While the court gave that portion of Walston's requested instruction defining such a relationship, it refused to include a second paragraph which would have told the jury that "where such a relationship is sought to be established by parole evidence the proof must be clear, convincing and so strong, unequivocal and unmistakable as to lead to but one conclusion." Defendants say that the refused instruction embodies prevailing Illinois law as illustrated by Lahman v. Gould, 82 Ill.App.2d 220, 226 N.E.2d 443 (1967). The mere existence of a broker-customer relationship is not proof of its fiduciary character, but on a disputed record the issue remains one of fact.

Decided March 25, 1968.82 Ill. App.2d 220, 226 N.E.2d 443, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Raymond Harkrider for appellant.

The default judgment here (for $5,000) was a small fraction of the judgment entered in Venzor (for $100,000), and that disparity widens even further when we consider that the consumer price index has risen 63% since 1992 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm). See Lahman v. Gould, 82 Ill. App. 2d 220, 229 (1967) ("As a matter of law, it is clear that our courts will take judicial notice, and will not require proof, of periods of inflation and deflation."). ¶ 31 In addition to discussing Venzor, defendants raise several points, none of which persuade us that the trial court erred in declining to vacate the December 2 default judgment. First, defendants contend that, in moving orally, and without notice, for the second default judgment, plaintiffs failed to comply with supreme court and local rules regarding notice and service.

• 2 Likewise, in the case at bar the strict application of that standard would result in great prejudice to the defendant. Had the trial court required the defendant to demand a speedy trial, rather than granting the motion to dismiss for lack of diligent prosecution, that demand would have had to come no earlier than 5 1/2 years after the filing of the condemnation petition, a period of very high inflation of which we, as did the trial court, take judicial notice (see Island Lake Water Co. v. Commerce Com. (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 853, 382 N.E.2d 835; Lahman v. Gould (1967), 82 Ill. App.2d 220, 226 N.E.2d 443). Prejudice to defendant would have been unavoidable given such a span at such a time. Even if the defendant had been expected to make such a demand after being advised of the state of mind of the "higher-ups in Springfield" and presumably after having waited at least a little while for them to "ma[k]e up their minds," the demand could not have come earlier than about 4 1/2 years from the date of filing of the condemnation petition during the same inflationary conditions.

The test to be applied in determining whether discretion was properly exercised is whether it furthers the ends of justice. Bowman v. County of Lake (1963), 29 Ill.2d 268, 193 N.E.2d 833; Lahman v. Gould (1967), 82 Ill. App.2d 220, 226 N.E.2d 443."

First, we note that this court may take judicial notice of economic conditions. (See, e.g., Peoples Gas Light Coke Co. v. Slattery, 373 Ill. 31, 69 (1939). See also Lahman v. Gould, 82 Ill. App.2d 220, 229 (1967).) We may also take notice of economic data by reference to authoritative tabulations of such data.

On the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to file. There is no showing that, after eight years, the ends of justice would be furthered by the filing of a third amended complaint. Lahman v. Gould (1967), 82 Ill. App.2d 220, 226 N.E.2d 443, appeal denied (1967), 36 Ill.2d 631; Hastings v. Abernathy Taxi Association, Inc. (1973), 16 Ill. App.3d 671, 306 N.E.2d 498. The order of July 26, 1974, granting defendants' motion under Supreme Court Rule 103(b) to dismiss and denying plaintiffs' motion to file their third amended complaint is affirmed.

The test to be applied in determining whether discretion was properly exercised is whether it furthers the ends of justice. Bowman v. County of Lake (1963), 29 Ill.2d 268, 193 N.E.2d 833; Lahman v. Gould (1967), 82 Ill. App.2d 220, 226 N.E.2d 443. • 2, 3 Promotion of the ends of justice in this case does not solely involve Abernathy's right to present a defense which may have absolved it from liability.

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, sec. 4; Skolnick v. Martin, 32 Ill.2d 55, 59 (1964), cert. den., 381 U.S. 926 (1965); Rank v. Rank, 107 Ill. App.2d 339, 342 (1969). • 2, 3 Generally whether to allow an amendment to pleadings (including supplemental pleadings, see: Kovac v. Kovac, 26 Ill. App.2d 29, 48 (1960)) is a discretionary matter for the trial judge; the exercise of that discretion, however, is to be tested by whether the ends of justice are furthered. ( Bowman v. County of Lake, 29 Ill.2d 268, 281 (1963), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 13 (1965); Ennis v. Illinois State Bank of Quincy, 111 Ill. App.2d 71, 76 (1969); Lahman v. Gould, 82 Ill. App.2d 220, 227 (1967), appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 458 (1968).) Here, the trial court, to facilitate full adjudication of the issues, should have applied the liberality intended under the Civil Practice Act and allowed plaintiffs to file their supplemental pleadings.

[6, 7] Appellant's final contention is that the magistrate should have allowed the substitution of appellant's own verified amended petition for the petition signed by appellant's attorney. An attitude of liberality in the amendment of pleadings is the announced policy of courts of this state, Lahman v. Gould, 82 Ill. App.2d 220, 226 N.E.2d 443; Ill Rev Stats 1967, c 110, § 46; and we can find no reason for not allowing the substitution of appellant's own petition. Appellee argues that the same matter had been dealt with by the court in several prior petitions, but this argument is without merit because the magistrate had already granted leave to appellant's attorney to file an amended petition and thereby had manifested his willingness to hear the matter again.