Opinion
B298298
05-27-2020
In re C.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RAMON M., Defendant and Appellant.
Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP01448) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed. Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Ramon M. (Father) appeals from the jurisdiction and disposition orders declaring his son, C.V., a dependent child of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), and removing him from Father's custody. Father contends the trial court erred in exercising jurisdiction and requiring him to move out of the family home because no substantial evidence existed that Father's conduct created a risk of harm. We disagree and affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The family consists of Father, the mother, L.V., their child C.V. (born in 2017), and C.V.'s half siblings, K.G. (born in 2013) and L.G. (born in 2015). In May 2018, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) investigated an allegation that Father punched K.G. in the face, leaving a bruise. The parents denied the abuse, claiming that what appeared to be a bruise was instead hyperpigmentation of the skin on K.G.'s face. DCFS determined the allegation was "inconclusive" and closed the investigation.
The children in this case have the same mother but different fathers. Father is the biological father of C.V., Martin V. is the father of K.G., and Juan G. is the father of L.G. Only Father and C.V. are parties to this appeal.
Hyperpigmentation is a discoloration of the skin caused by excess production of melanin.
Nine months later, on February 22, 2019, DCFS received a referral from K.G.'s afterschool caregiver, who reported that K.G. had a large, dark bruise on his cheek and a scratch under his eye. The child reported that Father punched him in the face, but refused to elaborate because he feared that Father would hit him again for reporting the abuse. The referral also disclosed that K.G. had a history of coming to school with suspicious and unexplained bruises on his body, which caused the afterschool caregiver to be concerned for the child's welfare at home.
The DCFS social worker went to the family home to investigate. The investigator observed that K.G. had a large, dark bruise on his cheek and a scratch under his eye; the child told the investigator that Father punched him in the face with his closed fist. He also said that he would fall and hurt himself on occasion. The child's half sibling, L.G., told the investigator that she was afraid of Father. She stated that Father "hits" K.G. when Father is angry.
When questioned, the mother denied the abuse. She claimed that the mark on K.G.'s face was his hyperpigmentation rather than a bruise. She alternatively contended that the child suffered the injury at school. A neighbor, who observed the child daily and was aware of his skin condition, told the investigator that she had noticed the bruise and scratch on the child's face and believed it was an injury not attributable to his hyperpigmentation. The neighbor also reported that when she questioned the mother about the child's injury, the mother initially told her that she did not know how the child had been injured, but later stated that the child had fallen. When questioned by the investigator, Father denied any physical abuse of the child; he accused the child of lying about it. Father claimed K.G. was often falling and sometimes came home from school with marks on his face.
The school had no records that K.G. had been injured at school on the day he suffered the bruise and scratch.
The report from K.G.'s medical examination by an emergency room physician on February 22, 2019 revealed that the child had faint hyperpigmentation near his eyes, a scratch under his eye and a large bruise on his cheek. The child told the doctor that Father had punched him in the face.
On February 28, 2019, the court issued an order removing all three children from the family home and placed them with relatives. On March 6, 2019, DCFS filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j), alleging that Father had physically abused the child, K.G., in February 2019 when Father punched the child on the face, and the mother, knowing of the abuse, failed to protect the children by allowing Father to reside in the home and have unlimited access to them. The petition further alleged that that Father's abuse put all of the children at risk of injury.
The detention report revealed that more than two weeks after he sustained the injuries, the bruise on K.G.'s face was still visible. The detention report also disclosed that a psychologist who had evaluated K.G. for mental health services said that the child reported that his face was bruised when he fell at school on his cheek but also stated that Father had pushed him, which caused him to fall on the bed and hurt his cheek.
When interviewed by a sheriff's deputy who investigated the report of abuse, Father denied abusing the child, claiming that he did not know how the child was injured. The mother told the sheriff's deputy that K.G. suffered the injuries when he fell and hit his face on the ground. K.G., who was interviewed at the same time as the parents, confirmed the mother's version of the events.
At the March 7, 2019 detention hearing, the court detained K.G. from the mother and placed him with his paternal aunt; detained C.V. from the mother and Father and placed C.V. with a paternal grandmother; and ordered half sibling, L.G., released to her father. The court ordered the parents to have monitored visitation with the children and to participate in services.
The May 8, 2019 jurisdiction/disposition report disclosed that the children remained in their placements with their relatives and that the parents were participating in visitation and services, including counseling and classes. Both parents continued to deny the allegations, however, claiming that K.G. was injured at school and was lying about the abuse. Both K.G. and L.G. continued to state that Father had caused the injuries. The paternal aunt with whom K.G. had been placed reported that, on two separate occasions, K.G. had disclosed he did not want to return to the family home because Father had punched him in the face.
