Opinion
B298291
01-21-2020
In re AUSTIN C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KRISTA J., Defendant and Appellant.
Corey Evan Parker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK79308A) APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jana M. Seng, Judge. Affirmed. Corey Evan Parker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Krista J., the mother of 12-year-old Austin C., appeals the juvenile court's May 1, 2019 orders denying her oral motion to provide additional family reunification services (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388) and terminating her parental rights (§ 366.26). Krista contends the court abused its discretion by denying her counsel's requests to have Austin testify in person, rather than by telephone, and to continue the May 1, 2019 hearing to allow Krista to introduce the testimony of her counsel's investigator concerning efforts that had allegedly been made to coach Austin's testimony. Krista also contends the court erred in ruling she had failed to establish the parent-child-relationship exception to termination of parental rights pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We affirm.
Statutory references are to this code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Dependency Determination
a. Prior dependency proceedings
In mid-2009, when he was not yet two years old, Austin was detained from Krista and declared a dependent child of the juvenile court because of Krista's substance abuse. Austin was placed with his maternal grandmother in November 2009, but returned to his mother's care in November 2010 after she completed an inpatient drug treatment program. The court terminated dependency jurisdiction in April 2011.
Austin was again detained in July 2013 and declared a dependent child in September 2013 based, in part, on Krista's use of inappropriate physical discipline and her continuing substance abuse problems. After Krista completed another inpatient drug treatment program, Austin was returned to her care; and the court terminated jurisdiction over the case in late October 2014.
b. The current dependency proceedings
In late July 2015 the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral alleging Krista worked as a prostitute for drugs and had drug addicts in her home. When interviewed, Krista denied the allegations of drug use and reported she had been the victim of domestic violence by her ex-boyfriend.
In August 2015 the Department received a second referral, this time alleging that Austin was the victim of emotional abuse by Krista based on her conduct at a domestic violence shelter. A third referral was made in December 2015, reporting that Krista was using methamphetamine and working as a prostitute in Austin's presence.
Austin was detained once again in early January 2016. He was declared a dependent child of the juvenile court on February 10, 2016 under section 300, subdivision (b), and removed from Krista's care and custody after the court sustained allegations that Krista had "placed the child in a detrimental and endangering situation in that the mother possessed marijuana and drug pipes in the child's home within access of the child [and had] exposed the child to drug trafficking in the child's home." The court ordered the Department to provide Krista with family reunification services; and she was ordered to participate in individual counseling, parenting classes and anger management counseling and to submit to random drug testing. The court permitted only monitored visitation by Krista two or three times a week for two to three hours each visit.
2. Subsequent Review Hearings
Austin was placed with his maternal grandmother, who lives in Las Vegas, Nevada, on August 5, 2016. Several days later, at the six-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e)), the court ordered the Department to facilitate monitored telephone contact between Krista and Austin at least four times a week. The Department was also ordered to assist Krista in arranging monitored visits two times each month at a location between Krista's and the maternal grandmother's homes. Family reunification services were continued.
At the 12-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (f)) in February 2017 the court again continued reunification services. On July 12, 2017, at the 18-month review hearing (§ 366.22), the court found Krista was only in partial compliance with the case plan and terminated her family reunification services. The court ordered monitored visitation one or two times per week in Las Vegas where Krista had moved to be close to Austin. The matter was continued to November 8, 2017 for a hearing to select a permanent plan for Austin (§ 366.26).
3. The Section 366.26 Selection and Implementation Hearing and Krista's Oral Motion Under Section 388
a. Repeated continuances of the hearing date
The Department's report for the section 366.26 hearing scheduled for November 8, 2017 stated Austin's maternal grandmother was interested in providing him permanency through adoption. The report further recommended the hearing be continued because the Department's due diligence search for an address for Austin's presumed father, Danny C., was not yet completed. The hearing was continued to January 24, 2018 and then again to February 21, 2018.
On February 21, 2018 Krista's counsel asked the court to set the matter for a contested hearing on the parent-child-relationship exception to adoption and to order Austin be present at the hearing since it was likely Krista would want him to testify. The court set the matter for May 2, 2018 and ordered Austin to be present. Because of continuing issues regarding notice to Austin's father, on May 2 the matter was continued to July 23, 2018; and Austin was again ordered to be present. Notice problems still had not been fully resolved by July 23, 2018; the hearing was continued yet again, to October 19, 2018. Over the objections of minor's counsel who noted the financial burden on Austin's grandmother and negative impact on Austin's schooling created by requiring them to travel from Las Vegas to Los Angeles, Austin was again ordered to be present for the hearing, "at least for now."
