Opinion
B307005
02-03-2021
In re T.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. K.L., Defendant and Appellant.
Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP00647) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Brett Bianco, Judge. Affirmed. Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
K.L. (Mother) appeals orders by the juvenile court pertaining to her son, T.B., born in November 2005. Mother asserts the juvenile court abused its discretion by finding T.B. was subject to initial and continuing jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and further erred by ordering visitation to occur in a therapeutic setting. We reject these arguments, and affirm.
All unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
T.B. came to the attention of the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) on January 29, 2020 based on allegations of neglect by Mother.
A. Detention Report
Prior to the incident giving rise to the report, Mother was divorced and living apart from T.B.'s father (Father). On July 18, 2019, the family court issued a permanent restraining order that protected Father and T.B. from Mother. The order gave Father sole legal custody and primary physical custody of T.B. and granted Mother weekend visits, which were to be professionally monitored and paid for by Father.
Father is not a party to this appeal.
On January 21, 2020, the family court granted Mother's application for a temporary restraining order against Father. The court also granted Mother primary custody of T.B. and Father monitored visits every other weekend. Mother did not give Father notice of the hearing on her application, nor was he made aware of the resulting temporary restraining order.
On January 26, 2020, Mother took T.B. for what was meant to be a short visit with her and her family, monitored by T.B.'s maternal aunt, to celebrate the Chinese New Year. Mother refused to return T.B. to Father's home. Father received a telephone call from the maternal aunt stating she had been preparing to drive T.B. back to Father's house when Mother showed her the court order indicating Mother had custody of T.B. The maternal aunt then left Mother's home, declining to further involve herself.
Father called law enforcement, who told Father he would need to return to court to have the order modified. Father stated that, given Mother's "past behavior," he did not want to engage in an irrational phone call with her, nor did he want to incur more "legal trouble" by going to her home. However, he noted Mother had made several false reports to DCFS and had "forg[ed] documents in efforts to gain custody" of T.B.
On January 29, 2020, Mother telephoned T.B.'s pediatrician after hours and reported T.B. had suicidal ideations. The on-call physician instructed Mother to take T.B. to the hospital emergency room, but she declined to do so, instead making an in-office pediatric appointment the following afternoon.
On January 30, 2020, Mother arrived for the doctor's appointment with T.B. and the maternal grandfather. Observing that Mother "appear[ed] to be struggling with a mental health condition and [that T.B. was] fearful of returning to her home," the medical provider called law enforcement. Office staff at the clinic also called Father and informed him Mother was "acting irrational[ly]."
Mother reported T.B. tried to kill himself at her home by "getting in a 'Tonka truck and running himself into a wall,' " which the interviewing social worker noted was an "implausible statement." Mother also stated T.B. was malnourished and "refused to eat." She said she had not taken T.B. to the emergency room the night before because she did not want him to be medicated, but that she had tried herself to give him medication, which he refused.
T.B. flatly denied he tried to commit suicide and further denied he harbored suicidal ideations at any time in his life. T.B. did corroborate Mother's statement that she had attempted to provide him with medication, but elaborated that she gave him "loose pills" that he did not recognize. These efforts were backed by the maternal grandfather, who also lived in the home with Mother. When T.B. asked what the medication was, Mother told him the pills were vitamin supplements or "D3." She refused his request to see the bottle the pills came from. T.B. further reported that he was afraid to eat or drink in Mother's home because he did not trust her to put the unknown medication in his food, nor did he trust her to prepare food that did not contain allergens, such as nuts, milk, and avocados, which in the past had caused T.B. to "swell and break out." T.B. was afraid to eat anything prepared by Mother and "did not eat the rest of his stay with her."
Father confirmed T.B.'s allergies, which resulted in "severe rashes and swelling," and added that Mother was aware of the food sensitivities since T.B. "ha[d] had them since infancy."
T.B. reported that his mother, who he said had been diagnosed with "bipolar 2 and depression," was suffering from "another mental break" and was not taking her prescribed medications. He stated that he felt "abducted" since Mother refused to allow him to leave her house following what was supposed to be a brief, one-day visit to celebrate the Chinese New Year. Since then, Mother had not allowed T.B. to attend school, telling T.B. he had a "learning disability and sleeping disability so he needs a 'special school and school for people who are truant.' "
According to Father, T.B. has no learning disability and, prior to Mother's intervention, had been enrolled in a "gifted program" at a public high school.
