Summary
In La Mesa Lemon Grove Spring Valley Irr. Dist. v. Hornbeck, (Cal.) 8 P.2d 1031, 1035 (companion case to Palo Verde Irr. Dist. v. Jamison, supra), the rule is announced, based on the California Constitution, that in that state the property of an irrigation district is state-owned property and exempt as property of the state, while in this jurisdiction the property of an irrigation district, as shown above, is owned by the district and held in trust for the land owners within its boundaries.
Summary of this case from Lewiston Orchards Irr. Dist. v. GilmoreOpinion
Rehearing Granted March 31, 1932.
In Bank.
Three petitions for writs of mandate; one by La Mesa, Lemon Grove & Spring Valley Irrigation District, against E. A. Hornbeck and others, another by Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District against H. D. Wylie and others, and another by Merced Irrigation District against F. R. Henderson and others, directing the boards of supervisors and district attorneys of San Diego, Glenn, and Merced counties to make the approve orders canceling certain described taxes, assessments, tax sales, and tax deeds. By stipulation the petitions were consolidated for hearing.
Writs made peremptory. COUNSEL
Albert J. Lee and Stearns, Luce & Forward, all of San Diego, for petitioner La Mesa, Lemon Grove & Spring Valley Irr. Dist.
Hankins & Hankins, of San Francisco, for petitioner Glenn-Colusa Irr. Dist.
Downey, Brand & Seymour, of Sacramento, for petitioner Merced Irr. Dist.
A. L. Cowell, of Stockton, T.C. Boone, of Modesto, C. L. Childers, of El Centro (H. J. Hankins, of San Francisco, of counsel), for Irrigation Districts Ass’n of California.
Milton M. Hogle, Dist. Atty., and Duard F. Geis, both of Willows, Thomas Whelan, Dist. Atty., and E. I. Kendall, Deputy Dist. Atty., both of San Diego, F. M. Ostrander, Dist. Atty., and S. P. Galvin, Deputy Dist. Atty., both of Merced, and Arthur C. Shepard, Deputy Dist. Atty., of Fresno, for respondents.
Herbert Kelly, of San Diego, for respondent Thomas Whelan.
Everett W. Mattoon, Co. Counsel, and J. H. O’Connor, Asst. Co. Counsel, both of Los Angeles, and Elmer W. Heald, Dist. Atty., and S. L. McCrory, Deputy Dist. Atty., both of El Centro, amici curiae.
OPINION
PER CURIAM
The above-named irrigation districts have severally petitioned this court for writs of mandate directing the boards of supervisors and district attorneys of San Diego, Glenn, and Merced counties to make and approve orders cancelling certain described taxes, assessments, tax sales, and tax deeds. It is alleged by petitioners and admitted by respondents that in each case the petitioning irrigation district has acquired certain parcels of real property, described in the respective petitions, pursuant to sales for delinquent assessments under the provisions of sections 47 and 48 of the California Irrigation District Act (St. 1897, pp. 270, 271), as amended in 1927 (St. 1927, pp. 190, 191). It further appears that in each case at the time that such properties were acquired by said irrigation districts various county taxes and special assessments had been levied against said properties, and had not been paid. Petitioners contend that they are entitled to have all of these county taxes, special assessments, and the tax sales and deeds based thereon canceled under the provisions of section 3804a of the Political Code as amended in 1925. St. 1925, p. 431. Respondents contend that petitioners are not entitled to the cancellation of the county taxes and special assessments and the tax sales and deeds based thereon under the provisions of section 3804a of the Political Code, or under any other statutory or constitutional provisions.
Inasmuch as the three petitions involve similar points of law, by stipulation of the parties the three cases have been consolidated for hearing.
The various types of claims which petitioners contend they are entitled to have canceled can be briefly summarized as follows:
In proceeding numbered S. F. 14324, the property described in the petition was transferred to the irrigation district, after a sale for delinquent assessments, by a deed dated January 20, 1931, which deed was recorded January 26, 1931. The claim of the state is based upon a tax sale at which the described parcel was sold to the state on July 3, 1929, for delinquent county taxes. No deed has issued to the state in reference to this property.
