Opinion
B232456
12-15-2011
In re J.F. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICARDO F., SR., Defendant and Appellant.
Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK 86531)
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Sherri Sobel, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Father, Ricardo F., Sr., appeals from the dependency court's jurisdiction and disposition orders removing his four children from his custody and placing them with their mother, after father admitted to having sexual intercourse twice with a girl who had lived in the family home for five years, the first time when she was not yet 13 years old, impregnating the girl. We affirm.
The Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition alleging all of father's four children were dependents pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d). In substance, the first section 300, subdivision (b) count alleged that on more than one occasion in December 2010, father locked an unrelated child, R.Z., who was 12 years old the first time, in a room, removed her clothes, inserted his penis in her vagina and impregnated her by his forcible rape. The children's mother discovered the sexual abuse of the child, R.Z., compelled her to take a pregnancy test, and told her not to disclose father's sexual abuse but to say a boy at school impregnated her. The second section 300, subdivision (b) count alleged the children were dependents as a consequence of father's alcohol abuse. The section 300, subdivision (d) count alleged the children were dependents as a consequence of mother's failure to protect them and permitting father to remain in the home with unlimited access to them until he was arrested and taken into custody for committing a sex crime against a child under 14 years old.
All undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the Department offered into evidence the detention report, the jurisdiction/disposition report, and other documents, including police reports recounting interviews conducted with father and with the child victim. There was no objection to the admission of these reports and documents. No party offered any testimony at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Father's counsel argued that even if the conduct described in the petition were true, there was no evidence father had abused his own children or that there was a substantial risk that any or all of his children would be sexually abused. Father's counsel argued that Department social workers had interviewed father's two daughters and two nieces, and none of them reported inappropriate conduct, demonstrating father had not broken the "family taboo" against incest. Father's counsel acknowledged it was true that father was intoxicated when he exchanged text messages with R.Z. on the evening before the second sexual assault, but argued father was normally a light social drinker.
Mother's counsel argued mother had come to accept the truth of the allegations against father and would protect her children if father were released from custody. Mother's counsel asked the court to strike the allegations against mother or amend them to allege mother "knew or should have known what was going on." Counsel asked that the children remain in mother's care.
The children's counsel argued that father was a sexual predator and there was a substantial risk of harm to them even though it appeared father had not yet crossed the line to commit incest. Counsel for the Department also contended father was a sexual predator and, since he had raped a 12-year-old child who lived in his home, there was no reason to believe father would not also rape another child in his home under the proper circumstances. Counsel for the Department also argued that despite the evidence that "father doesn't drink that much," father admitted being intoxicated on the night of the second attack and asserted "that was part of the reason why he did what he did," so obviously alcohol is a problem for him.
The court sustained all the allegations of the petition without amendment and explained its analysis at some length and with great sensitivity toward the family and the child victim. The court acknowledged the evidence that R.Z. had been sexually active and had two abortions before father's assault, and she had sent father text messages with pictures of herself naked. Yet, the court reasoned, R.Z. was living in father's family home with her own mother and was part of the family. The court expressed concern that "[n]obody was watching her in the household," and "[s]omebody needed to step in here." The court acknowledged that the children's "mother is absolutely in shock and that this is incredibly difficult to deal with." Recognizing the likelihood that father would spend "a significant period of time in custody," the court nonetheless found it was necessary for the court to protect father's children, particularly those aged 5, 11 and 15. As for father's 17-year-old son, the court stated it had considered "whether or not [he] needed to be part of this. He's almost 18 years old and he's a male. On the other hand, they all blame the child [victim R.Z.], and so [the oldest child] runs the same risk of believing that women are there to be used and that behavior can be excused on the basis of inappropriateness on both sides. In other words, if a 12-year-old goes after [him], then I guess it's okay for [him] to go after that 12-year-old." The court also observed that, while many people get intoxicated from time to time, it is rare for an adult to rape a child while under the influence, thereby underscoring the aberrant nature of father's conduct.
After declaring all the children to be dependents, the court expressed the view there was "absolutely no reason to remove the children from the mother." The children's counsel agreed, and no one objected to the court's disposition removing the children from father's custody only and ordering them placed in the care of their mother. The court stated it considered the option of terminating jurisdiction but decided to keep the case open for six months "based on mother's own request for services for her family. So I will be keeping the case open for at least six months." The court issued a statewide jail removal order for father so he could attend the six-month judicial review hearing on October 4, 2011, on which date the court stated it expected to "achieve permanence by exiting out of this case."
On appeal, father admits to having sexual intercourse with an unrelated 13-year- old girl, R.Z., who resided in the family home. (The child was 13 at the time of the second rape.) But father contends there was no substantial evidence of harm or risk of harm to his own children and no clear and convincing evidence warranted removing the children from his custody. He also contends there was no substantial evidence of harm or risk of harm to his children as a result of his "occasional social drinking." Finally, he argues there was no substantial evidence to support the allegations that mother failed to protect their children.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. "In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court." (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) "We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. [Citations.] '"[T]he [appellate] court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [that the order is appropriate]."' [Citation.]" (In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 315, 321.)
Turning first to the claim of insufficient evidence to support the sex abuse allegations, arguments similar to those father asserts here have been rejected by the courts, and we reject them here, too. (In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1407, 1475 [sufficient evidence to support jurisdiction over a two-year-old boy when the father sexually abused his 12- and 14-year-old daughters]; In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1341, 1345 [father's one occasion of touching vagina of nine-year-old on top of her underwear supported jurisdiction over eight- and five-year-old brothers; any younger sibling approaching the age of the abused child is at risk of sexual abuse]; In Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84, 90-91 [sexual abuse of daughter is so aberrant that it can place son at risk of abuse].) We find substantial evidence that father's sexually aberrant conduct created a substantial risk of harm to his own children.
We will not discuss all of the substantial evidence in this record, finding the police reports which were admitted into evidence provide ample substantial evidence supporting the trial court's findings and order. We will summarize briefly the evidence in the police reports and forego discussion of the detailed accounts of interviews of the members of this family, who struggled to understand father's behavior. Suffice it to say that none of the interviews of family members in any significant way created factual disputes when compared with the police reports.
A Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department incident report described an interview of the child victim on January 20, 2011. The child told deputies that on December 17, 2010, around 6:00 p.m., father called her into his room and, after she entered, closed the door and locked it. He then grabbed her by the hand and laid her on his bed, unbuttoned her pants and pulled down her pants and underwear. Father then pulled down his pants and underwear and forced himself on top of her. The child tried to squeeze her legs together so father could not put his erect penis in her vagina. Father forced the child's legs apart with both of his hands and forced himself on top of her again. Father grabbed his erect penis with his right hand and inserted it in her vagina and had intercourse with her for about five minutes, during which he told the child he loved her. When he finished, father got off the child and walked away from her.
The child told the deputies that two days later, mother confronted her after finding a text message on father's cell phone telling the child not to tell anyone about the incident. Mother gave the child a pregnancy test, with positive results. Mother then told the child to tell her own mother that the father was a boy from school who no longer goes there. The child complied. Distraught and seeking advice, R.Z.'s mother called a family friend, who spoke with the child, and the child told her the truth. The friend told the child to tell her own mother the truth and to file a police report. The child's mother said she and her daughters planned to leave father's home. After this interview, the deputies made a report to the Department of Social Services, since in addition to the child victim, there were other children living in the home.
A supplemental sheriff's department report described the arrest of father and father's confession on January 20, 2011. Father told the deputies that the child and her mother had moved out that day, and he knew the child was pregnant. After deputies told father the charges against him and read his Miranda rights, father said he understood his rights and agreed to talk to the deputies. Father admitted having intercourse with the child on December 17, 2010, though according to father, the child essentially seduced him. Father said he remembered the date because on the next day, the family held a baby shower at his house. Father admitted that he ejaculated inside the child without a condom. Father said the child wanted to stay with him and he had to persuade her to leave his bedroom before his wife returned from the market. The deputies asked what led to this incident, and he said he and the child had exchanged vows of love and she had called him her boyfriend.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
Father admitted he had sexual intercourse with the child again on Christmas Eve after everyone else in the house had gone to sleep. He was watching television when the child again seduced him. He again ejaculated inside her vagina without a condom. Again, the child wanted to stay with him on the couch afterward, and he had to convince her to return to her bedroom. Father told the deputies his wife found out about what happened after she found text messages the child had sent him saying she loved him and his replies saying he loved her too. Father said he and mother confronted the child about the text messages, and she said it was just a game. Father admitted knowing the child was 13 and that it was illegal for him to have sex with her. He said the child just wanted to get him in trouble and he fell for her games. Father said the child had lived in his home for four years and he knew she had intercourse with boyfriends before him and had an abortion "a couple of months ago."
