Opinion
B303915
09-22-2020
In re J.G., et al, Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M.H., Defendant and Appellant.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the County Counsel, Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. DK20034) APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Emma Castro, Temporary Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with directions. Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the County Counsel, Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this appeal by M.H. (Mother) from juvenile court orders primarily concerning her younger son M.G., we consider whether the juvenile court erred in denying a change of circumstances petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, whether the parent-child relationship exception should have forestalled the termination of Mother's parental rights, and whether the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) satisfied its duty, under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law, to inquire into whether M.G.'s father has any Indian heritage that would provide reason to know M.G. is an Indian child.
At the same hearing at which the juvenile court terminated Mother's parental rights as to M.G., the court also terminated Mother's parental rights as to her older son J.G. and issued an order for legal guardianship as to her daughter Me.G. The children's father, whose parental rights were also terminated at the same hearing, is not a party to this appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Initial Dependency Proceedings
In October 2016, the Department received a report that five-year-old M.G. and his two older siblings were at risk due to neglect arising from Mother's alcohol abuse. During the Department's investigation, Mother, who was 36 years old at the time, admitted she had a history of alcohol abuse that began when she was 16 and had been in and out of in-patient and out-patient alcohol treatment programs without ever successfully completing one. As a result of her recent relapse into alcohol abuse, Mother said she would submit to an on-demand drug and alcohol test, but she did not test as agreed. Shortly thereafter, the Department filed a dependency petition alleging, among other things, Mother's history of alcohol abuse placed M.G. and his siblings at risk of serious physical harm.
At the detention hearing, Mother, through counsel, admitted she suffered from alcohol addiction and requested testing and referrals for counseling and out-patient treatment. The juvenile court detained the children and ordered monitored visitation and treatment referrals for Mother.
In advance of the adjudication hearing, the Department interviewed M.G. and his siblings regarding Mother's alcohol abuse. M.G.'s then 13-year-old brother told the Department's social worker that despite repeated promises to stop drinking, Mother "kept drinking and drinking and drinking." Similarly, M.G.'s then 12-year-old sister stated that Mother was sober for periods of time but she would eventually relapse and drink "all day." M.G., however, told the social worker that he had never seen Mother drink alcohol.
Mother subsequently pled no contest to an amended petition. The juvenile court sustained the allegations that the children were at risk of harm from Mother's alcohol abuse. The court ordered monitored visitation and reunification services, which included parenting classes, random or on-demand drug/alcohol testing, a full drug/alcohol program with aftercare, and a 12-step program with a court card and sponsor.
B. Mother's Case Plan Performance and the Termination of Reunification Services
Between April 2017 and April 2018, the Department provided Mother with court-ordered reunification services. Mother's participation in those services, however, was less than complete. For example, Mother completed a 60-day residential treatment program for chemical dependency following the filing of the Department's petition, but her participation in the group aspects of the program "dwindle[d]" over time. In addition, despite working with a sponsor for more than eight months, Mother did not progress past step two of a 12-step alcohol abuse program (Mother also did not produce evidence she continued to work with a sponsor after this initial eight-month period). Mother also repeatedly failed to submit to drug and alcohol testing—missing 12 tests in one five-month period. As for parenting classes, Mother never enrolled in one.
In the Department's view, Mother had "not demonstrated a consistent commitment to the completion of her treatment goals" and had "not addressed the issue that brought the family to the attention of the Department." At the six-month and 12-month review hearings, the juvenile court agreed with the Department's assessment and found Mother's compliance with her case plan to be "slow" and "partial."
Mother's participation in court-ordered visits with her children was inconsistent over time. Mother regularly visited with the children while she was enrolled in the residential treatment program, but those visits declined and became infrequent and inconsistent after she left the program. When Mother did visit the children at the maternal grandmother's home, she would not always interact with the children, preferring on occasion to lie on the sofa and spend time on her cell phone. The Department found Mother to be "more concerned about her own needs instead of her children's needs."
In statements to the Department and to her children, Mother said she was not prepared to care for all three of her children and expressed a desire to care only for M.G. The Department found it "inappropriate" for Mother to state a preference for one child over the others as it exacerbated the older children's feelings of rejection by Mother. Of the children, only M.G. expressed interest in reunifying with Mother.
