Opinion
B302656
05-22-2020
In re E.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN C., Defendant and Appellant.
Paul Couenhoven, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP05589) APPEAL from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed. Paul Couenhoven, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) asserted dependency jurisdiction pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) over nine-year-old E.W. based in part on allegations that (1) E.W.'s mother (mother), E.W.'s maternal grandmother (MGM), MGM's ex-husband (William W.), and other members of E.W.'s household engaged in aggressive and threatening conduct in E.W.'s home, which eventually culminated in the murder of William W.; and (2) mother and E.W.'s father (father), were aware of this environment and failed to protect E.W. from it.
Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) provides, in pertinent part, for juvenile dependency jurisdiction if: "The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse." (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).)
The juvenile court later sustained this jurisdictional allegation as to both parents; removed E.W. from their custody, care, and control; and ordered mother and father to participate in services, including parenting education. Father appeals from the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional rulings. In particular, father argues that no substantial risk of serious physical harm existed at the time of the jurisdictional hearing because William W., the supposed "focal point of the household's violence[,] had been murdered and thus no longer resided in [E.W.'s] home" at that time. From this premise, he argues the juvenile erred in requiring him to participate in counseling and parenting programs.
We disagree. There was substantial evidence that father was aware that E.W.'s home presented a substantial risk of serious physical harm to her, that he was indifferent to that risk, and that he failed to protect her. Although arguably the probability that father would fail to protect E.W. from domestic violence in her home in the future was lower with William W.'s death, the magnitude of potential harm occasioned by father's indifference to E.W.'s safety is great, especially considering that a member of the household in which E.W. was living was murdered in the home, and repeated instances of domestic violence, including sexual assault, occurred there as well. Father's attitude towards whether E.W. should remain in that home at the time of these events was that he did not "choose that environment," thus evincing a dangerous level of apathy.
We thus conclude that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that father posed a substantial risk of serious physical harm to E.W. at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. Father does not contest the juvenile court's dispositional orders other than to contend erroneously that they fall if the jurisdictional findings against him are not well-founded. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We summarize only those facts that are relevant to this appeal.
1. The dependency petition and its supporting documents
On August 28, 2019, DCFS filed a juvenile dependency petition concerning nine-year-old E.W. The petition alleged jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), and asserted two counts under subdivision (a) and three counts under subdivision (b)(1). Mother and father were named as offending parents under counts a-1, b-1, and b-2, whereas mother was the sole offending parent named under counts a-2 and b-3.
Section 300, subdivision (a) provides that a child is subject to the juvenile court's jurisdiction if: "The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child's parent or guardian." (§ 300, subd. (a).)
Counts a-1 and b-2 each alleged the following: "On prior occasions in 2019, . . . [E.W.]'s mother . . . and father . . . created a detrimental and endangering home environment for the child in that the mother and father exposed the child to ongoing violent altercations with the child's mother[;] maternal grandmother[;] . . . now deceased unrelated adult male, William W[.;] unrelated adult male, John S[.; and] unrelated adult female, Shavonne W[.,] who were members of the household by engaging in aggressive, and threatening conduct towards each other, in the child's presence in the child's home. The child has been exposed to extreme verbal confrontations between the mother, her family and unrelated adults in the child's home. The child's father . . . was aware of the home environment and failed to protect the child by allowing the mother to reside in the child's home and have unlimited access to the child. Such a detrimental and endangering home environment created by the mother and father and the father's failure to protect the child endangers the child's physical health and safety and places the child at risk of serious physical harm damage, [sic] danger and failure to protect."
Counts a-2 and b-3 each alleged the following: "On or about 08/16/2019, . . . [E.W.]'s mother . . . was present during in [sic] a deadly assault against a now deceased unrelated adult male, William [W.] in that the mother failed to contact law enforcement, the mother covered the dead body of the victim and assisted in disposing of the body. On 08/26/2016, the mother was arrested for murder and is currently incarcerated due to mother's conduct. Said violent conduct by the mother endangers the child's physical health and safety and places the child at risk of serious physical harm damage [sic] and danger."