T.B. told the social worker he lived with his father and wanted to continue to do so. He did not want to stay with his mother anymore. He stated Mother believed Father had threatened T.B. with a knife, but it never happened. According to T.B., "My Mom says things that don't make sense. I cannot get through to her that I am not being abused and I am not a baby." He was afraid Mother's mental condition would "get worse" and wanted her to receive help. T.B., then 14 years old, also stated Mother pressured him to sleep in her bed with her and, when he refused, barricaded him in a bathroom. She later provided him with a "dusty twin air mattress" to be placed on the living room floor, which offered him no privacy and aggravated his allergies, making him "sneeze and [his] nose run." She also provided him with children's clothes that were too small and which he refused to wear, causing him to "wear[ ] the same thing for days."
The social worker also attempted to interview Mother, but observed her to have "disorganized" and "irrational thoughts." The social worker noted similar issues with Mother's father, T.B.'s grandfather, who had accompanied Mother and T.B. to the appointment. The maternal grandfather reported Mother was "fine"; it was T.B. who was "not well" and had "something wrong with his mind." The social worker also noted that, during the interview, both the social worker and law enforcement had to instruct the maternal grandfather not to put his arms around the social worker and to stop touching her shoulders and hands.
Based on the statements made by T.B. and Mother, including T.B.'s refusal to return to Mother's care, the social worker determined T.B. should be temporarily detained from Mother's custody and Father should be assessed for possible placement.
In interviews with Father, he reported Mother, who had been diagnosed with "Bipolar 2" in 2006 or 2007 and "struggled with mental health," had been exhibiting increasingly "odd" behavior over the past month. He was "unsure what to do because [M]other has not received treatment." Although she had been prescribed medication for her psychological diagnoses in 2008, she failed to take the medication consistently and suffered "episodes" when she was off of them, becoming "reckless" and exhibiting suicidal ideations. Father reported Mother committed herself to a psychiatric hospital in 2017 and did well for a period thereafter, but was later involuntarily admitted on a psychiatric hold.
Although he declined to provide the DCFS with details, Father claimed Mother was "almost" involved in a homicide in 2010.
Father stated Mother's ability to manage her mental illness was inconsistent, and during her last episode she had "bec[o]me so enraged she began calling law enforcement and DCFS making false reports." The record contains several examples of reports made by Mother to DCFS during the period of March 4, 2019 to January 6, 2020 alleging neglect and abuse of T.B. by Father. Among other things, Mother asserted that T.B. and Father were "planning to kill" her; T.B. said he "want[ed] to '[p]ull a murder like the Me[n]endez brother[s]' "; Mother " 'gets beat up by' " T.B.; Father was "brainwashing" T.B. to hurt Mother; T.B. was "lethargic" and had "liver damage" from "excessive amount of Tylenol" given to him by Father; T.B. "picked up a kitchen knife and approached" Mother, intending to "hurt her" for wearing his jacket; and Father allowed T.B. to watch pornography on the internet and took him to Las Vegas to "have sex with prostitutes." Without exception, the reports made by Mother were found to be unsubstantiated.
Mother was not the sole subject of referrals made to DCFS. In November 2019, T.B.'s school reported general neglect of T.B. following a parent conference with Mother to address the minor's excessive absences from school. During the conference, Mother told school staff that she was concerned about T.B.'s hygiene and that T.B. had said to her, among other things, that his father did not allow him to shower and would lock him up in his room. The school noted it made several attempts to reach Father by phone and in person to address T.B.'s poor attendance, but Father failed to respond.
B. Section 300 Petition and Detention Hearing
On February 3, 2020, DCFS filed a dependency petition on behalf of T.B., alleging under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) that Mother's mental and emotional problems rendered her unable to adequately care for or supervise T.B., placing T.B. at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm.
At the detention hearing the following day, the juvenile court ordered T.B. detained from Mother and released to Father under DCFS supervision. The court noted it had "sole jurisdiction over custody orders" and the temporary restraining order issued by the family court was "essentially dissolved." The juvenile court granted Mother monitored visitation, which had to occur in a therapeutic setting, and prohibited Mother from interfering with T.B.'s medical or educational services absent a court order.
C. Jurisdiction/Disposition Reports
Following the detention hearing, T.B. reported to a DCFS investigator that he had lived with Father for most of his life, and did not feel safe in Mother's care. He had attended therapy sessions for many years, and would only visit Mother in a therapeutic setting if she was taking her medication. He felt safe in Father's home, and denied Father ever physically or emotionally abused him.