In advance of the 18-month review hearing, the Department recommended termination of Mother's family reunification services because she had been "non-compliant" with drug and alcohol testing, had not completed a 12-step program, had not attended parenting classes, and was not consistent in her visitation with the children.
In April 2018, the juvenile court terminated Mother's reunification services based on its finding that Mother's progress toward alleviating the causes for the court's jurisdiction over her children "was unsatisfactory." The court set a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing to decide on a permanent plan for M.G. and his siblings.
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
C. Post-Reunification Developments
Over the next year and a half, the Department evaluated the maternal and paternal grandmothers as prospective adoptive parents for the children. During this period Mother continued to struggle with her alcohol addiction and her role as a parent.
Mother attended M.G.'s eighth birthday party, became intoxicated, and became so argumentative with her daughter and others that the maternal grandmother called the police. In the immediate aftermath of the party, M.G. and his siblings expressed a desire not to visit anymore with Mother. Mother enrolled in a residential alcohol treatment program and for two months thereafter was limited to one-hour visits once per week with M.G. at the treatment center. Once Mother completed the program, she resumed two-hour, weekly monitored visits with M.G. at the home of the maternal grandmother.
During this same 18-month period, M.G. and his brother were moved from the home of their maternal grandmother to the home of their paternal grandmother. According to an assessment by a Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health social worker, M.G.'s mental condition had greatly improved after being placed with the paternal grandmother and the paternal grandmother was meeting M.G.'s needs. The Department's social worker reached a similar conclusion, advising the juvenile court that M.G. was happy and felt safe in the care of the paternal grandmother.
Later, however, M.G. told a social worker he did not want to live with the paternal grandparents because his older brother J.G. had been hitting him without the grandparents' knowledge. M.G. said he still felt safe in the paternal grandparents' home but he preferred to live with the maternal grandmother or some other family member on Mother's side of the family. In a later report, however, the Department explained the concerns with M.G.'s wellbeing had been raised with the paternal grandparents and the Department determined there were no safety concerns for the family. With no impediments to adoption, the Department recommended the termination of parental rights.
D. Mother's Section 388 Petition and the Section 366 .26 Hearing
Two weeks before the section 366.26 hearing, Mother filed a section 388 change of circumstances petition, asking the juvenile court to return M.G. and his brother to her custody or, failing that, to order further reunification services and liberalized visitation. Mother's petition argued the relief she sought was warranted because, according to her, she was in full compliance with her case plan, her sons were bonded to her, and an additional six months of reunification services would give her sons "the best shot possible at having [her] in their lives for the rest of their childhood."
In support of her section 388 petition, Mother submitted documentation showing, among other things, she had completed a 90-day residential treatment program, enrolled in a 12-step program, obtained a sponsor, was attending meetings, and in the two preceding months had tested negative for alcohol and drugs.
On the date set for the section 366.26 parental rights termination hearing (January 10, 2020), the juvenile court also considered whether it should hold an evidentiary hearing on Mother's section 388 petition. The court reviewed the three-year history of the case and ruled it would deny the section 388 petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court concluded it would not be in the best interest of the children to be returned to Mother's custody or to reinstate Mother's reunification services because the evidence submitted in support of the petition did not show changed circumstances or full compliance with her case plan (as Mother had claimed in the petition).
With regard to the question of termination of Mother's parental rights and permanent placement for M.G., Mother did not present any evidence. The record before the court consisted solely of Department reports and judicially noticed case materials.
The juvenile court admitted into evidence 14 Department reports issued between August 2018 and January 2020 and took judicial notice of all prior sustained petitions, case plans, and minute orders.
Mother argued the parent-child exception to termination should apply because Mother had maintained consistent visitation with M.G. and they had such a strong bond that adoption by the paternal grandmother would not outweigh the benefits of maintaining Mother's parental relationship with M.G. The Department and M.G.'s attorney argued for termination of parental rights and adoption by the paternal grandmother because Mother had never progressed beyond monitored visitation and M.G. was thriving in the home of the paternal grandmother.
Agreeing with the Department and minor's counsel, the juvenile court terminated Mother's parental rights as to M.G. In explaining its reasons for ordering termination, the juvenile court emphasized that for almost half his life M.G. had been out of Mother's custody. In addition, over the course of the dependency proceedings, Mother had not been consistent in her visitation and her visitation had never progressed beyond monitored visits. The juvenile court did acknowledge M.G. enjoyed a bond with Mother and did not want Mother's parental rights to be terminated, but it found the incidental benefit to M.G. of maintaining his relationship with Mother was outweighed by the benefit he would receive from adoption into a stable, loving family. After explaining these reasons for its order, the court also stated there had been an off the record discussion in which the attorney for M.G. had spoken with the paternal grandmother regarding her willingness to allow Mother to continue to visit him; the court remarked if it "had heard contrary information" it was "not sure the court would have made the orders that it made today." But the court maintained "the orders that [it] made . . . are, clearly, in the child's best interest."
After terminating Mother's parental rights and after learning that the paternal grandmother was willing to allow Mother to continue having monitored visits with M.G. at the maternal grandmother's home, the court ordered two such visits per month.
II. DISCUSSION
We reject Mother's arguments for outright reversal, but conditionally reverse to enable the juvenile court to make an adequate record of compliance with ICWA as to Father's possible Indian heritage. The court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on Mother's section 388 petition because her evidence of two months of sobriety following completion of a three-month residential treatment program was not sufficient to make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances when viewed in light of her long history of problems with alcohol, including completing treatment only to later relapse. The court did not err in concluding the parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights did not apply because Mother did not occupy a truly parental role in M.G.'s life and the child's interest in stability and permanence with the paternal grandmother necessitated termination of Mother's parental rights. (The court's remarks about the off the record discussion between M.G.'s attorney and the paternal grandmother were not the basis of its decision.) The juvenile court and the Department, however, did not undertake an adequate inquiry into whether there is reason to know M.G. (and his older brother J.G.) are Indian children, so we will conditionally reverse the judgment with directions to remedy that deficiency.
A. Denial of Mother's Section 388 Petition without an Evidentiary Hearing Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
Section 388 allows a parent to petition the juvenile court to change or modify a previous order based on a "change of circumstance or new evidence." (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) The section 388 modification procedure is "an 'escape mechanism' when parents complete a reformation in the short, final period after the termination of reunification services but before the actual termination of parental rights." (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 528 (Kimberly F.).)
"If it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change of order, . . . the court shall order that a hearing be held . . . ." (§ 388, subd. (d).) The parent seeking modification must "make a prima facie showing to trigger the right to proceed by way of a full hearing. [Citation.]" (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310.) There are two components to the prima facie showing: "The parent must demonstrate (1) a genuine change of circumstances . . ., and that (2) revoking the previous order would be in the best interests of the [child]. [Citation.]" (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) A child's best interests are "determined by the seriousness of the problem leading to the dependency and the reason for its continuation; the strength of the parent-child and child-caretaker bonds and the time the child has been in the system; and the nature of the change of circumstance, the ease by which it could be achieved, and the reason it did not occur sooner." (In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685.) We review for abuse of discretion a juvenile court's determination that a section 388 petition did not make a sufficient prima facie showing to warrant an evidentiary hearing. (In re Aaron R. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 697, 705.)
In her petition, Mother alleged she recently completed a 90-day residential treatment program for her alcohol addiction, had not tested positive for use of alcohol in the two months following the completion of her treatment program, and was currently enrolled in a 12-step program. In light of Mother's long history of alcohol abuse and her repeated relapses, however, the juvenile court could appropriately conclude this was not a prima facie showing of a genuine change of circumstances. (See, e.g., In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 642 (Marcelo B.) [father did not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances by pointing to participation in substance abuse services where those services previously failed]; see also In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423-424 [the father's 200 days of sobriety were insufficient to demonstrate he would not relapse]; Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at 531, fn. 9 ["It is the nature of addiction that one must be 'clean' for a much longer period than 120 days to show real reform"].) Without a prima facie showing of changed rather than changing circumstances, the juvenile court's decision that it was not obligated to hold a hearing was not an abuse of discretion.
During the three-year course of the dependency proceedings, Mother completed two residential treatment programs (one in 2017 and another in 2019), had enrolled in at least one out-patient program (2018), and had enrolled but apparently did not complete an earlier 12-step program.
In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833 (J.M.), cited by Mother, is not to the contrary. In that case, the Court of Appeal reversed a juvenile court's orders denying a mother's section 388 petition, made after holding an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 837, 843.) The court in J.M. reached its decision based on evidence—including hearing testimony from a Department social worker—showing that the mother "made the kind of 'reformation' for which section 388 creates an 'escape mechanism'"; she had "ameliorated all concerns leading to dependency court jurisdiction" and was "ready, willing and able to care for her son." (Id. at 837.)
