We conclude that for Acuity Insurance to succeed in its claim for additional premiums from Olivas, the workers at issue (1) cannot be independent contractors under Wis. Stat. § 102.07(8)(b), and (2) must have an employer-employee relationship with Olivas. This analysis is consistent with both Jarrett v. LIRC, 2000 WI App 46, 233 Wis. 2d 174, 607 N.W.2d 326, and Labor Ready, Inc. v. LIRC, 2005 WI App 153, 285 Wis. 2d 506, 702 N.W.2d 27. ¶ 30.
"The principal test for determining whether a Chapter 102 employer-employee relationship exists is whether the alleged employer had the right to control the details of the employee's work." Labor Ready, Inc. v. LIRC, 2005 WI.App. 153, ¶11, 285 Wis.2d 506, 702 N.W.2d 27. Additional "secondary tests which should be considered are: (1) The direct evidence of the exercise of the right to control; (2) the method of payment of compensation; (3) the furnishing of equipment or tools for the performance of the work; and (4) the right to fire or terminate the relationship."
In this appeal, our review is of LIRC's interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 102.18(1)(b), and in such cases we apply one of three varying standards of review. See Labor Ready, Inc. v. LIRC, 2005 WI App 153, ¶ 5, 285 Wis. 2d 506, 702 N.W.2d 27. First, if the administrative agency's experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge aid the agency in its interpretation and application of the statute, the agency determination is entitled to "great weight."
When reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation of statutes, this court generally applies one of three standards of review, with varying degrees of deference. Daimler-Chrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 15, ¶ 15, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311; Labor Ready, Inc. v. LIRC, 2005 WI 153, ¶ 5, 285 Wis. 2d 506, 702 N.W.2d 27. The agency's determination is entitled to `great weight' deference if the agency's experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge aid the agency in its interpretation and application of the statute. Labor Ready, 285 Wis. 2d 506, 5 (citation omitted).
This court generally applies one of three standards of review, with varying degrees of deference, when reviewing an agency's legal conclusions under a statute: great weight deference, due weight deference or de novo review. Labor Ready, Inc. v. LIRC, 2005 WI App 153, ¶ 9, 285 Wis. 2d 506, 702 N.W.2d 27. A court must give great weight deference to LIRC's legal conclusions if all of the following apply to the case being reviewed: 1. "the agency was charged by the legislature with the duty of administering the statute";
Since Kress Packing was decided, we have applied great weight deference to the Commission's decisions under that test. See, e.g., Klusendorf Chevrolet-Buick, Inc. v. LIRC, 110 Wis. 2d 328, 331-32, 328 N.W.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1982); see also Labor Ready, Inc. v. LIRC, 2005 WI App 153, 8, 285 Wis. 2d 506, 702 N.W.2d 27 (acknowledging Commission's long experience determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, but reviewing de novo an issue of first impression). At this point, there can be no dispute that the Commission has developed a longstanding interpretation of the rules governing the employer-employee relationship and has used its expertise and specialized knowledge in crafting that interpretation. Contrary to the County's claim, the Commission's interpretation of Wis. STAT. § 102.07 and related statutes provides uniformity and consistency.