Opinion
B298933
03-05-2020
In re G.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. N.B., Defendant and Appellant.
Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles and Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP04390F) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed. Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles and Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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N.B. (mother) appeals from the order of the juvenile court taking jurisdiction over her newborn daughter, G.B. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (b)(1) & (j).) She contends the petition is jurisdictionally inadequate. We conclude that the petition is supported by the evidence and affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
I. The dependencies of mother's older children
As a child, mother was twice a dependent of the juvenile court. As an adult, mother has a history of arrests beginning in 2008 for possession of controlled substances, burglary, and robbery.
Mother has five children from at least three fathers. Her two eldest children, born in 2006 and 2007, were declared dependents of the juvenile court in 2011 based on her and the father's history of domestic violence in the children's presence and the father's alcohol abuse. The court awarded mother custody of the children provided they all lived with the maternal aunt. However, just before that order was issued, mother was jailed on charges of burglary and the aunt refused to allow mother to reside with her upon release, and so the juvenile court sustained an additional count alleging mother's inability to provide for the children. Mother gave birth to twins in May 2014. The court terminated jurisdiction in December 2014.
In May 29, 2018, the juvenile court sustained a six-count petition on behalf of all four children, naming mother and her male companion, the twins' father Gerald L. The 2018 petition alleged a history of domestic violence between mother and Gerald L., who she allowed to live with the children; Gerald L.'s history of criminal conduct and substance abuse; mother's criminal history and substance abuse, and her failure to protect the children. The court terminated jurisdiction for the eldest child, whose father was awarded sole custody. However, that child complained of physical abuse and so mother took her away from her father. Mother then denied Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) access to that child even though mother did not have custody. Eventually, DCFS recovered the child and placed her in foster care. The other three children were placed with a family member.
By March 2019, mother was mostly in compliance with her case plan and was on track to reunify with her children. She had not completed her anger management course and was not in compliance with her mental health services, despite having finished three other elements of her case plan. While she appeared to be capable of caring for the children's needs, DCFS had "concerns for [m]other's behavior." She was "not a great communicator and tend[ed] to cancel visits" with the social workers. Then, in March 2019, mother gave birth to G.B. and did not notify DCFS. II. G.B.'s detention
DCFS received a referral about G.B.'s birth a week after it occurred. DCFS was concerned because mother had hidden her pregnancy from the social workers during the reunification period in the older children's dependency. Mother did not mention the newborn when she spoke to the social worker the day after giving birth. She sounded "off" to the social worker but denied anything was wrong. Mother did not mention the birth a couple of days later in court in the older children's dependency.
Eventually, mother confirmed G.B.'s birth, but refused to provide any other information or to allow the social worker to assess the infant's safety. She was vague about their whereabouts, and refused to sign documents to allow DCFS to retrieve information about the newborn. Mother would not name the hospital where G.B. was born, and repeatedly declined to reveal information about the identity of G.B.'s father. Mother claimed G.B. was being seen by a clinic, but that clinic denied having a record of the baby's visits. Mother's concealment caused DCFS concern.
Mother filled out a parentage questionnaire on father before the jurisdiction hearing. Mother indicated that his name was Jonathan, but she claimed not to know his last name or whereabouts.
DCFS eventually learned that mother was living with the maternal aunt. In a March 2019 visit by DCFS, mother explained, and maternal aunt confirmed, that mother would be receiving financial help from her family and that she would move into her own place once she was able to start driving for Uber again. However, mother persisted in withholding information from DCFS during the visit. Maternal aunt was uncomfortable talking about other members of the household. Mother intervened to prevent DCFS from "bothering" maternal aunt and refused to provide information about who was living in the house or to give DCFS permission to assess the residence for safety or answer questions about pets, weapons, or medication there.
DCFS determined that G.B. was at a very high risk for future abuse or neglect based on mother's referral history, case history, current allegations, history with DCFS as a child, arrest history, and G.B's age. Additionally, mother was minimally cooperative and hid her pregnancy while knowing she should report it. DCFS needed to be able to assess G.B.'s safety. Accordingly, DCFS rejected voluntary family maintenance as an option for mother and determined that it would not be in G.B.'s best interest to close the referral. Instead, all social workers on the case agreed that a non-detention petition should be filed to add G.B. to the other children's dependency. Determining it was in the child's best interest to be supervised by the juvenile court, DCFS filed a petition in April 2019.
As amended, the 2019 petition naming G.B. contained two identical counts under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), that mother and her male companion, Gerald L. "have a history of engaging in volatile confrontations. On 05/05/2018 and 05/28/2018, the male companion was arrested for domestic violence incidents resulting in the male companion breaking a bed headboard, ceiling lamp, television, glass shelf and window in the home, exposing the siblings to broken glass. The mother pushed the male companion. The mother failed to protect the siblings in that the mother allowed the male companion to frequent the siblings' home and to have unlimited access to the siblings despite a restraining order protecting the mother from the male companion." The twin siblings are current dependents of the juvenile court because of domestic violence between mother and Gerald L. "Such violent conduct on the part of the male companion against the mother and the mother's failure to protect the siblings endanger the child's physical health and safety and place the child at risk of serious physical harm." III. Jurisdiction
The juvenile court detained G.B. and released her to mother under DCFS supervision, on the condition that mother and baby reside with maternal aunt, comply with the siblings' case plan, and cooperate with DCFS, including allowing unannounced home visits.
