Opinion
B298693
03-02-2020
In re HECTOR, JR., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GUADALUPE A., Defendant and Appellant.
Linda J. Vogel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP00608 A-E) APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Martha A. Matthews, Judge. Dismissed. Linda J. Vogel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Guadalupe A. appeals from the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and disposition orders declaring her five children, Hector A., Jr. (14 years old), Hector A. III (10 years old), Arielle A. (8 years old), Jose M., Jr. (18 months old), and Bella M. (6 months old), dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (j), and requiring her to complete parenting classes and individual counseling. Guadalupe argues that the juvenile court erred by applying the wrong legal standard and that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings. She also argues the disposition orders must be reversed because the court based those orders on the erroneous jurisdiction findings.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
While Guadalupe's appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and issued a custody order granting Guadalupe sole physical custody of Hector Jr., Hector III, and Arielle and granting Guadalupe and the children's father, Hector A., joint legal custody. The court did not issue a custody order for Jose Jr. and Bella, but the order terminating jurisdiction indicated the court had released the younger children to Guadalupe and their father Jose M.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services argues we should dismiss Guadalupe's appeal because the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and gave Guadalupe custody of her children. Because Guadalupe cannot show the jurisdiction findings caused her any adverse consequences, we dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Department Investigates a Referral for Child Abuse and Files a Petition Under Section 300
In November 2018 the Department received a referral stating Guadalupe physically abused Hector III. The caller who made the referral had observed marks on Hector III's back that looked like rope burns "with bruising color."
A Department social worker and police officers interviewed Hector III and learned Guadalupe hit him the previous evening with a "cable" for not eating his vegetables at dinner. Hector III stated that Guadalupe hit him three times with a "phone cord" over his clothes. The police observed "three red marks that were . . . approximately a quarter of an inch thick." The Department learned this was not the first time that Guadalupe had used a phone cord to strike Hector III, and that Guadalupe also hit Hector Jr. "using the same phone cord," most recently two weeks before she used it on Hector III. The police observed "two horizontal faded marks on [Hector Jr.'s] mid-back." Arielle stated that, when Guadalupe disciplines her and her siblings, "She hits us with the cable."
Guadalupe told the Department social worker that on the night in question she served Hector III his dinner of rice and vegetables and that he "sat for two hours without eating or doing anything." Guadalupe explained that she was "highly stressed" because she had several unpaid bills and that, "when Hector [III] did not listen, [she] hit him" with a "cell phone charging cable" to discipline him.
The Department filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), alleging Guadalupe's physical abuse of Hector Jr., Hector III, and Arielle placed all five of her children "at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger and physical abuse." The juvenile court found the Department had made a prima facie case under section 300 and released the children to Guadalupe on the conditions she cease all corporal punishment and enroll in a parenting class and individual counseling.
B. The Juvenile Court Makes Jurisdiction Findings and Disposition Orders
Two weeks before the jurisdiction hearing, the social worker interviewed Guadalupe again. When asked about the Department's allegations against her, Guadalupe said they were "exaggerated." She also claimed Hector Jr. "had fallen recently" and questioned whether the injuries the Department documented were "from falling or from what [she] did to him." Guadalupe also stated she did not believe she ever hit Arielle with the cell phone charging cord. Guadalupe stated, "The police officers told me that this type of punishment is against the law and so now I know."
The juvenile court sustained the petition under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (j). The court ordered all five children to remain at home with Guadalupe and Jose (the father of the two younger children) and ordered Guadalupe to participate in family maintenance services, including a class for parents of teenagers and individual counseling. Guadalupe timely appealed the jurisdiction findings and disposition orders.
C. The Juvenile Court Terminates Jurisdiction with a Custody Order
In August 2019 the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over Jose Jr. and Bella and issued an order indicating they had been released to Guadalupe and Jose. Later that month the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over Hector Jr., Hector III, and Arielle and issued a custody order awarding sole physical custody to Guadalupe and joint legal custody to Guadalupe and Hector A. Guadalupe did not appeal from either of the juvenile court's orders terminating jurisdiction or the custody order.
DISCUSSION
A. The Appeal from the Jurisdiction Findings Is Moot
The Department argues Guadalupe's appeal is moot because the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, Guadalupe has custody of her children, and we cannot provide her any effective relief. Guadalupe contends the juvenile court's orders terminating jurisdiction do not moot her appeal because a reversal would allow her to "clear her name." Guadalupe asserts that an "unreviewed finding" by the juvenile court "will follow her" in future family law or dependency proceedings, as well as "any licensing or employment situation that involves contact with children."
