Opinion
B227850
10-05-2011
In re J. L., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VANESSA M. and LUIS F., Defendants and Appellants.
Grace Clark, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Vanessa M. Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Luis F. Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK57230)
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Valerie Skeba, Referee. Affirmed.
Grace Clark, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Vanessa M.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Luis F.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Appellants Vanessa M. (Mother) and Luis F. (Father) are the parents of J., born in July 2008. Each parent's appeal contests the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights. In addition, Mother challenges the trial court's summary denial of her section 388 petition filed on the day of the section 366.26 hearing. We affirm the judgment in its entirety.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Introduction
Mother and Father separately came to Department's attention in regard to J. and consequently were subject to orders of the juvenile court made at different times. Therefore, for purposes of clarity, we set forth first the pertinent chronology in regard to Mother, followed by a separate chronology relating to Father. Thereafter, we set forth the facts of Mother's section 388 petition, followed by an explication of the parents' joint section 366.26 hearing.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services.
2. Mother
On January 5, 2009, Department filed a section 300 petition on behalf of Mother's two daughters, three-year-old Giselle and five-month old J.. The two girls have different fathers. Ivan L. is Giselle's father and appellant is J.'s father. When the petition was filed, Mother was living with Ivan L. The petition alleged that Mother physically abused her two daughters; that Mother had a history of drug use; and that Mother and Ivan L. engaged in domestic violence.
In May 2010, the juvenile court terminated Mother and Ivan L.'s parental rights to Giselle. Because this appeal does not challenge that order, we do not set forth the evidence leading to that ruling.
Following a detention hearing, the two girls were removed from Mother's custody. J. was placed with a family with whom she continued to reside throughout the underlying proceedings and who wish to adopt her. The juvenile court ordered monitored visits between Mother and J..
On January 29, 2009, Mother, who had previously admitted to Department that she regularly used marijuana and methamphetamine, entered the Mariposa Recovery Center (Mariposa), a residential drug rehabilitation program.
On March 2, 2009, the juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition, and ordered, among other things, monitored visits (minimum four hours per week).
In the next month, Mother visited her daughters regularly and her visits went well. She continued to participate in Mariposa's residential program, including submitting to several random drug tests, all of which were negative.
On April 2, 2009, the juvenile court conducted a contested dispositional hearing. Mother testified about her participation in the Mariposa program. Over Department's objection, the court ordered reunification services for Mother, stating: "She's to do parenting, domestic violence counseling, [and] drug rehabilitation with random testing."
Thereafter, Mother's compliance with the court's order to complete a substance abuse program became quite erratic. She left Mariposa on April 8, "due to a conflict with a resident." Several days later, she enrolled in an outpatient program (Bienvenidos), but then, at an undesignated point, entered another residential program, Foley House. On June 30, 2009, she left Foley House, "again due to a conflict with a roommate." From March through June 2009, Mother tested negative on six random drug tests set up by Department but from March to August 2009, missed six other scheduled tests. In September 2009, she enrolled in a six-month outpatient program through Homeboy Industries. Mother continued to have weekly monitored visits with her daughters at the social worker's office.
By October 2009, Department recommended termination of reunification services for Mother. Its status review report explained that Mother had "failed to demonstrate compliance with [the juvenile] court['s] orders. [She] has failed two residential drug treatment programs [Mariposa and Foley House] and has not yet completed parenting classes or domestic violence counseling. Although she has maintained fairly consistent visitation with the children, and recently again enrolled in an outpatient treatment program [Homeboy Industries], she has not been able to demonstrate an improved ability to meet the needs of the children during the last period of supervision. . . . [¶] A Reunification Reassessment was conducted on behalf of [Mother], which indicates a high risk level if the children were to be returned to her care."
Because Mother objected to Department's recommendation to terminate reunification services, the juvenile court set the matter for a contested hearing. On November 9, 2009, the court conducted a section 366.21, subdivision (e) hearing. One issue was Mother's compliance with the court's order to submit to Department-scheduled drug testing. Mother testified that the last time she had done so was "a week before [she] left Foley House" in June 2009. When asked why she had not tested recently for Department, she replied: "I work every day except Mondays and Wednesdays." She claimed that she had asked her social worker for a referral to a testing center near her home but that the social worker never gave her that information. When asked why she failed to attend a scheduled drug test on Wednesday, October 28, Mother replied that beginning at 1 p.m. on that day, she was in job training. Mother also testified about her participation in the Homeboy Industries Program. She had submitted to four random drugs test at the Homeboy program. She explained, in the most general terms, the insights she had gained about herself from participating in its programs that included three individual counseling sessions and four parenting classes. Mother conceded she had not attended any anger management classes as she had been ordered to do.
