The tort has four elements: (1) the defendant must act intentionally or recklessly, (2) his conduct must be extreme and outrageous, (3) the conduct must be the cause (4) of severe emotional distress. See, e.g., LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo.App. 1981). The single issue here is whether plaintiff has pleaded conduct which is "extreme and outrageous."

(3) by reason of said acts, plaintiff is caused to suffer severe emotional distress for which severe bodily harm results.LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo.App. 1981); but see Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. banc 1983) (modifying the bodily harm requirement). For a plaintiff to recover, a defendant's conduct must have been extreme and outrageous. Commented to § 46, Restatement (2d) of Torts (1965), delineates the type of conduct which is required:

The tort of outrageous conduct under Missouri law requires (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) that the defendant acted in an intentional or reckless manner; and (3) that the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress from which bodily harm resulted. LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo.Ct.App. 1981). None of these elements require the court to interpret any term of the collective bargaining agreement.

The elements of this tort are: (1) the defendant's conduct is extreme and outrageous; (2) the defendant acts in an intentional or reckless manner; and (3) by reason of said acts, plaintiff is caused to suffer severe emotional distress from which bodily harm results. Frye v. CBS Inc., 671 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (citing LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)). "The conduct must have been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."

Id. Plaintiff directs the Court to LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc. 612 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). In LaBrier, the plaintiff's husband, a car salesman, took a vehicle from his dealership employer without permission.

In order to prove a claim of outrageous conduct under Missouri law, the plaintiff must prove: (1) defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) defendant acted in an intentional or reckless manner; and (3) defendant caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress. See Hanks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 859 F.2d 67, 69 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo. 1981)); accord Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983) (abrogating requirement of a contemporaneous physical injury). The parties do not dispute whether there has been proffered substantial evidence that Isgrig's conduct was extreme and outrageous or whether it was intentional or reckless. (Docs.

However, the mere fact that the defendant knows that the plaintiff will interpret the conduct as insulting or will have her feelings hurt is insufficient.LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo.App. 1981) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, Comment (f)). Here, not only has Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Defendants knew of Plaintiff's mental condition, but Plaintiff has also failed to show that the conduct was anything more than insulting or hurtful.

Of the cases arising in other states that hold the defendant liable for IIED when the defendant has knowledge of the plaintiffs emotional or physical weakness, none supports Costello's claim. Instead, the facts giving rise to these claims are much more egregious than those presented here. See Mellaly v. Eastman Kodak Co., 42 Conn. Sup. 17, 597 A.2d 846, 848 (1991) (IIED claim viable when plaintiff showed defendant knew of plaintiffs alcoholism and intentionally taunted and harassed plaintiff regarding same, urging plaintiff to "handle his alcohol and go get drunk" and yelling at plaintiff about recovery); LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford; Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 793-94 (Mo.Ct.App. 1981) (defendant liable for IIED when it knew of plaintiff's severe emotional problems yet came to plaintiff's house and, in presence of neighbors, yelled at plaintiff regarding plaintiff's husband's whereabouts, threatening to have an "all points bulletin" issued for husband's arrest); Boyle v. Wenk, 378 Mass. 592, 392 N.E.2d 1053, 1055-56 (1979) (defendant private investigator may be liable for IIED when, with knowledge that plaintiff had just been discharged from hospital, defendant continued to telephone plaintiff late at night and mentioned his prior rape conviction in her presence). In contrast, in those cases in which a plaintiff was allowed to proceed on an IIED claim, the plaintiff was in a clearly vulnerable position in relation to the defendant.

' " Id. 392 N.E.2d at 1056. See also LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 793-94 (Mo.App. 1981); Meiter v. Cavanaugh, 40 Colo. App. 454, 580 P.2d 399, 401 (1978); 4 STUART M. SPEISER, et al., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 16.14, at 1032-38 (1987) (collecting authorities). We reach the same conclusion in this case.

Mintz properly argues that a relevant factor in determining outrageousness is defendant's knowledge that plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotional distress. See Lucchesi, 149 Ariz. at 79, 716 P.2d at 1016 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f); see also Brown v. Ellis, 40 Conn. Sup. 165, 484 A.2d 944 (1984) (knowing that plaintiff feared heights, defendant assigned him work at heights); LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790 (Mo.App. 1981) (defendants knew of plaintiff's susceptibility to emotional problems). Another relevant factor, however, is that Bell Atlantic had a legitimate business purpose in seeing that Mintz's work was done, either by her or by someone else.