Opinion
No. 19-35517
11-10-2020
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-01541-TSZ MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 9, 2020 San Francisco, California Before: O'SCANNLAIN, TROTT, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). --------
Benjamin Andrew Laigo, III, appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment to King County and 39 of its individual employees (together, "King County"). As the facts are known to the parties, we repeat them only as necessary to explain our decision. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
I
A
Laigo characterizes King County's alleged wrongs as Eighth Amendment violations. Because the complained-of conduct occurred during pretrial detention, the rights he asserts would derive from the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Because Laigo is a pro se prisoner, we liberally construe his pleadings as though they had properly alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).
To establish such violation, Laigo would need to show King County acted with "objective deliberate indifference" to his "serious medical needs." Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018).
B
Laigo fails to locate "objective deliberative indifference" in King County's denial of his requests to prescribe certain opiate pain medications, the timetable set for his transition from a wheelchair to crutches, or the fact that physical therapy was provided by outside specialists (rather than on-site in jail). King County offered ample evidence of such medical decisions' objective soundness. Laigo proffered no evidence to the contrary. Rather, his allegations express his personal disagreement with such decisions. But mere difference of opinion between an inmate and medical authorities regarding proper treatment does not constitute "deliberate indifference." Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, the district court did not err in holding that King County did not act with "[m]edical deliberate indifference."
II
Nor is Laigo availed by the other, miscellaneous legal theories toward which he gestures: His argument that the district court mis-applied the legal standard for ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, is inapposite. Laigo did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment, or even a response to King County's motion for summary judgment. His argument that the district court's grant of summary judgment violated his right to civil jury trial, is meritless. It is firmly established that summary judgment does not violate the Seventh Amendment. E.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. U.S., 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902).
AFFIRMED.