Opinion
B294916
02-06-2020
In re T.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. V.M., Defendant and Appellant.
Maryann M. Goode, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. DK14191C) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Nancy Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed. Maryann M. Goode, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
V.M. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her child, T.M. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c).) Mother contends the court (1) erred in denying her petition (§ 388) for reunification services, (2) violated her due process rights in terminating her parental rights in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness and detriment, and (3) erred in finding she failed to establish the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption. We find no merit in mother's contentions and affirm.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Detention
Mother has three sons, D.G., Jr., D.G. and T.M. Only the youngest child, T.M. (born July 2014), is a subject of this appeal. On October 13, 2015, respondent Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging that mother had severely neglected T.M. and placed her children at risk, after then 15-month-old T.M. was brought to the emergency room where he tested positive for amphetamines. Mother had called 911 after the baby awoke from an afternoon nap screaming, inconsolable, looked "zoned out" and vomited. T.M. was hospitalized for two days, then returned to mother's care.
The other boys are in the custody of their father. T.M.'s alleged father is not a party to this appeal.
Mother and her children lived with the boys' maternal grandmother (MGM). From the outset, mother denied any substance abuse in the home, and was unable to explain how T.M. came into contact with or ingested amphetamines. The family had been inside all day, except when mother took the two youngest boys outside the apartment to play. Mother said she left T.M. alone for a few seconds outside when she had to go after her other (two-year-old) son to keep him from going into the street. Mother explained that T.M. liked to touch things and put his fingers in his mouth, but she did not know if that happened on October 13. A DCFS social worker who visited the family's one-bedroom home found it cluttered, in disarray and in need of repair. Both mother and MGM took medication for diabetes and high blood pressure. Mother's medication was stored in a cabinet accessible to her eldest child. MGM kept hers in a zippered handbag behind the sofa, accessible to the children. All medication was stored in child-proof bottles.
On October 22, 2015, T.M.'s treating physician informed DCFS that the child had tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother's two oldest boys did not show up for forensic examinations on October 16. Both mother and the MGM denied using illegal drugs, and neither could explain how T.M. got hold of methamphetamine. Mother surmised that T.M. may have picked up something from the ground outside; it was dirty and her neighbors were "constantly partying."
Mother informed DCFS there was mental illness in her family. Her deceased father had been bipolar. In 2006, mother was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Mother had recently contacted a mental health services organization (Kedren), where she previously had received therapy, and was scheduled to begin counseling in November 2015. Mother and MGM were referred for drug testing. Mother tested negative for all substances; MGM did not test.
During an October 28, 2015 visit to the family's home, a social worker found the children dirty and unkempt, and saw rats in the kitchen. With regard to her mental health, mother told the social worker she had been seeking help on her own, but had missed two appointments with a psychiatrist. Mother had not been prescribed any psychotropic medication, which she believed would interfere with medicines she took for diabetes, high blood pressure and kidney disease. The children were detained from mother's custody on November 5, based on her apparent neglect and inability to explain how T.M. ingested methamphetamine, and concomitant risks posed to the other children.
On November 10, 2015, DCFS filed a section 300 petition alleging that mother had failed adequately to supervise T.M., who ingested methamphetamine, and her home was filthy, unsanitary and in a hazardous condition. T.M. was detained from parental custody and placed in foster care. The juvenile court ordered DCFS to refer mother for weekly random and on-demand drug/alcohol testing, to provide her transportation assistance, and gave mother twice weekly monitored visits of at least one hour each. A jurisdiction and disposition hearing was scheduled for March 21, 2016.
In early March 2016, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to evaluate mother's home for return of the children. In response, DCFS reported that mother had made home improvements—she had cleaned, organized and repaired the apartment, installed child safety equipment, and had contacted the landlord to repair an improperly installed smoke detector. However, she was slow to begin reunification services, due to transportation problems and her inability to access low-or no-cost services near her home.
DCFS remained concerned about mother's mental health and ability to supervise small children, particularly in light of her diagnosis of schizophrenia for which mother had never been prescribed medication. Mother, who lacked specific symptoms, did not believe she had schizophrenia and had never been offered anything beyond counseling for that condition. She consistently denied any drug use and did not understand why she had to undergo drug testing. MGM and mother's relatives also denied that mother or MGM used illegal drugs. MGM said lots of teens who did "all kinds of stuff" regularly hung around the apartment, and thought T.M. may have gotten hold of a pill or something when he was playing outside. Mother had a negative drug test on March 11, 2016.
