Opinion
No. C 04-4974 MHP.
March 9, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff Laurie H. LaBare filed this action against the Bureau of Justice Assistance of the Department of Justice ("BJA") seeking judicial review of the BJA's decision finding her ineligible to receive death benefits under the Public Safety Officer Benefits Act ("PSOBA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3796 et seq., and challenging the denial of benefits to all similarly situated claimants. Now before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Having considered the parties' arguments and for the reasons set forth below, the court enters the following memorandum and order.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Laurie H. LaBare is the widow of Craig LaBare. Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 3. Prior to Craig LaBare's death, he was employed as an aerial firefighting pilot by Hawkins Powers, a private contractor retained by the United States Forest Service. Id. Defendant BJA is an agency within the United States Department of Justice that is charged with administering the PSOBA. Under Part A of the PSOBA, certain enumerated decedents of any public safety officers who have died as a direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty are entitled to death benefits in the amount of $250,000. 42 U.S.C. § 3796(a). The statute defines "public safety officer" to include, inter alia, "an individual serving a public agency in an official capacity . . . as a law enforcement officer, as a firefighter, as a chaplain, or as a member of a rescue squad or ambulance crew." Id. § 3796b(8)(A). Regulations issued by the BJA set forth a substantially identical definition of the term. 28 C.F.R. § 32.2(j).
On June 17, 2002, Craig LaBare died in a plane crash while he was fighting a wildfire in Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest near Walker, California. Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 3-6. Following her husband's death, plaintiff filed an application with the BJA seeking death benefits under the PSOBA. On October 16, 2003, the BJA denied her claim on the ground that as an employee of a private government contractor, Craig LaBare was not, at the time of his death, serving as a "public safety officer" within the meaning of the statute. Janke Decl., Exh. A. Plaintiff subsequently sought review of that decision before a BJA hearing officer, who affirmed the denial of her benefits claim on December 7, 2004.Id., Exh. B. Plaintiff has since requested further review of the hearing officer's decision by the Director of the BJA, a request that is now pending before the Director pending the submission of additional evidence in support of her appeal.
Meanwhile, on November 23, 2004, plaintiff filed the instant action for judicial review of the BJA's denial of her request for death benefits, asserting that this court has jurisdiction to entertain such an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Chapter 7 of Part I of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 1. On March 7, 2005, the BJA moved to dismiss plaintiff's claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For reasons that will become apparent in the discussion that follows, the court need only address the BJA's motion under Rule 12(b)(1), which seeks dismissal of this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. See, e.g., Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2067 (2004). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the propriety of the court's jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Consequently, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion will be granted if the complaint, when considered in its entirety, on its face fails to allege facts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Savage, 343 F.3d at 1039 n. 2; Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. General Tel. Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Alternatively, a defendant may seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) by presenting evidence to refute the jurisdictional facts alleged in the complaint. Savage, 343 F.3d at 1039 n. 2; Thornhill Publ'g, 594 F.2d at 733. Once the defendant has introduced such evidence, the plaintiff "must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction." Savage, 343 F.3d at 1039 n. 3 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
The BJA first moves to dismiss plaintiff's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain actions seeking judicial review of PSOBA benefits determinations. Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over claims seeking money damages against the United States and not sounding in tort. Id. § 1491(a)(1). Where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000, the Claims Court's Tucker Act jurisdiction is exclusive. Id. § 1346(a)(2); cf. McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 590 (9th Cir. 1983) ("There is district court jurisdiction for civil actions against the United States, such as a taking claim, only if the damages sought do not exceed $10,000.").
Consistent with this general rule, a number of courts have concluded that the Tucker Act divests district courts of jurisdiction to entertain actions seeking an award of benefits under the PSOBA. See, e.g., Russell v. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., 637 F.2d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 1981); Durco v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 424, 426 (1988). Plaintiff does not take issue with the general rule that the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain claims for money damages brought pursuant to the Act. Rather, she suggests that her prayer for relief, which seeks declaratory and equitable relief as well as money damages, removes this action from the scope of the Claims Court's exclusive jurisdiction and permits this court to entertain her PSOBA claim.
The court finds this argument to be without merit. As the Tenth Circuit has observed, "[a] party may not circumvent the Claims Court's exclusive jurisdiction by framing a complaint in the district court as one seeking injunctive, declaratory, or mandatory relief where the thrust of the suit is to obtain money from the United States." Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc. v. United States, 901 F.2d 1530, 1532 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Vanalco, Inc. v. United States. 48 Fed. Cl. 68, 76 (2000) (observing that "the test for determining if a case belongs in the Court of Federal Claims is whether or not the prime objective or essential purpose of the complaining party is to obtain money from the Federal Government") (citations and original alterations omitted). Plaintiff cannot seriously dispute that the relief which she seeks in this action, an award of death benefits under the PSOBA, is monetary in nature. Thus, because the "essential purpose" of this action is to obtain money from the United States, see Eagle-Pitcher, 901 F.2d at 1532, the court must reject plaintiff's attempt to avoid the Claims Court's exclusive jurisdiction by framing her complaint as a request for declaratory or injunctive relief.
Nor is the fact that plaintiff seeks class action treatment for her claim of any moment in the court's jurisdictional analysis. It is axiomatic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can neither "expand the jurisdiction of the district courts" nor "create jurisdiction where none exists." United States v. Suntip Co., 82 F.3d 1468, 1474 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 82 and United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 589-90 (1941)). In asserting that her status as a representative of a putative class confers jurisdiction upon this court, plaintiff invites the court to rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to circumvent the clear limits on district court jurisdiction that the Tucker Act imposes. This is an invitation that the court must refuse. The court therefore concludes that the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim that she is entitled to receive death benefits under the PSOBA.
In her complaint, plaintiff also appears to assert that the denial of PSOBA benefits to government contractors violates her Fifth Amendment right to equal protection. Assuming arguendo that the court has jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's constitutional claim, the court would review the asserted equal protection violation under the "rational basis" standard. See, e.g., Ball v. Massanari 254 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2001). Under this highly deferential standard or review, there is no doubt that plaintiff's claim would fail as a matter of law.
Having reached this conclusion, the court must decide whether to transfer this action to the Court of Federal Claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, a district court, despite lacking jurisdiction over the substance of a plaintiff's claims, retains the authority to transfer a civil action to another federal forum in which the action might have been properly filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1631; see also Molina-Camacho v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2004). Transfer is appropriate under section 1631 if three conditions are met: (1) "the transferring court lacks jurisdiction; (2) the transferee court could have exercised jurisdiction at the time the action was filed; and (3) the transfer is in the interest of justice."Molina-Camacho, 393 F.3d at 942(quoting Cruz-Aguilera v. INS, 245 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Here, the Director of the BJA has yet to reach a final decision on the merits of plaintiff's death benefits application. Although plaintiff argues that she is excused from exhausting this available administrative remedy on grounds of futility, it is sufficient for purposes of adjudicating the instant motion to note that the interest of justice would be served by permitting the BJA to reconsider plaintiff's benefits claim in advance of any proceedings in the Claims Court that plaintiff might choose to pursue. Accordingly, the court finds that an order transferring this action to the Court of Federal Claims would be premature at this time. The court therefore dismisses plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff remains free to seek redress in the Claims Court and to present her futility of exhaustion argument in that forum.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED without prejudice to refiling this action in the Court of Federal Claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.