A second supplemental report prepared by a sheriff's detective in the special victims' bureau described another interview of the child victim and of father on January 21, 2011. The interview with father took place in a jailhouse interview room and was digitally recorded for use at trial. Father confirmed that deputies read him Miranda rights before he spoke with them the day before. He repeated what he had told the deputies. In addition, he said the child had moved into his three-bedroom apartment with her mother and sister when she was seven years old because they had nowhere to live, so "he opened his door to them to rent them a room." He said his wife found out what happened with the child because "he had been drinking and forgot to erase the messages from his phone."
Father asked the detective why no one had asked about the child R.Z. having had an abortion before the incidents involving him. The deputies asked father if that abortion had anything to do with him, and father said no. Father asked if the criminal charges against him could change if it was determined the baby was not his. The detective said they might change but explained the charges were not brought because of the pregnancy; they were brought because of the child's age. The detective asked father what he would think if one of his young daughters had sex. Father said that would be bad. The detective asked father why it was all right for him to have sex with the child, R.Z., at age 13, and father replied that the child saw the door open and came into his bedroom.
Later that day, the detective interviewed R.Z. She described father as being "like her uncle." She repeated what she had told the deputies the day before and added information about a third, previous sexual assault by father. It had happened in August 2010 on the day after father's older daughter celebrated her 15th birthday. The family met at a relative's home, and R.Z. said all the adults were drinking that day. They returned home around 8:00 p.m. The child changed into her pajamas and, as she was walking toward the bathroom, father approached her from behind, she turned around, and he put his hands inside her pajama pants, inserted a finger into her vagina, and kissed her with enough force to leave a bruise on her neck. As for mother's confrontation of the child with father present, she added that mother had recorded the confrontation with a video camera.
We find father's behavior to be extremely sexually aberrant. The various aberrant aspects of his behavior are horrific to enumerate. He twice raped a child at ages 12 and 13. The child had lived in his home for five years, and had been included in family activities and made to feel like a member of the family. Father knew she was sexually active and had been impregnated before. Yet, he ejaculated in her vagina without protection against another pregnancy, obviously concerned only with his own gratification and utterly unconcerned for the child in his home. He knew she had a crush on him, and he exploited her trust in him and her own misplaced emotional longings by responding to her declarations of romantic love with his own assurances that he loved her too—plainly, not as an uncle, but as the boyfriend she imagined him to be. The sexual assaults took place shortly after family celebrations: first, his daughter's 15th birthday celebration; second, the day before a baby shower; and last, on Christmas Eve. Father assaulted the child, R.Z., when she was most vulnerable, feeling safe at home in the evening in her pajamas after a day of family fellowship.
Equally aberrant as his conduct is father's assessment of how and why he assaulted the child. He knew it was illegal to have sex with R.Z. and viewed it as a bad thing if his own adolescent and teen daughters were to have sex. Yet, he described the rapes of R.Z. as if they were romantic encounters between mutually consenting lovers. He characterized R.Z. as a seductress with sexual experience that, in his mind, shifted to her responsibility for the rapes. He seemed to think his criminal punishment should be less severe if his admitted rapes were not the cause of R.Z.'s pregnancy. Father's behavior and his twisted perception of his own behavior are so sexually deviant as to constitute substantial evidence that father may be a risk to any child in his home, upon whom he might project his romantic fantasies.
Father's inability to recognize his own depravity is so disturbing as to support the reasonable inference that he might force himself upon any child, female or male. Moreover, as the trial court reasoned, there is a risk that father's sons may learn to become a sexual predator like father, by learning from father that it is appropriate to manipulate others more vulnerable. (In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, 198 ["Brothers can be harmed by the knowledge that a parent has so abused the trust of their sister. They can even be harmed by the denial of the perpetrator, the spouse's acquiescence in the denial, or their parents' efforts to embrace them in a web of denial."].) A sexually abusive and manipulative father in the home supports the finding that "the home environment of the children is extremely dysfunctional, and poses a risk to their well-being." (In re Maria R. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 48, 54, 69).