The dependency judge presiding at the July 23, 2018 hearing was new to the case. He explained, "I am well aware of the case law about the court's discretion to not allow a party to call a child witness. I understand that. And I don't know that he will be needed to testify, but all I know is that he has been ordered back for the previous dates. The mere fact that the Department hasn't managed to perfect notice properly for the .26 shouldn't prejudice the mother's rights to present her case at a contested .26. So, I don't see how, given what I know about the case today, how I can deny the request to order him back. So, at least for now, Austin is ordered back for the October 19 date."
On August 13, 2018 the October 19, 2018 hearing date was continued to December 18, 2018 with Austin ordered to be present. On October 31, 2018, at the review-of-permanent-plan hearing (§ 366.3, subd. (d)), the court ordered that Austin could testify at the December 18, 2018 section 366.26 hearing by telephone. However, on December 18, 2018 Austin's counsel asked for a continuance because Austin was not present in court. Noting that Austin had a right to be present, but "with great hesitation because the court is aware that this .26 has been pending for quite some time," the court continued the hearing to January 14, 2019. The court ordered Austin to be present on January 14, 2019.
Austin and his maternal grandmother were present in court on January 14, 2019. Krista's counsel was ill, but she was represented by an attorney from the same office who had previously represented her in the case. (That attorney said his last appearance had been in August 2018 and explained he was not privy to the substance of recent conversations between Krista and her current counsel.) Through that attorney, Krista requested the court continue the matter to allow Krista's current counsel to be present. Austin's counsel objected to the continuance, noting that the section 366.26 hearing had been continued multiple times for more than a year, that the lawyer appearing for Krista that day was the one who had initially set the matter for a contest, and that it was extremely burdensome for Austin to be repeatedly ordered to appear in person in Los Angeles. When the court indicated it was going to continue the matter in fairness to Krista, Austin's counsel requested that Austin be allowed to testify by telephone, as had been ordered on October 31, 2018, so he would not have to miss school again. The court agreed, but also said, if Krista's counsel objected, he could address the matter further at a nonappearance status conference the court set for February 14, 2019 to resolve all outstanding issues relating to the contested hearing, which would be held on May 1, 2019 with no further continuances.
b. The May 1, 2019 hearing
In a status review report prepared in early April 2019 for the May 1, 2019 hearing, the Department stated it had received an email from the Nevada social worker assigned to the case indicating Krista was making Austin feel guilty about not being with her. As a result, Austin was experiencing severe anxiety and having difficulty sleeping through the night. In addition, the report continued, Austin had recently attempted to choke himself, leaving visible red marks on his neck. According to Austin, he had attempted to choke himself after visiting with Krista because he felt as if he could no longer take the pressure of her making him feel guilty. The report also stated Krista's visits with Austin during the preceding several months had been sporadic. Austin indicated he wanted to continue to live with his maternal grandmother and be adopted by her, but was concerned his mother would hurt herself if he was adopted.
At the outset of the May 1, 2019 hearing Krista's counsel made an oral motion pursuant to section 388 to modify prior court orders and to provide additional reunification services to Krista or, in the alternative, to return Austin to her home. Counsel noted that Krista had completed a 30-day substance abuse treatment program and participated in individual therapy sessions.
Although acknowledging the court had authorized Austin to testify telephonically at the May 1 hearing, in light of the oral section 388 motion and the matters raised in the Department's status review report, Krista's counsel requested that Austin be ordered to physically appear so the court could evaluate "whether or not Austin is being sincere in his feelings or if he is being coached by other parties." The court denied that request.
Krista's counsel then asked for a brief continuance to permit him to subpoena an investigator from his law firm to testify "regarding coaching, possibly by maternal grandmother." The court denied that request, as well, emphasizing that the court had previously made clear its intention to proceed with the section 366.26 on May 1, 2019.
