Opinion
01-18-00600-CR
04-06-2023
Kristian Laflash v. The State of Texas
Trial court case number: CR13693 Trial court: 355th District Court of Hood County
ORDER
Appellant Kristian Joseph Laflash ("Appellant"), with an agreed punishment recommendation from the State, pleaded guilty to the second-degree offense of indecency with a child by sexual contact, and the trial court deferred adjudication of his guilt and placed him on community supervision for eight years. The trial court certified that this was a plea-bargain case and, therefore, Appellant did not have a right to appeal, and that Appellant had waived his right to appeal. The State, alleging violations of the conditions of his community supervision, then moved to adjudicate Appellant's guilt of the charged offense. After a hearing, the trial court found three allegations true, found Appellant guilty, and assessed his punishment at confinement for eighteen years. Appellant filed the present appeal from the judgment adjudicating his guilt.
On appeal, Appellant argues (1) he "did not have the mental competency to waive his constitutional rights during his plea hearing," he "did not intelligently and knowingly waive his constitutional rights during his plea hearing," and the "Trial Court's inquiry to determine intelligent and knowing waiver of constitutional rights [during the plea hearing] was inadequate to determine appellant's waiver of those rights," and (2) he "did not have the mental competency to Adjudicate Guilt." In his prayer, Appellant asks this Court to "remand the cause to the Trial Court for determination of Appellant's competency to waive constitutional rights and adjudicate guilt."
Abatement
On December 10, 2020, this Court issued an order holding the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an informal inquiry into Appellant's mental competency during the hearing on the State's motion to adjudicate guilt. We abated the appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings with respect to the issue of Appellant's competency. This Court ordered the trial court to determine whether it was feasible to conduct a retrospective competency inquiry, and, if so, to conduct an informal inquiry into Appellant's competency to stand trial. If the informal inquiry established that there is "some evidence from any source . . . that would support a finding that [Appellant] may be incompetent to stand trial," we ordered the trial court to then conduct a formal competency trial. Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.004(c)).
The supplemental clerk's record and reporter's record from the remanded competency proceedings, filed in this Court, reflect that after a formal competency trial, the trial court found that Appellant "was competent to stand trial at the November 2017 plea hearing and the May 2018 adjudication hearing." Because the trial court has determined the question of Appellant's competency to stand trial, we lift the abatement and reinstate the appeal on the Court's active docket.
In Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that the competency to plead guilty and waive one's constitutional rights is the same as the "competency to stand trial" standard set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Godinez, 509 U.S. at 389. Under this standard, a person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have (1) "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and has (2) "a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Id. at 396 (quoting Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.003(a) ("A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person.").
Jurisdiction
This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear, and must dismiss, prohibited appeals. See Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ("A court of appeals, while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who plea-bargained is permitted to appeal by [Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure] 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal."); Daniels v. State, 30 S.W.3d 407, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (affirming lower court's holding that it did not have jurisdiction over point of error relating to deferred adjudication proceeding that was raised in direct appeal from judgment adjudicating guilt and affirming lower court's judgment dismissing point of error for lack of jurisdiction); see also McLean v. State, No. 01-22-00239-CR, 2022 WL 3650342, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 25, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding court did not have jurisdiction over appeal when defendant waived his right to appeal and dismissing for lack of jurisdiction).
A defendant placed on deferred adjudication community supervision may raise issues relating to the original plea proceeding leading to the deferred adjudication only in an appeal taken when the deferred adjudication community supervision is first imposed. See Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Issues relating to the original plea proceeding may not be raised in an appeal from an order revoking community supervision and adjudicating guilt. See id.; see also Riles v. State, 452 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) ("We made clear in Manuel . . . that those issues that an appellant can raise in a direct appeal from the initial judgment must be raised, and that failing to do so results in procedural default.").
Appellant's arguments on appeal that he lacked the mental competency to waive his constitutional rights during his plea hearing, that he did not intelligently and knowingly waive his constitutional rights during the plea hearing," and that the trial court failed to adequately inquire during the plea hearing whether Appellant's waiver of his rights was intelligent and knowing are all issues relating to Appellant's original plea hearing, and, thus, he may not raise them in this direct appeal from the judgment adjudicating his guilt. See Daniels, 30 S.W.3d at 408; Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (holding plea-bargaining defendant may not attack voluntariness of his plea on direct appeal from revocation proceeding); cf. Giddens v. State, No. 01-17-00085-CR, 2018 WL 3150522, at *4 (Tex. App-Houston [1st Dist] June 28, 2018, pet. ref d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing to Manuel and holding plea-bargaining defendant "was required to raise his challenge to the trial court's ruling on his suggestion of incompetency in an appeal from the orders of deferred adjudication," and court did not have jurisdiction to consider his challenge on appeal from judgment adjudicating guilt). We thus appear to lack jurisdiction over these issues.
Although Appellant waived his right to appeal from the order of deferred adjudication, he could have raised this argument in a request for habeas relief. See Ex parte Gallow, 602 S.W.3d 605, 608 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2020, no pet.) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072, § 1) ("Generally, article 11.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure allows defendants placed on deferred adjudication to challenge the order of community supervision by filing a request for habeas relief."); see also Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (noting that involuntariness claims are cognizable on writ of habeas corpus).
This Court also lacks jurisdiction to decide moot controversies. Pharris v. State, 165 S.W.3d 681, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ("A case that is moot is normally not justiciable."); Freeman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 179, 181-82 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref d) (stating cause becomes moot when appellate court's judgment cannot have any practical legal effect upon controversy); see generally Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012) (explaining that "a case becomes moot if, since the time of filing, there has ceased to exist a justiciable controversy between the parties," meaning that "the court's action on the merits cannot affect the parties' rights or interests"). In the prayer section of his appellate brief, Appellant requested that this Court "remand the cause to the Trial Court for determination of Appellant's competency to waive constitutional rights and adjudicate guilt." We remanded to the trial court to conduct an informal inquiry into Appellant's mental competency to stand trial, and if necessary, to conduct a formal competency trial. The trial court conducted a formal competency trial and held that Appellant "was competent to stand trial at the November 2017 plea hearing and the May 2018 adjudication hearing." Thus, this Court has given Appellant the relief he requested, and it appears "there has ceased to exist a justiciable controversy between the parties."
This Court may dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction unless Appellant files a written response, citing relevant portions of the record, statutes, rules, and case law, establishing why this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal. Appellant's response, if any, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court by no later than April 21, 2023. The State's reply, if any, to Appellant's response must be filed with the Clerk of the Court by no later than May 5, 2023.
It is so ORDERED.