., supra, at pp. *2, fn. 3.) "In August 2010, the juvenile court sustained jurisdictional findings on the section 342 petition and terminated mother's visitation with all three children. Following the jurisdictional hearing on the section 342 petition, mother filed a notice of appeal (NOA). After mother filed her NOA, the juvenile court held a joint dispositional/12 month review hearing (joint hearing).After the joint hearing, the juvenile court issued an order setting a section 366.26 hearing and dispositional orders on the section 342 petition." (S.R., supra, at pp. *1-2.)
We have issued two prior decisions in the case, In re V.R. (Nov. 29, 2011, A129712, 2011 Cal.App. Unpub. LEXIS 9177 (V.R. I) and In re S.R. (Jan. 4, 2012, A131611, 2012 Cal.App. Unpub. LEXIS 34 (S.R.).
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
The section 300 petition also alleged father sexually abused V.R. The petition did not implicate mother in that sexual abuse and father was subsequently by-passed for services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6).
The hearing combined a 12-month review hearing on an original petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 with a disposition hearing on a subsequent petition filed pursuant to section 342.
"In V.R.[I], supra, we dismissed mother's appeal challenging orders made when the juvenile court set the section 366.26 hearing on the grounds mother failed to file a writ petition. (See § 366.26, subd. (l)(2).) Also, construing mother's NOA from the August 2010 jurisdictional hearing as a premature appeal from the later disposition order on the section 342 petition, we determined substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and its order terminating visitation." (S.R., supra, at pp. *2-3.)
In S.R., supra, mother appealed the juvenile court's denial of her section 388 modification petitions filed in January 2011. We concluded the juvenile court abused its discretion by summarily denying mother's section 388 petitions on the two younger siblings without holding an evidentiary hearing. (See S.R., supra, at p. *3.) The remand order did not apply to V.R. because the juvenile court set a section 388 hearing regarding V.R. in April 2011. (Ibid.) Mother's section 388 petition regarding V.R. was heard on May 2, 2011, in conjunction with a section 366.26 hearing which encompassed all three siblings. Mother now appeals the findings and orders entered after the May 2, 2011 hearing.
"On January 6, 2011, mother filed three separate but identical section 388 petitions, one for each of her children, requesting that based upon changed circumstances the court permit mother to resume visitation, grant mother a further six months of reunification services, and vacate the upcoming section 366.26 hearing. Each petition stated that since mother's visits and family reunification services were terminated, mother has enrolled in parenting courses, attended courses at Santa Rosa Junior College in pursuit of a nursing degree, graduated from Women's Recovery Services 12-Step program, obtained employment and received counseling services. Mother provided documentary evidence in support of the changed circumstances." (S.R., supra, at p. *4.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
To recap, mother's section 388 petition, filed on January 6, 2011, requested that "her supervised visitation with the minor [V.R.] be reinstated" and that the court grant another six months of reunification services and vacate the section 366.26 hearing set for January 10, 2011. In her petition, mother states that since termination of visitation with her children in August 2010 and termination of family reunification services in September 2010, she has enrolled in parenting classes, attended courses at Santa Rosa Junior College in pursuit of a nursing degree, graduated from a Women's Recovery Services (WRS) program, obtained employment and engaged in counseling.
We also incorporate by reference herein the factual and procedural background sections in V.R. I and S.R., which together cover the history of the case in detail up to and including the hearing on mother's section 388 petitions on March 7, 2011.
Respondent filed a response to mother's section 388 petition on January 28, 2011. In its response, respondent states the three minor children are placed in separate foster homes and could not be placed together "due to a lack of appropriate placement options for all three siblings." While commending mother's efforts to further her education, secure employment, and graduate from a WRS program, respondent asserted such efforts did not amount to changed circumstances "given the circumstances of the case." Respondent also noted mother failed to submit evidence that she had received counseling. Further, respondent opined that based on "mother's willful sexual abuse of her child after a year of services it is evident that the issues that need to be overcome to warrant the change of an order for detriment of contact and/or termination of reunification services go far beyond substance abuse treatment, employment and college." On this point, respondent placed particular emphasis on that portion of mother's psychological evaluation by Dr. Singer which states that when mother's "anger is engaged, she is also likely to show a poor capacity to maintain good reality testing . . . and her ability to maintain clear boundaries [] becomes impaired." Respondent concluded the minors' best interests would not be served by further visitation or reunification services and recommended the section 388 petitions be denied.
The joint section 388/366.26 hearing scheduled for January 2011, was continued to March 7, 2011. In preparation for the hearing, respondent submitted a report by the State Adoptions Services Bureau (SASB) dated March 1, 2011, stating V.R. "is not likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated" and recommending an alternative permanent plan for the minor. Based on the SASB report and the concerns it raised regarding V.R.'s adoptability, the court continued the section 388 hearing, and also continued the section 366.26 hearing, at father's request, in order to secure permission for father's attendance from prison authorities.
On April 28, 2011, respondent file a supplemental section 366.26 report that also addressed mother's pending section 388 petition. The report confirmed that V.R. receives weekly counseling services and described his progress as follows: V.R. "is emotionally fragile and when upset, . . . regresses into an infantile state; speaking in baby talk and crying uncontrollably. [The counselor] reported that V.R. does not appear to understand why he cannot live or visit with his mother. However, the undersigned [social worker] and State Adoptions Specialist Kim Costa have discussed this matter with V.R. at length and explained to him our roles in his life and why he cannot return home. V.R. seems confused regarding the events that led the Department to intervene and how they pertain to his reality, dependency, and permanent plan." The report also states it is the opinion of V.R.'s counselor that "visitation with the mother could create more confusion for V.R., which would negatively affect his fragile emotional state and potentially be detrimental to his stability in placement." V.R.'s counselor further opined that if given the choice, V.R. would opt to visit his mother, but stated that during counseling sessions V.R. rarely speaks of his mother and does not request visitation. Thus, the Agency opined that it was not in V.R's best interest to grant the mother's section 388 petition. Accordingly, the Agency recommended the petition be denied. The report also advised the court that SASB would submit an updated report concerning V.R.'s adoptability by the May 2, 2011 hearing date and recommended the section 366.26 be continued for two months to allow the state adoptions specialist time to identify appropriate permanent plans for the minors.
An updated SASB report (SASB report) regarding V.R.'s adoptability was prepared by adoption specialist Kim Costa and received into evidence at the May 2 hearing. In the SASB report, Costa states "continued assessment of [V.R.] . . . has determined the minor is now considered to have a probability for adoption but is difficult to place for adoption and that there is no identified prospective adoptive parent."
The SASB report states that the recommendation V.R. now has a probability of adoption is based on new information, obtained since the last hearing, about V.R.'s adjustment to his current foster home placement, his progress in therapy and consideration of placement with relatives. Regarding placement, the SASB report states V.R.'s current foster home is his third placement. He moved there in February 2011 after he was involved in sexualized behavior with another child in the second foster home. At the time of the move, it was thought V.R. may require "more supervision than was practically possible in a family setting," but since then the "problematic behaviors . . . are not as pronounced" and V.R. has adjusted well to his new placement. The current foster parents have noted V.R. has "poor self esteem and emotional immaturity" and although he requires "constant supervision to ensure compliance with guidelines, . . . they do not regard him as an exceptionally difficult child to parent."
Regarding V.R.'s progress in therapy, the SASB report states V.R. has attended 55 sessions with the same therapist over a year. V.R.'s diagnosis includes adjustment disorder, physical abuse, sexual abuse, neglect, dysthymia (depressive symptoms) and attachment issues. The therapist describes V.R. as insecure, emotionally immature and fragile. V.R. sometimes physically curls into a ball and becomes silent when difficult subjects are raised. V.R. does not know the facts about his sister's sexual abuse by mother and "is unclear on what has happened (in his case) or why. V.R. has not opted to discuss past abuse with the therapist." [¶] . . . [¶] "The therapist is of the opinion that contact with the birth mother is likely to be disruptive to any placement that V.R. is in, thus creating challenges to the effort of stabilization." Additionally, the report states that it is the opinion of "the therapist, the CPS caseworker and the adoptions specialist that contact with the birth mother is highly likely to result in significant emotional stress for V.R., leading to behavioral challenges and potential disruption of placement. Such a risk at this time does not appear to be in V.R.'s best interest." Thus the SASB report recommends the court identify adoption as the permanent placement goal for V.R. and, without terminating parental rights, order that efforts be made to locate an appropriate adoptive family within 180 days.
Mother appeared with counsel at the section 388 hearing on May 2, 2011. Before mother testified, the court invited counsel to focus on whether "mother has done anything to address the psychological element of the issues that got her into the system and got [her] where we are today," as well as whether it would be in V.R.'s best interests to grant the section 388 petition. Mother testified since visitation with V.R. and reunification services were terminated in August and September 2010, she enrolled in college, obtained part-time employment, graduated from a CHD recovery program, continues to live at Sober Living Environment in Santa Rosa, and began attending weekly therapy sessions with a therapist named Drew Mazer in February 2010. Mother added that her therapy sessions with Mazer terminated in November 2010, and then resumed on April 1, 2011. After resumption of therapy, mother met with Mazer five or six times, most recently on April 29, 2011. Mother's testimony also addressed the focus of her therapy with Mazer. She noted that she is working on her "anger problems" and "being a stable mother" and added that she talked to Mazer "a lot" about the allegation she sexually molested her daughter, about V.R. having been sexually abused by his father and learned "a lot of understanding and patience and acceptance and forgiveness" in dealing with that subject. Mother also testified that after reunification services were terminated, she enrolled in a vocational nursing program at Santa Rosa Junior College, carrying 15 units during the current semester. She also works an average of 16 hours per week at a store called the Children's Place in Santa Rosa and graduated from a recovery program on December 16, 2010.
On cross-examination, when asked what insight or understanding she had gained into why she sexually abused her daughter S.R. with a pencil in May 2010, mother stated: "Well, my understanding is I did not do that to my daughter, so — but I know she's hurting from it, the incident of me not being able to see her, but I never had any interaction with my child like that []." Mother also stated her "anger issues" are "from previous relationships with their dad, domestic violence."
Following mother's testimony, the court heard argument of counsel and ruled as follows: "The 388 for resumption of reunification services is denied. It is not shown to be in the best interest of the child and the Court does not believe the mother has significantly addressed her own psychological issues and problems that led the children into [the] system." In regard to the 366.26 hearing, the court found that all three children have a probability for adoption, that adoption is the permanent goal, and ordered that further efforts be made to locate an adoptive family within 180 days. The court did not terminate parental rights.
DISCUSSION
I Section 388 Petition
A. Legal Principles
"After the termination of reunification services, the parents' interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point 'the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability' [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interests of the child. [Citation.]" (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) Although "[s]ection 388 provides the 'escape mechanism' that . . . must be built into the process to allow the court to consider new information[,]" after termination of services "[t]he burden [] is on the parent to prove changed circumstances . . . [in order] to revive the reunification issue." (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) Specifically, parent has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a change of circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification would be in the best interests of the child. (§ 388; Nahid H. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1068.) "It is not enough for a parent to show just a genuine change of circumstances under the statute. The parent must show that the undoing of the prior order would be in the best interests of the child. (Citation.)" (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 529.) Furthermore, the parent must show changed, not changing, circumstances. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.) "The change of circumstances or new evidence 'must be of such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged prior order.' (Citation.)" (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615.)
"In considering whether the petitioner has made the requisite showing, the juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. (Citation.) The court may consider factors such as the seriousness of the reason leading to the child's removal, the reason the problem was not resolved, the passage of time since the child's removal, the relative strength of the bonds with the child, the nature of the change of circumstance, and the reason the change was not made sooner. (Citation.) In assessing the best interests of the child, 'a primary consideration . . . is the goal of assuring stability and continuity.' (Citation.)" (In re Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.)
"We review the juvenile court's denial of a section 388 petition for an abuse of discretion. (Citation.) The court 'exceeds the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination.' (Citation.) . . . ' "The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court." [Citation.]' (Citation.)" (In re Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.)
B. Merits
Mother avers she demonstrated changed circumstances by presenting evidence she enrolled in parenting classes, was attending nursing courses in pursuit of a nursing degree, graduated from a WRS 12-step recovery program, obtained employment and engaged in therapy. On the basis of this evidence, mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition as to V.R. We disagree. (See In re Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 616 [abuse of discretion lies only if juvenile court's decision is "arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd"].)
Here, the juvenile court found there was insufficient evidence of changed circumstances with regard to mother's "psychological issues and problems" that led to dependency proceedings. The court's finding on this point is neither arbitrary nor capricious in light of "the entire factual and procedural history of the case," "the seriousness of the reason" leading to the children's removal and "the reason the problem was not resolved." (In re Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.)