In July 2020, DCFS reported that Mother's mental health "appear[ed] to have deteriorated even further" since the detention hearing. Following the hearing, Mother went to T.B.'s school on two occasions, once claiming T.B. had been kidnapped, a report that triggered police intervention. Mother also left a lengthy voicemail message and sent incoherent emails with DCFS in which she made a number of claims, including that Father had schizophrenia, Father's doctor had given Father's medication to her, and doctors had informed her that she was "delusional" even though actors, such as herself, play characters as part of their jobs. DCFS could not reach Mother, and was unsuccessful in contacting any of Mother's family members save one brother, who reported the family had encouraged Mother to take her medications and attend therapy.
T.B.'s therapist, Dr. Yellen, who initially told the DCFS investigator he would facilitate joint therapy sessions between T.B. and Mother if T.B. agreed, now reported he would not be able to assist. T.B. did not want Mother present at his therapy sessions, and Dr. Yellen feared forcing the issue would jeopardize his therapeutic relationship with the child.
D. Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing
The juvenile court held the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing in July 2020. The juvenile court sustained the petition as pleaded, finding that T.B. was described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1) "if for no other reason than Mother trying to force the minor to eat foods that she knows he's allergic to which we know can have—especially when we're talking about nut allergies—can have serious consequences—life threatening consequences even."
At the disposition portion of the hearing, DCFS recommended the court "terminate jurisdiction with a juvenile custody order awarding Father sole legal and sole physical custody of [T.B]." Mother requested juvenile jurisdiction continue only as long as necessary to order joint counseling and identify a therapist "that could be put on the family law order" to facilitate such sessions, given Dr. Yellen's unwillingness to do so. Father and T.B.'s counsel asked the court to instead "keep the case open, provide services for Mother, and continue monitoring the situation," with T.B. in Father's sole custody.
The court ultimately agreed with Father and T.B.'s counsel and removed T.B. from Mother's custody, citing Mother's "unaddressed mental [health] issue and the direct risk that's posed to [T.B.]" The court thereafter declined to terminate jurisdiction, citing its concern that, without direct supervision, T.B. "is going to be subjected to emotional abuse by . . . Mother." The court granted enhancement services to Mother, which included orders that she take her prescribed medication, receive regular psychiatric care, submit to a mental health evaluation, and participate in both individual counseling and joint therapy sessions with T.B. The court permitted one weekly monitored visit in a therapeutic setting—that is, only in the context of a joint counseling session. While recognizing visitation was "going to be a problem" because T.B. had previously refused to attend joint therapy sessions with Mother, the court believed that "if there [was] going to be a path forward, it's only going to be done in the context of a therapeutic setting." The court further instructed DCFS to identify a new therapist willing to facilitate and oversee the mandatory joint sessions between Mother and T.B.
Enhancement services are " 'not designed to reunify the child with that parent' " (In re A.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 636, 642, fn. 5), but rather "designed to enhance the child's relationship with" the parent not retaining custody. (Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1497, fn. 1.)
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the court's July 28, 2020 section 360 declaration of dependency, jurisdictional findings under section 300, and removal of T.B. from Mother's custody.
DISCUSSION
A. Initial Finding of Jurisdiction
Mother first contends that insufficient evidence supported the court's finding that her conduct placed T.B. at risk of serious physical harm or illness as required by section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Specifically, she argues her mental illness did not place T.B. at substantial risk of harm because she never physically abused him. T.B. lived with Father, who provided T.B. with safe and appropriate care, and T.B. was a teenager capable of understanding Mother's health issues.
Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a child when the child "has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness" as a result of the failure of his or her parent to "adequately supervise or protect the child" or by the failure of the parent to "provide regular care for the child due to the parent's . . . mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse."
When a parent challenges a juvenile court's jurisdictional findings on appeal, we apply the substantial evidence test standard of review. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654.) Under this standard of review, the appellate court must examine the record in a light most favorable to the juvenile court's findings, accepting its assessments of the credibility of the witnesses. (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1427.) The juvenile court's findings must be upheld when there is any substantial evidence that supports the findings, resolving all conflicts in support of the findings and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the findings. (In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212.) Stated in other words, an appellate court will look only at the evidence supporting a finding, and disregard the evidence supporting a contrary finding. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1526.)