The trial court ruled: "I don't think mother's made very much progress, particularly given the fact that . . . the petition was filed back in January, and this is now November. [¶] I really don't find persuasive mother's explanation for the lack of testing. It appears that she could have tested. I don't believe that the Department [did not provide her with] a new referral for the closer testing site. [¶] . . . I didn't find mother's testimony to be very persuasive at all. . . . [S]he's made some progress . . . [b]ut as far as making enough progress to continue reunification services, I think we're a long ways from that. [¶] What I think mother needs to do is to continue to comply with the recommended case plan . . . and then a file a 388 . . . because I really need to see something from her counselor supporting what she's saying because she really didn't provide very much in the way of any type of substantive evidence addressing what she's learned in the [substance abuse] program. So I think mother needs to continue to work her program and have her counselor provide that information to the court." (Italics added.)
In addition, the juvenile court found that Department had made reasonable efforts to reunify but that Mother's compliance with the case plan had been "minimal." The court terminated reunification services, stating that there was "little likelihood that further services would result in a different outcome." The court set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
After the contested hearing, Mother had one scheduled visit with her daughters later that month. Thereafter, Mother did not contact her social worker to confirm or participate in weekly meetings with her daughters until March 2010.
In January 2010, Mother entered the residential program run by the Alcoholism Center for Women (ACW). This was her fifth substance abuse program. In June 2010, Mother was terminated from the ACW program because she had lied about her whereabouts when she left the program grounds, had conflicts with the program's other clients, and failed to follow the program's rules.
In June 2010, Mother enrolled in two outpatient programs, the Casa Libre Drug and Alcohol Program and a program run by Homeboy Industries.
From March through August 2010, Mother had 12 monitored visits with her daughters. During these visits, the monitors did not observe a mother-daughter relationship but, instead, "more of the child [J.] having visits with an acquaintance."
3. Father
When Department initially filed its section 300 petition in January 2009, Ivan L. (Mother's then boyfriend and father of her daughter Giselle) believed J. was his daughter, and, in fact, was listed as J.'s father on her birth certificate. However, Mother informed Department that appellant, who had lived upstairs from her, was J.'s biological father. Department located appellant (Father) and administered paternity tests.
On May 13, 2009, the juvenile court, after reviewing the results of the paternity tests, found Father to be J.'s biological father. Over Department's objection, the court ordered reunification services for Father and monitored visits with J.. Father, acknowledging his past marijuana use, agreed to enroll in a six-month random drug testing program. In May and June, Father failed to appear five times for a scheduled drug test. The one time he did furnish a sample, he tested positive for marijuana. Father did not return repeated phone calls from Department. He had one supervised visit with J. but failed to appear for two other scheduled visits.
On June 25, 2009, Department filed a section 342 petition alleging that Father's use of marijuana placed J. at risk. In the next two and a half months, Father failed to contact his social worker, visit J., or appear for six scheduled drug tests.
On September 9, 2009, Father plead no contest to the section 342 petition. The juvenile court ordered reunification services, including drug counseling and random drug testing. Subsequently, the social worker made multiple attempts to contact Father to schedule visits with J.. Father was non-responsive.
In January 2010, Father visited with J. for the first time since being offered reunification services. The visit lasted 15 minutes. In the next two months, Father never contacted Department to schedule further meetings with J.. In March 2010, Father scheduled a visit with J. which he attended. Father then did not contact Department until May.
From May through August, Father had 12 monitored visits with J.. Department characterized his interactions with J. during these visits as positive but also noted that the monitors did not observe a father-daughter relationship but, instead, "more of the child [J.] having visits with an acquaintance."
Further, Father continued to fail to comply with the juvenile court's drug testing order. In 2010, he missed 12 scheduled drug tests.
Father testified at the 12-month review hearing conducted in May 2010. He conceded that he was required to submit to drug tests scheduled by Department and that he had only completed one such test. He testified that he had enrolled in a nine-week parenting class two weeks earlier and had attended one session. He believed that J. was "attached to [him]."