In proceeding numbered S. F. 14323, several parcels are involved. The parcels referred to in the petition as parcels I and IV were transferred to the irrigation district, after a sale for delinquent assessments, by deeds dated September 4, 1930, which deeds were recorded September 26, 1930. Parcel I was sold to the state for delinquent county taxes on August 28, 1926. Parcel IV was sold to the state for delinquent county taxes on August 24, 1926. No deeds have issued to the state in reference to these properties. Parcels referred to in the petition as parcels II and III have not only been sold to the state for delinquent county taxes, but deeds have issued to the state as provided in section 3785 of the Political Code. Both parcels were transferred to the irrigation district, after a sale for delinquent assessments, by deeds dated September 4, 1930, which deeds were recorded September 26, 1930. The deed to the state in reference to parcel II is dated June 30, 1926, while the deed to the state in reference to parcel III is dated June 29, 1928.
In proceeding numbered S. F. 14322, the property described in the petition was transferred to the irrigation district, after a sale for delinquent assessments, by a deed dated September 25, 1928, which deed was recorded August 17, 1929. The claim of the state is based upon a tax sale at which the described parcel was sold to the state on June 29, 1929, for delinquent county taxes. No deed has issued to the state in reference to this property. In addition to the general county tax the parcel involved in this proceeding was likewise subject to an assessment under the Acquisition and Improvement Act of 1925, p. 849, and was also subject to a further assessment levied by a fire protection district under the authority conferred by the statutes of 1923, p. 431. It appears that both of these special assessments were levied at the same time and as part of the levy for county purposes generally. For the purpose of these cases it would appear to be immaterial that some of the parcels involved have been only sold to the state, while in reference to other parcels deeds have issued to the state. If petitioners are entitled to the relief prayed for where the property has been only sold to the state but no deed issued, they would likewise be entitled to such relief even though a deed has issued to the state. This is so because section 3787 of the Political Code has long provided that ‘such deed [issued to the state after the five-year period of redemption has expired] conveys to the state the absolute title to the property described therein, free of all encumbrances, except any lien for taxes levied for * * * irrigation district purposes. * * *’ The state, therefore, even where a deed has issued to it, takes the property subject to the lien of irrigation district taxes.
Preliminarily, it should be stated that there can be no doubt that if petitioner are entitled to a cancellation of the tax liens mandamus is the proper means of securing that relief. State Land Board v. Henderson, 197 Cal. 470, 241 P. 560; San Francisco v. McGovern, 28 Cal.App. 491, 152 P. 980.
The first question presented is whether or not when land has been acquired by an irrigation district pursuant to a sale for a delinquent assessment, duly and properly levied, is such district entitled to a cancellation of all tax liens, sales, and deeds existing against the property, which tax liens, sales, and deeds are based upon a failure to pay county taxes? The problem involving the special assessments will be considered later in this opinion.
