urance Co. of New York, 183 La. 908, 165 So. 140 (1935); Crowe v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States, 179 La. 444, 154 So. 52 (1934); Scalia, supra; Rambin v. Continental Casualty Co., 186 So.2d 861 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1966), writ refused, 249 La. 578, 187 So.2d 740 (1966); Dennis v. Business Men's Assurance Co. of America, 175 So.2d 431 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1965), writ denied, 247 La. 1091, 176 So.2d 146 (1965); Yuratich v. Continental Casualty Co., 606 So.2d 821 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1992); Phillippe v. Commercial Insurance Co. of Newark, N.J., 574 So.2d 374 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1990); Rodriguez v. American Standard Life Accident Insurance Co., 553 So.2d 479 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1989), writ denied, 558 So.2d 586 (La. 1990); Cannon v. Ormet Corp., 479 So.2d 555 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1985), writ denied, 483 So.2d 1023 (La. 1986); Francois v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 405 So.2d 1292 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1981); Foret v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 337 So.2d 676 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1976); LaCour v. Colonial Life Accident Insurance Co., 324 So.2d 458 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1975): Miller v. American Casualty Co., 263 So.2d 398 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1972), writ denied, 262 La. 1151, 266 So.2d 441 (1972). Trustmark argues that the definition in its policies is distinguishable from that of the cases cited, i.e., "Trustmark's policies' contain plain language barring coverage if the insured is working at all.
This rule is especially pertinent where the testimony, as in the case before us, is highly contradictory and emotional. Billiot v. Bourg, La., 338 So.2d 1148; Canter v. Koehring Company, La., 283 So.2d 716; Boatner v. McCrory Corp., La.App., 341 So.2d 1174; Thornton v. Moran, La.App., 341 So.2d 1130; Pennington v. Panepinto, La.App., 328 So.2d 812; Constance v. Smith, La.App., 326 So.2d 905; LaCour v. Colonial Life Accident Insurance Co., La.App., 324 So.2d 458; Wiley v. Travelers Insurance Company, La.App., 300 So.2d 555. Here, the rule is particularly applicable because of additional testimony establishing the fact that a physical encounter did take place.
When evidence is before the trier of fact which, upon a reasonable evaluation of credibility, furnishes a reasonable factual basis for the trial court's finding, the appellate court should not disturb this finding absent manifest error. Where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed even though the appellate court may believe its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Canter v. Koehring Company, 283 So.2d 716 (La. 1973); Landry v. City of Lafayette, 324 So.2d 550 (La.App. 3rd Cir., 1975); Rogers v. Murphy, 324 So.2d 544 (La.App. 3rd Cir., 1975); LaCour v. Colonial Life Accident Insurance Co., 324 So.2d 458 (La.App. 3rd Cir., 1975); Vaughn v. Earthly, 313 So.2d 347 (La.App. 3rd Cir., 1975); Bertrand v. Aetna Casualty Surety Company, 306 So.2d 343 (La.App. 3rd Cir., 1975). Appellant having failed to establish manifest error in the jury determination, the trial court judgment is affirmed at appellant's costs.