"As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot. [Citation.] However, dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, but 'must be decided on a case-by-case basis.' [Citations.] [¶] 'An issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings.'" (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488; see In re E.T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436 [appeal was not moot where "allowing the [juvenile court's] order to stand may have collateral consequences," such as prejudice to the mother in her efforts to reunify with her child].) "[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error." (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60; see, e.g., id. at p. 61 [appeal was moot because the mother "has been awarded custody of [her child] and the jurisdictional findings are not the basis of any current order that is adverse to her"]; In re Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1096, fn. 6 [appeal was not moot, even though the parent did not appeal the order terminating dependency jurisdiction, "because the disposition order continues to adversely affect her"]; In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431-1432 [the father's "challenge to the jurisdictional findings is not moot" because "the sustained jurisdictional findings against [the father] have had an adverse effect on his custody rights"].)
Although Guadalupe asserts the juvenile court's findings "place[ ] her at risk of suffering concrete damage in future legal actions," she has not pointed to any proceedings, pending or anticipated, the jurisdiction findings could adversely affect. The possibility of prejudice "in subsequent family law proceedings" is "highly speculative." (In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1489; accord, In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1494.)
Guadalupe also argues the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings substantiate child abuse charges against her, which require the Department to forward her name to the Department of Justice's Child Abuse Central Index (CACI). Penal Code section 11169, subdivision (a), requires the Department to submit to the Department of Justice a report for inclusion in the CACI "every case it investigates of known or suspected child abuse or severe neglect that is determined to be substantiated." The Department of Justice makes the index available to government agencies, including county welfare departments investigating suspected child abuse and social services departments that provide licenses for employment related to childcare. (Pen. Code, § 11170, subds. (b)(3), (b)(4); see Saraswati v. County of San Diego (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 917, 921, fn. 1 ['"[t]he CACI consists of an index of all reports of child abuse and severe neglect submitted to the DOJ pursuant to the [Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act] under Penal Code section 11169"'].)
"If a report has previously been filed which subsequently proves to be not substantiated, the Department of Justice shall be notified in writing of that fact and shall not retain the report." (Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (a).) In addition, "any person who is listed on the CACI has the right to a hearing before the agency that requested his or her inclusion in the CACI to challenge his or her listing on the CACI." (Id., § 11169, subd. (d).) However, the hearing "shall be denied when a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that suspected child abuse or neglect has occurred." (Id., § 11169, subd. (e).)
If the Department reported Guadalupe to the Department of Justice, reversal of the jurisdiction findings would allow Guadalupe to challenge her inclusion on the CACI. (See Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (d)). But Guadalupe does not claim, let alone show, the Department submitted her name to the CACI, even though the Department must notify her if it does so. (See In re C.F. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 454, 462 ["[t]he reporting agency must notify the known or suspected child abuser that he or she has been reported"].) Nor does Guadalupe identify any current job or future employment opportunity a CACI listing would jeopardize. Guadalupe's general contention that a referral to the CACI, which may or may not occur, will limit her "employment prospects" (without disclosing what those prospects may be) is too speculative.
B. The Appeal from the Disposition Orders Is Moot
Guadalupe's appeal from the disposition orders is moot because those orders no longer exist. The juvenile court's custody order superseded the disposition orders. (See Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1165 ["the exit order 'shall be a final judgment and shall remain in effect after [the juvenile court's] jurisdiction is terminated'"]; see also § 362.4, subd. (b) [custody and visitation orders "continue until modified or terminated by a subsequent order of the superior court"].) The disposition orders no longer adversely affect Guadalupe, who does not contend otherwise. Nothing we could do in this appeal can grant her any relief from non-existent orders. (See In re E.T., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 436 ["[a]n appeal may become moot where subsequent events, including orders by the juvenile court, render it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effective relief"].)
"Custody and visitation orders issued under section 362.4 are sometimes referred to as 'family law' orders or 'exit' orders." (In re Ryan K. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 591, 594, fn. 5; see § 362.4.) We take judicial notice of the custody order in this case under Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (d), and 459.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
SEGAL, J. We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J.
FEUER, J.