Additionally, count b-1 averred: "[E.W.]'s mother . . . has mental and emotional problems, including a diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder, which renders the mother unable to provide regular care of the child. The mother has failed to take the mother's psychotropic medications as prescribed. The mother failed to follow up psychiatric treatment [sic]. The child's father . . . knew of the mother's mental health issues and failed to protect the child by allowing the mother to reside in the child's home and have unlimited access to the child. Such mental and emotional condition [sic] on the part of the mother and the father's failure to protect the child endangers the child's physical health and safety and places the child at risk of serious physical harm, damage and failure to protect."
The petition also disclosed that DCFS had placed E.W. in "[s]helter/foster care" on August 26, 2019.
On August 28, 2019, DCFS filed a detention report. On July 11, 2019, E.W.'s family came to the attention of DCFS when an unidentified individual reported: E.W.'s MGM claimed that William W. (MGM's ex-husband) had sexually assaulted MGM in her home on July 10, 2019; and mother and E.W. were in the home during the incident, although they did not witness the sexual assault. That matter remained under investigation when, on August 26, 2019, a police detective reported to DCFS that William W. had been murdered on August 15, 2019; mother had been arrested in connection with the murder; and law enforcement suspected that mother, father, and MGM "were all involved in the death of William W[.]" Specifically, the detective told DCFS that these individuals "all had stood to gain financially from [William W.'s] death" and there had been "constant disputes about the sale of [William W.'s and MGM's] home." Law enforcement also reported to DCFS that William W. had been beaten to death by friends of mother who were living in the child's home, and that William W.'s "body was found burned in Joshua Tree National Forest."
The remainder of this paragraph and the following nine paragraphs summarize certain pertinent aspects of the detention report.
On August 26, 2019, DCFS interviewed E.W. E.W. said she lived at home with mother, father, MGM, and William W. E.W. reported that mother, MGM, and William W. "often argued about the sale of the house because [William W.] wanted to sell it." E.W. stated "the arguments were pretty bad and that her mother would sometimes take her out of the house during the arguments because they would often accuse one another of all type[s] of things."
E.W. claimed that William W. "died while she was away [from the home] for a couple of weeks." E.W. told DCFS that MGM had informed her William W. "had passed away after having gotten in a fight with" one of mother's friends, i.e., a person named John, who lived at the home with a spouse. E.W. reported "the family has no more arguments since [William W.'s] passing," and " 'now [her] family can sell the house for [$]3.3 million.' "
During her interview with DCFS, E.W. suggested that she was at a friend's home when William W. was killed. Specifically, "[E.W.] stated that [William W.] died while she was away for a couple of weeks. [E.W.] stated that she thought it was odd that her parents were being so nice and letting her stay with friends but she later figured out it was because of what happened to [William W.]"
E.W. told DCFS that mother and father "use[d] to argue a lot up until she was 7 year[s] old and that once she turned 7 things got better." E.W. "denied witnessing any domestic disputes in the home or between her parents" or being subjected to "any physical or sexual abuse." DCFS reported that during its interview with E.W., she "did not have any marks or bruises . . . indicative of abuse/neglect."
DCFS spoke with father on August 27, 2019. He stated that law enforcement had released him the prior evening after officers had questioned him about his whereabouts during the week of the murder. Father denied having any involvement in the crime or any knowledge of what precisely occurred, and he claimed that mother also had no involvement with the crime. Father later conceded mother " 'had some knowledge' " of the crime that she should have shared with law enforcement, but "he didn't feel comfortable discussing" mother's knowledge of the crime with DCFS.
Father said he left E.W.'s home on August 14, 2019 and returned to that location on August 18, 2019. He claimed that during that timeframe, a man named John and that man's girlfriend were renting a room in E.W.'s home for $40 per night. Father further asserted mother told him that this other man "was involved in a physical dispute with the victim William." Father claimed that he "kicked" John out of the home because that individual "was becoming aggressive with the family." Father "reported that he was uncomfortable" with John and his girlfriend "staying there and that he was uncomfortable with the overall renting of rooms by strangers at the home where his child was living."
Father indicated he was living with E.W. and mother during half of each week, and he suggested that during the rest of the week, he resided at a dwelling that was occupied by eight other individuals, including father's girlfriend. Nonetheless, DCFS reported that it was "unclear who father [was] in a relationship with and what his actual living arrangements [were] at th[at] time" because he "was very all over the place about questions asked and often confused [the social worker] with all the different statements [he] made."
