Opinion
B297307
03-24-2020
In re A.H. et. al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ERICA H. & JEFFREY H., Defendants and Appellants.
Erica H., Defendant and Appellant, in pro per. Jeffrey H., Defendant and Appellant, in pro per. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a). Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK57697 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Veronica S. McBeth, Judge. Affirmed. Erica H., Defendant and Appellant, in pro per. Jeffrey H., Defendant and Appellant, in pro per. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Erica H. (mother) and Jeffrey H. (father) appeal from the juvenile court's orders terminating their parental rights with respect to two of their children, A.H. and S.H., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. They each contend the court made several rulings amounting to reversible error throughout the proceedings that ultimately culminated in the orders terminating their parental rights.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
We conclude mother and father have failed to demonstrate the court committed any reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The family's dependency proceedings involving the parents' eight children have collectively generated numerous appeals and writ proceedings. We borrow some relevant background facts from one of our most recent opinions.
"'Since 2011, the parents' six oldest children have been subjects of an open dependency case, based on sustained allegations that father hit A.H. in the face with his fist, mother failed to protect her, and both parents regularly gave her beer to drink. S.H., the parents' seventh child, was declared a dependent of the court [and removed from his parents] after his birth in 2012, based on the sustained allegations in his older siblings' case. The parents were ordered to receive reunification services and to complete parenting education and individual counseling. In March 2013, the court terminated reunification services with the six older children, but did not return the children to the parents' custody due to their insufficient progress, father's disruptive behavior through most of the case, and mother's continued submissiveness to his control.'" (In re A.H. (Apr. 2, 2019, B288387) [nonpub. opn.].) In 2014, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for S.H. and set a section 366.26 hearing. (Ibid.) Mother's writ petition challenging that order was denied in case No. B255970. (Ibid.)
"'Ms. T. has cared for S.H. since 2014 and has been his legal guardian since 2016. With the exception of A.H., who was placed with Ms. T. in 2017, all of S.H.'s other siblings have been adopted, and jurisdiction over them has been terminated.' [Citation.]" (In re A.H. (Apr. 2, 2019, B288387) [nonpub. opn.].)
On August 27, 2018, the parents filed a pleading entitled "Objection to the Hon. Veronica McBeth on Grounds of Judicial Disqualification," in which the parents sought to disqualify Judge McBeth based on Code of Civil Procedure sections 170.1, 170.2, and 170.3. In support of their request, the parents alleged Judge McBeth was biased against them, as she had ruled against them on several prior occasions, and threatened the parents with criminal charges. The juvenile court struck the pleading on September 4, 2018, finding the pleading failed to state any legal grounds for disqualification, and that the pleading was duplicative of the parents' prior requests for disqualification.
On October 15, 2018, mother and father each filed identical petitions under section 388. The petitions sought to modify an order entered on April 9, 2018. That order is not in the record provided to us. The parents characterize the order as follows: the juvenile court terminated reunification services for A.H. and S.H., found A.H. and S.H. were appropriately placed with Ms. T., suspended father's visitation with S.H. until S.H. completed an evaluation under Evidence Code section 730, and ordered family therapy. The petitions requested the court terminate Ms. T.'s guardianship over S.H., reinstate reunification services for both parents, require S.H. to complete an evaluation under Evidence Code section 730 with a specified doctor, reinstate visitation for both parents, and order both parents to attend conjoint therapy with A.H. and S.H.
On October 17, 2018, the court summarily denied both petitions. The court found the petitions did not state new evidence or a change of circumstances, and that the parents failed to show their requested modifications were in the children's best interests.
Following a contested section 366.26 hearing held over the course of several months, on February 1, 2019, the court found A.H. was adoptable. The court further found the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply, and that it would be detrimental for A.H. to be returned to her parents. Thus, the court terminated mother's and father's parental rights with respect to A.H.
Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), even if the court finds it is likely that a child will be adopted, it may not terminate parental rights if it "finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child," as "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
Two weeks later, on February 14, 2019, the contested section 366.26 hearing pertaining to S.H. also concluded. There, the court likewise found S.H. was adoptable, that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply, and that it would detrimental for S.H. to be returned to his parents. Consequently, the court terminated mother and father's parental rights with respect to S.H. That same day, the court also issued orders reiterating the denial of the parents' section 388 petitions.
