When one elects to engage in actions prohibited by ordinance, actions which are recognized as dangerous to himself, and as a result of such actions incurs an injury, he is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. LaGarde v. Aeverman, 144 Colo. 465, 356 P.2d 971. Finally, assuming, arguendo, that the defendant was negligent and having determined that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, did the trial court err in holding that the defendant did not have a last clear chance to avoid the accident as a matter of law? The answer is in the negative.

Certainly each factual situation must be decided on its own merits, and we are aware that cases involving a stalled motor vehicle on a railway crossing have been decided both ways. See cases collected in 70 A.L.R.2d 100. Before a case may be submitted to a jury with an instruction on last clear chance, there must be evidence in the record that both parties were negligent, and that defendant, assuming he should have seen and recognized plaintiff's peril, had a last clear chance to avoid the collision. See Anchor Co. v. D. R. G. W. (1954), 130 Colo. 548, 277 P.2d 523. And, of course, the plaintiff must have plead it as well. Compare: La Garde v. Aeverman (1960), 144 Colo. 465, 356 P.2d 971. In the present case the engineer testified that he first saw the vehicle when the locomotive was about 1500 feet from the crossing but did not apply the emergency brakes until 1000 feet from the crossing.

In Colorado, the doctrine has established negligence for violations of, among other provisions, the state liquor code, Lyons v. Nasby, supra; a city building code, Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. Crissy Fowler Lumber Co., 687 P.2d 514 (Colo.App. 1984); motor vehicle safety statutes, Eddy v. McAninch, supra; and motor vehicle and pedestrian safety ordinances. Reed v. Barlow, 153 Colo. 451, 386 P.2d 979 (1963); LaGarde v. Aeverman, 144 Colo. 465, 356 P.2d 971 (1960). The federal regulations at issue here, 49 C.F.R. §§ 392.21 392.22, promulgated consecutively by the Department of Transportation and the Interstate Commerce Commission, as authorized by Congress, 49 U.S.C. § 301, et seq. (1982) (repealed 1978); 49 U.S.C. §§ 10521 (1982), require interstate motor carriers to comply with the following safety standards: