Opinion
B290255
02-27-2020
Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of L.C. THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC GUARDIAN, Petitioner and Respondent, v. L.C., Objector and Appellant.
Jean Matulis for Objector and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Joyce M. Aiello, Assistant County Counsel, and William C. Sias, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a). Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. ZE042516 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robert Harrison, Judge. Appeal dismissed as moot. Jean Matulis for Objector and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Joyce M. Aiello, Assistant County Counsel, and William C. Sias, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
L.C. appeals an order establishing a one-year conservatorship over his person and estate under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.). L.C. challenges the jury's finding that he was gravely disabled within the meaning of the LPS and the court's order imposing a legal disability restricting him from refusing medical treatment unrelated to his grave disability, arguing the finding and order are not supported by substantial evidence. Because the conservatorship terminated while this appeal was pending, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 7, 2018, the Los Angeles County Office of the Public Guardian (Public Guardian) petitioned for appointment of a conservator over L.C.'s person and estate. (§ 5352.) The petition alleged that a medical professional had determined L.C. was "gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder"—i.e., schizophrenia—and was "unwilling" or "incapable of accepting treatment voluntarily." At the time the petition was filed, L.C. was being detained at "Twin Towers Correctional Facility" on a criminal hold. The court appointed the Public Guardian as L.C.'s temporary conservator the same day the petition was filed.
The court conducted a jury trial in May 2018. L.C., L.C.'s brother, L.C.'s mother, and Dr. Aram Keshishyan, a psychologist who treated L.C., testified at trial.
L.C. was 50 years old at the time of trial. He graduated summa cum laude from the University of California Los Angeles with a Bachelor's of Science in biology, and he attended medical school at the University of California Irvine for three years before dropping out to focus on research. L.C. was diagnosed with ADHD in 1996. At the time of trial, L.C. had been unemployed for about five years. The only income L.C. received was about $1,100 a month in social security benefits.
L.C.'s mother testified that around December 2016, L.C. called his parents asking for money to help pay for food as well as the hotels and motels in which he had been living. Between December 2016 and May 2017, L.C.'s parents gave him between $14,000 and $40,000. The parents eventually stopped providing L.C. financial support because he was depleting their savings. After cutting off financial support, L.C.'s parents allowed him to live in their home on the condition that he sleep inside a car at night. L.C. lived with his parents between May and June 2017, until they called a "PET" team to remove him from their home after he started verbally abusing them and refusing to follow their rules. According to L.C.'s mother, L.C. never sought mental health treatment or took any medication while he was staying at their home.
L.C.'s brother, O.C., testified that, since sometime in 2017, L.C. had left numerous paranoid and delusional voicemails on O.C.'s phone. In several of the messages, L.C. threatened harm or death against O.C., O.C.'s wife, and O.C.'s daughter. For example, in one message, L.C. stated: "[O.C.], I am being tortured, that means you, your wife, your daughter, and your extended family are all going to be hung by the neck because you are all involved. You are no longer Disney, [O.C.]. You are a spec[k] of dust, idiot."
Dr. Keshishyan, a psychologist, started treating L.C. in September 2017. Dr. Keshishyan had met with L.C. about 11 times, and he reviewed L.C.'s medical and psychiatric records, including records of L.C.'s prior psychiatric and psychological evaluations, medical charts from treatment providers at the jail where L.C. was housed, and "collateral information" from L.C.'s family members.
Dr. Keshishyan diagnosed L.C. with schizophrenia based on evidence that L.C. experienced "grandiose" and "paranoid" delusions, "negative symptoms," and "illogical thinking." L.C. had been prescribed a "Haldol Decolic injection." According to Dr. Keshishyan, L.C. didn't think he needed the medication because he denied suffering from schizophrenia, but L.C. told the doctor he would continue to take the medication as a "means of getting out of jail."