In this regard, Dr. J. Singer's April 2010 psychological evaluation notes mother "has difficulty managing her feelings, tends to distort the perceptions of others and their motives," and suffers "feelings of inadequacy, low self-esteem and feelings of inferiority." Dr. Singer opined that in mother's relationships with men, she "may have a tendency to be a passive victim and yet also lash out in a hostile fashion when she is no longer able to manage her own intense feelings or get her needs met." Mother's difficulty in controlling anger is mentioned repeatedly by Dr. Singer. For example, Dr. Singer opined that not only does mother's "attempts to constrict her experience result in impaired reality testing, but when her anger is engaged, she is also likely to show a poor capacity to maintain good reality testing and her perceptions become distorted." Additionally, Dr. Singer notes mother "shows a poor ability to integrate or express affect without feeling overwhelmed, and anger distorts her perceptions further. She may use paranoid type defenses, projecting her anger and inadequacy onto others."
Dr. Singer's observations concerning mother's unpredictability when her anger is aroused help to account for mother's otherwise inexplicable actions on May 21, 2010, when she sexually abused her young daughter by inserting a sharpened pencil into her daughter's vagina. (See V.R. I, supra, at pp. *16-18 [concluding record contains substantial evidence to support court's jurisdictional findings that mother sexually assaulted S.R. with a pencil].) Moreover, the record fails to establish that mother has made substantial progress in resolving her anger issues, or the psychological traits underlying those issues, since services were terminated. Indeed, mother testified at the section 388 hearing that she had only resumed therapy within the past month or so and continued to work on anger issues in those therapy sessions. The letter from mother's therapist submitted at the section 388 hearing states mother "participates actively in treatment" on "personality development [and] anger management" but her treatment is in "the middle stages." Thus, contrary to mother's assertion, the record supports the trial court's finding that mother failed to provide evidence of changed circumstances regarding the psychological problems that led to dependency proceedings. (See In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47 [parent must show changed, not changing, circumstances to warrant section 388 relief].)
Furthermore, we conclude that the trial court's finding that mother's section 388 petition was in not V.R.'s best interests was not arbitrary or capricious. In this regard, the updated SASB report regarding V.R.'s adoptability, received into evidence at the hearing on May 2, 2011, supports the trial court's finding of adoptability. The SASB report notes that V.R.'s therapist describes V.R. as insecure, emotionally immature and fragile, as illustrated by the fact V.R. sometimes physically curls into a ball and becomes silent when difficult subjects are raised. Importantly, the SASB report states V.R.'s therapist is of the opinion that "contact with the birth mother is likely to be disruptive to any placement that V.R. is in, thus creating challenges to the effort of stabilization." Additionally, the report states that it is the opinion of "the therapist, the CPS caseworker and the adoptions specialist that contact with the birth mother is highly likely to result significant emotional stress for V.R., leading to behavioral challenges and potential disruption of placement. Such a risk at this time does not appear to be in V.R.'s best interest." Keeping in mind that "[a]fter the termination of reunification services, the parents' interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount [and] . . . 'the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability' [citation]" (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317), the updated SASB report regarding V.R.'s adoptability amply supports the trial court's finding that the section 388 petition was not in V.R.'s best interest.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court's denial of mother's section 388 petition. (See In re Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.)
II Section 366.26 Findings
Mother also contends the court's findings and order entered at the May 2, 2011 hearing pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) constitute reversible error. We review the order under the substantial evidence standard of review. (In re Gabriel G. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1438 (Gabriel G.) [reviewing section 366.26, subd. (c)(3) order for substantial evidence].) We conclude the court's section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) order is supported by substantial evidence.
"[T]he juvenile court may do one of four things at the time of the section 366.26 hearing: (1) terminate parental rights and free the child for adoption, (2) identify adoption as the goal and order the Department to try, for no more than 180 days, to locate an appropriate adoptive home, (3) appoint a legal guardian, or (4) order that the child be placed in long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).)" (Gabriel G., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433.) Where the juvenile court selects the option (2), the court identifies adoption as the permanent placement goal without terminating parental rights and orders that efforts be made to locate an adoptive family within 180 days. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(3).) "The juvenile court must make at least three findings before it may defer selection of a permanent placement plan under subdivision (c)(3)"—(1) termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the child; (2) the child has a probability of adoption; and, (3) the child is difficult to adopt. (Gabriel G., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1436.) Here, mother asserts termination would be detrimental to V.R. and his siblings because the minors have no probability of adoption.
