It is a notice statute that enhances the alienability of property. See generally Lagae v. Lackner, 996 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 2000). The General Assembly's intent was to "give credence to actions of a trustee in selling, pledging as collateral, or otherwise dealing with trust property."
Even though the Colorado statute, like the Wyoming statute, required that the instrument conveying real estate to a trustee “name the beneficiary so represented and define the trust” by proper reference to public record, the Colorado Supreme Court construed the statute as requiring “designation of the trust's beneficiaries or [reference] to a public record containing such information.” Lagae v. Lackner, 996 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Colo.2000).Id. at 1286.
" Id. Courts "should reject interpretations that will render words or phrases superfluous and must avoid interpretations that produce illogical or absurd results." Id.; see also Lagae v. Lackner, 996 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Colo. 2000). IV. ANALYSIS
"Although we must give effect to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning, the General Assembly's intent and purpose must prevail over a literalist interpretation that leads to an absurd result." Lagae v. Lackner, 996 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Colo.2000). Grant v. People, 48 P.3d 543, 546-47 (Colo. 2002).
Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter , 255 P.3d 1083, 1088–89 (Colo.2011) ; see alsoLagae v. Lackner , 996 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Colo.2000) ( “Although we must give effect to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning, the General Assembly's intent and purpose must prevail over a literalist interpretation that leads to an absurd result.”) If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court need go no further; it simply applies the words as they are written.
“Although we must give effect to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning, the General Assembly's intent and purpose must prevail over a literalist interpretation that leads to an absurd result.” Lagae v. Lackner, 996 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Colo.2000).Grant v. People, 48 P.3d 543, 546–47 (Colo.2002).
Nothing in this section shall be construed to be the exclusive manner in which title to an interest in real or personal property may be held by or on behalf of a trust, and title to an interest in real or personal property may be held by or on behalf of a trust in any other manner permitted by law.¶ 25 Section 38–30–108.5 was enacted in response to the division's decision in Lackner v. King , 972 P.2d 690 (Colo. App. 1998), rev'd sub nom. Lagae v. Lackner , 996 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 2000). See R. Sterling Ambler, Title to Colorado Real Property Held in Trust , 31 Colo. Law. 85, 85–86 (May 2002) (discussing the history of section 38–30–108.5 and related provisions).
Nothing in this section shall be construed to be the exclusive manner in which title to an interest in real or personal property may be held by or on behalf of a trust, and title to an interest in real or personal property may be held by or on behalf of a trust in any other manner permitted by law.¶ 25 Section 38–30–108.5 was enacted in response to the division's decision in Lackner v. King , 972 P.2d 690 (Colo. App. 1998), rev'd sub nom. Lagae v. Lackner , 996 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 2000). See R. Sterling Ambler, Title to Colorado Real Property Held in Trust , 31 Colo. Law. 85, 85–86 (May 2002) (discussing the history of section 38–30–108.5 and related provisions).
“Although we must give effect to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning, the General Assembly's intent and purpose must prevail over a literalist interpretation that leads to an absurd result.” Lagae v. Lackner, 996 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Colo.2000). Additionally, when interpreting a comprehensive legislative scheme, we construe each provision to further the overarching legislative intent.
Thus, if the agent transfers the property to a third party, the third party is protected against a claim by the agent's principal challenging the agent's authority to make the transfer. See Lagae v. Lackner, 996 P.2d 1281, 1285–86 (Colo.2000) (holding similar Colorado statute to be a notice statute with the purpose of eliminating duty of inquiry and preventing an undisclosed beneficiary from contesting the interest of a subsequent taker); see also Trierweiler, 484 B.R. at 794–95 (holding Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34–2–122 is a notice statute and trustee's attempt to invalidate mortgage was outside statute's intended purpose). [¶ 17] Based upon the stipulated facts, this case does not present the circumstances Sections 122 and 123 are intended to address.