Opinion
B301151
05-21-2020
In re A.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. B.P., Defendant and Appellant.
Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP03652A) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Philip L. Soto, Judge. Dismissed. Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Mother challenges the juvenile court's order removing Son from her custody. After Mother filed this appeal, the juvenile court returned Son to Mother's and Father's custody. We therefore dismiss the appeal as moot. Code references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I
We summarize the events leading to the removal order.
Mother and Father were in a relationship for five years before they married in June 2019. They had one child together: one-year-old Son. Mother lived with Father but occasionally stayed with Maternal Grandmother.
In April 2019, Mother filed a police report against Father. Mother and Father "got into a pretty bad argument" after Mother asked Father to change Son's diaper. Mother described the argument as "[a] little too heated" and said Father "got domestic." Father hit Mother's face, neck, and ears. Mother "had scratches in the neck and face" and a black eye. Son was asleep on the bed during the incident. A police officer reported Mother "had multiple scratches in her face, on the back of the neck, swelling on [her] right eye and a bruise on [her] inner arm."
Mother asked Maternal Grandmother to pick her up from Father's apartment following the incident. Maternal Grandmother advised Mother to file the police report. Mother said Father had not been abusive towards her in the past. Mother also said she and Father were willing to participate in family therapy.
Father denied there was a physical altercation and said "[t]here is no violence at all" and "I never left an injury on her." When a social worker told Father about Mother's injuries, Father replied, "Not by me." He then stated, "People need to mind their business. People hate to see you happy."
Father admitted engaging in domestic violence in the past with a former partner, which his criminal record reflected. Father took court-ordered domestic violence classes as a result.
Maternal Grandmother later denied knowing about any domestic violence between Mother and Father. She picked Mother up from Father's apartment on the day of the reported incident but said "she didn't see anything that day" and "denied seeing any marks or injuries on [Mother]." When a social worker asked if Maternal Grandmother recalled advising Mother to file a police report, Maternal Grandmother replied, "I don't remember." Maternal Grandmother described Father as "a good man." She had no concerns about Son's well-being and said, "[A]s far as I'm concerned I don't see anything."
In June 2019, the Department of Children and Family Services placed Son in foster care and filed a petition alleging Son was at risk of serious physical harm under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1).
At the June 11, 2019 detention hearing, Mother's counsel asked the juvenile court to release Son to Mother because Mother was willing to follow a safety plan and live with Maternal Grandmother. Counsel argued the department failed to prove there were no other alternatives to detention. The department did not create a safety plan or offer other solutions. Counsel noted the domestic violence incident appeared to be a first-time incident and Mother was forthcoming by telling the department "it was a pretty bad fight" and admitting Father hit her, scratched her neck and face, and gave her a black eye. Mother took the incident seriously and was willing to enroll in programs immediately.
Father's counsel told the court Father was cooperating with the department and enrolled in a domestic violence program. Father's counsel stated the parties could "make a safety plan to release [Son] to one or both of the parents."
Son's counsel joined Mother's request to release Son to Mother's custody with a safety plan. She noted it appeared Mother could be protective because she went to the police after the domestic violence incident.
The juvenile court detained Son from both parents, "at least temporarily," and ordered the department to investigate whether the department could place Son with relatives. The court set a Child and Family Team meeting "to see if a safety plan can be implemented to allow the child to be returned to the mother or the father or both." The court also issued a mutual stay-away order, prohibiting Mother and Father from contacting or coming within 100 yards of each other.
The department placed Son with his paternal aunt.
When the department interviewed Mother a week after the detention hearing, Mother changed her story about the domestic violence incident. She said Father did not want to change Son's diaper and they argued about sharing responsibilities. Mother was "cranky and upset" at Father. Father walked away and Mother tried to grab him. Father "attempted to push her off in an effort to try to get away" and "it was not a big deal." Mother said she was "over exaggerating," "should have not reported anything to the police," and "made a big deal out of nothing." Mother also denied having scratches on her face and said she "was just being a brat." She said Father was never violent with her. She could not recall how she got the bruises on her face.
Father continued to deny physically hurting Mother during the incident. He said Mother was "nagging" and "trying to tell him to change the child's diaper" so he swung his arm to tell Mother to "leave him alone." He said he loved Mother and Son and would never want to hurt them. He did not know why Mother "would make 'false' claims at the police station."
Mother now lived with Maternal Grandmother. She claimed she was not aware of the stay-away order or anything going on in court because she was distraught and did not recall what she agreed to do. Father knew there was a stay-away order but reported he and Mother continued to communicate with each other. He did not understand the order because "our life is built around each other." Mother and Son visited his home frequently.
At the July 11, 2019 adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found the department's allegations true, sustained the petition, and declared Son a dependent of the court. The court found no reasonable alternatives to removal and ordered Son removed from his parents' custody. The court acknowledged both parents enrolled in programs but stated counseling alone did not solve the problem. Father denied injuring Mother. Mother completely backtracked from her police report. Mother and Father violated the court's stay-away order. The court did not want to put Son in danger by giving Mother or Father custody when neither parent accepted the fact that Father had a history of domestic violence.
The juvenile court ordered the mutual stay-away order to remain, except when Mother and Father participated in counseling together. The court also ordered separate monitored visits, and unmonitored visits as long as Son's paternal aunt was present. The court ordered Mother to enroll in domestic violence services for victims and ordered Father to enroll in domestic violence services for perpetrators. The court ordered both parents to enroll in parenting classes, individual counseling, and conjoint counseling.
Mother filed a notice of appeal on August 9, 2019.