The court then heard Austin's testimony over the telephone. Questioned by Krista's counsel, Austin testified he visited with Krista almost every Saturday for approximately one hour, enjoyed his time with her, wanted to continue visiting with her and would be sad if he was not able to do so. During the visits Austin and his mother talked on the couch or played with toys at the agency. Austin also said he loved his mother, but his grandmother and aunt had told him she was not healthy enough to care for him. Austin explained he had attempted to choke himself because he was really stressed about "what was happening in general." Austin said he would like to possibly give his mother another chance, but his teachers and others had told him that staying with his grandmother was the right thing to do. Also, he was afraid of "bad things" happening to him if he returned to Krista; he elaborated that he was afraid he would not be properly cared for if she became drunk and would end up back in the dependency system yet again.
Following Austin's testimony, the court heard argument on Krista's section 388 motion. The court denied the motion. Although commending Krista for the completion of her programs, the court ruled it was not in Austin's best interest to grant the motion, noting that family reunification services had been terminated nearly two years earlier in July 2017. The court continued, "Although I don't doubt the child loves his mother and wants to see his mother, I do not believe it's in the best interest of the child as clearly he was stating in his testimony that he has anxiety not knowing whether mom will be drunk one day, will be able to take care of him, will be—whether he'll be back in the system."
Turning to the section 366.26 hearing and the Department's recommendation for termination of parental rights and adoption, Krista's counsel asserted the parent-child-relationship exception applied and urged the court to direct the Department to assess the maternal grandmother for legal guardianship instead of adoption. He emphasized that Austin had testified he loved his mother and would be sad if they could no longer visit, demonstrating "a very clear and strong bond here between the child and his biological parent." Austin's counsel argued a loving relationship, without more, was not sufficient to establish the parent-child-relationship exception, noting Krista had only monitored visits with Austin and was inconsistent in keeping those appointments.
After her counsel's argument, Krista stated, "I'm filing a complaint" and walked out of the courtroom, exclaiming, "This whole case is bullshit. I've never been drunk."
The court concluded Krista had not established the parent-child-relationship exception to adoption. At the hearing the court explained, "Given the inconsistent visits, sporadic visits by mother with the child, and when the mother does have visits with the child, they are detrimental to the child. It's evident by the most recent choking incident after the mother's visit, the child attempted to choke himself after suffering from anxiety and guilt brought on by mother's visits and her conversations with the child." The court's written order found, "[T]he parent has maintained regular visitation with the child and has not established a bond with the child. [¶] . . . [A]ny benefit accruing to the child from his/her relationship with the parent(s) is outweighed by the physical and emotional benefit the child will receive through the permanency and stability of adoption and that adoption is in the best interests of the child."
The apparent conflict between the oral description of sporadic and inconsistent visitation by Krista and the written finding that she had maintained regular visitation was not addressed by the court.
The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that Austin was adoptable; terminated the parental rights of Krista and Austin's father; transferred Austin's care, custody and control to the Department for adoptive planning and placement; and designated Austin's current caregiver, his maternal grandmother, as the prospective adoptive parent.
DISCUSSION
1. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Permitting Austin To Testify by Telephone or Denying Krista's Request for a Continuance
Krista challenges the denial of her oral section 388 motion solely on the grounds the court abused its discretion by permitting Austin to testify by telephone and denying her request for a continuance to permit her counsel to subpoena his investigator to testify about coaching. Krista argues those two rulings also constitute error requiring reversal of the section 366.26 order terminating her parental rights. Neither claim has merit.
a. Austin's telephonic testimony
Section 366.26, subdivision (h)(1), directs the court at a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26 to "consider the wishes of the child and . . . act in the best interests of the child." Although a child subject to juvenile court jurisdiction who is 10 years old or older has a right to be present at the hearing (§§ 349, subd. (a), 366.26, subd. (h)(2)), "in the usual case the minor's testimony will not be directly presented." (In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1085.) "However, parents in a dependency proceeding do have a right to call and examine witnesses." (Ibid.)
As discussed, Austin was not physically present at the section 366.26 hearing at his own request and testified telephonically pursuant to the court's January 14, 2019 order continuing the hearing to May 1, 2019, which permitted him to do so. Thus, Krista was not deprived of Austin's testimony. Moreover, on January 14 the court set a status conference for February 14, 2019 to resolve any outstanding issues relating to the contested selection and implementation hearing before travel plans had to be made and specifically advised Krista's counsel, if he wished to revisit the question whether Austin would be required to testify in person, to raise it at that time. Krista did not take advantage of that opportunity, nor did she seek appellate review of the January 14, 2019 order authorizing Austin's telephonic testimony.