Here, as already discussed, Mother had not ameliorated the concerns that gave rise to dependency jurisdiction. Just six months before the combined hearing, Mother became so drunk and argumentative at M.G.'s birthday party that the police were summoned. Mother did, of course, make positive strides after that (e.g., her completion of a treatment program and two subsequent negative tests), but she had taken similar steps in the recent past only to later relapse again into alcohol abuse. The five months of sobriety that immediately preceded denial of the section 388 petition was too insubstantial to make out the type of changed circumstances found by the J.M. court. In addition, Mother did not proffer evidence (in her petition or when given the opportunity to address whether a hearing on the petition was required) similar to the testimony of the social worker in J.M. that restoration of reunification services would be in M.G.'s best interests. To the contrary, the only facts in the record or proffered at the time of the combined hearing indicated M.G. had been in the care of the paternal grandmother and her husband for nine months, they provided a nurturing environment in which he felt happy and safe, and they were committed to adopting him.
B. The Parent-Child Relationship Exception Does Not Apply
"The section 366.26 hearing is a critical late stage in a dependency proceeding. The child has been under juvenile court jurisdiction for an extended period following the dispositional order, and the court has held one or more review hearings to consider a return to parental custody. (§ 366.21.) At the section 366.26 hearing, the focus shifts away from family reunification and toward the selection and implementation of a permanent plan for the child. [Citation.] . . . If adoption is likely, the court is required to terminate parental rights, unless specified circumstances compel a finding that termination would be detrimental to the child. (§ 366.26(c)(1); In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53[ ].)" (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532, fn. omitted.)
Mother invokes one of these statutory circumstances, the parent-child relationship exception, codified at section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). In relevant part, that subdivision states: "[T]he court shall terminate parental rights unless . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (B) The court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c).) Mother had the burden to prove the exception applied. (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395 (Anthony B.); In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621 (K.P.).)
To meet her burden, Mother was required to do more than show M.G. would receive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466 ["To overcome the preference for adoption and avoid termination of the natural parent's rights, the parent must show that severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed"] (Angel B.).) Even if the parent-child contact has been loving and frequent, and notwithstanding the existence of an "'emotional bond'" with the child, Mother must show she occupies "'a parental role'" in M.G.'s life. (In re Noah G. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1300 (Noah G.); accord, K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at 621.)
We review the trial court's decision on the applicability of the parent-child exception by employing a hybrid standard of review: "We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child." (Anthony B., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at 395; see K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at 621-622 [discussing the hybrid standard].) When deciding whether Mother has carried her burden, we take into account the age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and child, and the child's particular needs. (In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 937-938; Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at 467.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that the requisite parent-child relationship did not exist between Mother and M.G. The only evidence on Mother's role and relationship with M.G. came from the Department's reports and they do not establish she occupied a parental role in M.G.'s life. The reports indicate, for instance, that Mother sometimes chose to lie on the sofa and spend time on her cell phone rather than interact with the children during visitation, and the Department recommended designating the maternal grandmother as the educational rights holder for the children because of Mother's unavailability. Furthermore, throughout the three-year dependency proceeding, Mother never progressed beyond monitored visits with M.G., which is an additional indication that the parent-child relationship exception does not apply. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51 ["Day-to-day contact is not necessarily required, although it is typical in a parent-child relationship"].)
In addition, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when determining termination of Mother's parental rights was required. M.G. was eight years old at the time of the rights termination hearing and he had been out of Mother's custody for almost half his life (during the three years of dependency proceedings). The paternal grandparents provided M.G. a home in which he was safe and happy. Mother, by contrast, was on the road to recovery from alcohol abuse but her restarted journey was only beginning—and the risk to M.G. remained. Thus, while there are indications M.G. enjoyed a bond with Mother, the juvenile court was within its discretion to conclude the relationship between the two should not overcome the statutory preference for adoption. (See, e.g., K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at 622-623 ["While the weekly two-hour visits between K.P. and his mother may have been pleasant for both parties, there was no evidence in the record (beyond [the mother's] stated belief) that termination of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to K.P. or that the relationship conferred benefits to K.P. more significant than the permanency and stability offered by adoption"]; Marcelo B., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at 644 ["The parents demonstrated that they have a warm and affectionate relationship with their son. Because they continue to abuse alcohol and each other, however, they have not demonstrated an ability to provide Marcelo, over the long term, with a stable, safe and loving home environment"].)
