Opinion
No. 1-1020 / 01-0128.
Filed April 24, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, JON STUART SCOLES, Judge.
Fleetguard appeals from the district court's judgment reversing the workers' compensation commissioner's decision denying benefits to its former employee, Michael Laitinen. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Richard Book of Huber, Book, Cortese, Happe Brown, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Mark Soldat, Algona, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Fleetguard appeals from the district court's judgment reversing the workers' compensation commissioner's decision denying benefits to its former employee, Michael Laitinen. We reverse. Laitinen was employed as a laborer at Fleetguard from July 5, 1993. In mid-1995 Laitinen experienced pain in his left leg. He was subsequently diagnosed with a back injury and underwent surgery on August 26, 1996. Laitinen did not return to work at Fleetguard following his surgery.
In September 1996 Laitinen applied for short-term disability payments under a disability insurance policy. At that time, Laitinen stated the condition for which he sought disability benefits was not work related. In early 1997 Laitinen sought legal advice concerning his eligibility for workers' compensation benefits. His attorney wrote Laitinen's surgeon, Dr. Enson Transfeldt, in December 1997 to determine if Dr. Transfeldt believed Laitinen's condition was work related. Dr. Transfeldt responded on May 28, 1998, stating Laitinen's work aggravated his condition.
Laitinen filed a petition seeking workers' compensation benefits on June 24, 1998. After a hearing, the chief deputy workers' compensation commissioner concluded that Laitinen's failure to give Fleetguard timely notice of his injury precluded an award of benefits.
On judicial review, Laitinen claimed he told coworkers about his back problems. He alleged the employer had actual knowledge of his injury. He also claimed he did not know of the probable compensable character of his condition until he heard from Dr. Transfeldt in May 1998.
The district court concluded there was substantial evidence to show Fleetguard did not have actual knowledge Laitinen's problems were work related. The court determined there was not substantial evidence in the record, however, to show Laitinen knew or should have known prior to receiving Dr. Transfeldt's letter that he could have a workers' compensation claim. The commissioner's decision was accordingly reversed and remanded for further action consistent with the court's ruling.
On appeal to this court Fleetguard argues Laitinen did not give timely notice of his injury under Iowa Code section 85.23 (1999) and is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Fleetguard claims the commissioner's decision was supported by substantial evidence and should have been upheld by the district court.
An appeal of a district court's ruling on judicial review of an agency's decision is limited to determining whether the district court correctly applied the law in exercising its judicial review function under section 17A.19(8). Herrera v. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 284, 287 (Iowa 2001). The district court, as well as this court, is bound by the commissioner's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001).
Iowa Code section 85.23 provides:
Unless the employer or the employer's representative shall have actual knowledge of the occurrence of an injury received within ninety days from the date of the occurrence of the injury, or unless the employee or someone on the employee's behalf or a dependent or someone on the dependent's behalf shall give notice thereof to the employer within ninety days from the date of the occurrence of the injury, no compensation shall be allowed.
The purpose of the notice requirement in section 85.23 is to alert employers "to the possibility of a claim so that an investigation can be made while the information is fresh." Venenga v. John Deere Component Works, 498 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993) (quoting Dillinger v. Sioux City, 368 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Iowa 1985)).
The determination of the date of injury is an inherently fact-based determination, and the commissioner's findings are entitled to substantial deference. George A. Hormel Co. v. Jordan, 569 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Iowa 1997). Under the cumulative injury rule, the date of injury is considered to be the date at which the injury manifests itself. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Tasler, 483 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Iowa 1992). This is the date on which both the fact of the injury and the causal relationship of the injury to the employee's work would have become plainly apparent to a reasonable person. Id. The date of injury is based on more than knowledge of an injury or receipt of medical care. Venenga, 498 N.W.2d at 425. The employee must realize his or her injury will have an impact on employment. Id.
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, we find there is substantial evidence in the record to support the chief deputy's decision. The evidence shows that at the time of Laitinen's back surgery in August 1996 he was or should have been aware his work at Fleetguard either aggravated or caused his back injury. Furthermore, he admitted that he was aware of a potential workers' compensation claim when he consulted his attorney in early 1997.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for an order affirming the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.