In advance of the jurisdiction hearing, mother claimed she had attended anger management classes but was unable to elaborate on what she learned. Mother refused to make a statement for the family assessment portion of the jurisdiction report and was hesitant to meet with the social worker.
At the jurisdiction hearing, mother orally moved to dismiss the 2019 petition on the ground there was no nexus between the allegations of past conduct and any ongoing risk to newborn G.B. "In the alternative," mother twice argued that only the count under section 300, subdivision (j) be sustained. The juvenile court denied the motion, amended the 2019 petition to match the dates alleged in the 2018 petition, sustained two identical counts under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), and ordered the baby placed with mother under DCFS supervision. The court ordered family maintenance services for mother and G.B. and required mother to undergo individual counseling to address case issues including domestic violence and child protection. Mother filed her timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that the 2019 petition is jurisdictionally insufficient because it fails to allege facts that mother placed G.B. at risk by engaging in domestic violence.
" ' "[I]f the jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial evidence, the adequacy of the petition is irrelevant." [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'The only exception occurs when a parent claims a petition fails to provide actual notice of the factual allegations. Unless the alleged factual deficiencies result in a miscarriage of justice, the reversal of a jurisdictional order supported by substantial evidence is unwarranted.' " (In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123.) I. Mother had adequate notice of the 2019 petition's allegations.
The 2019 petition's allegations match the allegations sustained in the siblings' dependency. As the juvenile court noted, mother is collaterally estopped from challenging the truth of the facts alleged in the sustained 2018 petition. Therefore, mother cannot argue the exception, namely that she had prejudicially inadequate notice of the allegations against her. (See In re John M., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.) II. Substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (j).
Mother contends there is no substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional findings because there is no evidence beyond speculation that G.B. is at risk of harm, given that the domestic violence, which gave rise to the 2018 petition, occurred 10 months before G.B.'s birth; mother almost completed her case plan; she worked up to unmonitored visitation; she gained insight into case issues; and there was no evidence that she continued be in contact with any of the children's fathers with whom she had been violent.
A child is defined by subdivision (j) of section 300 when "[t]he child's sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions." (Italics added.)
" ' "We review the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings for sufficiency of the evidence. [Citations.] We review the record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's conclusions, and we resolve all conflicts and make all reasonable inferences from the evidence to uphold the court's orders, if possible. [Citation.]" [Citation.] " ' "The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record." ' " ' " (In re John M., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1124.)
" 'Subdivision (j) does not state that its application is limited to the risk that the child will be abused or neglected as defined in the same subdivision that describes the abuse or neglect of the sibling. Rather, subdivision (j) directs the trial court to consider whether there is a substantial risk that the child will be harmed under subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e) or (i) of section 300, notwithstanding which of those subdivisions describes the child's sibling.' " (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 774, italics omitted.)
When determining whether there is a substantial risk to a child, the statute directs the juvenile court to "consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative in determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child." (§ 300, subd. (j).) " 'The "nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling" is only one of many factors that the court is to consider in assessing whether the child is at risk of abuse or neglect in the family home. Subdivision (j) thus allows the court to take into consideration factors that might not be determinative if the court were adjudicating a petition filed directly under one of those subdivisions. [¶] The broad language of subdivision (j) clearly indicates that the trial court is to consider the totality of the circumstances of the child and his or her sibling in determining whether the child is at substantial risk of harm, within the meaning of any of the subdivisions enumerated in subdivision (j). The provision thus accords the trial court greater latitude to exercise jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has been found to have been abused than the court would have in the absence of that circumstance.' " (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 774.)
The totality of the circumstances here presented the juvenile court with ample evidence from which it could conclude that mother would not protect G.B. from harm. This is a classic basis for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), a subdivision enumerated in subdivision (j), and supports jurisdiction irrespective of whether mother is in contact with the fathers with whom she has been violent. (See In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 774.) Mother has been exposing her children to her own and others' violence for eight years. Her eldest children were dependents of the juvenile court twice because of her failure to protect them. Mother exacerbates the problem by concealing information from DCFS. She hid her oldest child from the social workers, was not communicative, and canceled DCFS visits. She repeated this behavior by concealing G.B. and obstructing every attempt by DCFS to assess whether the newborn was safe. Most important, despite the repeated involvement by DCFS and the juvenile court, mother has not gained an understanding of the causes of these numerous dependencies, notwithstanding her assertion to the contrary. Mother has not complied with her mental health services, and although she recently enrolled in anger management class, she was unable to explain what she was learning. G.B. is so young that the absence of adequate supervision and care poses an inherent risk to her health and safety. (See In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1220.)
Given mother's repeated failure to protect her children from harm for nearly a decade despite DCFS involvement, her failure to complete the case plan designed to ameliorate the causes of the 2018 petition, and her lack of insight into the causes of harm to her children, the juvenile court reasonably found that G.B. was at substantial risk of harm and, therefore, was defined by subdivision (j) of section 300. Having reached this conclusion, we need not consider whether G.B. is defined by subdivision (b)(1). (See In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
DHANIDINA, J. We concur:
LAVIN, Acting P. J.
EGERTON, J.