Finally, we are also unconvinced by Mother's argument that the juvenile court ordered termination of parental rights only in improper reliance on an "unenforceable promise of the caretaker to permit post-adoption contact" between Mother and M.G. By the point at which the court made the remarks on the record that Mother finds problematic, the court had already articulated the rationale for its termination order under proper legal standards. The court's musing that it was not sure if it would have made the same order if it had not been informed of conversations between M.G.'s attorney and the paternal grandmother do not undermine the court's rationale—the court did not say it would have made a different decision, but rather mused about what decision it might have made ("I'm not sure the court would have made the orders that it made today") in purely counterfactual circumstances.
C. The Juvenile Court's ICWA Finding as to the Father Is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence
1. Additional background
At the detention hearing in October 2016, based on Mother's submission of Parental Notification of Indian Status form (ICWA-020) denying any Indian ancestry, the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply as to Mother. The father did not appear at the detention hearing, did not submit an ICWA-020 form, and was not represented by counsel because his whereabouts at the time were unknown. The record before us does not indicate the father ever submitted an ICWA-020 form or was ever ordered to do so by the juvenile court. However, from the jurisdiction hearing onward, the father was represented by counsel.
At a subsequent hearing in January 2018, after the Department advised the juvenile court that an ICWA finding as to the father was still outstanding, the court questioned the paternal grandmother as follows: "Do you know if you have any American Indian heritage in your background? [¶] No. [¶] . . . [¶] So on his father's side, do you know if [the children's father] had any American Indian heritage? [¶] No." The court did not inquire about the depth of the paternal grandmother's knowledge of the paternal grandfather's side of the family. Although the father was represented by counsel at the hearing, the court did not inquire about the father's ICWA-020 form or order submission of one. Based on the paternal grandmother's testimony alone, the court found ICWA inapplicable as to the father.
The transcript of the January 4, 2018, hearing does not indicate that the paternal grandmother's statements were made under oath.
2. Conditional reversal is required for lack of an adequate ICWA inquiry
ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum federal standards a state court must follow before removing an Indian child from his or her family. (25 U.S.C. § 1902; In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7-8; In re Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 784.) At the first appearance by a parent in a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court must order the parent to complete an ICWA-020 form. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(2)(C).)
If circumstances, such as the ICWA-020 form, indicate a child may be an Indian child, the juvenile court and the Department have a duty to inquire regarding the child's possible Indian status, including contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs for assistance in identifying the names and contact information of the tribes in which the child may be a member, or eligible for membership. (§ 224.2; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).) Moreover, under ICWA, the Department and the juvenile court have "an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child." (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).) We review the juvenile court's ICWA findings for substantial evidence. (In re Hunter W. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1467; In re Barbara R. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 941, 951.)
Here, the juvenile court's ICWA finding as to father is not supported by substantial evidence. The juvenile court never directed the father's attorney to have his client complete an ICWA-020 form. The court's reliance on the paternal grandmother's purported denials of Indian heritage as to both her side of the family and the paternal grandfather's side was not reasonable given the ambiguous nature of the colloquy with the paternal grandmother ("So on his father's side, do you know if [the children's father] had any American Indian heritage? [¶] No.") and, even putting aside that ambiguity, the absence of any foundational questions about the extent of her knowledge of the paternal grandfather's ancestry. We shall therefore conditionally reverse the parental rights termination orders to allow for an appropriate ICWA inquiry. (See, e.g., In re N.G. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 474, 477-478.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order denying Mother's section 388 petition is affirmed. The January 10, 2020, parental rights termination orders as to M.G. and J.G. are conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court for the limited purpose of demonstrating full compliance with the inquiry (and, if necessary, notice) provisions of ICWA and related California law. If the juvenile court determines, after an appropriate documented inquiry, that there is no reason to know M.G. or J.G. is an Indian child, the parental rights termination orders shall be reinstated. If the court finds there is reason to know M.G. or J.G. is an Indian child, the court shall proceed in compliance with ICWA and related California law.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J. We concur:
RUBIN, P. J.
KIM, J.