On appeal Krista argues Austin's sincerity regarding his feelings about once again living with her was a crucial factor in the court's decisions to deny her section 388 motion and to terminate her parental rights and contends, in a single conclusory statement, his credibility "could not be effectively weighed by the Court over the telephone." Yet Krista's counsel, who conducted the examination of Austin, thoroughly explored with him whether his views on returning to his mother had been shaped by what he had been told by others, including his maternal grandmother, the individual Krista's counsel believed may have been coaching Austin. And Austin candidly acknowledged that his grandmother and several teachers told him it would be better for him to live with his grandmother.
To be sure, observing Austin as he delivered this testimony, rather than just hearing him, might have marginally increased the court's understanding of the role those statements played in forming Austin's views. But requiring live testimony from Austin at this point in the proceedings would have required yet another continuance of the oft-continued section 366.26 hearing, something the court on January 14, 2019 clearly stated would not be permitted. Given the belated nature of Krista's counsel's objection to Austin testifying via telephone, as well as the full opportunity given Krista's counsel to examine Austin, it was well within the juvenile court's ample discretion to conclude that further delaying the hearing to determine a permanent plan for Austin (and forcing him to miss several more days of school to travel to Los Angeles when doing so) was not in the child's best interest. (See § 352, subds. (a)(1) ["a continuance shall not be granted that is contrary to the interest of the minor"; "[i]n considering the minor's interests the court shall give substantial weight to a minor's need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements"], (a)(2) "[c]ontinuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause"].)
b. Krista's request for a continuance
Krista's contention the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her request for a continuance to permit her lawyer to subpoena his own investigator stands on even weaker ground than her argument regarding Austin's telephonic testimony. Once again, the basis for the requested continuance was to support Krista's claim Austin had been coached, primarily by his maternal grandmother, to testify negatively about his feelings regarding returning to live with Krista—a subject Krista's counsel fully explored in his examination of Austin. But this request had two additional shortcomings.
First, from counsel's description of the testimony he anticipated, it is apparent counsel knew his investigator had potentially relevant information prior to the May 1, 2019 hearing. Yet counsel provided no explanation why he had failed to subpoena the investigator in advance of the hearing, let alone why a subpoena was necessary for someone who worked for the same law firm. Krista's lawyer should have arranged for the investigator to be present at the May 1, 2019 hearing if Krista wanted her to testify.
Explaining his request, counsel stated, "[Krista] believes that this individual [the 'investigator from my law firm'] has credible statements regarding coaching, possibly by maternal grandmother, that might be relevant to this hearing."
Second, counsel failed to explain how any information regarding possible coaching his investigator had obtained through interviews with the maternal grandmother or others who had heard the maternal grandmother talking to Austin would be anything other than inadmissible hearsay. The court was fully justified in concluding under all these circumstances Krista had not shown good cause for a further continuance of the section 388 or section 366.26 hearing to permit her to present the investigator's testimony. (§ 352, subd. (b); see In re Emily D. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 438, 448 ["[a]lthough continuances are discouraged in dependency cases [citation], the juvenile court may continue a dependency hearing upon a showing of good cause, provided the continuance is not contrary to the interest of the child"].)
2. The Court Did Not Err in Terminating Krista's Parental Rights
a. Governing law and standard of review applicable to the termination of Krista's parental rights
The express purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is "to provide stable, permanent homes" for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) Once the court has decided to end parent-child reunification services, the legislative preference is for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1); In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532 ["[i]f adoption is likely, the court is required to terminate parental rights, unless specified circumstances compel a finding that termination would be detrimental to the child"]; In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 ["[I]f the child is adoptable . . . adoption is the norm. Indeed, the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child"]; see In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307 [once reunification efforts have been found unsuccessful, the state has a "compelling" interest in "providing stable, permanent homes for children who have been removed from parental custody," and the court then must "concentrate its efforts . . . on the child's placement and well-being, rather than on a parent's challenge to a custody order"]; see also In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 645-646; In re Noah G. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1299-1300.)
Section 366.26 requires the juvenile court to conduct a two-part inquiry at the selection and implementation hearing. First, the court determines whether there is clear and convincing evidence the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249-250; In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283, 290.) Then, if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence the child is likely to be adopted, the statute mandates judicial termination of parental rights unless the parent opposing termination can demonstrate one of the enumerated statutory exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) & (B); see Cynthia D., at pp. 250, 259 [when the child is adoptable and declining to apply one of the statutory exceptions would not cause detriment to the child, the decision to terminate parental rights is relatively automatic].)