The juvenile court found that Department had made reasonable efforts to comply with the case plan but that Father had failed to comply. The court terminated reunification services for Father. The court set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
4. Mother's Section 388 Petition
On September 29, 2010 (the day of both parents' section 366.26 hearing), Mother filed a section 388 petition seeking additional reunification services with J.. She alleged the following changed circumstances: enrollment in another drug and alcohol treatment program as well as domestic violence classes and individual counseling. In addition, she had completed a parenting class and was working closely with a psychiatrist. Mother averred that additional reunification services would be in J.'s interest because: "I have participated in the court ordered treatment program and am ready, willing and able to care for J. at this time."
Mother attached to her petition letters from three social services organizations that set forth the following.
In January 2010, she entered the residential treatment program run by ACW. Mother made some progress in the program but ultimately was discharged because she had lied to the staff on at least two occasions about her actions outside of the residential program. Further, she "had started to get into trouble with some of her peers" at ACW. According to ACW's residential supervisor, "[Mother] had got to the point that no matter what type of intervention was done she was determined to do things her way."
In June 2010, Mother enrolled in the outpatient program run by the Casa Libre Drug and Alcohol Program but provided no information about what progress, if any, she had made there.
Lastly, Mother was involved with three programs run by Homeboy Industries. In April 2010, she enrolled in its 26-session Batterer's Intervention Treatment program. By July, she attended eight sessions but had missed four sessions. The program coordinator stated that Mother had "demonstrated progress" with the program. In June 2010, she enrolled in Homeboy Industries' six-month Mental Health and Substance Abuse Program. Although she attached a letter from her substance abuse counselor, the letter provided no information about her participation, let alone progress, in the program. In September 2010, she successfully completed a ten-session parenting class with Homeboy Industries.
The juvenile court summarily denied the petition without setting it for a hearing. The judge explained: "Well, it looks like mother was in a program for a while, dropped out, and then started a new program in June. [¶] . . . [T]he last letter is from July 21st [stating that in June Mother had enrolled in the Casa Libre Drug and Alcohol Program]. This is now two months later. So I don't believe there's a substantial change in circumstances or that it's in the best interests of [J.] to set mother's 388 for a hearing. I note that it was filed very late in the case. It was filed on the day of the contested .26 hearing. [¶] . . . So the 388 is denied."
5. The Parents' Joint Section 366.26 Hearing
Department's report for the section 366.26 hearing indicated that the family with whom J. had been living intended to adopt her. Neither Mother nor Father testified at the section 366.26 hearing to support application of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights. Mother's attorney asked the court to consider the testimony Mother had given four months earlier at a hearing conducted on the section 388 petition that she had filed in regard to her other daughter, Giselle. The court declined to do so, stating "I can't consider testimony that's not part of the record for this child [J.]." Mother's attorney then simply told the court: "[Mother] wanted the Court to know that she does love [J.] very much and she did what she could, and she's asking the Court to give her another chance."
Mother does not challenge that ruling in this appeal.
The juvenile court found "by clear and convincing evidence, [J.] is adoptable." Regarding the exception urged by appellants, the court explained:
"I have to consider the most permanent plan for the children, or for the child, unless I believe there is a parental-child relationship that is so beneficial to the child that it would outweigh the child's need for stability.
"And in the context of the parental-child relationship, it has to be a relationship where the parent is actually acting as a parent. And when a parent's visits have been limited to monitored visits, then, that's pretty difficult to find, although I have found it in certain circumstances.
"But with respect to this child, given her age, which is a little over two years, I think it's very difficult to conceive of how this child would have the type of parental-child relationship with the parents. For all their good intentions and the stuff that they've tried to do, they just are not able to meet that burden.
"And, you know, it's a difficult burden for parents to make with children this young because this child has been in this home for quite some time. And I think it's pretty reasonable - and I think the parents can understand - that the caretakers are the ones that have been acting as the parents for most the child's life." (Italics added.)
These appeals follow.
DISCUSSION
A. DENIAL OF SECTION 388 PETITION
Mother contends that the trial court's summary denial of her section 388 petition was an abuse of discretion. She claims: "[The] petition established a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, and showed how additional reunification services would be in J.'s best interest." We are not persuaded.
Subdivision (a) of section 388 provides that in a dependency proceeding, a party, "may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court . . . to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made." Subdivision (d) explains that "[i]f it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order, . . . the court shall order that a hearing be held." Thus, the trial court has two options: (1) summarily deny the petition or (2) conduct a hearing. "[I]f the petition fails to state a change of circumstances or new evidence that might require a change of order, the court may deny the application ex parte." (In re Jamika W. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1450.)