Father told DCFS he was aware of MGM's allegations that William W. had sexually assaulted her, but father stated he " 'd[id]n't think [the allegations] are true.' " Father indicated he was aware of the "ongoing verbal disputes" in the home that occurred in the presence of E.W., but he nevertheless "reported that he did not feel his daughter was at risk." When father was asked "what he did to protect the child" from the ongoing verbal disputes, "he stated, 'I didn't choose that environment.' " The social worker asked father "if he ever thought about taking the child to his home to protect her from all the things going on at the mother's home and he stated no" because "the home he was staying at had a lot of people there and that it was a 'hoarder situation.' "
When asked what father "wanted to happen with his daughter," he provided several inconsistent answers on that subject. Initially, father "stated that right now he is not stable and that he is in-between housing." Next, father said "he will get the money to rent a place of his own." Then he "stated that he want[ed] to take the child with him to Connecticut [to live] with [the child's] Paternal Grandparents and raise his daughter there as California doesn't seem to be a good place for his daughter." Approximately 10 minutes later, father indicated that "he wanted the child with him in Los Angeles." Although father claimed he had a friend who was willing to care for E.W., that man told DCFS that "he had barely met the family and child last week and that he was [merely] considering" the prospect of taking care of E.W.
The detention report indicates E.W.'s paternal grandmother later told DCFS that E.W.'s paternal grandfather's and her paternal grandmother's respective "poor health conditions" prevented them from caring for E.W.
Father told DCFS that mother had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. He reported mother was taking her medications as prescribed, although he admitted mother had failed to do so "a few months back." The social worker "advised father of the ongoing concerns found during the course of the investigation as to the parent's [sic] failure to protect the child from potential risks," and father replied, " 'I'm not feeling guilty. I don't think taking my child from [mother] was the answer.' "
On August 29, 2019, DCFS filed a last minute information report. The day before the report was filed, a police detective reported to DCFS: Mother "was present during the deadly assault" of William W.; William W.'s death was caused by mother's "friends who were living at the home"; mother failed to contact the police about the incident; and mother covered William W.'s corpse and assisted in disposing of the body at Joshua Tree National Forest. The detective also stated law enforcement was investigating whether mother and MGM hired mother's two friends to kill William W., and MGM had "help[ed] clean the murder scene and destroy[ ] evidence." Law enforcement believed that mother and MGM sent E.W. away from the home as part of their plan to murder William W., and that during that timeframe, father knew to stay away from the home for a few days. DCFS further reported: "The concern with the father is currently that his housing is very unstable and that the child may not have her immediate needs met."
The remainder of this paragraph discusses relevant portions of the last minute information report.
2. The detention hearing
At the August 29, 2019 detention hearing, the juvenile court declared father to be the presumed father of E.W. pursuant to Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). Father entered a denial to the petition. The juvenile court found a prima facie case for detaining E.W., and vested temporary placement and custody with DCFS pending disposition or further order of the court. The court also ordered monitored visitation for mother and father.
Mother was not present at the detention hearing. At an arraignment hearing held on September 23, 2019 in the dependency case, she likewise entered a denial to the petition.
3. The jurisdiction/disposition report and its attachments
DCFS filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on September 20, 2019.
On September 18, 2019, DCFS interviewed E.W. once again. E.W. reported she used to live with William W., MGM, and mother, and father would visit every other day. E.W. stated "there were occasional verbal arguments between" William W. and MGM, and mother "did not have a good relationship" with William W.
During her meeting with DCFS personnel, E.W. denied many of the statements that she had made to the agency during her prior interview, including her claims that William W., MGM, and mother had " 'pretty bad' " arguments about the sale of the home, and that MGM had told E.W. that William W. "passed away after he was involved in a fight." The DCFS employee who interviewed E.W. suspected that the child had falsely denied her prior statements in order to retaliate against the agency; specifically, the DCFS employee apparently surmised that E.W. believed the agency maliciously prevented father from participating in a previous telephone appointment with E.W.'s therapist.
DCFS interviewed mother on September 14, 2019 at a detention facility. Mother stated she was "concerned about the negative impact [that] the tumultuous relationships in the home was going to have on [E.W.]" Mother disclosed she had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and had been prescribed a mood stabilizer and an antipsychotic medication. Mother insisted she was "not guilty of what she [was] being accused of and that eventually she was going to get out of jail." Mother said "she would like [E.W.] to live with [MGM] if she cannot live with father."