The proper solution of this question depends basically upon the proper interpretation of article 13, § 1, of the Constitution, and section 3804a of the Political Code. So far as pertinent here, article 13, § 1, as amended in 1914, provides: ‘All property in the state except as otherwise in this Constitution provided, not exempt under the laws of the United States, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law, or as hereinafter provided * * * and further provided, that property used for free public libraries and free museums, growing crops, property used exclusively for public schools, and such as may belong to the United States, this state, or to any county, city and county, or municipal corporation within this state shall be exempt from taxation, except such lands and the improvements thereon located outside of the county, city and county, or municipal corporation owning the same as were subject to taxation at the time of the acquisition of the same by said county, city and county, or municipal corporation; ’
Section 3804a of the Political Code, as amended in 1925 (St. 1925, p. 431), provides: ‘Any uncollected tax, or assessment, or portion thereof, or penalty or costs thereon, heretofore or hereafter assessed, charged or levied more than once, or erroneously or illegally, or upon that portion of an assessment found to be in excess of the actual cash value of the property assessed, by reason of a clerical error of the assessor, or upon an assessment for improvements on land when such improvements did not in fact exist at the time said tax or assessment became a lien, or upon an assessment of property which after the time said tax or assessment became a lien was acquired and owned by the state, or by any county, city and county, municipal corporation, school district or other political subdivision and which, because of such public ownership, is not subject to sale for delinquent taxes, may, upon satisfactory proof thereof, be canceled by the officer having custody of the record thereof upon the order of the board of supervisors, or other governing board with the written consent of the district attorney, city attorney or legal advisor of said board; provided, that no cancellation shall be made of such charges on property exempt from taxation in event of failure to comply with the provisions of law, if any, relative to the manner of claiming such exemptions. If real property has been sold to the state or other subdivision for nonpayment of any tax levied as described in this section, and a certificate of sale or deed therefor has been issued to the state, or other subdivision and the state or other subdivision has not disposed of the property so sold, the order of the board shall also direct the officer having custody of the record thereof to cancel the certificate of sale or deed so issued.’
Petitioners contend that property acquired by an irrigation district pursuant to a sale for delinquent assessment is property which belongs to the state within the meaning of article 13, § 1, that such property is therefore exempt from taxation, and is not subject to sale for delinquent taxes; that under section 3804a of the Political Code petitioners are entitled to a cancellation of all tax liens against the property existing by reason of delinquent county taxes; that petitioners are entitled to this relief whether or not a deed has been issued to the state.
Respondents, supported by various amici curiae, very strongly contend that such cancellation of the lien for county taxes should not be permitted. Respondents emphasize the evil results that will flow from such an interpretation, pointing out that a decision adverse to the counties may seriously hamper some counties in carrying out their governmental functions. In various forms and with varying degrees of emphasis they point out that if the irrigation districts prevail in this proceeding large blocks of land will be removed from the county assessment roll, because of many persons allowing their tax and assessment payments to become delinquent. It is pointed out that the irrigation districts will buy in large areas of land because of delinquent assessments; that such areas will not be subject to county taxation; that this will necessarily and unfairly increase the tax burden on other county lands. These arguments, while pertinent if addressed to a legislative body, can have no weight before this court, if in fact the constitutional and statutory provisions provide for such cancellation. It is the duty of this court to interpret those provisions, and, if the language is clear and unambiguous, to give effect to those provisions regardless of the hardships that may result. The main legal argument of respondents proceeds on the following theory: It is contended that, although undoubtedly the ‘operative’ property of an irrigation district is exempt from taxation, such exemption does not extend to ‘nonoperative’ property; that the exemption found in article 13, § 1, only extends to property ‘used’ for a ‘public purpose’; that property acquired by an irrigation district pursuant to a sale for delinquent taxes is ‘nonoperative’ property and is not ‘used for’ a ‘public purpose’; that therefore such property is subject to taxation by the county in which said property is located, and is subject to sale for delinquent county taxes; that petitioners are therefore not entitled to a cancellation of such taxes. Respondents cite no decision of any court in this state that makes the distinction between operative and nonoperative property contended for, but cite certain cases from other jurisdictions where such a distinction is recognized. Those decisions are of course of no weight unless the statutory and constitutional provisions in those states are substantially the same as those here involved. Particularly are the decisions from other states of little importance in the instant case because the courts of this state have already directly passed upon the very question here involved adversely to respondents.
The question involved is really severable into two parts: First, is the exemption from taxation of state property found in article 13, § 1, dependent upon whether such property is used as ‘operative’ property; and, secondly, is the property of irrigation districts state property within the meaning of article 13, § 1?
Turning our attention to the first part of this problem, and assuming for the moment that property acquired by an irrigation district for delinquent assessments is state-owned property, it must be kept in mind that the matter of exemptions from taxation is not a matter of policy, but is purely dependent upon constitutional and legislative enactment. We are of the opinion that article 13, § 1, exempts all state property from taxation regardless of use. The test found in that provision is ownership, not use. The express language of the constitutional provision is that all property ‘as may belong to * * * this state * * * shall be exempt from taxation.’ No restriction is placed upon the exemption at all. All that is required is that the property ‘belong to,’ i. e., be owned by, the state. To hold that the exemption only applied to property used by the state for a public purpose, would be to place a restriction on the exemption not found in the Constitution. This we are not permitted to do. Particularly is that so in the present case because, in the same sentence exempting state-owned property from taxation, the people have seen fit to exclude certain property ‘used for’ certain purposes. The exact language is ‘property used for free public libraries,’ etc. ‘Property used exclusively for public schools,’ and immediately thereafter follows the expression ‘as may belong to * * * this state’ is found. Obviously and clearly a distinction was intended and expressed.
Not only is the above interpretation a reasonable one, but it is the interpretation that has been given to that very section by the courts of this state. The first case directly so holding is San Francisco v. McGovern, 28 Cal.App. 491, 152 P. 980. In that case the city and county of San Francisco petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the board of supervisors of Tuolumne county to cancel certain county taxes assessed on certain described real property in Tuolumne county owned by the city and county of San Francisco. It was admitted that the land involved had been purchased by the city and county of San Francisco in connection with the Hetch Hetchy water project, and that the said city and county intended to use the land not only for supplying the inhabitants of the city and county of San Francisco with water and power, but to sell water and power to the inhabitants of other municipalities. At the time the case arose article 13, § 1, provided that such property ‘as may belong to the United States, this state, or to any county * * * or municipal corporation * * * shall be exempt from taxation.’ The section has since been amended as far as county and municipal property is concerned. The county of Tuolumne contended, as is contended in the instant cases, that under the Constitution the only property of a municipality exempt from taxation was that used for governmental purposes, and that property of a municipality held by it in its private and proprietary capacity situated in a taxing district other than that in which the municipality is located is subject to taxation in that district. The District Court of Appeal, in an excellently reasoned opinion, held that the exemption involved depended solely and entirely on ownership, and that the use to which said property was put was immaterial. At page 500 of 28 Cal.App., 152 P. 980, 984, it is stated: ‘We find ourselves unable to discover, from the language employed in the Constitution, any reason for interpretation, or ground for entertaining doubt as to its meaning. The language employed in classifying the property declared to be exempt from taxation, it will be noted, limits the exemption as to property used for free public libraries and free museums and property used for public schools, but the language following is: ‘And such (property) as may belong to the United States, this state, or to any county or municipal corporation within this state shall be exempt from taxation.’ The condition here seems only to be that it (the property) shall ‘belong’ to the United States, etc. Its location or use is not made a condition of its exemption. The word ‘belong’ is applied alike and with the same force and meaning to the United States, this state and to counties and municipalities, and it seems to us was employed to denote an unqualified ownership of the property, not an ownership subject to the condition that it was to be used exclusively for governmental purposes. Certainly it was not intended to attach any such condition to property belonging to the United States or this state and how can we give it a different meaning as applied to counties and municipalities? ‘The Constitution of a state derives its force and authority form the vote of the people adopting it. For that reason it is a general rule that in construing the provisions of a Constitution the words employed therein shall be given the meaning which they bear in ordinary use among the people. The natural and ordinary meaning of the words is to be accepted, except where a word is used the meaning whereof is established by statute or by judicial construction.’ Burke v. Snively, 208 Ill. 328, 70 N.E. 327, 329. All the dictionaries give the word ‘belong,’ among other meanings, the definition: ‘To be the property of’ (Webster, Century); ‘to be possessed by’ (Worcester). That this was the sense in which the framers of the Constitution used the word will be seen when we consider the debates upon its adoption by the constitutional convention hereinafter to be noticed. It is true, as suggested by defendants that we must rather look to the sense in which the people regarded the word, when they voted at the polls, for it was the people and not the framers who finally passed upon the provision. We must, however, assume that the people gave to the word its ordinary and natural meaning, and in doing so we can reach no other conclusion than that they understood the provision to exempt ‘such (property) as may belong to’ as meaning ‘such (property) as was owned by’ or ‘the property of’ the United States, this state, etc.’