"The juvenile court's determination to deny a section 388 petition without a hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] We must uphold [that denial] unless we can determine from the record that its decision[] '"exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court." [Citations.]'" (In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505.)
When, as here, the trial court has previously ordered termination of reunification services and the section 388 petition is brought on the eve of a section 366.26 hearing, "the child's interest in stability is the court's foremost concern, outweighing the parent's interest in reunification." (In re Ramone R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348.) Because reunification services have been terminated, the parent's interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. (In re Brittany K., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505.) In that regard, "[i]t is only common sense that in considering whether a juvenile court abuses its discretion in denying a section 388 motion, the gravity of the problem leading to the dependency, and the reason that problem was not overcome by the final review, must be taken into account." (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531.)
In this case, Mother has a serious substance abuse problem. In the nine months following the juvenile court's sustaining of the section 300 petition, Mother had started but failed to complete four programs to address that problem. In addition, she failed to appear multiple times for random drug tests scheduled by Department.
At the November 2009 section 366.21, subdivision (e) hearing at which reunification services were terminated, the juvenile court explicitly disbelieved Mother's explanation for not completing the required drug tests and found that she had not made sufficient progress in addressing her drug addiction. In particular, the court did not find Mother's testimony about what she had learned in the substance abuse programs to be persuasive. It directed her to continue in the program and suggested that if she were to later file a section 388 petition, she should have her drug counselor provide "substantive evidence" to support her claim about her emotional growth.
Mother's section 388 petition, filed 10 months after the section 366.21, subdivision (e) hearing, did not respond to the juvenile court's suggestion. Mother included no letter or declaration from any substance abuse counselor attesting to her progress. In fact, the specific information she provided indicated she had made no real progress. She had enrolled in another residential program (ACW) but was not responsive to its direction and was ultimately discharged for lying. Although she subsequently participated in programs run by Casa Libre and Homeboy Industries, she included no information that suggested that she was now making significant progress. Given these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Mother had failed to establish changed circumstances.
To support a contrary conclusion, Mother relies upon some mildly favorable remarks the juvenile court made at the May 2010 hearing in which it first denied a section 388 petition regarding her other daughter (Giselle) and then terminated her parental rights to that child. Mother's reliance is unfounded. The remarks are not relevant in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion four months later when it denied the section 388 petition regarding J. because those remarks were based on a different set of circumstances that no longer existed.
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Furthermore, the trial court properly denied the petition because there was no showing that Mother's request for additional reunification services was in J.'s best interests. Mother's claim that J. would benefit because she (Mother) was now "ready, willing and able to care for J. at this time" was conclusory with no evidentiary support and thus insufficient to require a hearing on a section 388 petition. (In re Ramone R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348.) In fact, Mother's visitation history with J. indicated that grant of the section 388 petition would not have been in J.'s best interests. After one visit with her in November 2009, Mother did not see J. again until March 2010. At that point, Mother began regular visitation (12 monitored visits through August) but the monitors did not observe the development of a mother-daughter relationship. Meanwhile, J. had formed a "strong and healthy bond" with her prospective adopted parents and their biological daughter.
B. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Both Mother and Father challenge the trial court's order terminating parental rights. They contend that the record supports application of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to the termination of parental rights. We are not persuaded.
1. The Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), provides an exception to termination of parental rights when a parent has "maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." To establish this exception and "overcome the statutory preference for adoption, the parent must prove he or she occupies a parental role in the child's life, resulting in a significant, positive emotional attachment of the child to the parent. [Citations.]" (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 229.)
Both Mother and Father urge that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that the exception did not apply. As our colleagues in the Sixth Appellate District recently explained, that approach is analytically incorrect.
"'[T]he burden [of proof] is on the party seeking to establish the existence of one of the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) exceptions to produce that evidence.' [Citation.]
"To meet the burden of proving the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception the parent must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits— the parent must show that he or she occupies a parental role in the life of the child. [Citation.]
"As is apparent from the way mother frames her contention, mother is essentially urging that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding against her position because evidence supports her position. We see this type of presentation in dependency cases too frequently and are constrained to offer the following.
