Whereas some courts have found the lack of a private right of action to be dispositive, others have held that where as a federal right of action does not frustrate a state's interests or unduly interfere with its administrative scheme, the federal claim is not barred by the McCarran–Ferguson Act. Compare LaBarre v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 175 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir.1999) (holding RICO claim is reverse-preempted by Minnesota law where state did not provide a private right of action under its insurance code) and Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 517 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that RICO claim impaired Ohio's insurance regulatory scheme based upon application of the “Humana factors” noted above), with Weiss v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d 254, 264 (3d Cir.2007) (holding that RICO claim is not reverse-preempted by New Jersey law, despite lack of private right of action, in light of the factors noted above) and BancOklahoma Mortg. Corp. v. Capital Title Co., Inc., 194 F.3d 1089, 1099 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that a RICO claim is not reverse-preempted by the Missouri Unfair Trade Practice Act, despite the lack of a private right of action under state law). See also Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 169 (3d Cir.2001) (finding no reverse-preemption of Lanham Act claims brought against an insurer under Penns

In other words, the McCarran-Ferguson Act bars the application of a federal statute if: (1) the federal statute does not relate specifically to the business of insurance, (2) a state statute has been enacted to regulate the business of insurance, and (3) the federal statute would invalidate, impair, or supersede the state statute. LaBarre v. Credit Acceptance Corp. , 175 F.3d 640, 643–43 (8th Cir.1999). First, RICO does not specifically relate to the business of insurance.

Thus, NationsBank argues that its obligations are limited to the purchase contract that it furnished and do not extend to Hillman's separate obligation to pay off the liens on the vehicles traded in by the Plaintiffs. In support of its argument, NationsBank cites LaBarre v.Credit Acceptance Corp., 11 F. Supp.2d 1071 (D. Minn. 1998), aff'd in part for proposition cited by NationsBank; rev'd in part on other grounds, 175 F.3d 640 (8th Cir. 1999). In LaBarre the court held that a creditor assignee was not liable for the seller's failure to satisfy its obligation to obtain insurance on the vehicle it sold.

To the contrary, if it were clearly established that a state let aggrieved parties bring common-law claims against insurance companies in a given situation, we would seem to be justified in drawing much the same inference as if the cause of action were written into the insurance code, namely that the state had not found its regulatory efforts frustrated by the availability of private litigation. See Humana , 525 U.S. at 312, 119 S.Ct. 710 (citing the availability of analogues under "other state laws, statutory or decisional ," as tending to show that allowing RICO claims would not impair Nevada's regulation of the insurance business (emphasis added)); Saunders , 537 F.3d at 968 (reaching the opposite conclusion because, among other reasons, "neither the Missouri insurance laws nor Missouri common law provide a private right of action for [the alleged misconduct]" (emphasis added)); LaBarre v. Credit Acceptance Corp. , 175 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Minnesota law permits only administrative recourse for violations of [the relevant provision] and, unlike RICO, does not provide a private cause of action."). The district court read our ruling against the plaintiff in LaBarre differently, reasoning that because (in the district court's view) Minnesota law did in fact allow some common-law claims for fraud and breach of contract against insurance companies, the existence of such causes of action must be irrelevant, otherwise it would have factored into our analysis.

Thus, the Rule contemplates a situation exactly like that in which the class members find themselves as holders of an unsatisfied judgment against a seller. The courts are split as to whether this means that assignees are liable for claims beyond the amount they have received under the contract. Compare LaBarre v. Credit Assistance Corp., 175 F.3d 640 (8th Cir. 1999) with Alduridi v. Community Trust Bank, 1999 WL 969644 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1999). Resolution of this question depends on what state law claims and defenses are available, LaBarre, 175 F.3d at 644, and is not necessary for analysis of the propriety of intervention since neither the Applicant nor any of its class members are allegedly parties to the contracts assigning the consumer contracts to the purchasing lenders.

As the court explained, “Minnesota has determined that its insurance market can best be regulated by the Commissioner's pursuit of fines and injunctive relief,” and RICO remedies would frustrate this regulatory scheme. Doe v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A., 107 F.3d 1297, 1300, 1307–08 (8th Cir.1997) (construing McCarran–Ferguson Act); see also LaBarre v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 175 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir.1999) (same). The insureds' breach of contract claims must thus be considered in the context of Minnesota's comprehensive regulatory scheme and the historical deference Minnesota courts have accorded the Commissioner of Commerce in enforcing the law in this area.

See id. at 719-20. Furthermore, several courts post- Humana have held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act bars the application of RICO where, as here, the state insurance scheme does not allow a private right of action for the conduct alleged by Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 537 F.3d 961, 968 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming the McCarran-Ferguson Act's preemption of federal claims where Missouri insurance laws do not provide a private right of action for unfairly discriminatory insurance rates); LaBarre v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 175 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act barred plaintiff's claims against insurers because Minnesota law only allowed administrative recourse and did not provide for a private right of action); In re Managed Care Litig., 185 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1321-22 (S.D.Fla. 2002) (affirming dismissal of RICO claims filed by plaintiffs residing in California, Florida, New Jersey, and Virginia, because unlike the Nevada statute at issue in Humana, those states do not expressly provide a private cause of action for victims of insurance fraud). b. Other State Statutes

By barring private actions to enforce that right, and by granting the Director of Insurance exclusive authority to seek the limited remedies for violations of Chapter 379 prescribed by statute, Missouri law creates an administrative regime that would be frustrated and interfered with, if not supplanted, by "a rate-payer's cause of action to recover damages measured by the difference between the filed rate and the rate that would have been charged absent some alleged wrongdoing." Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1491 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021, 113 S.Ct. 657, 121 L.Ed.2d 583 (1992); see LaBarre v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 175 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1999). We reiterate that our decision is limited to the impact of the specific claims asserted and relief sought by plaintiffs on the exclusively administrative insurance rate-setting regime under Missouri law.

There is nothing of record in this case that suggests that the availability of RICO would disrupt the playing field in the state insurance regime beyond what was clearly intended by state law. That approach was reaffirmed with little discussion post- Humana in LaBarre v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 175 F.3d 640 (8th Cir.1999). After canvassing the Humana factors, we are left with the firm conviction that RICO does not and will not impair New Jersey's state insurance scheme.

Id. (quoting Humana, 525 U.S. at 314, 119 S.Ct. 710); see also Humana, 525 U.S. at 312, 119 S.Ct. 710 ("Moreover, the [Nevada] Act is not hermetically sealed; it does not exclude application of other state laws, statutory or decisional."); Sabo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that RICO does not impair a state insurance law that permits private rights of action under other state laws). But see LaBarre v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 175 F.3d 640 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the lack of a private right of action in the state insurance laws was dispositive without considering whether the statute at issue permitted the application of other state laws to the conduct of insurers). RICO furthers Virginia's interest in policing insurance fraud and misconduct and does not frustrate any declared state policy.