Section 559.77(1), Florida Statutes, authorizes civil actions for violations of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act. See Lab'y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So.3d 318, 321 (Fla. 2022). Section 559.77(2) permits a prevailing plaintiff to recover "actual damages" and "additional statutory damages" not exceeding $1,000.
(quoting Shepard v. State, 259 So. 3d 701, 705 (Fla. 2018))); Coates v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 365 So. 3d 353, 354 (Fla. 2023) ("In deciding whether this statute is a prevailing-party statute, we apply the supremacy-of-the-text principle, recognizing that ‘[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.’ " (quoting Levy, 326 So. 3d at 681)); Lab. Corp, of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 323 (Fla. 2022) ("In interpreting a statute, our task is to give effect to the words that the legislature has employed in the statutory text.
To derive this common meaning, we must "be mindful of the ‘fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.’ " Lab'y Corp. of Am. v. Davis , 339 So. 3d 318, 324 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Deal v. United States , 508 U.S. 129, 132, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993) ). And in cases that task us with interpreting multiple provisions, where possible, we "must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another." Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist. , 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992).
Consequently, "[t]he words of a statute are to be taken in their natural and ordinary signification and import; and if technical words are used, they are to be taken in a technical sense." Lab'y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So.3d 318, 323 (Fla. 2022) (quoting James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 432 (1826), quoted in Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 69 n.1). According to the Florida Supreme Court, when "the [L]egislature has not defined the words used in a [statute], the language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning."
Much of our analysis turns upon the interpretation of statutory law, which is also an issue subject to de novo review. See Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So.3d 318, 323 (Fla. 2021) (citing Lopez v. Hall, 233 So.3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2018)). III.
The trial court agreed with the Department and denied Bell's motion for reconsideration. "In interpreting a statute, [a court's] task is to give effect to the words that the legislature has employed in the statutory text," Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Davis , 339 So. 3d 318, 323 (Fla. 2022), and what those words "convey, in their context, is what the text means," Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs. , 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)).
Indeed, this Court found only two Florida cases where the terms FCCPA and email appear. See Davis v. Sheridan Healthcare, Inc., 281 So.3d 1259, 1262 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2019) (holding that workers' compensation law does not bar FCCPA claim against medical service providers) opinion approved of sub nom. Lab'y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So.3d 318 (Fla. 2022); Colombo v. Robertson, Anschutz & Schneid, P.L., 341 So.3d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (finding no FCCPA violation). Neither of the cases is on point.
We read the requirements of subsection (4) in their physical and logical relationship to subsection (5) and conclude that the former sets out the content of the public interest determination required by the latter. See Antonin Scalia &Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012) (explaining that we must consider "the physical and logical relation of [a text's] many parts"); see also Lab'y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So.3d 318, 324 (Fla. 2022) ("Under the whole-text canon, proper interpretation requires consideration of 'the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.'" (citing Scalia &Garner, supra, at 167)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Revival Chiropractic, LLC, 385 So.3d 107, 113 (Fla. 2024) ("Provisions in the texts of statutes and contracts cannot be viewed in isolation from the full textual context of which they are a part.").
We have also recognized the fundamental principle that "[c]ontext is a primary determinant of meaning." Lab’y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 324 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Scalia & Gamer, supra note 1, at 167). Provisions in the texts of statutes and contracts cannot be viewed in isolation from the full textual context of which they are a part.
Looking at the complete text of the provision allows us to consider the physical and logical relation of its parts, as they might have been viewed by a voter. See Lab’y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 324 (Fla. 2022).The dissent cites Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (invalidating on privacy grounds a state law criminalizing the use of contraception in the marital context), to support the assertion that the involvement of others does not prevent an activity or procedure from being a private matter.