Opinion
B301763
08-20-2020
In re J.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.H., Defendant and Appellant. A.O. Real Party in Interest.
Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Real Party in Interest A.O.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 18LJJP00866) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Stephanie M. Davis, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed. Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Real Party in Interest A.O.
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Appellant C.H. (Mother) ran over A.O.'s (Father) foot with her car, while Father was holding their two-year-old child in his arms. As a result, the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over the child, J.H., finding he is a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The court subsequently terminated its jurisdiction and awarded Father sole physical and legal custody of J.H. On appeal, Mother contends the court abused its discretion by awarding Father sole legal custody. We disagree and affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother and Father have one child together, J.H., and have been in an "on and off" relationship over the course of several years. Father has cared for J.H. for most of the child's life.
When J.H. was two years old, Mother drove him to a bank, where she planned to give the child to Father to take home. Mother and Father got into an argument in the bank's parking lot. As Father took J.H. out of the car seat, Mother accelerated her car and drove over Father's foot. Father fell to the ground while holding J.H., causing Father to suffer minor injuries. Mother was arrested for domestic violence and child endangerment.
As a result of the incident, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition alleging J.H. is a person described by section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). The court sustained the petition, declared J.H. a dependent of the court, and placed the child with Father, who was a nonoffending parent. The court granted Mother supervised visitation and ordered she complete domestic violence and parenting programs, and attend individual counseling to address anger management and co-parenting issues.
DCFS subsequently reported that J.H. was doing well with Father, and it had no concerns about his ability to care for the child. DCFS observed that Father and J.H. were closely bonded, and Father was very protective of his son. Father reported that J.H. enjoyed visits with Mother and would ask for her afterwards. Father wanted Mother to be a part of J.H.'s life and would do what he could to co-parent with her.
Mother refused to speak to DCFS until about a month after the disposition hearing. At her first meeting with a DCFS social worker, she claimed she was the victim of the incident and did not understand why she was considered the perpetrator. Mother also said the district attorney would be dismissing her criminal case because there were no witnesses and Father did not want to press charges.
Mother provided the social worker letters from Olive Support Services showing she had been attending parenting, anger management, and domestic violence classes. Mother had also enrolled in a parenting program at a different agency, but she attended only four out of nine classes. Mother claimed she could not complete all her court-ordered programs because it was too expensive; she admitted, however, she had not contacted the low-cost referrals that DCFS had provided to her.
A DCFS social worker contacted Olive Support Services to confirm Mother's progress in the various classes. Olive Support Services said it had no record of Mother being a client. At a subsequent face-to-face interview with a DCFS social worker, Mother refused to discuss her progress in the court-ordered programs and abruptly left the DCFS office.
The court conducted a section 364 judicial review hearing on October 22, 2019. All the parties agreed the court should terminate jurisdiction; they disagreed, however, over who should have custody of J.H. Mother asked the court to grant her and Father joint physical and legal custody. DCFS recommended Father have sole physical custody and Mother and Father share legal custody. Father and J.H.'s counsel urged the court to grant Father sole physical and legal custody.
The juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and awarded Father sole physical and legal custody of J.H. The court found, based on the totality of the circumstances, it would not be in J.H.'s best interests to award joint custody with Mother. The court explained: "The mother has continued to be uncooperative, refuses to provide the Department with any updated information, and has no regard for court orders. [¶] The court believes that once jurisdiction is terminated, if the mother has any type of custody with this child at all, that lack of cooperation will spill over and forward towards the child, and her dealings with the father. [¶] Also, she was the aggressor in this circumstance, and has provided the court with no information that she has ameliorated the situation that brought the matter before the court. [¶] Not only that, but her actions in court demonstrate that she has failed to resolve the issues that brought her to court in the first place."
Mother timely appealed the custody order.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in refusing to award her joint legal custody of J.H. We disagree.
Under section 362.4, when a juvenile court terminates jurisdiction over a dependent child, it may make orders regarding custody and visitation that become part of any family court proceeding concerning the same child. (In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1122-1123.) " 'When making a custody determination in any dependency case, the court's focus and primary consideration must always be the best interests of the child. [Citations.] Furthermore, the court is not restrained by "any preferences or presumptions." [Citation.] Thus, for example, a finding that neither parent poses any danger to the child does not mean that both are equally entitled to half custody, since joint physical custody may not be in the child's best interests for a variety of reasons. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 102-103.)
We review "the juvenile court's decision to terminate dependency jurisdiction and to issue a custody (or 'exit') order pursuant to section 362.4 for abuse of discretion [citation] and may not disturb the order unless the court ' " 'exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination [citations].' " ' [Citations.]" (Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 300.)
Here, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award Mother joint legal custody. The incident that led to jurisdiction was precipitated by an argument between Mother and Father. What began as a verbal dispute, however, escalated to violence, with Mother running over Father's foot with her car while he was holding J.H. Despite the significant risk this conduct posed to J.H., Mother refused to cooperate with DCFS for several months. She then disclaimed any responsibility for the incident, insisting she was the victim rather than the perpetrator.
The record further shows Mother failed to comply with the court-ordered case plan, which was designed to address the issues that led to jurisdiction. It appears Mother lied to DCFS about her participation in parenting, domestic violence, and anger management classes at Olive Support Services. Although she additionally enrolled in a different parenting program, she attended fewer than half the sessions. There is also nothing in the record showing she participated in individual counseling. Further, when DCFS asked Mother about her progress with the case plan, she refused to answer and abruptly left the meeting.
Given Mother's failure to demonstrate she had meaningfully addressed the underlying issues that led her to run over Father's foot with her car, the juvenile court could have reasonably found a co-parenting relationship would lead to similar altercations with Father in the future. Such altercations, in turn, pose a serious risk to J.H.'s physical and emotional well-being. Moreover, Mother's repeated refusals to cooperate with DCFS and comply with court orders betrayed an oppositional personality, which would pose further challenges to a successful co-parenting relationship. Under such circumstances, it was reasonable to conclude a joint custody order would not be in the child's best interests. (See In re Maya L., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 104 [sole custody order appropriate where mother displayed erratic behavior and refused to accept responsibility for any wrongdoing].) This is true even though DCFS recommended joint legal custody, Father indicated he wanted Mother involved in J.H.'s life, and Mother's visits with J.H. went well.
Mother insists this case is analogous to In re C.M. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 101, in which the appellate court affirmed an order awarding the parents joint legal custody of their child. On appeal in that case, the father raised two issues: (1) the juvenile court made a legal error in failing to apply Family Code section 3044; and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion in awarding joint custody. (In re C.M., supra, at p. 108.) The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, but certified for publication only the portion of the opinion discussing the legal issue. Mother does not raise that legal issue here; she contends only that the juvenile court abused its discretion. As such, her reliance on In re C.M. is misplaced. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a) [a party may not rely on unpublished opinions].)
DISPOSITION
The custody order is affirmed.
BIGELOW, P. J. We Concur:
GRIMES, J.
STRATTON, J.