Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-6221-12T1
06-23-2014
KAREN LAJTERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EQUUS, Defendant-Respondent.
John J. Pisano, attorney for appellant. Gage Fiore, L.L.C., attorneys for respondent (AnnMarie Flores, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fuentes and Simonelli.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-562-12.
John J. Pisano, attorney for appellant.
Gage Fiore, L.L.C., attorneys for respondent (AnnMarie Flores, on the brief). PER CURIAM
In this personal injury action, plaintiff Karen Lajterman appeals from the order of the Law Division granting defendant's, (a restaurant and social club called Equus), motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's case as a matter of law. We affirm.
Because the trial court dismissed plaintiff's case on summary judgment, we will review all of the factual allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, including any rational inference that can be drawn from the record developed before the motion judge. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); R. 4:46-2(c). Furthermore, our review of the trial court's ruling is de novo. Wakefern Food Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 406 N.J. Super. 524, 538 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 209 (2009). We will review the record to determine "'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury [or trier of fact] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007) (quoting Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 536).
These are the salient facts. At approximately eleven o'clock in the evening on February 14, 2012, plaintiff, her husband, and another couple decided to dine and see a comedy show at Equus. At her deposition, plaintiff described the front entrance of the restaurant as having "two steps and a door . . . [with] two flowerpots." The entrance floor had "[l]ike a welcome mat." Plaintiff did not notice the mat when she first entered the restaurant; she and her party entered the establishment without incident.
At some point that evening, plaintiff and one of her friends left the restaurant because her friend wanted to smoke. Again, plaintiff and her friend exited the restaurant through the main entrance without any mishap. Plaintiff was asked at her deposition to "briefly describe what type of incident occurred at Equus restaurant?" She gave the following description:
I went outside with Karen. She wanted to have a cigarette. We were coming back in. All of a sudden, I turned to open the door and I hit my face on the flower pot and I looked down and the rug was all crumpled up like a Sharpey [sic].
. . . .
Q. . . . You said you turned to open the door and then your face hit a planter. Did you trip or do you know?
A. Yeah, I tripped.
Q. Do you know what you tripped on?
A. The carpet.
Q. Do you know which foot tripped on the carpet?
A. No.
Q. Were you turning to open the door or were you turning to do something else?
A. I was turning to open the door.
Q. You said at some point you made contact with one of the planters by the front entrance?
A. Yes.
Q. Which part of your body made contact?
A. My face and my nose, my whole side of my left.
. . . .
Q. Did you fall to the ground at any point?
A. Yes.
Q. Did any parts of your body make contact with the ground?
A. Yes, my [left] shoulder.
. . . .
Q. Can you just describe the mechanics of the fall?
A. All of a sudden, I was on the ground. It happened so quick.
Q. Can you describe, did your face hit the planter first or something else, if you remember?
A. I don't remember. It sounds like it could have been the way it went. My face hit the planter so hard. It made a loud noise. My friend turned around and said, "What was that?"
Q. Did Karen actually witness the accident?
A. No. She turned around and I was on the ground.
It is undisputed that defendant had not received any prior notice of any defect or other problems with the floor mat at the front entrance of the restaurant. Defendant's manager attended to plaintiff immediately after she fell, giving her ice packs and towels. Plaintiff visited the restaurant's bathroom and left the restaurant with her husband. Defendant's manager visually and manually inspected the site of the accident that night and did not notice any defects or obstacles that could have caused plaintiff to trip and fall.
Based on this record, the motion judge found "plaintiff fail[ed] to establish a prima facie case of negligen[ce]. . . ." The judge specifically emphasized that
the mere showing of an accident causing an injury sued upon is alone not sufficient to authorize an inference of negligence, nor is the plaintiff entitled to a mode of operation theory. A plaintiff can obtain a mode of operation charge when a substantial risk of injury is inherent in the business operator's method of doing business.
At this point, the motion judge cited Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc., 175 N.J. 559 (2003) in support of her legal analysis.
We agree with the motion judge. Under these circumstances, the mere happening of an accident does not raise a presumption of negligence by defendant. Plaintiff has the burden to show, by direct evidence, that defendant was responsible for the accident, or to show the existence of such circumstances as would justify the inference that the injury was caused by defendant's wrongful act or failure to take reasonable action to discover the existence of a dangerous condition.
Our Supreme Court has defined the legal responsibility a business operator like defendant owes to a patron such as plaintiff.
The proprietor of premises to which the public is invited for business purposes of the proprietor owes a duty of reasonable care to those who enter the premises upon that invitation to provide a reasonably safe place to do that which is within the scope of the invitation. This duty to maintain safe premises and protect invitees includes an affirmative obligation upon the proprietor to inspect the premises to discover their actual condition and any latent defects, as well as possible dangerous conditions of which he does not know.
A proprietor generally is not liable for injuries caused by defects of which he had no actual or implied knowledge or notice, and no reasonable opportunity to discover. Whether a reasonable opportunity to discover a defect existed will depend on both the character and the duration of the defect. Thus, proprietors have been absolved of liability where a defective condition was found not to be discoverable by reasonable inspection, or where a latent defect, undiscoverable except by extraordinary investigation, caused an injury shortly after a new owner bought a building.
[Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown, 95 N.J. 280, 290-91 (1984) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)]
Here, plaintiff has not produced any evidence to show defendant was aware that the mat presented a dangerous condition. We discern no legal basis to disturb the motion judge's ruling.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION