Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-9302 c/w 20-3387
01-08-2021
LOUISIANA MARINE OPERATORS, LLC v. JRC MARINE, LLC, et al.
Georges M. Legrand, Trevor Matthew Cutaiar, Mark Emerson Hanna, Michael Thomas Neuner, Mouledoux, Bland, Legrand & Brackett, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Louisiana Marine Operators, LLC. J. Christopher Erny, Law Office of J. Christopher Erny, Houma, LA, Jennifer E. Michel, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Lafayette, LA, E. Stuart Ponder, Joseph Patrick Tynan, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, New Orleans, LA, for JRC Marine, LLC. Anthony John Staines, Corey Patrick Parenton, Staines & Eppling, Metairie, LA, James K. Mondl, Pro Hac Vice, Mondl Law Firm LLC, Saint Louis, MO, Joseph Patrick Tynan, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Miss Dixie M/V. J. Christopher Erny, Law Office of J. Christopher Erny, Houma, LA, for Ranny Lee Fitch. Georges M. Legrand, Michael Thomas Neuner, Mouledoux, Bland, Legrand & Brackett, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Louisiana Marine Operators, LLC.
Georges M. Legrand, Trevor Matthew Cutaiar, Mark Emerson Hanna, Michael Thomas Neuner, Mouledoux, Bland, Legrand & Brackett, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Louisiana Marine Operators, LLC.
J. Christopher Erny, Law Office of J. Christopher Erny, Houma, LA, Jennifer E. Michel, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Lafayette, LA, E. Stuart Ponder, Joseph Patrick Tynan, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, New Orleans, LA, for JRC Marine, LLC.
Anthony John Staines, Corey Patrick Parenton, Staines & Eppling, Metairie, LA, James K. Mondl, Pro Hac Vice, Mondl Law Firm LLC, Saint Louis, MO, Joseph Patrick Tynan, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Miss Dixie M/V.
J. Christopher Erny, Law Office of J. Christopher Erny, Houma, LA, for Ranny Lee Fitch.
Georges M. Legrand, Michael Thomas Neuner, Mouledoux, Bland, Legrand & Brackett, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Louisiana Marine Operators, LLC.
SECTION: "H"
ORDER AND REASONS
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court are Plaintiff Louisiana Marine Operators, LLC's ("LMO") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Liability (Doc. 184), and Intervening Plaintiffs Inland Marine Service, Inc. ("Inland Marine") and American Commercial Barge Line LLC's ("ACBL") (collectively "Intervenors") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 183).
For the following reasons, both motions are GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a vessel collision that took place on the Mississippi River between the M/V Miss Dixie ("the Miss Dixie") and the M/V D&R Boney ("the D&R Boney"), on February 13, 2019 at or near Nine Mile Point in New Orleans, Louisiana.
On the day of the collision, Captain Victor Martin ("Captain Martin") was navigating the Miss Dixie as it traveled south on the Mississippi River. Captain Nicky Nelms ("Captain Nelms") was navigating the D&R Boney as it traveled north on the Mississippi River. As the vessels approached each other, each vessel positioned itself for the customary "two-whistle," or starboard-to-starboard, passing arrangement. When the Miss Dixie was less than a half of a mile from the D&R Boney, a mechanical failure on the Miss Dixie rendered the vessel's steering mechanism inoperable, resulting in the collision of the two vessels.
See Doc. 183-4 at 61.
At the time of the collision, LMO was a party to a Bareboat Barge Sub-Charter Agreement, which obligated LMO to maintain and preserve various barges. After some of the barges in LMO's care were damaged in the collision between the Miss Dixie and the D&R Boney, LMO brought this suit against the operator of the Miss Dixie, JRC Marine, LLC ("JRC"), in personam , and the Miss Dixie, in rem , for damages. ACBL and Inland Marine intervened in the suit, also seeking damages from JRC as owner and operator, respectively, of the D&R Boney. LMO later filed its First Amended and Supplemental Complaint to include, in part, claims for general maritime negligence and unseaworthiness against Inland Marine. In turn, Inland Marine denied liability, claiming that JRC was solely at fault for the collision, and asserted a crossclaim against JRC Marine and the Miss Dixie for indemnity and contribution. LMO's Second Amended Complaint includes additional claims for damages against JRC and Inland Marine.
