Opinion
C. A. 3:21-2740-CMC-PJG
03-04-2022
Glen K. LaConey, Plaintiff, v. Leon Lott; Alan McCrory Wilson; Joshua Koger, Jr.; William Hodge; Clifton B. Newman; R. Knox McMahon; Robert M. Madsen; Jason Scott Chehoski; Jocelyn T. Newman; Lori L. Pelzer, Joseph M. Strickland; James R. Barber, III; Alison Renee Lee; DeAndrea G. Benjamin; Walter Shawn McDaniel; Ashley A. McMahan; Jeanette W. McBride; Joseph Bass; Andrew Caldwell; Nicole T. Wetherton; Meagan B. Burchstead; Kinli B. Abee, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Glen K. LaConey, proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review of the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 23) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The court previously recommended that this action be dismissed based on the original complaint, but this matter was recommitted to the undersigned for consideration of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 15.) Having reviewed the Amended Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court still concludes that this case should be summarily dismissed without issuance and service of process.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The following facts from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are taken as true. This case arises out of four state criminal charges Plaintiff faced in the Richland County Court of General Sessions. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985 seeking damages for purported violations of Plaintiff's civil rights against judges, public defenders, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and the victim associated with one of those charges.
Much of Plaintiff's allegations begin with a business dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant Lori Pelzer, which ended up in civil litigation and eventually in court to enforce a judgment before Defendant and Master-in-Equity Joseph Strickland, whom Plaintiff claims treated him unfairly. Plaintiff further claims that the Honorable James R. Barber, III, and the Honorable Alison Renee Lee, state circuit court judges whom Plaintiff names as defendants, went outside of their jurisdiction to issue orders in Plaintiff's case with Pelzer or ignored his requests for their help.
In August 2011, Plaintiff was arrested by Defendant Walter Shawn McDaniel of the Richland County Sheriff's Department on two counts of second-degree harassment for allegedly threatening judges within South Carolina's Fifth Judicial Circuit. Those judges presided over a civil matter in which Plaintiff sought to enforce a judgment against Defendant Lori Pelzer, who herself had alleged that Plaintiff harassed her. Defendant Alan McCrory Wilson, South Carolina Attorney General, and Ashley A. McMahan, an Assistant Attorney General, assumed the prosecution of Plaintiff's charges, and Defendant Joshua Koger, Jr., was appointed to represent Plaintiff. Koger failed to notify Plaintiff of the appointment and Plaintiff ceased communications with him until Koger informed Plaintiff on June 30, 2014 that Plaintiff's trial would commence on July 7, 2014. Plaintiff thereafter posted derogatory comments about Koger online, which prompted Koger to move to be relieved as Plaintiff's counsel. Contemporaneously, Koger filed a complaint with Defendant Jeanette W. McBride, the Richland County Clerk of Court; the Richland County Sheriff's Department; and other law enforcement agencies against Plaintiff claiming that Plaintiff threatened to “blow up” the Richland County Judicial Center. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 23 at 19.) Plaintiff was arrested by Defendant and Richland County Sheriff's Deputy Andrew Caldwell on July 3, 2014 and charged with threatening the use of destructive devices. Contemporaneously, Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a warrant by Defendant and Richland County Sheriff's Deputy Joseph Bass for first-degree harassment of Pelzer.
On July 7, 2014, the day of trial for Plaintiff's two second-degree harassment charges, the Honorable Clifton B. Newman, South Carolina Circuit Judge, granted Koger's motion to be relieved as counsel but declined to appoint substitute counsel and denied Plaintiff's motion for a continuance. Plaintiff, unable to prepare for trial, pled no contest to the two second-degree harassment charges. Plaintiff has since challenged that guilty plea in a post-conviction relief application, which was dismissed by the state circuit court, but Plaintiff's appeal in that matter remains pending in the South Carolina Court of Appeals. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 23 at 21, 23.)
On Plaintiff's charges for threatening the use of a destructive device and first-degree harassment, Wilson and Defendants Assistant Attorneys General Ashley A. McMahan, Nicole T. Wetherton, Meagan Burchstead, and Kinli Abee assumed the prosecution, and Defendant William Hodge was appointed to represent Plaintiff. On July 21, 2016, Plaintiff's bond was revoked on those charges and the Honorable R. Knox McMahon, South Carolina Circuit Judge, ordered that Plaintiff submit to a competency evaluation. Following Plaintiff's competency evaluation, Plaintiff filed a motion for a speedy trial that Judge McMahon denied.
In August 2017, Plaintiff filed a pro se motion for reinstatement of bond that was denied after a hearing by the Honorable Jocelyn T. Newman, South Carolina Circuit Judge. In an order dated February 2, 2018, Judge Jocelyn Newman found Plaintiff fit to stand trial. On August 30, 2018, Judge Jocelyn Newman dismissed Plaintiff's charge for threatening the use of a destructive device charge because of the State's failure to produce discovery. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 23 at 26.) On October 19, 2018, the State dismissed Plaintiff's first-degree harassment charge for lack of probable cause. (Id. at 26.) Plaintiff was released from detention on October 22, 2018. Upon release, Plaintiff requested that the Richland County Sheriff's Department return his cellphone that was seized in his 2014 arrest, but the phone could not be located.