In Dr. Keshishyan's opinion, L.C.'s "superficial insight" into his illness made it unlikely that L.C. would continue to seek mental health treatment or take his medication without the supervision of a conservator. Dr. Keshishyan also believed L.C. likely would not be able to provide for his own shelter, clothes, or food without a conservatorship.
L.C. testified that he did not suffer from schizophrenia. L.C. disagreed with Dr. Keshishyan's diagnosis because it was based on other psychiatrists' evaluations of L.C., who had "misquoted" him. Nevertheless, L.C. claimed he would take his medication for schizophrenia if he was not placed in a conservatorship. L.C. also believed he could find a "board and care" facility that would provide food and shelter. L.C. had lived in such a facility before he started staying in motels and hotels, but he had left because he was forced to "eat their food."
On May 16, 2018, the jury found L.C. was gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. The court appointed the Public Guardian as L.C.'s conservator for a one-year term. The court authorized the Public Guardian to place L.C. in a locked or unlocked residence, residential care facility, nursing facility, or state or public hospital, with priority given to the "least restrictive setting which is appropriate for [L.C.'s] treatment, care and needs." The court also imposed legal disabilities that restricted L.C. from: possessing a driver's license or firearm, entering into contracts, and refusing medical treatment related and unrelated to his grave disability. L.C. appealed.
On April 15, 2019, the Public Guardian filed a "Report of Conservatorship for Re-Appointment." The report concluded there was no evidence that L.C. continued to suffer from a grave disability, noting that L.C. was considered stable and had been "compliant to medications and treatment." According to the report, L.C. had not had any "psychiatric hospitalizations" since the conservatorship was established in May 2018.
On April 17, 2019, the court issued a minute order relieving the Public Guardian as L.C.'s conservator and dismissing without prejudice its "SUBSEQUENT PETITION FOR REAPPOINTMENT OF CONSERVATORSHIP." The minute order noted that the Public Guardian's April 15, 2019 report "ind[i]cates the recommendation to not continue conservatorship due to conservatee not being found gravely disabled."
We grant the Public Guardian's request for judicial notice of the Public Guardian's report filed on April 15, 2019 and the court's April 17, 2019 minute order. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) --------
DISCUSSION
L.C. challenges the jury's finding that he was gravely disabled and the court's order imposing a legal disability restricting him from refusing medical treatment unrelated to his grave disability, arguing they are not supported by substantial evidence. The Public Guardian contends L.C.'s appeal is moot because the conservatorship terminated while this appeal was pending and none of the challenges that L.C. raises implicate matters of public interest or involve issues that are likely to recur.
An appeal becomes moot when the reviewing court's decision can have no practical impact or provide the parties no effective relief. (Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 158, 166.) While an appeal may initially present an existing controversy, it may become moot where, through a subsequent act, an event occurs that renders it impossible for the reviewing court to provide the appellant effective relief. (Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v. Chadmar Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1178-1179 (Ebensteiner).) For example, where the order issued by the trial court is temporal, and that relief expires before the appeal can be heard, the appeal becomes moot. (City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079.)
Generally, when no effective relief can be granted, an appeal will be dismissed as moot. (In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315.) A reviewing court may exercise its discretion to hear a case that is moot, however, in three circumstances: (1) when the case raises an issue of broad public interest; (2) when the conduct leading to the underlying action is likely to recur; and (3) when a material question remains for the court to decide. (Malatka v. Helm (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1088 (Malatka).) As we explain, L.C.'s appeal is moot and none of the circumstances warranting the exercise of our discretion to consider a moot appeal exist in this case.
"A conservator of the person, of the estate, or of the person and the estate may be appointed for a person who is gravely disabled as a result of mental health disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism." (§ 5350.) A grave disability is defined in relevant part as "[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental health disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter." (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) "Grave disability must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to establish and to renew LPS conservatorships." (Conservatorship of Johnson (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 693, 696-697; see also Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 ["The due process clause of the California Constitution requires that proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict be applied to conservatorship proceedings under the LPS Act."].)