DCFS scheduled an interview with father for September 18, 2019. Father failed to attend this appointment. The agency also reported that Father had not "responded to DCFS'[s] efforts to arrange visitation with [E.W.] [or] . . . inquired about visitation with [E.W.]"
DCFS reported that since 2013, William W., mother, and MGM had sought "countless restraining and protective orders" against each other. In particular, DCFS noted that "two [recent] elder abuse prevention orders [were issued] to protect William W[.]"
DCFS reviewed certain police records and determined that "police responded to the family home 22 times between 12/17/2018 and 08/19/2019 for domestic violence calls, keeping the peace and welfare checks." DCFS noted that several of the calls concerned "disputes between" MGM and William W., whereas others involved "disputes between [William W.] and mother." For instance, police records indicated that William W. called law enforcement on June 11, 2019 to report that MGM was "harassing" him, and the police thereafter arrested MGM for violating a restraining order. (Capitalization omitted.) Further, these records show that on July 14, 2019, mother called the police and "requested [that officers] keep the peace," as she reported there was an "ongoing dispute" between her and William W. and a "history of harassment and abuse." (Capitalization omitted.) Additionally, the records show MGM reported to police on December 17, 2018 that William W. had pushed her out of his vehicle and driven off as she attempted to retrieve certain belongings from the vehicle. 4. The October 28 , 2019 last minute information report and its attachments
On October 28, 2019, DCFS filed a last minute information report, along with (among other documents) several police reports describing misconduct allegedly perpetrated by William W. against MGM.
A police report dated July 11, 2019 shows MGM reported that the day before, William W. sexually assaulted her. MGM asserted that "she was asleep in her bed when [William W.] . . . 'aggressively' flipped her onto her back and forcefully performed oral copulation, putting his mouth onto her vagina." She told police that William W. covered her mouth with his hand to prevent her from objecting to the encounter. MGM stated that William W. "then sat on her chest and placed his penis in her mouth." She claimed she pushed William W.'s penis away from her mouth, and that while William W. was still seated on her chest, he "masturbate[d] and ejaculated on her face and her hair." A forensic medical report indicates that on July 11, 2019, a nurse examining MGM observed that a "red tende[r] lesion" was on the right side of MGM's labia minora.
According to a police report dated January 31, 2019, MGM said that while she, mother, and E.W. were in the master bedroom of the family home, William W. "screamed" at her and "banged" on the bedroom doors. She reported that he then "kicked the double doors wide open" and yelled, " 'Why was the door locked, don't lock the doors.' " Thereafter, William W. "entered the room and paced back and forth still upset at [MGM]."
Additionally, a police report indicates that on December 17, 2018, MGM claimed that William W. committed an "intimate partner battery" against her. (Capitalization omitted.) MGM reported that she and William W. were "involved in a verbal argument . . . over financial issues" while they were seated in a vehicle parked in the garage of the family home. She asserted William W. pushed her out of the passenger side of the vehicle, causing her to fall on the ground. MGM further claimed that when she thereafter attempted to retrieve her belongings from the vehicle, William W. drove "forward at low speed," causing part of the vehicle to hit her arm. William W. then allegedly "fled the location in the vehicle."
Several other police reports concerning William W. were also submitted to the court. For instance, a February 19, 2015 report indicates that MGM accused William W. of "walk[ing] up behind her and punch[ing] her on the upper right side of her back."
5. The adjudication/disposition hearing
On October 28, 2019, the juvenile court held an adjudication/disposition hearing. The court admitted the following DCFS exhibits into evidence: The detention report and its attachments, the aforementioned two last minute information reports, the attachments to the last minute information report that was filed on October 28, 2019, and the jurisdiction/disposition report and its attachments. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the juvenile court treated father's statements from the detention report as if they had been made under oath in open court. DCFS and E.W. then argued that the juvenile court should sustain the petition, whereas mother and father each argued that the petition should be dismissed.
Although DCFS sought to call mother to the stand, mother did not testify, but instead invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
E.W.'s counsel commented that counts a-2 and b-3 may need to be stricken because of the lack of a sufficient "nexus" between mother's alleged participation in the murder of William W. and a risk of harm to E.W.
