Opinion
No. 72670
04-28-2017
MARY ELIZABETH LAFRANCE, Petitioner, v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE MATHEW HARTER, DISTRICT JUDGE, Respondents, and GAIL H. CLINE, Real Party in Interest.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION
This is an original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging a district court order adopting the date of the parties' Vermont civil union as the start date of their marriage.
Although Judge Mathew Harter signed the order at issue in this case, the decision on which that order was based was rendered by Senior Judge Jack Ames. --------
A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. See NRS 34.160; Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008). This court may issue a writ of prohibition to arrest the proceedings of a district court exercising its judicial functions when such proceedings are in excess of the district court's jurisdiction. See NRS 34.320; Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991). Whether to consider a writ petition is within this court's discretion. See Smith, 107 Nev. at 677, 818 P.2d at 851. Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted. See Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004).
Writ relief is typically not available when the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. See NRS 34.170; NRS 34.330; Int'l Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 197, 179 P.3d at 558. And "the right to appeal is generally an adequate legal remedy that precludes writ relief." Pan, 120 Nev. at 224, 88 P.3d at 841. Having reviewed the petition and supporting documents, we conclude that petitioner has a speedy and adequate remedy available in the form of an appeal following the entry of the final judgment in the underlying action. See id. Accordingly, our extraordinary intervention is not warranted and we therefore deny the petition. See NRAP 21(b)(1); Smith, 107 Nev. at 677, 818 P.2d at 851.
It is so ORDERED.
/s/_________, C.J.
Silver
/s/_________, J.
Tao
/s/_________, J.
Gibbons cc: Hon. Mathew Harter, District Judge
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