Mother and father appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. General Principles: The Presumption of Correctness and the Appellant's Burden on Appeal
"[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.]" (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) "This means that an appellant must do more than assert error and leave it to the appellate court to search the record and the law books to test his claim. The appellant must present an adequate argument including citations to supporting authorities and to relevant portions of the record. [Citations.]" (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 557.) Accordingly, the California Rules of Court expressly require appellate briefs to "[s]tate each point . . . and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority" and to "[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears." (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).)
"It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness." (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach).) Nor are we "required to search the record on [our] own seeking error." (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) Consequently, "[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived. [Citation.]" (Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852.) Likewise, "'[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record . . . the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived. [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 (Nwosu).)
These rules apply to both parties represented by legal counsel and self-represented parties. (See Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1246-1247.) "A party proceeding in propria persona 'is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.' [Citation.]" (First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1.)
While the parents have raised numerous points of error for our consideration, many of their contentions are unsupported by reasoned argument or their citations to the record. The record in this case consists of a 2-volume, 585-page clerk's transcript, as well as 16 volumes of reporter's transcripts, which pertain to over 50 hearings occurring over an 8-year period. Undertaking an independent review of this voluminous record to evaluate the parents' unsupported arguments would be significantly burdensome. Under these circumstances, as discussed below, we find several of the parents' arguments have been forfeited. (See Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; see also Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.)
II. Clarification of Orders Subject to Review
We begin by clarifying the orders subject to our review in this appeal. In their notices of appeal, mother and father state they seek to challenge not only the orders filed on February 1 and February 14, 2019, but also "[a]ll jurisdictional orders from 10/31/18 to present."
We decline to review any orders beyond those entered on February 1 and February 14, 2019, as the parents' notices of appeal do not identify those other orders with requisite specificity. (See Cal. Rules of Court rule 8.405(a)(3); see also DeZerega v. Meggs (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 28, 43 ["'[W]here several judgments and/or orders occurring close in time are separately appealable[,] . . . each appealable judgment and order must be expressly specified - in either a single notice of appeal or multiple notices of appeal - in order to be reviewable on appeal.' [Citation.]"].) Moreover, we lack jurisdiction to review any orders prior to those rendered 60 days before the parents' notices of appeal were filed. (See Cal. Rules of Court rule 8.406(a)(1); see also Van Beurden Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 56 (Van Beurden) ["The time for appealing a judgment is jurisdictional; once the deadline expires, the appellate court has no power to entertain the appeal. [Citation.]"].)
Accordingly, we limit our review solely to the juvenile court's orders entered on February 1 and February 14, 2019.
III. Mother's Challenges on Appeal
A. Denial of Mother's Section 388 Petition
Mother contends the court should not have terminated her parental rights, as the court erroneously denied her section 388 petition without a hearing. Specifically, mother contends she demonstrated Ms. T. has not adequately cared for A.H. and S.H., and that Ms. T. was "attempting to erode" her bond with A.H. and S.H. "by refusing visitation and speaking ill of [mother] in their presence." The denial of a section 388 petition is an appealable order. (In re Madison W. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1450 (Madison W.).) Mother's challenge to the denial of her section 388 petition, however, is untimely.
As noted above, the court originally denied mother's section 388 petition on October 17, 2018. Consequently, mother was required to file a notice of appeal within 60 days of that date. (See Cal. Rules of Court rule 8.406(a)(1); see also Madison W., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1450.) The record, however, does not contain any evidence demonstrating mother ever filed a notice of appeal regarding the court's ruling on her section 388 petition. Moreover, although the court later issued an order on February 14, 2019, which apparently reiterated the court's denial of mother's section 388 petition, this order did not restart or otherwise extend the deadline by which mother was required to file a notice of appeal. (Laraway v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 579, 583 ["The Rules of Court do not provide, once a judgment or appealable order has been entered, that the time to appeal can be restarted or extended by the filing of a subsequent judgment or appealable order making the same decision."].)
The parents filed a notice of appeal on August 21, 2018 challenging "[a]ll appealable findings and orders filed from April 9, 2018 to present." This notice of appeal, however, pre-dates the October 17, 2018 order denying mother's section 388 petition.
Accordingly, we may not consider mother's challenges to the juvenile court's order summarily denying her section 388 petition, as we "ha[ve] no power" to do so. (Van Beurden, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 56; Cal. Rules of Court rule 8.406(a)(1).)