II
We turn to the juvenile court's order at the February 24, 2020 status review hearing. On our motion, we took judicial notice of that minute order. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
The court found Mother and Father made substantial progress and ordered the department to return Son to both parents' custody. The court terminated its July 11, 2019 suitable placement order and lifted the stay-away order. The court continued its jurisdiction over Son.
On March 17, 2020, we requested and received supplemental briefing from Mother and the department addressing whether we should dismiss the appeal as moot, given the February 24, 2020 order.
III
Mother makes one argument on appeal: insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's July 11, 2019 removal order. Mother's appeal is moot because the court ordered the department to return Son to his parents' custody at the February 24, 2020 status review hearing.
An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, an event makes it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief. (In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316.) We must dismiss such an appeal because reversal would have no practical effect. (In re Dani R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402, 404.) Thus, the critical factor is whether we can provide any effective relief if we find reversible error. (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.)
In her supplemental brief, Mother argues the juvenile court's order returning Son to Mother's custody "does not render her challenge to the removal orders moot" and even if it does, "this Court should exercise its inherent authority to decide the merits of the controversy." Both arguments fail.
Mother incorrectly argues her appeal is not moot because she and Father have custody of Son. The juvenile court's February 24, 2020 order makes it impossible for us to grant effective relief even if we reverse the removal order. (In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 60.) Her appeal is moot because reaching the merits would have no practical effect. (In re Dani R., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 404.)
Mother's second argument is, even if the appeal is moot, we "should exercise [our] inherent authority to decide the merits of the controversy."
Established law governs this point. On a case-by-case basis, we decide whether later events in a dependency matter moot the appeal and whether our decision would affect the case's outcome in a later proceeding. (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404 (Yvonne W.).) We may exercise our inherent discretion to resolve an issue rendered moot by later events if the controversy has continuing public importance and is capable of repetition, yet evading review. (Ibid.)
We exercise our discretion to decline to reach the merits in this moot case.
Mother's appeal raises no continuing issue of public importance. Her dispute is solely about the facts of her particular case. She raises no legal question of widespread application or statewide importance. Whether substantial evidence supports the government decisions in this particular case is of vital importance, but only to the people directly involved.
Nor does Mother point to any specific reason to believe past decisionmaking in this case will prejudice her in the future. She argues we should reach the merits because the juvenile court retained jurisdiction over Son, and the court's findings at the dispositional hearing could continue to affect her adversely if the court issues another removal order in the future. Mother's fears are generalized and hypothetical. Were generalized and hypothetical fears sufficient, no case would ever be moot. The exception would swallow the rule.
This case thus differs from Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1394 where the facts created concern the juvenile court might base a future removal decision on one erroneous factor.
Mother's reliance on Yvonne W. does not persuade us otherwise. There, after the child was removed the mother enrolled in a residential treatment program, participated in therapy, drug tested regularly, and had successful visitation. (Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1397.) As of the 18-month hearing she continued making good progress, but was unable to find permanent housing and was living at a shelter the agency expressly approved as appropriate. (Id. at p. 1398.) The juvenile court found that return of the child created a substantial risk of detriment based on the child's expressed fear, anxiety, and unhappiness about her mother living at a shelter. (Id. at p. 1399.) The court selected "another permanent planned living arrangement" as the child's permanent plan. (Ibid.)
As here, the child was returned to the mother's custody after the mother appealed. (Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.) The court of appeal declined to dismiss the appeal as moot because it found the issue it raised—whether the court properly premised a risk of detriment finding on the sole basis of the parent's residence in a shelter previously deemed by the agency to be appropriate—was "of continuing public importance and . . . capable of repetition, yet evading review." (Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404; see In re Jody R. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1615, 1622 ["'If an action involves a matter of continuing public interest and the issue is likely to recur, a court may exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue, even though an event occurring during its pendency would normally render the matter moot.'"].) The instant case presents no such issue of continuing public importance. Mother does not ask us to clarify a legal standard that will likely recur in her own case or among other parties, but rather to determine whether the evidence was sufficient in her particular case to warrant the children's initial removal from her care.
Mother points out the Yvonne W. court of appeal also reached the merits because the juvenile court continued its jurisdiction over the child and the basis for the court's removal findings could affect the mother adversely if the court issued another removal order in the future. (Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.) But in contrast to Yvonne W., the facts here give no cause for concern that the juvenile court might base a future removal decision on one erroneous factor, even though the juvenile court retained jurisdiction over Son. We decline to exercise our discretion to decide the matter.
Mother also invokes In re Joshua C., 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1547-48 (Joshua C.), contending the juvenile court's removal order continues to affect her adversely or undermines the foundation for a later order or finding. But Joshua C. is inapplicable. The Joshua C. court reviewed the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings, even though a family law order later terminated dependency jurisdiction, because the jurisdictional orders were the basis for the family law order. (Id. at p. 1548.) Any error in the jurisdictional findings undermined the foundation for the family law order. (Ibid.) Declaring the case moot rather than addressing any jurisdictional errors on appeal would insulate those errors from review. (Ibid.) There were concrete consequences to the jurisdictional findings. There are no such concrete consequences for Mother here. Mother mentions only hypothetical "future dependency proceedings" and argues the removal order could "support the detention and jurisdiction over [Son] which would be highly prejudicial to [Mother]." Adverse effects of the juvenile court's removal order are speculative.
Mother has not shown any specific or concrete adverse effects from the removal order. Even if we found reversible error, we could not provide Mother any effective relief because Son already is in her custody.
We decline to review the order. We dismiss Mother's appeal as moot.
DISPOSITION
Mother's appeal is dismissed.
WILEY, J. WE CONCUR:
BIGELOW, P. J.
STRATTON, J.