Currently before the Court is LMO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability and Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judgment. In the motions, both LMO and Intervenors (collectively "Movers") ask this Court to find JRC solely liable for the collision. Intervenors also ask this Court to grant summary judgment on all of Intervenors’ claims and dismiss LMO's claims against Intervenors.
LEGAL STANDARD
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "As to materiality ... [o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Nevertheless, a dispute about a material fact is "genuine" such that summary judgment is inappropriate "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment, the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. "If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-movant "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).
Engstrom v. First Nat'l Bank, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
"In response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that evidence supports that party's claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the nonmovant on all issues as to which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial." The Court does "not ... in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Additionally, "[t]he mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion."
Johnson v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 393–94 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) ).
Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Movers ask this Court to find JRC and the Miss Dixie solely liable for the collision between the Miss Dixie and the D&R Boney. Liability for collisions is "placed upon the vessel in rem as well as the vessel owner/operator in personam. " JRC is the bareboat charterer of the Miss Dixie. Under a bareboat charter, the owner transfers complete "possession, command, and navigation of the vessel." "Because the charterer's personnel operate and man the vessel during a demise charter, the charterer has liability for any and all casualties resulting from such operation." The bareboat charterer is therefore responsible in personam for the negligence of the crew and any unseaworthy condition that arises during the duration of the charter. Movers assert that Captain Martin was negligent in his operation of the Miss Dixie and that JRC failed to comply with United States Coast Guard Regulations, leaving JRC and the Miss Dixie liable for the collision. Each issue is addressed in turn below. As a preliminary matter, both LMO and Intervenors argue that a ruling in their favor is warranted because JRC's opposition is untimely and because JRC has not responded to certain discovery requests. The Court will address this matter first.
2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum , Admiralty & Mar. Law § 14:3 (6th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2020).
See Doc. 11-1 (Bareboat Vessel Charter Agreement).
Agrico Chem. Co. v. M/V Ben W. Martin, 664 F.2d 85, 91 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Gaspard v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 593 F.2d 605, 606 (5th Cir. 1979) ).
Walker v. Braus, 995 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1993).
See Saudi v. S/T Marine Atl., 159 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497 (S.D. Tex. 2000) ; Schoenbaum , supra note 14, at § 14:3.
I. JRC's Procedural Deficiencies
Movers argue that JRC's opposition should be stricken from the record as untimely. Movers’ motions were set for submission on December 9, 2020. Under Local Rule 7.5, all oppositions or responses to motions under submission must be filed at least eight days before the submission date. JRC's opposition was therefore due on December 1, 2020 but was not filed until December 2, 2020. JRC did not seek leave of Court to file an untimely opposition, and JRC has not shown this Court good cause as to why its filing was untimely or its opposition should not be stricken. This Court therefore agrees that JRC's opposition should be stricken from the record.
LR 7.5.
Intervenors further ask this Court to deem Intervenors’ Requests for Admission admitted as JRC's responsive deadline has passed and JRC has not yet responded. As support for this contention, Intervenors provide a copy of an email dated October 29, 2020, to JRC's counsel with the Requests for Admission attached. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3) states that "[a] matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney." JRC has not contested Intervenors’ allegations or provided this Court with any evidence that Intervenors’ Requests for Admission were answered. This Court therefore agrees that the Admissions should be deemed admitted.
Intervenors’ Requests for Admission include requests that JRC admit that Intervenors’ damages are fair, reasonable, and a direct and proximate result of the collision. Intervenors’ Requests for Admission also include a request that JRC "[a]dmit JRC is solely liable for Intervenors’ [c]ollision-related damages." Together, Intervenors’ Requests for Admission, as deemed admitted, conclusively establish all facts necessary to grant both Intervenors’ and LMO's motions for summary judgment. " Rule 36 admissions, whether express or by default, are conclusive as to the matters admitted, they cannot be overcome at the summary judgment stage by contradictory affidavit testimony or other evidence in the summary judgment record." As JRC has not moved to withdraw his admissions, this Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to JRC's sole liability and Intervenors’ damages, compelling this Court to grant summary judgment in Movers’ favor.
See Doc. 202-1.
Id. at 4.
In re Carney, 258 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Rule 36(b) provides that ‘[a]ny matter admitted ... is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.’ ").
Id. at 420 (citations omitted).
Although this Court finds that JRC's procedural deficiencies warrant a ruling in Movers’ favor, out of an abundance of caution, this Court will also analyze the merits of the motions for summary judgment.