On March 21, 2016, DCFS filed the operative first amended petition adding allegations reflecting concerns about the impact of mother's mental and emotional problems on her ability to care for T.M.
Jursidiction/Disposition
At the May 2, 2016 adjudication hearing, the juvenile court sustained the amended petition, after striking allegations about the family's unsafe home. T.M. was declared a dependent of the court and removed from parental custody. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that a substantial danger existed to the child's physical and/or emotional health, and there were no reasonable means to protect him short of removal from mother's custody.
Proceeding to disposition, the court found that DCFS made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for T.M.'s removal from mother's home, and reasonable efforts to enable the child's safe return home. T.M. was placed in the care of DCFS for suitable placement. The court ordered reunification services for mother, including random or on-demand consecutive drug tests, and explained that mother would be required to complete a full drug rehabilitation program in the event she missed or had a dirty test. The court ordered parenting education, individual mental health counseling, a psychological assessment, and a psychiatric evaluation. Mother's monitored visits with T.M. were continued. The matter was set for a six-month review hearing in November 2016.
Reunification Period
The reunification period began in early May 2016, and ended in early July 2017. During that 14-month period, mother had 20 negative drug tests, and missed 26 others. Meanwhile, DCFS reported that T.M. was adjusting well in his foster home. Mother had consistent weekly monitored visits with T.M., which went well. Mother had difficulty finding a mental health service center that would accept her insurance, but ultimately began seeing a therapist at Kedren in November 2016.
At the six-month review hearing in mid-December 2016, the court found mother had only minimally complied with her case plan, and that returning T.M. to her physical custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child's physical and emotional well-being. The court ordered additional reunification services, and set the matter for a 12-month review hearing on March 21, 2017.
In late November 2016, when asked by a social worker why she still was not regularly drug testing, mother reiterated that she did not understand why she had to test since she did not use drugs. She agreed to start testing after the social worker explained that a missed drug test counted as a positive test, and that her missed tests now had triggered the court's requirement that she enroll in a drug rehabilitation program. Mother tried to enroll in several drug programs, but none would accept her because she lacked a history of drug abuse. The social worker gave her additional referrals. In February 2017, mother was still having trouble finding a drug program, and a free or affordable parenting program that was not full.
Mother received both individual counseling and mental health services at Kedren once a month. Mother told DCFS she had undergone a mental health assessment. Her therapist had no concerns about her mental health, but did believe she needed to continue counseling to address depression.
A social worker spoke with mother's therapist at Kedren in early March 2017. The therapist reported that mother had undergone a mental health assessment in November 2016, and had had two sessions with the therapist, most recently in January 2017. Mother was not prescribed any psychotropic medication. The therapist believed mother required more frequent counseling. Mother had not signed a release, so DCFS was unable to obtain documentation of her mental health assessment. Between November 2016 and late February 2017, mother had six negative drug tests, and missed four others.
Mother continued to have consistent monitored weekly visits with T.M. DCFS reported that the visits went well: mother's behavior and communication with T.M. were appropriate, and they played educational games. She was affectionate with T.M., changed his diapers and fed him snacks, and he seemed happy to see her. In May 2017, mother told DCFS she had enrolled in, but not yet attended, a parenting program. By early July, mother had participated in three sessions, and missed a fourth. Mother's therapist was not concerned about her mental health. Mother remained unable to find a drug rehabilitation program that would accept her.
On July 5, 2017, at the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court observed that reunification services had been ordered for mother over a year earlier. It found that, although DCFS had provided reasonable services, mother had only minimally complied with her case plan. She had not completed a parenting course, had not fully participated in mental health and individual counseling, and her contact and visits with T.M. were not consistent. The court was particularly concerned about mother's repeated failure to drug test in light of the fact that the family came to the court's attention because one-year-old T.M. has ingested methamphetamine. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that mother had failed to make significant progress to address and resolve the problems that led to T.M.'s removal, and that returning the child to her physical custody would pose a substantial risk of detriment to his physical and emotional well-being. Reunification services were terminated. A section 366.26 hearing was set for January 3, 2018.
Permanency Planning
In January and February 2018 status reports, DCFS informed the court that T.M. had been placed in a second foster home in July 2017. He was healthy and ready to attend preschool. Mother's weekly visits with T.M. had been largely consistent, and her interactions with the child were appropriate.