We address only briefly father's argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence of his alcohol abuse. Regardless of whether father ordinarily drank socially and not excessively, there is substantial evidence that occasionally he becomes intoxicated, and he was intoxicated during at least two of his assaults upon R.Z., thus posing a risk to other children in the home.
Mother has not appealed. Ordinarily, it would have been unnecessary for us to address father's challenge to the jurisdictional findings against him, because "a jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring her within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent. [Citations.] This accords with the purpose of a dependency proceeding, which is to protect the child, rather than prosecute the parent." (In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397.) However, father also asserts the evidence was insufficient to sustain the findings that mother failed to protect her children. Assuming without deciding that father has standing to appeal the findings that mother's behavior also brought the children within the statutory definition of dependent children, we find there was substantial evidence to support the findings of mother's failure to protect and consequential risk of harm to the children.
When mother discovered the text messages between her husband and the child, she required the child to undergo an interrogation in the presence of her rapist, which she videotaped; she later administered a pregnancy test and, when the test was positive, told the child to say a boy at school had impregnated her. Mother was concerned only with protecting her own interests and showed no concern whatsoever for the physical and emotional harm that father had inflicted on the child, or for the emotional harm mother herself inflicted by forcing the child to confront her attacker on videotape and by urging her to lie about what had happened to her. R.Z. had lived in mother's home and been included in the family since she was seven years old; it requires no leap of logic to infer from this evidence there may be a risk that mother would fail to protect her own children from father's predatory conduct. Indeed, mother took no steps to protect her children from father at any time before he was arrested more than a month after the first rape.
We also find substantial evidence supports the disposition order removing the children from father's custody. Section 361, subdivision (c) provides, inter alia, that no dependent child may be taken from the physical custody of the parent with whom the child resided at the time the petition was filed, unless the dependency court finds clear and convincing evidence of a substantial risk of harm and no reasonable means to protect the child without removal. (E.g., Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248.) In assessing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to findings made in the trial court by clear and convincing evidence, "the substantial evidence test applies to determine the existence of the clear and convincing standard of proof, the same as in other cases." (In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1038.)
Father was present in custody at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, presumably awaiting trial on the charges of raping the child, R.Z. At the hearing, he made no objection to the court's expressed intention to remove the children from his custody and place them with mother. In his reply brief, father asserts he had no chance to object, but we reject that contention. The trial court interrupted its own recitation of dispositional findings to inquire of R.Z.'s counsel whether there was an objection to placement of the children with their mother. Father could have asked to be heard then, or later, and nothing in the record of proceedings suggests the court would have been unwilling to entertain father's objection. Ordinarily, an appellate court will not consider "a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citation & fn. omitted.] The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected." (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.)
Moreover, although on appeal father argues there is no evidence that he would cross the line to commit incest with any child, much less with a male child, at no time during the hearing did father ever suggest that the court should consider treating his sons differently than his daughters. The court specifically stated it had considered declining to declare the older boy a dependent, which suggests to us the court would have considered any argument by father asking that the boys be treated differently than the girls. Father never asked the court for custody of the boys on the ground they were not at risk, or offered evidence that any potential risk to the girls was not present as to the sons.
In any event, we find the court's order placing the children with mother and removing them from father was not prejudicial to father. It seems as likely to us as it seemed to the trial court that father will remain in custody until sometime after (perhaps long after) the court has terminated jurisdiction over this case. The court stated its expectation that jurisdiction would be terminated even before this appeal has been heard. Whether jurisdiction is extended another six months is not likely to make any difference in terms of father's ability to assert custody over the children. Moreover, his older son will reach the age of majority in December of this year. It is likely that, even if the court maintains jurisdiction over the other children until the 12-month review date, the court may terminate jurisdiction over the older boy. After the court has terminated dependency jurisdiction, as to the children who are still minors when father is released from custody, he can seek a family law order modifying the dependency court's custody order. (In re Roger S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 25, 30 [following termination of jurisdiction, exit orders pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code, § 362.4 remain in effect until modified or terminated by the family law court].)
DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
GRIMES, J. I Concur:
BIGELOW, P. J.
FLIER, J., DISSENTING
Because I find no substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's jurisdictional order, I respectfully dissent.
Juvenile courts lack jurisdiction over children unless there is evidence that the children fall within specified statutes. (In re V.M. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 245, 252.) "When a child is not a person described by [Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (section 300)], the court shall order that the petition be dismissed and the child discharged from any detention or restriction theretofore ordered." (Id. at p. 253.) That is what should have happened in this case.
The juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over the children under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d). That statute provides in pertinent part:
"Any child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court: [¶] . . . [¶]No evidence supported the finding that the children fell within the ambit of section 300, subdivision (b) or (d).
"(b) The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left . . . or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. . . . The child shall continue to be a dependent child pursuant to this subdivision only so long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness. [¶] . . . [¶]
"(d) The child has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child will be sexually abused, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, by his or her parent or guardian or a member of his or her household, or the parent or guardian has failed to adequately protect the child from sexual abuse when the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that the child was in danger of sexual abuse."
1. Allegations That the Children Were at Risk of Physical Harm and Sexual Abuse Are Not Supported by Substantial Evidence
The court sustained the following finding under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d): father's "sexual abuse of the unrelated child . . . and . . . mother's failure to protect the children endangers the children's physical and emotional health, safety and well- being, creates a detrimental home environment and places the children at risk of physical and emotional harm, damage, danger, sexual abuse and failure to protect."
There was no evidence, however, that the children (ages 5, 11, 15, and 17) had suffered any physical harm or sexual abuse while in mother's and father's custody. Mother stated that father was never violent, and the record contains no contrary evidence. Mother reported that father was not a risk to the children and that she never saw any signs that the children had been sexually abused. The record contains no contrary evidence. All four children stated that father had never abused them, and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) introduced no evidence contradicting their denials or otherwise suggesting that the children were at risk of future abuse. Tellingly, the children wanted to remain in mother's and father's care.
Although there was evidence that father raped R.Z., this case concerns mother's and father's children, not R.Z. The lack of any evidence that father engaged in or threatened similar conduct with his children or placed his children at risk of abuse similar to that inflicted on R.Z. requires reversal of the jurisdictional finding. (See In re B.T. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 685, 693 [threatened harm must be to child who is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, not someone else].) Absent any evidence supporting the inference that father's conduct toward R.Z. posed any substantial risk to the children, jurisdiction is not warranted.
There may be circumstances when a parent's conduct with an unrelated child shows that the related child is also threatened. (See, e.g., In re Y.G. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 109 [finding physical abuse of unrelated child supported jurisdiction over mother's child who was same age as unrelated child].) However, here there was no evidence supporting the inference that the children were at risk of abuse similar to that father inflicted on R.Z. Cases discussing jurisdiction over a child when that child's sibling has been sexually abused are not relevant here because none of the children had been sexually abused.
Finally, there was no evidence that mother failed to protect the children from physical harm or sexual abuse, which a fortiori requires evidence that the children were harmed or abused. Mother cannot be faulted for failing to protect the children from nonexistent harm or abuse.
2. The Allegation That the Children Were at Risk of Serious Physical Harm Because of Father's Use of Alcohol Is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence
The court found under section 300, subdivision (b) that the "father's abuse [of] alcohol and the mother's failure to protect the children endangers the children's physical and emotional health and safety, creates a detrimental home environment and places the children at risk of physical and emotional harm, damage, danger and failure to protect."
Father's alcohol use was relevant "only to the extent that it affected" his ability to care for the children. (In re B.T., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 694.) Here, DCFS presented no evidence that father's use of alcohol in any way affected his ability to care for the children. There was evidence that father was under the influence of alcohol when he texted R.Z. But there was no evidence that father's alcohol use affected the children or placed them at risk of abuse. Accordingly, jurisdiction over the children on the basis of father's alcohol use was improper. (Ibid.)
3. Conclusion
Dependency proceedings have a different focus from criminal proceedings. (In re B.T., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 695.) Evidence of father's conduct with R.Z. falls outside the ambit of the dependency statutes because there was no evidence the children were at risk of similar abuse. (See ibid.) I would therefore reverse the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.
FLIER, J.