Once an LPS Act conservatorship is imposed, a conservator has extensive control over the activities and decisions of the conservatee, often including the right to refuse or consent to medical treatments over the objection of the conservatee. (§ 5357; see also § 5357, subds. (d), (e).) An LPS conservatorship terminates after one year, although the conservator may petition the court for reappointment. (§ 5361.) Any reappointment likewise expires after one year. (Ibid.)
L.C. challenges the May 16, 2018 order appointing the Public Guardian as the conservator over his person and estate. The court relieved the Public Guardian as L.C.'s conservator on April 17, 2019, about a month before the conservatorship was set to automatically terminate under section 5361. Although L.C.'s appeal initially presented a live controversy, the conservatorship's termination has eliminated any effective relief we can provide L.C. since he is no longer subject to, or otherwise constrained by, the order he challenges on appeal. (See Ebensteiner, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1178-1179.)
L.C. nevertheless urges us to reach the merits of his appeal, claiming it raises important issues of public interest and involves conduct that is likely to recur. We disagree. L.C.'s appeal presents highly fact-specific issues pertinent only to L.C.'s case—i.e., whether the Public Guardian presented substantial evidence to support a finding that L.C. was gravely disabled and the court's imposition of specific legal disabilities on L.C. Both issues require analysis of the particular evidence supporting the establishment of a conservatorship over L.C. at the time of his trial in May 2018. L.C. does not claim the court or Public Guardian engaged in any ongoing procedures or practices that violate the law or that the court otherwise committed legal error that could have an impact on future proceedings involving L.C. or other litigants. L.C.'s appeal, therefore, does not present a matter of public interest warranting the exercise of our discretion to consider a moot issue.
Nor are any of the issues raised in L.C.'s appeal likely to recur. If the Public Guardian or another individual or entity were to petition to establish a conservatorship over L.C. in the future, any order establishing a new conservatorship would have to be based on evidence that L.C. is presently disabled at the time of the future hearing. In other words, any future conservatorship must be based on evidence of L.C.'s condition at the time of that hearing, and it cannot be based on any prior finding establishing a conservatorship. (See § 5368 ["A person who is no longer a conservatee shall not be presumed to be incompetent by virtue of his having been a conservatee under the provisions of this part."]; see also Conservatorship of Guerrero (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 442, 446 [an order establishing a conservatorship must be based on evidence that the conservatee is presently gravely disabled, not evidence that the conservatee was disabled in the past or that the conservatee's disability is likely to recur in the future].) Thus, any subsequent establishment of a conservatorship over L.C. would be independent of any prior conservatorship, including the one L.C. challenges in this appeal.
The cases L.C. relies on are inapposite. In each case, the reviewing court was presented with legal issues potentially impacting future proceedings involving the litigants as well as the general administration of the LPS conservatorship statutory scheme. (See Conservatorship of Carol K. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 123, 133- [in addition to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, the appellant argued the court applied the wrong standard in finding she fell within the scope of the LPS]; Conservatorship of Jones (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 292, 298-302 [despite termination of conservatorship, "both parties urge[d] [the] court to address the issues of public interest presented since they are capable of repetition and should not evade review"—i.e., whether the Department of Corrections, which had custody of the appellant, constitutes a provider of third party assistance, thereby eliminating the need to establish a conservatorship over the appellant]; K.G. v. Meredith (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 164, 175 [although conservatorship terminated before appeal was heard, appellants challenged "what they allege are the ongoing [illegal] practices and policies of the Public Guardian"].)
In sum, we decline to reach the merits of L.C.'s appeal. The termination of the challenged conservatorship has rendered the appeal moot and the highly fact-specific nature of L.C.'s claims do not present matters of public importance or issues that are likely to recur.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
LAVIN, J. WE CONCUR:
EDMON, P. J.
DHANIDINA, J.