Mother also avers V.R. "shared a significant beneficial relationship with his mother, and he shared a beneficial relationship with his siblings, each of which make it detrimental to him to terminate [mother's] parental rights and select adoption as his permanent plan." To the extent mother claims either the beneficial child-parent relationship exception to adoption (see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) or the substantial interference with a sibling relationship exception to adoption (see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E)), mother's conclusory assertion fails to carry her burden of proof (see In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 [parent has the burden of proving termination would be detrimental to the child under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A)]; In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017 [parent has the burden of showing that a sibling relationship exists and that its severance would be detrimental to the child]), and does not provide substantial evidence for either exception. (See In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 200 [where parent has burden of proof, appellate court will affirm under substantial evidence standard unless there was "indisputable evidence [in parent's favor,] evidence no reasonable trier of fact could have rejected"].)
In regard to mother's assertion on adoptability, we note that the showing for probability of adoption under subdivision (c)(3) is to be distinguished from the showing required for likelihood of adoption under subdivision (c)(1). In Gabriel G, supra, the court explained the difference as follows: "In determining whether a child is likely to be adopted, the juvenile court must focus on the child, and whether the child's age, physical condition, and emotional state may make it difficult to find an adoptive family. (Citation.)" (Gabriel G., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438, italics added.) On the other hand, "[u]nder subdivision (c)(3), the court merely needs to find that, under the circumstances, the [child has] a probability of adoption." (Gabriel G., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.) Furthermore, unlike the inquiry under subsection (c)(1), in determining whether the child has a probability of adoption under subsection (c)(3), the court must consider factors that make the child difficult to place. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(3) [court must find child is "difficult to place for adoption"].) As such, mother's emphasis on the difficulty of placing the children as a barrier to adoption is misplaced: The enquiry is not whether the children will be difficult to place — that is a given under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3)—but whether, despite such difficulty, there is a probability of adoption.
On that the latter point, substantial evidence in the record supports the court's finding of probability of adoption. First, addressing V.R.'s younger siblings, S.R. and V.R. III, the March 2011 SASB adoption assessment states S.R. is "an attractive, energetic girl [who] loves to sing, dance and color," and, according to her foster mother, "can be loving, kind, gentle and sweet." V.R. III is "an attractive, robust, and curious three-year old boy with a big laugh, who loves to dance and play outside." The assessment states S.R. and V.R. III "are young children with the potential to connect in a meaningful manner to parents through adoption. Though their histories of abuse and neglect are significant, and though their current problematic behaviors are also significant, the children each appear to have responded positively to the structure and nurturing they are experiencing in foster care. Though [S.R.] and [V.R. III] will be difficult to place, and while it is at this time unclear if placement together will be possible or in their best interests, CDSS is hopeful that an appropriate adoptive family can be identified for each of these children." And in regard to V.R., the SASB adoption assessment of April 2011 states that although there are challenges to adoption, "the most recent information . . . brings hope for a positive prognosis. V.R. has demonstrated an ability to respond reasonably well to the guidelines and instruction in his current placement. There have been no new instances of clearly inappropriate, clearly sexualized behaviors. . . . Finally, there are interested relatives who do not have criminal histories, who have indicated a willingness to adopt [V.R.], and who are willing to work with the adoptions specialist for further assessment." This evidence, in our view, is sufficient to support the court's finding of probability of adoption under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3). (Cf. Gabriel G., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438 [sufficient evidence to support finding of probability of adoptions where children were young, healthy, physically appealing, and, "although their behavioral problems could make placement difficult, the social worker believed that a stable adoptive home might be the way to address those problems"].)
In sum, the juvenile court's findings pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court did not err by ordering that further efforts be made to locate adoptive families for the children within 180 days.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's findings and orders of May 2, 2011, denying mother's section 388 petition as to V.R. and selecting adoption as the permanent placement goal under section 366.26, subdivisions (b)(4) and (c)(3), are affirmed.
Jenkins, J. We concur: Pollak, Acting P. J. Siggins, J. In re V.R., et at., A132565