Opinion
Civ. No. 98-3185, SECTION "K" (3).
February 11, 2000.
Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Order of Summary Judgment and to Alter Judgment (Doc. 65) filed by plaintiff Jeron J. LaFargue ("LaFargue") and Motion to Strike Plaintiff's New Evidence (Doc. 67) filed by defendant Jefferson Parish. Having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, exhibits and the relevant law, the Court finds no merit in either motion. The Court will first take up the Motion for Reconsideration.
Motion for Reconsideration — Standard under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)
While a motion for reconsideration is not recognized in haec verba under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when such a motion is filed no later than 10 days from the entry of judgment where a dispositive pre-trial motion has been granted, then it is treated as a Rule 59(e) motion. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990) abrogated on other grounds, Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1994); Clark v. America's Favorite Chicken Co., 919 F. Supp. 985, 987 (E.D.La. 1996). As this motion was filed on the tenth day after entry of judgment excluding weekends and federal holidays, the Court will utilize Rule 59(e) to determine whether this motion has merit.
In order to reopen a case under Rule 59(e) on the basis of evidentiary materials that were not timely submitted, the mover need not first show that the default was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect or that the evidence is such as to show that the judgment was manifestly wrong.Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 174. Rather, the district court has "considerable discretion" in so deciding; however, it is not limitless.
In any case in which a party seeks to upset a summary judgment on the basis of evidence she failed to introduce on time, two important judicial imperatives clash: the need to bring litigation to an end and the need to render just decisions on the basis of all the facts. The task of the district court in such a case is to strike the proper balance between these competing interests. In order to do this, the court should consider, among other things, the reasons for the moving party's default, the importance of the omitted evidence to the moving party's case, whether the evidence was available to the non-movant before she responded to the summary judgment motion, and the likelihood that the nonmoving party will suffer unfair prejudice if the case is reopened.Id. Reconsideration of a judgment is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly and should not be used to relitigate old matters, raise new arguments, or present evidence that could have been raised prior to entry of the judgment.Albright v. City of New Orleans, 1997 WL 358144 (E.D.La. June 26, 1997) (Sear, J.), citing Wright, Miller Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2810.1.
The Merits of the Motion for Reconsideration
The main thrust of plaintiffs arguments constitute a rehashing of the previously presented ones. As such, the reasons for the dismissal previously expressed by the Court stand and will not be disturbed. Plaintiffs argument that the Court failed to view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff is meritless. Such a characterization misses the mark and ignores the basis for the Court's ruling.
As this Court noted in its Order and Reasons:
So, the inquiry is whether LaFargue has presented evidence that both (1) rebuts the employer's non-discriminatory reason, and (2) creates an inference that age was a determinative factor in the challenged employment decision." Ross, 139 F.3d at 525. This circuit tests motions for summary judgment for sufficiency of the evidence under Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc). As noted in Rhodes:
Under Boeing, "[t]here must be a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question." Id. at 375. Substantial evidence is defined as "evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions." Id. at 374. Consequently, "[a] mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury." Id. Even if the evidence is more than a scintilla, "Boeing assumes that some evidence may exist to support a position which is yet so overwhelmed by contrary proof as to yield to a directed verdict." Neely v. Delta Brick and Tile Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1987).Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993. Plaintiffs "evidence" does not meet theRhodes test.
The Court remains convinced that LaFargue's "evidence" is overwhelmed by contrary proof of Jefferson Parish's legitimate reasons for LaFargue's being required to retire. The immutable fact remains that Wilkinson decided to revamp his office and the manner in which litigation was managed. The majority of LaFargue's duties were reassigned to a paralegal. Simply put, there is no substantial evidence of age discrimination as required under the law. The "additional" evidence of LaFargue's response to a Comprehensive Questionnaire is unavailing. To begin, the Court is not convinced that this material was unavailable to plaintiff and as such need not even be considered by the Court under Rule 59(e). Nonetheless, even reviewing the same in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court does not find such evidence compelling with respect to an age-based animus on the part of Jefferson Parish.
Other "new" evidence presented is a memo dated June 8, 1998, which plaintiff contends "rebuts the Parish's defense that no one knew about the 17th Street Canal case until after LaFargue left the Parish's employ." This "smoking gun" is a run-down of the contents of three files and the recollections of Susan Kirsch, a paralegal in the office, who is apparently plaintiffs witness. The salient entry concerns a document described as the "April Docket" for the office which noted an April 13th trial date for the matter. Debra Yenni, Louis Gruntz and Bill Fortenberry all testified that they did not know about the litigation before April 17, 1998, and thus plaintiff argues that this "false" testimony gives rise to an inference that requires the Court to reopen the matter and reverse itself. The actual document is the Parish Attorney's Office Docket and consists simply of a listing of the name of each case for the entire month of April for the office, the docketed event (i.e. — pre-trial conference, Motion to Compel), the attorney assigned and the reference number for the office. This list is bare of any description or explanation of the cases. Assuming the evidence shows mendacity by Jefferson Parish, it is not sufficient to prevail on this Rule 59(e) motion. The 17th Street Canal issue is not the reason LaFargue was terminated. Rather, it was raised as a supplemental reason during the course of this litigation.
For LaFargue to prevail, there must be substantial evidence that age was a determinative factor in the employment decision. The "new evidence" examined in the light most favorable to plaintiff is not related to age and is tangential to the fundamental inquiry. The record simply and plainly is insufficient to demonstrate that age was the reason for Jefferson Parish's action. Again, as stated previously noted, "Boeing assumes that some evidence may exist to support a position which is yet so overwhelmed by contrary proof as to yield to a directed verdict." Neely v. Delta Brick and Tile Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1987). This "evidence" does not constitute sufficient proof to demonstrate the kind of "mendacity" or "cover-up" such that a reasonable person would so find. LaFargue was not fired because of his age; he was retired because Wilkinson revamped the office.
As to the Motion to Strike, the Court will deny that motion so that the Court of Appeal may get the full flavor of this case. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED and the Motion to Strike is DENIED.