In a June 2018 report for the section 366.26 hearing, DCFS said T.M. had been placed with prospective adoptive parents (the M.'s) in May 2018. The M.'s have one biological son, and have twice before adopted children through DCFS. Mr. M. is a stay-at-home parent. The children in the M.'s care seemed to thrive. The M.'s were last approved as adoptive parents in October 2016. T.M. seemed to be very happy in the M.'s home. He laughed and played with the M.'s and their children, ate and slept well, and was almost toilet-trained. The M.'s worked daily with T.M. to teach him shapes, colors and numbers, and did arts and crafts. T.M. threw tantrums, but the M.'s believed they were age-appropriate and he was not developmentally delayed. By early July 2018, T.M had fewer tantrums and was "potty trained during the day and stay[ed] dry most nights." T.M. was home schooled by Ms. M. The M.'s monitored mother's weekly visits with T.M., and reported that she appropriately engaged with T.M. On July 2, 2018, the juvenile court found that adoption was the most appropriate permanent plan for T.M.
Mr. M. had an arrest in 1993 for domestic violence against a prior wife, but no criminal charges were filed. There also had been a May 2017 child welfare referral regarding the M.'s for general neglect, which resulted from Mr. M. burning his daughter's finger while pressing her hair. Their children had appeared clean, healthy and well treated, and that referral was closed.
Mother's Section 388 Petition
In September 2018, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting the provision of further reunification services, based on purportedly changed circumstances. Mother presented evidence that she had completed a 12-week parenting course. Mother also had attended therapy appointments and, in a June 28, 2018 letter attached to the petition, mother's therapist opined that mother was "mentally, physically and emotionally stable [enough] to care for her children," and recommended that DCFS reevaluate mother's capacity to reunify with T.M. Mother claimed additional reunification services were in T.M.'s best interest because he had only been placed with the M.'s for a few months, and it would not greatly delay the child's permanency to provide mother another opportunity to reunify. Mother also submitted evidence of a negative drug test on May 11, 2018. The petition was set for a hearing.
DCFS filed an interim report and response to mother's petition on November 9, 2018. DCFS reported that mother continued to receive therapy at Kedren and did not take any psychotropic medication because her therapist did not believe she needed it. Mother continued to deny that she ever had used any drug (except marijuana as a teen). Mother explained to DCFS that she had not submitted to consistent drug tests because she could not afford them.
DCFS also reported that, on October 22, 2018, Ms. M. told its investigator that mother was only complying with her visitation schedule about half the time, and did not interact with T.M. during their visits. Rather, mother let T.M. spend the visit watching videos and movies on her phone. Mother called T.M. two or three times per week, but he did not want to talk to her. Meanwhile, DCFS reported that T.M. appeared to be thriving in the M.'s care, and had formed a bond with them and their children.
DCFS was unable to access documentation regarding mother's mental health status (until the court ordered mother to sign a release on November 9). In a last minute information filed December 10, 2018, DCFS reported that the supervisor of adult outpatient services at Kedren said mother had been admitted in October 2016, left the program, and was readmitted in March 2018. Since her readmission, mother had attended all therapy sessions. In January 2017, mother met with a psychiatrist who did not believe that she needed medication. After her readmission, mother was scheduled to see a psychiatrist in early November for a reassessment, but missed the appointment. The supervisor did not know whether mother needed psychotropic medication. DCFS recommended that the court deny mother's request to reinstate reunification services.
DCFS reported that T.M. was integrating well into the M.'s home. T.M. said he was happy living with the M.'s (whom he called "mom" and "dad"), and his foster siblings. He was fully potty trained, could recite his ABC's, and was able to identify colors, numbers and shapes. The M.'s were attentive to T.M.'s needs. They loved T.M. and were committed to his adoption. The M.'s continued to monitor mother's inconsistent visits with T.M., during which she allowed the child to play games on her phone. She did not interact with T.M., provide food for the child, or attend to his needs. When mother phoned, T.M. was reluctant to talk to her. Hearings on Mother's Section 388 Petition and Section 366 .26
Mother's section 388 petition was argued on December 14, 2018. The court admitted into evidence DCFS's reports, and took judicial notice of the prior sustained petition, case plan and minute orders. The juvenile court acknowledged that this was a difficult case. However, over two years had passed since the detention of then one-year-old T.M., and mother still had only partially complied with her case plan. Mother had completed a parenting course, participated in individual counseling and regularly visited T.M. There was no showing that mother's mental health issues were resolved. Further, because the case had initially arisen from T.M.'s ingestion of methamphetamine, regular drug testing was a pivotal component of mother's case plan, with which she had only partially complied. In short, after more than two years, mother had failed fully to address the primary concerns that gave rise to this action. Under the circumstances, the juvenile court lacked confidence that mother would ever fully comply with the case plan. The court denied the section 388 petition after finding that mother had not demonstrated sufficiently changed circumstances. Moreover, even if mother had been able to show a change of circumstance, the court found it would not be in T.M. best interest to provide mother more reunification services.