II. JRC's Sole Liability
Assuming arguendo that JRC had timely filed its opposition and had timely denied Intervenors’ Requests for Admission, this Court still finds that summary judgment in favor of Movers is warranted on the merits.
A. JRC's Liability Arising from the Negligent Operation of the Miss Dixie
Movers argue that JRC is liable for the collision because Captain Martin was negligent in his operation of the Miss Dixie. LMO and Intervenors, however, assert different theories to explain Captain Martin's negligence. Accordingly, each party's argument is addressed separately below.
1. LMO's Argument
LMO argues that Captain Martin was negligent by failing to set up a passing agreement with the D&R Boney. Section 83.14(d) of the Code of Federal Regulations states that downbound vessels "shall have the right-of-way over an upbound vessel, shall propose the manner of passage, and shall initiate the maneuvering signals prescribed by Rule 34(a)(i) (§ 83.34(a)(i)), as appropriate." Captain Martin concedes that he violated this regulation. LMO therefore argues that JRC has the burden of causation under the Pennsylvania Rule. The Pennsylvania Rule provides that "[w]hen a vessel at the time of a collision is in actual violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions, the burden rests upon her to show that her fault not only was not, but could not have been, the cause of the collision." JRC has not set forth any evidence to rebut this presumption of liability. LMO thus argues that, in accordance with the Pennsylvania Rule, Captain Martin's negligence was the cause of the collision.
Doc. 184-6 at 8.
United Overseas Exp. Lines, Inc. v. Medluck Compania Maviera, S.A., 785 F.2d 1320, 1325 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125, 136, 19 Wall. 125, 22 L.Ed. 148 (1873) ).
Despite the lack of evidence set forth by JRC, this Court finds that there is sufficient evidence in the record to at least create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Captain Martin's failure to set up a passing agreement contributed to the collision. Both Captain Martin and Captain Nelms testified that they prepared their vessels to pass on the customary two-whistle passing arrangement. Captain Martin's failure to officially radio the D&R Boney and set up the customary pass could therefore not have been a contributing cause of the collision as there is no evidence that it would have altered the course of events.
Doc. 183-6 at 2; Doc. 183-4 at 92.
See United Overseas Exp. Lines, Inc. , at 1325 (affirming the district court's finding that "the Medjoy's failure to signal a turn could not have been a cause of the collision.").
2. Intervenors’ Argument
Intervenors contend that the Miss Dixie's sudden veering into the D&R Boney must be a product of Captain Martin's negligence. Intervenors argue that "[w]ithout any explanation as to why, Captain Martin changed the mutually anticipated passing agreement, requesting the M/V D&R Boney meet the M/V Miss Dixie on the one-whistle." This Court finds this argument unsupported. The evidence is clear that Captain Martin veered off course because of the Miss Dixie's mechanical failure. Intervenors do not provide any evidence to support their argument that, given the circumstances, Captain Martin failed to exercise reasonable care or maintain proper steerage. This Court therefore does not find that Movers have sufficiently demonstrated that Captain Martin was negligent in his operation of the Miss Dixie.
Doc. 183-1 at 12–13.
See Doc. 183-4 at 96.
B. JRC's Liability arising from the Miss Dixie's Mechanical Failure
Movers also argue that the collision was caused by the Miss Dixie's mechanical failure, leaving JRC solely liable as the bareboat charterer for failure to properly maintain the vessel. Bareboat charterers, as vessel owners pro hac vice , are "responsible for managing and maintaining the vessel." Both JRC's owner, Ranny Fitch, and Captain Martin confirmed that JRC was responsible for maintaining the Miss Dixie. This responsibility included "overseeing or directing maintenance on the engines or clutches of the vessel."
Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (Am.), Inc., 900 F. Supp. 2d 669, 672 (E.D. La. 2012), aff'd, 551 F. App'x 228 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Bosnor, S.A. de C.V. v. Tug L.A. Barrios, 796 F.2d 776, 783 (5th Cir. 1986) ).
Doc. 184-8 at 2–3.
Doc. 183-4 at 49.
Movers have presented sufficient uncontested evidence that the sole cause of the collision was a failure of the Miss Dixie's port clutch. Captain Martin testified that the port clutch failure caused him to lose steering and to veer directly into the path of the D&R Boney. Captain Martin also testified that the collision would not have occurred but for the mechanical failure, that the D&R Boney could not have done anything to avoid the collision, and that he did not believe that the D&R Boney was responsible for the collision. A post-collision inspection of the Miss Dixie also confirmed that the port clutch showed excessive wear.