B. Delegation of Juvenile Court's Authority to Determine Terms of Visitation
Mother contends the court should not have terminated her parental rights, as the court unlawfully delegated its authority to determine whether visitation would occur to A.H. and S.H., the Department of Children and Family Services (Department), Ms. T., and the children's therapists.
In support of her argument, mother does not identify any order in which the juvenile court set the terms of visitation and thereby provided the children, the Department, Ms. T., or the children's therapists with the authority to determine whether visitation should occur. Mother also does not identify any order in which the court terminated her rights to visitation based solely on any of the identified individuals' preferences. Further, while mother asserts several individuals "testified" the court delegated to the children and the Department its authority to determine whether visitation should occur, her assertions are not supported by her citations to the record. Mother has therefore failed to support her argument with necessary record citations. Thus, her argument is forfeited, and we need not consider it on the merits. (See Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.)
C. Denial of Mother's Requests for Issuance of Subpoenas and Other Evidence
Mother contends the court erred in terminating her parental rights because it improperly refused to issue subpoenas compelling the testimony of several witnesses who, according to mother, would have demonstrated the applicability of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption. Again, we conclude mother's argument on this point has been forfeited, as it is unsupported by necessary record citations. (See Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.) Specifically, while mother notes the clerk's transcript contains copies of the subpoenas she prepared, she does not identify the proceeding or filing in which she requested the court to issue her subpoenas, nor does she properly identify any order by the court denying her request.
Mother's assertion the court "erroneously found that 'the clerk here does not issue subpoenas'" is unsupported by the citation to the record she has provided.
The record reflects that on October 15, 2018, mother and father filed a document entitled "Parents Witness List; Ex Parte Request for Court Clerk to Issue Subpoenas; and Motion to Compel Discovery," in which they requested the court to direct the clerk to issue subpoenas compelling the testimony of several witnesses in support of their defense at the section 366.26 hearing. But mother has not identified any order denying the request.
Mother also contends the court should not have terminated her parental rights because, during the section 366.26 hearing, the court declined to order the Department to produce to her several documents she requested. Her assertion, however, is unaccompanied by any reasoned argument. Consequently, we find mother has forfeited her contention on this matter as well. (Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852.)
To the extent father appears to raise the same argument in his opening brief, we likewise conclude it is forfeited, as he has also failed to support it with reasoned argument.
Moreover, even if mother had not forfeited this contention, we cannot conclude the court erred. Mother requested the Department to produce: (1) all delivered service logs from April 25, 2011 to present; (2) a copy of the spousal waiver indicating Mrs. T.'s spouse consented to A.H.'s adoption by Mrs. T.; (3) all of A.H.'s and S.H.'s medical, educational, and mental health records; and (4) a copy of the case file pertaining to dependency proceedings regarding Timothy R., A.H. and S.H.'s half-sibling, filed on March 3, 1998. Considering the age, breadth, and subject matter of the documents sought, and the lateness of the request, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the documents would not have been relevant to whether the children were adoptable, or whether the beneficial parent-child exception to adoption applied. (See San Diego County Dep't of Social Services v. Tina G. (in Re Tabatha G) (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1166 ["Discovery in juvenile matters rests within the control of the juvenile court and the exercise of its discretion will be reversed on appeal only on a showing of a clear abuse. [Citations.]"].)
"The issue of adoptability posed in a section 366.26 hearing focuses on the minor, e.g., whether the minor's age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor. [Citations.]" (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.)
IV. Father's Challenges on Appeal
A. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction due to Failure to Provide Adequate Notice of Detention Hearing
"Personal jurisdiction over a parent in dependency proceedings is obtained when the parent is properly noticed, because notice gives the parent the choice whether to appear in the dependency proceeding. [Citations.]" (In re Daniel S. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 903, 916.) Reversal is not required, however, where the failure to provide parents with proper notice is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at pp. 912-913, 916.)
Father contends the orders terminating his parental rights are void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Specifically, father argues he did not receive proper notice of the initial detention hearing held on April 28, 2011, and therefore the court never obtained personal jurisdiction over him. We disagree with father's conclusion.