Proceeding to the section 366.26 hearing, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that T.M. was adoptable, and it would be detrimental to return him to mother's care. Mother had failed to show that any statutory exception to adoption applied. Parental rights were terminated. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
1. Forfeiture/Waiver
Mother maintains that principles of due process required that the juvenile court make a finding of parental unfitness or detriment to T.M. by clear and convincing evidence at the section 366.26 hearing before her parental rights could be terminated. She contends that no such detriment was found here. Mother concedes that the juvenile court had reason at the outset to fear that T.M. was not safe in her care, given its concerns about her mental health and possible drug usage. However, she argues that over the course of the next three years, she proved her parental fitness and it became clear the court's concerns were unwarranted: she has no substance abuse problem, and the psychiatrist and therapist who assessed her believe she is mentally and emotionally stable, or at least that she does not suffer from a mental health disorder.
DCFS contends that mother forfeited the right to raise this due process issue on appeal after failing to object to the court's order terminating parental rights on this ground. Mother implicitly concedes that she failed to object on due process grounds at the trial level. Nevertheless, she insists she should not be deemed to have forfeited the right to contest the denial of due process because it was clear at the section 366.26 hearing that she was "still trying to prove her competence as a parent, and . . . wanted to keep her parental rights intact." She invites us to independently review the court's ruling despite her failure to raise it below because due process rights are involved.
We have discretion to consider forfeited claims under special circumstances, and recognize this is a difficult case. Nevertheless, we deem the issue forfeited. (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 686.) Like other rights, a parent may forfeit constitutional due process rights. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222 (Dakota H.).) Our Supreme Court has instructed that in dependency matters, courts should proceed with care and exercise their discretion "to excuse forfeiture . . . rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue." (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 (S.B.).) Dependency proceedings involve special concerns, and are governed by their own special rules. Because such actions involve a child's well-being, considerations of permanency and stability are of paramount importance. (§ 366.26; S.B., supra, at p. 1293; see In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1267.) Here, no legal justification exists to relieve mother from her belated failure to challenge the detriment findings.
Mother failed to bring to the court's attention her claim that principles of due process required that the court make a new finding of detriment before proceeding to a permanency planning hearing. Had mother done so, the court could have considered the claim and, if it found merit in the due process argument, determined and applied the appropriate legal standard. A party may not assert on appeal theories it failed to raise in the trial court. (Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 222.) Mother forfeited the right to assign error on appeal. (Ibid; see also S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.)
Even if the issue were not forfeited, we would find that the record contains substantial evidence that mother failed to establish a due process violation with respect to termination of her parental rights. Findings made prior to the section 366.26 hearing establish that the court concluded it would be detrimental to T.M. to return him to mother's care. In its disposition order the court found "clear and convincing evidence" that T.M.'s welfare required that he be removed from mother's physical custody, because a substantial danger to his physical health remained if he were returned to her care, and there were no reasonable means to protect him short of removal. Further, in the order from the 12-month review hearing, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that mother had failed to resolve the problems that gave rise to this action, and that returning T.M. to her custody would pose a substantial risk of detriment to the child's safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being.
Mother does not challenge the dispositional order on appeal. The general rule is that, if a parent has notice and fails to timely appeal an order, the parent forfeits her challenges to that order, including now-final findings of detriment and due process challenges. (See In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1212 [dispositional finding]; In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1151-1152 [due process]; see also California Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a).)
Although mother rectified the problem of an unclean and unsanitary home, completed a parenting program and took positive steps to address her mental health issues, she consistently resisted drug testing and failed to complete a drug rehabilitation program, claiming neither was necessary because she did not use and had never used illicit drugs. Although the drug tests mother did take were all negative, she failed to show up for at least as many tests as she took, notwithstanding the court's warning that a missed test constituted a dirty test. In addition, although a January 2017 psychiatric assessment indicated mother did not suffer from schizophrenia or other mental health disorders, mother failed to attend a reassessment two years later, and provided no explanation for her failure to attend or reschedule that assessment. The record contains ample evidence to support the juvenile court's finding of detriment.
2. The Court Did Not Err in Denying Mother's Section 388 Petition
Mother maintains that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her section 388 petition seeking reinstatement of reunification services. We conclude otherwise.