The court conducted the adjudication proceedings on May 29 and 30, 2019. DCFS, joined by the children's counsel, urged the court to sustain the petition. The court sustained the section 300 petition under subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j) against Father. The court then declared the children dependents of the court, removed custody from Father, and placed the children "in home-of-parent-mother," and ordered Father not to be in the home. The court ordered monitored visitation for Father and services for the parents.
Father timely appealed. On January 16, 2020, at the section 364 review hearing, the juvenile court found the parents had complied with their case plans and allowed Father to move back into the family home and continued jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
A child may be adjudged a dependent of the court under subdivision (a) of section 300 when "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child's parent or guardian. For purposes of this subdivision, a court may find there is a substantial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on the child or the child's siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian that indicate the child is at risk of serious physical harm." (§ 300, subd. (a).)
Although the juvenile court sustained counts under subdivisions (a), (b) and (j) of section 300, the factual allegations supporting each of the separate counts are identical. We focus on subdivision (a), because the allegations in this case involve physical abuse. " 'When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court's jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the [trial] court's finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.' " (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762.)
" 'In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.' " (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)
Father argues that substantial evidence did not support the jurisdictional finding that he abused K.G. According to Father, the evidence that he physically abused K.G. was contradictory, and in any event, any injury K.G. suffered was not sufficiently severe to support the court's exercise of jurisdiction over his son, C.V. We disagree.
On appeal, Father also challenges the disposition order requiring that he move out of the family home. While this appeal was pending, however, the juvenile court allowed Father to return to the family home and, thus, appellant's challenge to the disposition order is moot. This court will not reach the merits of appellant's argument about the disposition because we can offer no remedy at this point and Father has not persuaded us that disposition will affect the outcome of subsequent proceedings.
Concerning contradictions and conflicts in the evidence, we observe that this court does not retry the facts or resolve any conflicts in the evidence. Instead, the appellate court gives deference to the juvenile court and " ' " 'looks only at the evidence supporting the successful party, and disregards the contrary showing.' " ' " (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527, italics omitted.) And here, substantial evidence supported the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the children, including C.V., based on the finding that the Father physically abused K.G.
When he spoke to familiar or trusted adults outside of the presence of his parents, K.G. consistently reported that Father had punched him in the face and had scratched him. K.G.'s report of abuse was also corroborated by his half sibling, L.G., who, on two separate occasions, told the social worker that Father had abused K.G.
In contrast, inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence appear in the parents' statements about the injuries. They maintained that the child lied about the abuse; they claimed that the child was injured at school, or that he had injured himself accidentally at home. Alternatively, they claimed that the child had not been injured at all—that the mark on his cheek was his hyperpigmentation rather than a bruise caused by abuse. The parents' explanations are, however, belied by other evidence in the record. The school had no reports that K.G. had been hurt at school on the day he suffered the injury. In addition, the mark on the child's face was not consistent with the parents' claim that it was the child's hyperpigmentation. The neighbor and the child's afterschool caregiver, who saw the child regularly and were familiar with his skin condition, both stated that the child had a large, dark bruise and scratch on his face. The doctor who examined the child also distinguished between the hyperpigmentation and the bruise, observing that the child had a large bruise and scratch, in addition to hyperpigmentation. Moreover, although the record contained evidence, that included the child's statements that he had accidentally fallen and injured himself on prior occasions, the evidence supported the court's finding that Father inflicted the injuries alleged in the petition.
In addition, concerning the severity of the injuries, the court rationally inferred that the children were at substantial risk of serious future injury under section 300, subdivision (a), based on these injuries and the prior alleged incidents of Father abusing K.G. The afterschool caregiver reported they had observed K.G. with similar injuries on previous occasions. K.G.'s half sibling, L.G., confirmed that when he was angry with K.G., Father had resorted to physical abuse in the past. Moreover, less than a year before this incident, DCFS had investigated a referral that involved nearly identical allegations of abuse. From this evidence, the court could reasonably conclude that Father had physically abused K.G. previously. Although the injuries in this case did not permanently disfigure the child, the large bruise on K.G.'s face was still clearly visible more than two weeks after Father inflicted it. And Father's abuse of K.G. caused the children to be afraid of Father. Thus, the abuse in this case, combined with the prior incidents of abuse, supported the court's finding of risk of serious physical harm under section 300 subdivision (a).
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P.J. We concur:
BENDIX, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.