As an initial matter, we conclude father has forfeited his right to challenge the Department's failure to provide him with notice of the detention hearing. Following the hearing, father immediately began participating in the dependency proceedings. For example, father was present at the jurisdictional hearing held in August 2011, where he testified he never hit his children and only allowed the children to have one sip of wine on the Sabbath. (In re A.H. (July 20, 2012) B236022 [nonpub. opn.].) Moreover, father has participated in reunification services over the last several years, and has represented himself throughout the section 366.26 hearings regarding A.H. and S.H. Despite his involvement in these proceedings, father has not shown he sought relief in the juvenile court for the Department's failure to provide him notice of the detention hearing. Thus, father has forfeited his right to raise this issue on appeal. (See In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209-1210.) Additionally, we note that by participating in the dependency proceedings as discussed above, father made a general appearance and submitted to the court's jurisdiction. (See In re Jennifer O. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 539, 547 [acknowledging general rule that a court acquires jurisdiction over a party by the party's general appearance].)
Furthermore, even if father had not forfeited his right to raise this issue on appeal, we conclude father's lack of notice regarding the detention hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. At the time the hearing was held, both parents were in custody, having been arrested for refusing to allow police to enter their home to investigate a report that father had hit A.H. (In re A.H. (July 20, 2012, B236022) [nonpub. opn.].) At the hearing, the court found the Department made a prima facie case for detaining A.H. and her older siblings under section 319 and ordered it to find temporary placement for the children. Father, however, has not shown a reasonable probability that the court would have ruled otherwise had he been given proper notice of the hearing, nor has he articulated how the court's rulings at the detention hearing affected the outcome of any of the subsequent proceedings giving rise to this appeal.
Accordingly, although father did not receive proper notice of the detention hearing, he has not shown this error warrants reversal of court's orders terminating his parental rights.
B. Father's Removal from the Courtroom
Father argues the orders terminating his parental rights should be reversed because the court abused its discretion when it removed him from portions of the section 366.26 hearings, and thereby deprived him of the opportunity to fully present his defense. We disagree.
At the outset, we note father does not identify, either by date or by citation to the record, the hearings at which the court ordered his removal from the proceedings. Under these circumstances, we find father's argument is forfeited, as he has failed to support it with necessary record citations. (See Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.)
Nevertheless, we note the Department, in the background section of its brief, identifies two occasions on which father was removed from the section 366.26 proceedings. As discussed below, even if father had identified these occasions in support of his argument, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering his removal at those hearings.
"It is . . . well established that courts have fundamental inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power to control litigation before them. [Citation.]" (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967.) "'That inherent power entitles trial courts to exercise reasonable control over all proceedings connected with pending litigation . . . in order to insure the orderly administration of justice. [Citation.]'" (Ibid.) "'The Legislature has also recognized the authority of courts to manage their proceedings and to adopt suitable methods of practice. [Citation.]'" (Ibid.) Specifically, Code of Civil Procedure section 128 provides a court has the power to, among other things, "enforce order in the proceedings before it," and "provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it[.]" (Code Civ. Proc. § 128, subds. (a)(2) & (3).)
As the Department correctly points out, father was removed from the courtroom during a hearing held on October 30, 2018. The record indicates that, in the moments leading up to his removal, father repeatedly interrupted the proceedings by speaking out of turn. He also addressed the court in an inappropriately aggressive and combative manner. After warning father he would be escorted out of the courtroom if he did not conduct himself appropriately, the court ultimately ordered his removal when he interrupted the Department's counsel while she was answering a question directed to her by the court, and insisted on "tell[ing] her how to answer." Following a recess, the court allowed father to return to the courtroom and participate in the remainder of the proceedings.
Father was also removed from the courtroom during a hearing held on January 24, 2019 after repeatedly interrupting mother's cross-examination of Ms. T. Shortly before his removal, the court warned father he would be escorted out of courtroom if his "outburst[s]" continued. While the court attempted to have father return to the courtroom after mother finished cross-examining Ms. T., the bailiff could not locate him, as he had left the courthouse.
We conclude the juvenile court reasonably determined father's removal was necessary to facilitate the orderly administration of justice in the proceedings before it. Moreover, the court allowed father to return to the courtroom on both occasions. Accordingly, father has not shown his removal from portions of the section 366.26 hearing requires reversal of the court's orders terminating his parental rights.