The juvenile court struck counts a-2 and b-3 as to mother. The court sustained count b-1 and amended counts a-1 and b-2 against mother and father. As amended, counts a-1 and b-2 each read as follows: "On prior occasions in 2019, [E.W.]'s mother . . . and father . . . created a detrimental and endangering home environment for the child in that the mother and father exposed the child to ongoing violent altercations with the child's mother[;] maternal grandmother[;] . . . now deceased step maternal grandfather, William W[.;] unrelated adult male, John S[.; and] unrelated adult female, Shavonne W[.,] who were members of the household by engaging in aggressive, and threatening conduct towards each other, in the child's presence in the child's home. The child has been exposed to extreme verbal confrontations between the mother, her family and unrelated adults in the child's home. The child's father . . . was aware of the home environment and failed to protect the child by allowing the mother to reside in the child's home and have unlimited access to the child. Such a detrimental and endangering created by the mother and father and the father's failure to protect the child endangers the child's physical health and safety and places the child at risk of serious physical harm damage, [sic] danger and failure to protect."
The juvenile court sustained count b-1 in the form in which DCFS had initially pleaded this jurisdictional allegation. The text of count b-1 is reproduced in the Factual and Procedural Background part 1, ante.
The juvenile court found that E.W. was a person described by section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), and declared her a dependent of the court. The court removed E.W. from mother's and father's care, custody, and control, and placed her in the care, custody, and control of DCFS. The juvenile court also ordered father to participate in conjoint counseling with E.W., parenting education, and individual counseling to address "case issues." The court authorized monitored visitation with E.W for mother and father.
On November 26, 2019, father appealed "[a]ny and all appealable findings and orders, including orders sustaining the petition as to [father] and removing the child [E.W.] from" father.
The record does not reveal the current status of mother's criminal proceedings. A December 16, 2019 minute order from the dependency proceedings indicates that as of that date, mother was still in custody. The court, sua sponte, takes judicial notice of that minute order. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d) & 459.)
DISCUSSION
On appeal, father challenges the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and argues that because those findings were not supported by substantial evidence, the juvenile court lacked authority to issue its dispositional orders. Apart from his challenge to the juvenile court's assertion of jurisdiction, father does not otherwise contest the juvenile court's dispositional orders.
As a preliminary matter, because mother is not a party to this appeal and there is no indication that she has otherwise challenged the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings as to her, the juvenile court would have jurisdiction over E.W. irrespective of the merits of father's appeal because of the unchallenged jurisdictional findings against mother. "As a general rule, a single jurisdictional finding supported by substantial evidence is sufficient to support jurisdiction and render moot a challenge to the other findings." (In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452 (M.W.).)
"However, when . . . the outcome of the appeal could be 'the difference between [a] father's being an "offending" parent versus a "non-offending" parent,' a finding that could result in far-reaching consequences with respect to these and future dependency proceedings, we find it appropriate to exercise our discretion to consider the appeal on the merits." (In re Quentin H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 608, 613.) Because the juvenile court's decision to sustain count b-1, amended count a-1, and amended count b-2 rendered father an offending parent, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of father's appeal.
Additionally, contrary to father's argument, the juvenile court had the authority to require father to participate in services regardless of whether the jurisdictional findings as to him were well-founded. "Section 362, subdivision (a) gives the court the authority, once a child is declared a dependent, to 'make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child.' " (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1148 (D.L.).) Under that statute, the validity of an order requiring services does not hinge on whether there is " 'a jurisdictional finding as to the particular parent upon whom the court imposes a dispositional order.' " (See ibid.) Rather, the court may issue orders pursuant to section 362, subdivision (a) so long as there are any valid jurisdictional findings. (See ibid. [" '[A] jurisdictional finding involving the conduct of a particular parent is not necessary for the court to enter orders binding on that parent, once dependency jurisdiction has been established' "].) Although a nonoffending parent may challenge a dispositional order against him or her for " 'clear abuse of discretion[,]' " (see In re Briana V. (2016) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311), father has not done so here as to the orders requiring him to participate in counseling and parenting education.
Regarding the merits of his appeal, father contends the juvenile court erred in sustaining amended count b-2 because "[t]here was no evidence in this case that the child was at any risk at the time of the jurisdictional hearing because the person who was the focal point of the household's violence [(William W.)] had been murdered and thus no longer resided in the home." For the reasons discussed below, we disagree.
" 'In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. "In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court." [Citation.] "We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court." ' " (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).)