Plaintiff now brings several claims related to his prosecution on the four charges. Plaintiff claims he was arrested without probable cause on all of the charges and in retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment; that he was denied his right to counsel in the prosecutions; that he was denied a fair and impartial trial on the second-degree harassment charges because he had to represent himself under duress; that his right to a speedy trial was violated on the threatening use of destructive devices and first-degree harassment charges; that the length of his detention awaiting trial on those charges violated the Eighth Amendment; that he was denied equal protection of the law generally; and that all of the defendants conspired with each other to violate his rights.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious, ” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The Amended Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). However, all of Plaintiff's claims of civil rights violations are subject to summary dismissal either because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the defendants or because the defendants are immune from suit.
Plaintiff also purports to bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, but he makes no specific allegations that would support a conspiracy claim. See A Soc'y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011) (“We have specifically rejected section 1985 claims whenever the purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely conclusory manner, in the absence of concrete supporting facts.”) (quoting Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2009).
1. Judicial Immunity
In the court's previous Report and Recommendation, the court concluded that all of the judges Plaintiff named as defendants were absolutely immune from suit for their actions taken in performance of the judicial role. (ECF No. 9 at 5.) In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not add any facts against the originally-named judges so that the court's analysis would change. Additionally, the judges who are newly named in the Amended Complaint are entitled to summary dismissal based on immunity for the very same reasons. See generally Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Therefore, Judges Clifton Newman, McMahon; Jocelyn Newman, Strickland; Barber, Lee, and Benjamin are immune from suit on Plaintiff's claims.
2. Prosecutorial Immunity
In the court's previous Report and Recommendation, the court concluded that Defendant Alan McCrory Wilson was entitled to immunity from suit as a prosecutor. (ECF No. 9 at 5-6.) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not change the court's analysis. Additionally, Plaintiff names several other Assistant Attorneys General in his Amended Complaint, but they are entitled to summary dismissal based on immunity for the same reasons as Wilson. See generally Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Therefore, Defendants Wilson, McMahan, Wetherton, Burchstead, and Abee are immune from suit on Plaintiff's claims.
3.State Actors
As the court concluded in its previous Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 9 at 7-8), and for the same reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendants Joshua Koger, Jr.; William Hodge; Robert M. Madsen; Jason Scott Chehoski; and Lori L. Pelzer because they are not “state actors” amenable to suit. See West, 487 U.S. at 49; Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”); Dillberg v. Cty. of Kitsap, 76 Fed.Appx. 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating a complaining witness is not a state actor amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against these defendants are subject to summary dismissal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
4. Personal Involvement
As the court concluded in its previous Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 9 at 8-9), and for the same reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendant Leon Lott, the Richland County Sheriff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). Similarly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Jeanette McBride, the Richland County Clerk of Court, because he fails to plead any facts that would plausibly show that she was personally involved in the purported deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Lott and McBride upon which relief can be granted.
5. False Arrest
The court construes Plaintiff's claims against his arresting officers-newly named Defendants Walter Shawn McDaniel, Joseph Bass, and Andrew Caldwell-as claims that they arrested him without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. To establish a § 1983 claim based on a Fourth Amendment violation for false arrest, a plaintiff must show that a seizure was effected without probable cause. See Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 356 (4th Cir. 2014); Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996). Thus, there is no § 1983 claim for false arrest unless the officer lacked probable cause. See Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1974).
However, Deputies McDaniel and Bass arrested Plaintiff on various harassment charges pursuant to arrest warrants. “[A] public official cannot be charged with false arrest when he arrests a defendant pursuant to a facially valid warrant.” Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996)); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1979) (finding the plaintiff's false imprisonment claim failed because he was arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant, which satisfied probable cause). Here, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that the arrest warrants were not valid on their face, such that the arresting officer could incur individual liability for arresting Plaintiff in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a false arrest claim against McDaniel and Bass upon which relief can be granted.
Also, Plaintiff's indicates his post-conviction challenge to his second-degree harassment charges remain pending. Consequently, Plaintiff's false arrest claim relating to those charges would be barred. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (holding a claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983 where success of the action would implicitly question the validity of a conviction or duration of the sentence, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been previously invalidated).
As to Defendant Caldwell, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Caldwell lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for threatening to use a destructive device. Plaintiff alleges that his own lawyer, Defendant Koger, lodged a complaint against Plaintiff because Plaintiff threatened to “blow up” a building. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 23 at 19.) Plaintiff claims that Koger's complaint was based on “statements which may not be construed as crime or fraud” (id.), but Plaintiff does not explain what that means or why it would lead an objective officer to conclude that Plaintiff did not threaten to blow up a building. See Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992) (“ ‘Probable cause,' for Fourth Amendment purposes, means ‘facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.' ”) (quoting Michigan v. De Fillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)); see also Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating the probable cause inquiry turns on the suspect's conduct as known to the officer at the time) (citing Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176, 184 (4th Cir. 2016)). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a false arrest claim against Caldwell upon which relief can be granted.
III. Conclusion
Despite having availed himself of the opportunity to amend his pleading, all of the defendants named by Plaintiff are subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or because they are immune. Consequently, the court recommends that this case be summarily dismissed without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiffs claims against the defendants who are immune should be dismissed with prejudice. See generally Brown v. Daniel 230 F.3d 1351 at *4-5 (4th Cir. 2000) (Table); Smith v. Swanson, Civil Action No. 9:18-251-RMG, 2018 WL 1225110, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2018) (citing Ostrzenski v. Seigel 177 F.3d 245, 253 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).