"We generally apply the familiar substantial evidence test when the sufficiency of the evidence is at issue on appeal. Under this test, '"we are bound by the established rules of appellate review that all factual matters will be viewed most favorably to the prevailing party [citations] and in support of the judgment. . . . 'In brief, the appellate court ordinarily looks only at the evidence supporting the successful
party, and disregards the contrary showing.' [Citation.] All conflicts, therefore, must be resolved in favor of the respondent."' [Citation.]
"But this test is typically implicated when a defendant contends that the plaintiff succeeded at trial in spite of insufficient evidence. In the case [such as this one] where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party [here, the parent] with the burden of proof did not carry the burden [to establish an exception to termination of parental rights] and that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. This follows because such a characterization is conceptually one that allows an attack on (1) the evidence supporting the party who had no burden of proof, and (2) the trier of fact's unassailable conclusion that the party with the burden did not prove one or more elements of the case. [Citations.]
"Thus, where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant's evidence was (1) 'uncontradicted and unimpeached' and (2) 'of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.' [Citation.]
"Here, as in many dependency cases, the case posed evidentiary conflicts. And, as is common in many dependency cases, this case obligated the juvenile court to make highly subjective evaluations about competing, not necessarily conflicting, evidence. As reflected in the juvenile court's ruling, the juvenile court considered the conflicting, competing evidence and essentially discounted mother's evidence in concluding that mother had failed to carry her burden of proof. It is not our function to retry the case. We therefore decline mother's implicit invitation to review the record so as to recount evidence that supports her position (reargument) with the object of reevaluating the conflicting, competing evidence and revisiting the juvenile court's failure-of-proof conclusion. [Citations.] This is simply not a case where undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion." (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527-1529, italics added.)
Using that analytical framework, we reject appellants' contention that the trial court erred in finding that they had not met their burden to prove the exception applied. For a parent to sustain the burden of proving the existence of the exception, the parent "must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child's life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment between child and parent. [Citations.] Further, . . . the parent must show the child would suffer detriment if his or her relationship with the parent were terminated. [Citation.]" (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.) "The parent must do more than demonstrate 'frequent and loving contact[,]' [citation], an emotional bond with the child, or that parent and child find their visits pleasant." (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.)
Neither Mother nor Father met the required burden of proof. As we explain, neither established that 26-month old J. would suffer a detriment if their parental rights were terminated and J. was adopted.
As for Mother, she had not lived with J. since her daughter was five months old. For the next 20 months, J. lived with a loving family who intended to adopt her. J. had strongly bonded with her prospective adoptive parents and their daughter. From J.'s initial detention and up through the section 366.26 hearing, Mother's visitation with her was erratic. From March 2009 through September of that year, Mother had fairly regular monitored visits with J. but after one visit in November, Mother did not see J. again until March 2010. Thereafter, Mother had 12 monitored visits with J. but the visits did not show a mother-daughter relationship but, instead, a relationship more akin to one that a child would have with an acquaintance. In sum, Mother failed to establish as a matter of law that she had created a relationship of "substantial, positive emotional attachment such that [J.] would be greatly harmed" by terminating Mother's parental rights. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) While "[i]nteraction between [a] natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child[,] . . . [t]he exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent." (Ibid.)
Mother attempts to avoid this conclusion by setting forth the evidence that the juvenile court could have relied upon (but did not) to conclude that Mother had discharged her burden to prove the predicates to the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. We decline Mother's implicit invitation to reweigh the evidence. "This is simply not a case where undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion." (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1529.)
A similar analysis applies to Father: his visitation with J. was equally erratic. After the juvenile court determined in May 2009 that he was J.'s father, he kept only one of three scheduled visits that month. In the next three months, he never visited J.. After he pled no contest to the section 342 petition in September 2009, Father did not respond to his social worker's many attempts to schedule visits with J.. In January 2010, he had one 15-minute visit with her but then did not contact Department for two months to arrange further visits. In March 2010 he visited J. once but then did not contact Department until May. From May through August, he had 12 positive but monitored visits with his daughter. The monitors never observed a father-daughter relationship, but instead, characterized it as a casual acquaintance relationship.
Acknowledging this record, Father relies upon the fact that for the four-month period from May through August 2010 in which he had regular monitored visits with his daughter, he interacted with her in a positive manner. That evidence, however, does not establish as a matter of law the elements of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. At best, the evidence established that Father had 12 positive visits that conferred some incidental benefit to J.. This falls far short of the showing the law required Father to make. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
WILLHITE, J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, P. J.
MANELLA, J.