Id. at 91–95, 112.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 137.
Doc. 183-11 at 4.
JRC's failure to properly maintain the Miss Dixie constitutes a violation of the United States Coast Guard regulations. Specifically, Section 143.205 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides:
(a) Machinery and electrical systems must be designed and maintained to provide for safe operation of the towing vessel and safety of persons onboard under normal and emergency conditions.
(b) The crew of each towing vessel must demonstrate the ability to operate the primary and auxiliary machinery and electrical systems for which they are responsible, and to do so under normal and emergency conditions. This includes, but is not limited to, responses to alarms and restoration of propulsion and steering in the event of failure.
(c) Propulsion machinery , including main engines, reduction gears, shafting, bearings, and electrical equipment and systems, must:
(1) Be maintained to ensure proper operation;
(2) Be suitable for route and service; and
(3) Have suitable propulsion controls to provide the operator full control at each operating station.
46 C.F.R. § 143.205 (emphasis added).
Movers have clearly demonstrated that JRC violated the United States Coast Guard regulations by failing to maintain the Miss Dixie's propulsion machinery and ensuring that it was suitable for route service.
Failure to comply with Coast Guard regulations triggers application of the Pennsylvania Rule. JRC therefore has the burden to show that this failure could not have been a cause of the collision. JRC has presented no evidence to rebut the presumption that the Miss Dixie's mechanical failure was a cause of the collision. Accordingly, this Court finds that the failure of the Miss Dixie's port clutch was a cause of the collision and that JRC and the Miss Dixie are liable for the collision.
See United States v. Nassau Marine Corp., 778 F.2d 1111, 1117 (5th Cir. 1985) (affirming application of the Pennsylvania Rule where the defendants failed to have the Coast Guard supervise and inspect repairs to defendants’ barge in violation of federal regulations).
C. The D&R Boney's Contributory Negligence
JRC argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether JRC is solely liable for the collision. JRC contends that Captain Nelms contributed to the collision by failing to monitor his radio and missing Captain Martin's first two calls to the D&R Boney. As support, JRC looks to Captain Martin's deposition testimony where he describes his first radio to the D&R Boney after he discovered that the Miss Dixie was not responding to his commands. Captain Martin stated:
I recall calling a couple of times with no answer. Then I found the name of the boat, I called him by name, and he answered, and I told him that I was having—I don't know the exact words, but I told him I was having a problem, that something was wrong with my boat, can you meet me on the 1-whistle.
Doc. 183-4 at 93.
JRC reasons that Captain Nelms's failure to "acknowledge or answer Captain Martin's first two calls ... can only be because he wasn't listening." The Vessel Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone Act requires masters of vessels to "maintain a listening watch on the designated frequency." JRC thus argues that Captain Nelms's failure to keep a listening watch triggers application of the Pennsylvania Rule and requires Movers to demonstrate that Captain Nelms's failure could not have been a contributing cause of the collision. This Court disagrees.
Doc. 193 at 2.
JRC has proffered insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Captain Nelms failed to maintain a listening watch to the D&R Boney's radio. In fact, Captain Martin later explained that in his first attempt to call the D&R Boney, he made the broadcast on the wrong radio. Captain Martin thus testified that the D&R Boney never received his first radio transmission, and that the D&R Boney answered the Miss Dixie's call when Captain Martin called the D&R Boney by name. JRC has not provided any additional evidence to support its claim that Captain Nelms failed to listen to his radio and therefore JRC's claim must fail.
Doc. 183-4 at 138.
Id. at 93, 138.
Further, even if this Court were to accept JRC's claim that Captain Nelms missed Captain Martin's first two radio calls, Movers have presented sufficient evidence that Captain Nelms's failure could not have contributed to the collision. Captain Martin testified that he first radioed the D&R Boney approximately 90 seconds before the collision and right after he recognized the Miss Dixie's mechanical failure. Captain Martin also testified that 90 seconds was insufficient time for the D&R Boney to avoid the collision, although he had hoped that D&R Boney would attempt a one-whistle pass so as to avoid a head-on collision. When confronted with the fact that Captain Nelms refused the suggested one-whistle pass because he believed it would put his vessel and crew in greater danger, Captain Martin conceded that "[n]one of that had crossed [his] mind" and agreed that "there was very little time for [the D&R Boney] to do anything." Intervenors’ expert has also confirmed that "[t]here was not sufficient sea room for the M/V D&R Boney to avoid the collision on its own" and that Captain Nelms acted reasonably in reversing the vessel to mitigate the damage. JRC has not presented any evidence as to any action the D&R Boney could have taken to mitigate or avoid the damage from the collision or presented any evidence that a few extra seconds from an earlier radio transmission would have made difference. This Court therefore does not find any evidence of fault on behalf of the D&R Boney.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 123–24.