" 'The three elements for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) are: " '(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) "serious physical harm or illness" to the [child], or a "substantial risk" of such harm or illness.' " [Citation.] "The third element . . . effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur)." ' [Citation.] Evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions. [Citation.] To establish a defined risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there 'must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (D.L., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1146, second italics added.)
The record contains substantial evidence that father was aware of the protracted and frequent verbal and physical confrontations in E.W.'s home, and that he was indifferent to the risk of harm that this environment posed to her.
There was evidence showing that "police responded to the family home 22 times between 12/17/2018 and 08/19/2019 for domestic violence calls, keeping the peace and welfare checks." Police reports from the relevant timeframe recount that William W. perpetrated acts of domestic violence against MGM at the family home. For instance, MGM reported that in December 2018, William W. pushed her to the ground and later caused part of his vehicle to hit her at a low speed. She also told the police that in January 2019, William W. "kicked . . . open" the doors to the master bedroom and shouted at MGM while she, mother, and E.W. were in that room. MGM told police that on July 10, 2019, William W. held her down and forcibly sexually assaulted her. Further, the evidence showed that a nurse discovered forensic evidence that was consistent with MGM's claim of sexual assault—i.e., red lesions on her labia minora.
Father points out that a police officer characterized MGM as " 'a chronic 911 caller.' " To the extent father seeks to impugn MGM's credibility, we may not reweigh evidence under the standard of review applicable to father's jurisdictional challenge. (See I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773 [" ' "[W]e note that[, when reviewing the record for substantial evidence,] issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court" ' "].)
DCFS's interviews with several witnesses revealed that a resident of the family home had murdered William W., and that William W.'s torched corpse was found in Joshua Tree National Forest.
These incidents of domestic violence in E.W.'s home created a substantial risk of serious physical harm to her. (See In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941 [" ' "[D]omestic violence in the same household where children are living . . . is a failure to protect [the children] from the substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from it" ' "].) Furthermore, substantial evidence demonstrates that father knew of this substantial risk. Father admitted to DCFS: "[H]e was aware of the sexual assault allegations made by" MGM against William W.; father knew William W. had been murdered and mother " 'had some knowledge' " of the crime; and father "was aware of the ongoing verbal disputes in the home in the presence of the child." Further, E.W. stated that father visited the home "every other day," from which it is reasonable to infer he had the opportunity to learn about the severity and frequency of the domestic violence perpetrated in E.W.'s home.
Father seemed apathetic to this substantial risk of serious physical harm to E.W. He denied responsibility for failing to remove E.W. from the family home, stating that " '[he] didn't choose that environment.' " In fact, father told DCFS he did not "feel[ ] guilty" about the agency's "ongoing concerns . . . as to [his] failure to protect the child from potential risks." Father further stated that he "did not feel his daughter was at risk," even though sexual assault and murder had allegedly been committed in the home. Father's apparent inability to admit his failure to protect E.W. is circumstantial evidence that he could expose her to a substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future. (See In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [" '[D]enial is a factor often relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without court supervision' "].)
The fact that William W. is now deceased does not undermine this conclusion. To this day, father has not taken responsibility for leaving E.W. in what fairly can be described as a toxic environment for a nine-year-old child. Furthermore, DCFS was unable to assess fully the risks of releasing E.W. to father because he lacks "stable" housing.
Under these circumstances, there was a cognizable probability that were E.W. released to father's custody, he would fail to protect her in the future from great physical harm, given that he had already exposed her to a home permeated with domestic violence resulting in sexual assault and murder, and he was indifferent to his responsibility for leaving her in that environment. (See In re S.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 204, 207 ["The Supreme Court has held that ' "even . . . a low degree of probability" ' can give rise to a substantial risk if ' "the magnitude of the harm is potentially great," ' " quoting I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 778].) Therefore, the juvenile court did not err in asserting jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (Cf. S.R., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 224 [upholding the juvenile court's ruling that a father posed a substantial risk of serious harm to his daughter because there was substantial evidence of "a cognizable and unmitigated, but arguably low, probability that [the father] would [molest his daughter] if he had unmonitored contact with her"].)
Because we conclude the juvenile court did not err in sustaining amended count b-2 as to father, we need not reach his challenges to count b-1 and amended count a-1. (See M.W., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J. We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.