One of the statutory exceptions to termination is contained in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), which permits the court to order some other permanent plan if "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." The exception requires the parent to prove both that he or she has maintained regular visitation and that his or her relationship with the child "'"promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents."'" (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643; accord, In re Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 646; In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 689; see In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 ["the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer"].)
A showing the child derives some benefit from the relationship is not a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory preference for adoption. (See In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466 ["[a] biological parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child may not derail an adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent"].) No matter how loving and frequent the contact, and notwithstanding the existence of an "'emotional bond'" with the child, "'the parents must show that they occupy "a parental role" in the child's life.'" (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527.) Factors to consider include "'"[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the 'positive' or 'negative' effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs."'" (In re Marcelo B., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 643.) Moreover, "[b]ecause a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement." (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
The parent has the burden of proving the statutory exception applies. (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826.) The court's decision a parent has not satisfied this burden may be based on any or all of the component determinations—whether the parent has maintained regular visitation, whether a beneficial parental relationship exists, and whether the existence of that relationship constitutes "a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); see In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 622; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314.) We review for abuse of discretion the determination whether the benefit to the child derived from preserving parental rights is sufficiently compelling to outweigh the benefit achieved by the permanency of adoption. (In re K.P., at pp. 621-622; In re Bailey J., at pp. 1314-1315.) When the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, we ask whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. (See In re I.W., at pp. 1527-1528; see also In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1163.)
Several months ago the Supreme Court granted review in In re Caden C., review granted July 24, 2019, S255839, and asked the parties to brief and argue the following issues: "(1) what standard governs appellate review of the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption; and (2) whether a showing that a parent has made progress in addressing the issues that led to dependency is necessary to meet the beneficial parental relationship exception." --------
b. Krista failed to establish the parent-child-relationship exception to termination of parental rights
Emphasizing Austin's testimony he loved his mother, enjoyed his weekly visits with her when they occurred, missed her when she was not there and would be sad if he was not able to continue to visit with her, Krista argues this evidence compels a finding a mother-child bond existed and it was, therefore, an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to conclude the parent-child-relationship exception to termination of parental rights had not been established. The evidence before the court falls far short of that required for us to reverse the court's ruling.
Nothing in Austin's testimony or in the Department's reports concerning the weekly monitored visits Krista had with Austin indicated she occupied a parental role in his life. At most they hugged each other on Krista's arrival and departure, played board games and had some pleasant conversations. But Krista did not participate in any meaningful way in ensuring Austin's medical, educational and emotional needs were met, an essential aspect of proving the existence of a beneficial parental relationship. (See, e.g., In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 396 [fact that children were happy to see parent during visits does not compel a finding a parental relationship existed absent some other evidence of a "'significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent'"]; see also In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.) To the contrary, it was Austin's maternal grandmother who saw to these aspects of Austin's life, as she had during the first time Austin was removed from Krista's care in 2009.
In addition, whatever the nature of Krista and Austin's attachment to each other, the record contains ample evidence that their relationship was not so substantial that its termination would greatly harm Austin. (See In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53 [termination of mother's parental rights affirmed despite evidence the child and mother were emotionally attached and well-bonded].) As discussed, this was Austin's third removal from Krista's care. Those repeated removals and Austin's fear that, if returned to his mother, a further removal would inevitably follow, together with Austin's guilt at seeming to be the cause of his mother's unhappiness, created stress and anxiety for the child, ultimately leading to the incident of self-harm that followed one of his most recent visits with Krista. In contrast, in his grandmother's care, where he had been for nearly three years by the time of the May 1, 2019 hearing, Austin felt secure and was doing significantly well in school. Austin consistently reported he was happy living with his grandmother and, while not wanting to disappoint his mother, wanted to continue to live with, and be adopted by, his grandmother.
In sum, the juvenile court's finding that the benefits to Austin of adoption far outweighed those from continuing his relationship with Krista was well within its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The May 1, 2019 orders of the juvenile court denying the section 388 petition for modification of prior court orders and terminating parental rights are affirmed.
PERLUSS, P. J.
We concur:
ZELON, J.
SEGAL, J.