Doc. 183-8 at 2.
As all available evidence confirms that the Miss Dixie's mechanical failure was the only cause of the collision, Movers’ motions for summary judgment are granted to the extent that they ask this Court to find JRC solely liable.
III. Intervenors’ Damages and Dismissal of Associated Claims
Having found JRC solely liable for the collision, Intervenors ask this Court to award associated damages and to dismiss LMO's claims against them.
A. Intervenors’ Damages
At the time of the collision, Inland Marine was operating the D&R Boney and had Barge AEP 7235 in tow. ACBL was the owner of the D&R Boney and Barge AEP 7235. Pursuant to their 2011 Master Bareboat Charter Agreement, Inland Marine was required to indemnify ACBL for all losses related to Inland Marine's operation of the D&R Boney. Accordingly, Inland Marine and ACBL entered into a settlement agreement whereby Inland Marine indemnified ACBL for the $159,249.87 in damages that ACBL sustained as a result of the collision, and ACBL assigned all rights and interests necessary for Inland Marine to pursue litigation and recover damages arising from the collision. Inland Marine now asks this Court for a judgment in its favor in the amount of $168,053.87, with prejudgment and postjudgment interest, against JRC, in personam , and the Miss Dixie, in rem. This total represents the $159,249.87 that Inland Marine paid to ACBL and the $8,804.00 that Inland Marine paid for survey expenses.
See Doc. 183-13 at 4.
Doc. 21. at 2.
Doc. 183-13 at 4.
ACBL provides evidence that it paid $146,058.25 for barge repairs, $4,691.62 for lost cargo, and $8,500 for trans-loading cargo. See Doc. 183-12 at 19–21.
Id.
Inland Marine has provided evidence that the $8,804 in survey expenses were actually incurred. See Doc. 183-12 at 15–16.
Inland Marine has provided evidentiary support for its request of $168,053.87 in damages, and JRC has not contested Inland Marine's valuation. To the contrary, JRC's own surveyor found that the total damages should not exceed $180,000, which they do not. Accordingly, this Court finds that an award in favor of Inland Marine in the amount of $168,053.87 is proper.
See Doc. 183-7 at 7.
Inland Marine also asks this Court for an award of prejudgment and post-judgment interest at the maximum legal rate. "[P]rejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases, subject to a limited exception for ‘peculiar’ or ‘exceptional’ circumstances." Again, JRC has not given this Court any reason as to why prejudgment interest is inappropriate in this case. Inland Marine's request for prejudgment and post-judgment interest is therefore granted. This Court awards prejudgment interest on past damages to Inland Marine at the federal judicial rate from the date of judicial demand until the date of judgment. An award of post-judgment interest at the federal judicial rate shall apply to Inland Marines’ total damages from the date of judgment until paid.
City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat. Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 195, 115 S.Ct. 2091, 132 L.Ed.2d 148 (1995).
"Post-judgment interest is awarded as a matter of course" in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). Meaux Surface Prot., Inc. v. Fogleman, 607 F.3d 161, 173 (5th Cir. 2010).
See In re Int'l Marine, LLC, 614 F. Supp. 2d 733, 742 (E.D. La. 2009) ("The rate of prejudgment interest, as well as the date from which it accrues, is also discretionary with the court.") (citations omitted).
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B. LMO's Claims Against Inland Marine
In LMO's First and Second Amended Complaints, LMO asserted claims against Inland Marine, alleging that the D&R Boney's negligence and unseaworthiness contributed to the collision. This Court finds here that the Miss Dixie's mechanical failure was the sole cause of the collision and that there is no evidence of the D&R Boney's contributory fault. Accordingly, LMO's claims against Inland Marine are dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, LMO and Intervenors’ Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED .
IT IS ORDERED that LMO and JRC's claims against Inland Marine are hereby DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor of Intervenors and against JRC, in personam , and the Miss Dixie, in rem , in the amount of $168,053.87 with prejudgment interest and post-judgment interest as described herein.