We are in entire accord with the views thus expressed by the District Court of Appeal, which have been recently affirmed by this court in the case of State Land Settlement Board v. Henderson, 197 Cal. 470, 241 P. 560, where it was specifically held that state-owned lands are exempt from taxation regardless of use.
We are therefore of the opinion that state-owned lands are exempt from taxation, regardless of the use to which such lands are put.
From what has heretofore been said, it necessarily follows that if the property owned by an irrigation district is state-owned property within the meaning of article 13, § 1, of the Constitution, then such property is exempt from taxation. We turn now to a discussion of that question.
In order to determine whether the property of an irrigation district is state-owned property within the meaning of that section it is not necessary to enter into a detailed discussion as to the nature of irrigation districts. That question has been answered many times in many different ways. However, the exact question now involved has been directly passed upon by this court. In the case of Turlock Irr. Dist. v. White, 186 Cal. 183, 198 P. 1060, 17 A. L. R. 72, it was directly held that as far as the exemption involved in article 13, § 1, of the Constitution is concerned the property of an irrigation district is state-owned property. In that case the Turlock Irrigation District, in Merced and Stanislaus counties, owned certain real property in Tuolumne county. The latter county sought to tax the same, resulting in an action for an injunction. In 1914, article 13, section 1, had been amended to provide that lands owned by county, city and county or municipal corporation in another county were subject to taxation in that county. It was contended that an irrigation district was a municipal corporation, and that therefore lands owned by it outside the county in which it was located were subject to taxation. This court held that an irrigation district was an arm of the state government, and that the lands owned by it were exempt from taxation as state-owned lands. At page 189 of 186 Cal., 198 P. 1060, 1062, the court stated:
‘It should be stated that it is conceded that irrigation districts were not taxable before the amendment of 1914, and are not now, unless such taxation is authorized by the amendment, but it is contended that they then were exempt because of the special exemption of the property of ‘municipal corporations’ contained in such section, and that such irrigation districts are now taxable under the special exception in the amendment authorizing the taxation of ‘municipal corporations.’ To the contrary, such exemption existed because of the express exemption of the property of ‘the state,’ and contained in that section because of the implications in favor of the exemption of public property. See Reclamation Dist. No. 551 v. County of Sacramento, 134 Cal. 477, 66 P. 668, and cases therein cited for a discussion of the principle applicable. See, also, Webster v. Board of Regents, 163 Cal. 705, 126 P. 974, and cases cited. Reference may also be made to Central Irr. Dist. v. De Lappe, 79 Cal. 351, 21 P. 825, and Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. 315, 187 P. 1056, for a discussion of the similarity of the organization of reclamation and irrigation districts.
‘The language quoted in the dissenting opinion from Southern Pacific Co. v. Levee Dist. No. 1, 172 Cal. 345, 156 P. 502, read in the light of the express statement in the opinion that such districts are not ‘municipal corporations,’ would indicate that the court considered that the property of the district was ‘state property,’ rather than property of a ‘municipal corporation.’ The same view is taken in People v. Reclamation District No. 551, 117 Cal. 114, 48 P. 1016, where it is said: ‘Certainly, these districts were not municipal corporations as that term is used in the Constitution. * * * If these districts can be said to be corporations at all, I think they are properly called public corporations for municipal purposes. That phrase means no more than that they are state organizations for state purposes. They certainly are not municipal corporations in the strict sense.’ Similarly, in Re Madera Irr. Dist., 92 Cal. 296, 322, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 14 A. L. R. 755, 28 P. 272, 278 [675] it was said: ‘The property held by the corporation is in trust for the public, and subject to the control of the state."