It is true that "[t]he existence of a mental illness is not itself a justification for exercising dependency jurisdiction over a child." (In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, 563 (Joaquin C.) Unlike the mother in Joaquin C., however, whose mental illness did not present the requisite risk that she would "fail[ ] to provide [her child] with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment" (id. at p. 562), there was substantial evidence here on which the juvenile court could rely to find just such a risk. The juvenile court could reasonably infer that various problematic aspects of Mother's behavior were manifestations of mental health problems. Mother had failed to treat her mental illness, she lacked insight and denied the existence of these issues, she behaved erratically while T.B. was in her care, and she failed to adequately provide for T.B.'s basic needs, all of which were probative of Mother's fitness as a parent.
Mother, citing to In re A.G. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 675, 685, argues dependency cannot be sustained where, as here, the nonoffending parent provides appropriate care and the minor's welfare is not endangered by placement with that parent. We are not persuaded. Mother misrepresented facts to the family court in order to obtain primary custody of T.B., after which she engaged in the very misconduct which led the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction over the minor. Substantial evidence supported the court's finding that "Father's efforts to protect [T.B.] . . . have just not been effective." In any event, " '[t]he court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.' " (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Mother's reliance on In re A.L. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1044 (A.L.) is similarly misplaced. In that case, the court held evidence that a parent suffered from mental illnesses was insufficient to support jurisdiction where there was no evidence the mental illness resulted in neglectful conduct or posed a risk of harm to the children. (Id. at p. 1050-1051.) Moreover, in both Joaquin C. and A.L. the courts found no risk of future harm because the parents were in treatment or strong family support mitigated the risk. (Id. at p. 1051; Joaquin C., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 565.)
Here, to the contrary, there is evidence that Mother was in denial about the seriousness of her condition and had no reliable support system in place to mitigate future risk. While she admitted to a DCFS social worker on one occasion that she had diagnoses of bipolar depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder, she also refused to take her medication as it made her feel "crazy like a zombie," and was not receiving appropriate treatment. Our concern is compounded by the fact that Mother's parents, with whom she lives, also deny that she suffers from mental illness, and instead assert that it was T.B. who had a " 'disability' " and " 'something wrong with his mind.' " Quite simply, "[o]ne cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge." (In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197.) Accordingly, there is a direct link between her mental health issues and a risk to T.B.
B. Visitation
Pursuant to section 362, the juvenile court has broad discretion to make any reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of a child, including orders placing conditions on parental visitation. (See also In re Corrine W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 522, 532.) We review an order setting visitation terms for abuse of discretion. (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 692, 699, fn. 6.) We will not disturb the order unless the trial court made an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering visitation in a therapeutic setting. The negative effect on T.B. of Mother's irrational and endangering behavior is patent. For example, he felt Mother had "abducted" him when she refused to allow him to return to Father's home after a visit for the Chinese New Year, and was upset by her plan to keep him. He had trouble sleeping, and feared eating food Mother prepared. In order to prevent further negative effects on T.B., the court required any contact between Mother and T.B. be monitored by someone who understood the mental health issues at the root of Mother's behavior. T.B.'s regular therapy sessions to process his anger toward Mother presented a logical opportunity for such visits as a means of enhancing the relationship between the two and, ideally, lessening the risk Mother posed to T.B.
Mother does not contend otherwise. Rather, Mother argues that the essential effect of the court's order was to deny her any visitation, because T.B. and Dr. Yellen were unwilling to participate in joint counseling sessions. But the court ordered T.B. to participate in the joint sessions and instructed DCFS to identify another therapist willing to oversee them. The order was not a de facto denial of visitation, nor was it an abuse of discretion.
C. Continuing Jurisdiction
Lastly, Mother argues the court erred by retaining jurisdiction at the dispositional hearing, "as substantial evidence did not support jurisdiction." To the extent this is a distinct argument from Mother's challenge to the court's jurisdictional findings, we are not persuaded. The court could reasonably infer from the record that, even after T.B. was removed from Mother, she continued to place T.B. at risk of significant emotional harm. Moreover, based on Mother's past conduct, the court was entitled to be skeptical as to Mother's ability and willingness to take necessary psychotropic medication and otherwise address the mental health issues that have repeatedly led to behavior that negatively affected T.B.'s emotional and/or physical well-being.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. We concur:
CHANEY, J.
Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.