C. Striking of the Pleading Seeking Judge McBeth's Disqualification
Father contends the orders terminating his parental rights are void because Judge McBeth erred in striking his pleading seeking her disqualification due to her alleged bias or prejudice against him. We decline to consider father's argument disputing Judge McBeth's ruling, as it is procedurally improper.
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4, subdivision (b), "if a statement of disqualification . . . on its face . . . discloses no legal grounds for disqualification, the trial judge against whom it was filed may order it stricken." (Code Civ. Proc. § 170.4, subd. (b).) Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d) sets forth "the exclusive means of challenging a denial of a motion to disqualify a judge." (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 275.) Pursuant to this statute, "[t]he determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought only by the parties to the proceeding. The petition for the writ shall be filed and served within 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the court's order determining the question of disqualification." (Code Civ. Proc. § 170.3, subd. (d).)
Judge McBeth issued her order striking father's statement of disqualification on September 4, 2018. Her order was served by mail on the same date. The record, however, does not reflect father ever filed a petition for a writ of mandate seeking to challenge Judge McBeth's determination.
Accordingly, we will not entertain father's argument challenging Judge McBeth's disqualification order because it has been inappropriately raised on direct appeal. (See Roberts v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 474, 487.)
D. Denial of Right to Due Process
Father contends he was deprived of his right to due process in three respects. We consider each argument in turn.
First, father contends he was denied his right to due process because he was "denied notice of writ." His contention on this point consists of a single, conclusory statement, which is unsupported by citations to the record or reasoned argument. Accordingly, we conclude father's argument on this matter is forfeited and decline to address it on the merits. (Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.)
Next, father argues he was denied due process because he was "denied [his] right to the evidence." In particular, he argues the Department failed to provide him with Title XX's for the six-month period leading up to January 29, 2018, and an adoption report pertaining to A.H. We reject father's contentions.
Title XX's refer to "Delivered Service Log[s]" prepared by Department staff, which set forth the Department's contacts and visits with, as well as services provided to, the family.
Contrary to father's argument, the record does not indicate the parents were never provided the Title XX's for the six-month period leading up to January 29, 2018. At a hearing held on October 30, 2018, mother stated the Title XX's the parents had been given relating to this period were "almost complete." During a recess, mother and Department's counsel were able to clarify which Title XX's the parents were entitled to but had not yet received. Father does not contend, nor cite to any evidence in the record demonstrating, the Department subsequently failed to provide the parents with the rest of the Title XX's relating to the time period at issue.
Additionally, father's assertions that the Title XX's the Department provided were "scrubbed of all the comments," which would have "show[n] that [A.H. and S.H.] desperately wanted to come home and that [he] maintained regular visitation," and that father was never given an adoption report concerning A.H., are unsupported by adequate citations to the record. Father, for example, does not provide any record citations illustrating the Department's Title XX's are ordinarily accompanied by detailed comments. Moreover, father does not identify - with any specificity - the adoption report referenced in his argument, let alone cite to any evidence in the record indicating the Department prepared an adoption report relating to A.H., but failed to provide him a copy of it. Therefore, father's contentions on these points are forfeited. (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.)
Lastly, father contends he was denied due process when the court "unfairly tipp[ed] the scale in favor of [him] losing [his] parental rights" by improperly "reversing her order for the Department to prepare a bonding study and provide conjoint therapy." Once again, father's argument is unaccompanied by necessary record citations. In particular, father has not provided any record citations demonstrating the court ordered him to participate in conjoint therapy, that the court ordered the Department to prepare a bonding study, or that the court "reversed" any of those prior orders. Consequently, father's contentions on these issues have been forfeited. (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.)
Mother and father appear to raise numerous other arguments for the first time in their reply brief. Because they have not shown good cause exists to consider these additional arguments, we decline to do so. (Nordstrom Com. Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 583 ["[P]oints raised for the first time in a reply brief on appeal will not be considered, absent good cause for failure to present them earlier [citation]."].) In addition, issues raised by the parents for the first time at oral argument are forfeited because they were not presented in the parents' opening briefs. (Ace American Ins. Co. v. Walker (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1027 fn. 2 ["We need not consider an argument not mentioned in the briefs and raised for the first time at oral argument. [Citation.]"].)
DISPOSITION
The orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CURREY, J. WE CONCUR:
MANELLA, P. J.
WILLHITE, J.