When this decision is read in connection with the rule enunciated in the McGovern and Henderson Cases, supra, we see no escape from the conclusion that property of an irrigation district acquired by it pursuant to sales for delinquent assessments is state property, and as such is exempt from taxation. It therefore follows, of course, that such property, by reason of such public ownership, is not subject to sale for delinquent taxes under the express terms of section 3804a of the Political Code, and petitioners are entitled to a cancellation of all county taxes levied against the property. It follows, also, that petitioners are entitled to this relief whether or not a deed has been issued to the state based on a tax sale for delinquent county taxes because section 3804a of the Political Code provides for such cancellation, and section 3787 of the Political Code, quoted supra, provides the deed of the state is subject to the irrigation district lien.
We turn now to a discussion of the effect of the assessments levied under the Acquisition and Improvement Act of 1925. It appears that the property involved in proceeding S. F. 14322, prior to the date of the issuance of the irrigation district tax deed, had been impressed with a tax lien under the provisions of section 41 of that act (St. 1925, p. 890). By that section all of the laws for the collection and enforcement of taxes for county purposes are made applicable to the collection and enforcement of this assessment. The irrigation district on September 25, 1928, became the owner of these lands by deed as authorized by section 47 of the Irrigation District Act, as amended. Under the provisions of section 48 of that act the district took ‘absolute title * * * free of all incumbrances. * * *’ Section 3804a of the Political Code provides: ‘Any uncollected tax, or assessment, or portion thereof * * * heretofore or hereafter assessed * * * or upon an assessment of property which after the time said tax or assessment became a lien was acquired and owned by the state * * * and which, because of such public ownership, is not subject to sale for delinquent taxes, may * * * be canceled * * * provided, that no cancellation shall be made of such charges * * * in event of failure to comply with the provisions of the law, if any, relative to the manner of claiming such exemptions. * * *’ It must be remembered that the land here involved was in private ownership at the time the assessment under the Acquisition and Improvement Act of 1925 was levied. It was properly included within the district at that time, but since that time it has become state property by virtue of the deed issued to the irrigation district pursuant to a sale for delinquent assessments as heretofore held in this opinion. Section 41 of the act specifically provides that the assessment district shall not include ‘any lands belonging to * * * the State of California.’ We have been referred to no provision of the Acquisition and Improvement Act that sets forth a procedure to be followed when the lands were properly included in the district because privately owned, but after the assessment of such district became a lien the property became state property, nor have we discovered any such provision. It is clear therefore that the last clause of section 3804a above quoted has no application. Keeping in mind that the assessment of an Acquisition and Improvement District is levied by the board of supervisors, and that the act, section 41, specifically provides that the special assessment ‘shall be levied, computed, entered, collected and enforced in the same manner and by the same persons and at the same time * * * as are other taxes for * * * county purposes * * * and all laws applicable to the levy, collection and enforcement of taxes for * * * county purposes * * * are hereby made applicable to said special assessment taxes,’ we see no escape from the conclusion that the lien of such assessment comes directly within the provisions of section 3804a, above quoted, and petitioners are therefore entitled to have the same canceled.
We do not at this time find it necessary to determine the personal liability of the irrigation district or its lands for assessments levied under the Acquisition and Improvement Act.
Under section 41 of that act the irrigation district may be liable for such assessments, but that question is not here presented, and we specifically refrain from passing upon it.
The lands involved in proceeding S. F. 14322 were also impressed with a lien of a tax for the protection imposed by the board of supervisors under the Act of May 23, 1923 (St. 1923, p. 431), prior to the time the deed was issued to the irrigation district. An inspection of that act shows that such tax is part of the general county tax, in the same sense that any other tax which the board of supervisors is specially directed to levy to be expended for a particular purpose is part of the general county tax. The lien of this tax should be canceled for the same reasons that the lien of county taxes should be canceled.
We have carefully considered the many arguments advanced by respondents, but we find nothing in them to cause us to change our opinion that petitioners are entitled to the cancellation of the various liens as prayed for.
The general demurrer filed in cause numbered S. F. 14324 is overruled and the several alternative writs of mandate heretofore issued are, and each is, made peremptory.