"Section 388 accords a parent the right to petition the juvenile court for modification of any of its orders based upon changed circumstances or new evidence." (In re Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478, fn. omitted.) "To prevail on a section 388 petition, the moving party must establish that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist, and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child. [Citation.] 'The petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and its decision will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.' [Citation.]" (In re J.T. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 953, 965, italics added.)
We need not address whether mother's section 388 petition demonstrated sufficiently changed circumstances. The outcome of a best interests analysis is dispositive: the court acted within its discretion to conclude that it was in T.M.'s best interests to terminate parental rights and free the child for adoption. By the time mother filed her petition, T.M had been in foster care for almost three years. The juvenile court's focus properly had shifted from family reunification to T.M.'s need for the permanency and stability adoption would provide. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.) [once reunification services are terminated, a parent's interest in the care, custody and companionship of her child is no longer paramount, and the focus shifts to the child's need for permanency and stability].) The record demonstrates that the child was thriving in the M.'s care and had formed strong bonds with the M.'s and their children. (See In re Aaron R. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 697, 706 [no error in denying section 388 petition where nothing rebutted evidence in the record indicating the child was thriving in the care of his prospective adoptive parent's care]; cf., In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531 ["the disruption of an existing psychological bond between dependent children and their caretakers is an extremely important factor bearing on any section 388 motion"].) Moreover, the bond between T.M. and mother had weakened over time—they no longer interacted during visits and T.M. was increasingly reluctant to take mother's calls. Mother bore the burden of demonstrating that reinstating reunification services with a goal of regaining custody at some future date would promote her son's best interests. (See Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) She failed to do so. (See In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 302 (Marilyn H.).)
3. Mother Failed to Establish a Statutory Exception to Adoption
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The record does not support application of the exception.
"The Legislature has declared that California has an interest in providing stable, permanent homes for children who have been removed from parental custody and for whom reunification efforts with their parents have been unsuccessful." (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 307.) Once the juvenile court terminates reunification services and determines a child is adoptable, it "must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified" exceptions stated in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) "provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child." (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53; In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 645 (Breanna S.).)
One exception—the beneficial parental relationship exception—applies if the "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 336.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The parent bears the burden of establishing the existence of the exception, which applies in only "extraordinary" cases. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 412, fn. 9.)
The court considers two prongs when determining whether a parent has met her burden to establish the beneficial relationship exception. The first prong examines the consistency of the parent's visitation with the child. (In re Grace P. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 605, 612 (Grace P.).) The second prong involves a more nuanced analysis, and requires a parent to prove that the bond she shares with her child "is sufficiently strong that the child would suffer detriment from its termination." (Id. at p. 613.) To meet her burden of proving the existence of a beneficial parent/child relationship, mother must do more than show frequent, loving contact, an emotional bond with T.M., or pleasant visits—she must show that she occupies a parental role in her son's life, and that the child would suffer detriment if that relationship were terminated. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.)
We review a court's refusal to find a statutory exception to adoption under the substantial evidence or abuse of discretion standards of review, depending on the nature of the challenge. Courts generally "apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child. [Citations.]" (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395.) "[B]oth standards call for a high degree of appellate court deference." (In re J.S. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1080.)
Courts have applied different standards of review when determining whether an exception to adoption applies. Some apply the substantial evidence standard, others use the abuse of discretion standard or a combination of both, and others have required evidence compelling a finding in favor of the parent as a matter of law. (See In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947 [substantial evidence]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [abuse of discretion]; In re Collin E. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 647, 663 [combination]; Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 647 [matter of law].) The Supreme Court has granted review to determine the appropriate standard of review in this context. (In re Caden C. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 87, 106, review granted July 24, 2019, S255839.) On this record, we would affirm under any standard.
We assume, for purposes of discussion, that mother maintained sufficiently consistent visitation to establish the first prong. With regard to the more qualitative analysis of the second prong, we find no error in the court's conclusion that mother failed to establish the statutory exception by showing she shared a bond with T.M. so strong that he would suffer detriment by its termination. (Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 613.) Although mother clearly loves T.M., and shared a largely positive relationship with him, she failed to demonstrate that she and her son had a relationship of such substantial, positive emotional attachment that T.M. would suffer detriment by the termination of her parental rights. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) In short, mother failed to demonstrate that a continued relationship with her would sufficiently promote T.M.'s well-being so as to outweigh the benefits he would derive in a permanent home with adoptive parents he had come to love. Mother failed to meet her burden of showing that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to T.M. under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
DISPOSITION
The orders denying mother's section 388 petition and terminating parental rights are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
WILLHITE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
COLLINS, J.
CURREY, J.