Opinion
B298426
06-01-2020
In re N.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANNA N. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Landon Villavaso, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Anna N. Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Rheta N. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 18LJJP00157) APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Steven E. Ipson, Commissioner. Affirmed. Landon Villavaso, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Anna N. Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Rheta N. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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The juvenile court found that appellants Anna N. and Rheta N. are unable to appropriately supervise their teenaged son N.W. His behavioral and runaway issues endanger his physical health and safety and place him at substantial risk of harm. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)(1).) The court removed N.W. from appellants' custody and care.
Unlabeled statutory references in this opinion are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional finding. The court focused on the child's behavior. It did not find the parents neglectful or blameworthy. The evidence shows that appellants cannot control N.W.'s chronic, disturbing behavior. Removing him from appellants is necessary to protect his safety and emotional well-being. The service plan is designed to mitigate the problems leading to dependency jurisdiction. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
N.W. was born in 2005. His biological mother died in 2008. In 2012, the court terminated the parental rights of N.W.'s father, whose drug abuse prevented him from providing N.W. with regular care and supervision. In 2014, N.W. was adopted by Anna. Rheta is Anna's wife and is in the process of adopting N.W. The court found Rheta to be a presumed parent.
In October 2017, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) investigated a report that N.W. was living in a neighbor's shed. N.W. said that Anna slapped his face and punched his chest. Anna showed the case worker (CSW) photos of N.W. trying to jump from her home's second floor window. She told the CSW to "take him with you." The allegations were deemed inconclusive.
The same month, N.W. was admitted to Kedren Community Mental Health Center (Kedren). He had jumped from a second story window and expressed thoughts of suicide and hitting appellants. Appellants feared for their safety. Anna removed N.W. from Kedren against medical advice.
In February 2018, N.W. was placed on a 14-day psychiatric hold at Kedren. He said he ran away from home because Anna "whopped" him with an extension cord. He reported being hit with a belt, slapped on the face, punched in the stomach, and verbally abused. He said he urinates and defecates on himself and in his bedroom "to get back at his parents." His bedroom smells strongly of human waste.
N.W. threatened suicide if returned to appellants' home. He complained that appellants call him a "jerk," an "asshole," and say "they hate me." He described himself as "a very intelligent person and a troublemaker." Anna stated that N.W. has run away from home five or six times. He has not received services from an agency, but appellants "tried several interventions in the home." Appellants "reported that they do not feel equipped to continue to care for child."
Rheta said, "This boy has me tapped out as to what to do with him, and I have a master's degree in this." She "is not able to turn her back on the child for a second or else he will run away or do something he is not supposed to." Anna agreed, saying "We have to keep 24/7 eyes on him."
Appellants deny harming N.W., saying he makes false accusations, eats excessively, and has disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. Although N.W. takes psychotropic medications, Anna attributed his actions to being "a mean little boy [with a sense of] self-entitlement." She believes he defecates in his bedroom to "pay us back." On one occasion, N.W. ran away from home, but sneaked in at night and appellants "found feces smeared all over his bedroom wall."
Appellants homeschool N.W. While in public school, he threw a computer, pinecones, and rocks, called the teacher stupid, and flunked his exams. He has learned "all the buzz words" to convince DCFS to admit him to a mental hospital. Anna said, "The only way [DCFS] will consider taking him will be if ya'll found me having done something," but she did not "want her record to be ruined" if a petition is sustained. She is at her wit's end. Asked if N.W. might harm himself, appellants laughed and said, "Are you kidding me? That egomaniac, no way."
Asked what she would like to see happen, Anna replied, "Honestly, I cannot help him anymore," and began to cry. She wants him placed in a long-term care hospital for six months to a year to receive intensive services because his misconduct is escalating.
Informed that N.W. threatened suicide if returned to the parental home, Anna "laughed and said, 'I'll tell you what then, you keep him, I'm done.' [She] then began to cry and screamed and reported she took the child into her home and adopted him but feels like she is a 'prisoner.' [Anna] reported the child is lying to everyone to make her life 'a living hell.' " She is aware he does not want to return home.
Anna asked "if she will go to jail if she asked CSW to take the child." Rheta began to cry and said they were not abandoning N.W., but he had put them in a corner. Anna reiterated, "I'm done with this, I'm done ok, you keep him, you tell him that I love him and I wish him the best." She no longer wants N.W. to humiliate her and asked DCFS to " 'charge me with being incapacitated.' " During their interview, appellants referred to N.W. as "an addict to everything," "a troublemaker," "a charmer," "slick," "so sick," "a monster," "a liar," and "a smart kid."
Adult sibling Z.Y. lives in the family home. He said that N.W. refuses to do schoolwork, is not physically punished, and is unlikely to commit suicide. Appellants are trying to help N.W. Z.Y. believes N.W. needs treatment for a mental illness that causes him to soil his bedroom with his waste.
A Kedren social worker informed the CSW that N.W. was doing well, independently working on his homework and was "everyone's favorite" patient. He said he " 'poops on himself because he has accidents and other times because it's on purpose.' " Anna denied consent for N.W.'s medication at Kedren and said, "I don't want him, you keep him, I'm done with him." She then apologized for being overwhelmed.
DCFS offered a voluntary plan to place N.W. in out-of-home care. Anna did not sign the agreement, saying, "I want my son back, I want him to come back home." She said she would agree to six months of inpatient hospitalization at Kedren, noting that N.W. is a "master manipulator" who will continue his behavior in foster care. The court issued an order authorizing DCFS to detain N.W.
N.W. was taken to a group home. He was happy because it meant he did not have to live with appellants and would be treated fairly. He continued to threaten suicide if placed with appellants and expressed fear of them. He said he learned coping skills in group therapy at Kedren.
DCFS filed a petition alleging that appellants physically abused N.W. by striking him with their hands and objects; Anna failed to protect him from physical abuse by Rheta; N.W.'s mental health and behavioral issues require treatment, but Anna failed to ensure he received proper services; and she is unable to provide N.W. with appropriate parental supervision due to his runaway and behavioral issues, placing him at risk of physical harm. (§ 300, subds. (a), (b).)
DCFS reported that N.W. is comfortable in a group home. He does not want to live with appellants and accused them of physical abuse. The group home did not observe N.W. engaging in problematic behavior.
On March 5, 2018, the court found a prima facie showing that N.W. falls within section 300 and detained him in shelter care under DCFS supervision. It ordered an assessment of N.W.'s psychological status. He went to a neuropsychiatric hospital for inpatient assessment and treatment.
In an interview for the jurisdiction/disposition report, N.W. continued to accuse appellants of physical abuse with their hands and objects, causing him injuries. He does not trust Anna and does not want to live with or visit her. At the group home he enjoyed classes, was treated fairly, and received enough food. He denied suicidal thinking. He became emotional and distraught when required to visit appellants and refused to go.
Anna continued to deny that N.W. was abused and accused him of "manipulating the authorities because he does not want to participate in home schooling." She wants N.W. to remain in her care because in foster care he will play violent video games. She does not feel she needs parenting education.
Rheta similarly denied any wrongdoing. She is educated and is homeschooling N.W. He runs away and acts out to avoid doing chores, homework, or exercise. She glued shut the window of his bedroom so he cannot jump out.
N.W.'s psychological assessment was completed. During his hospitalization, he got along with peers; had good coping skills; and sought guidance and support from staff. He was "a model patient, cooperative, respectful, appreciative of being here." No behavioral problems were noted.
DCFS asked the court to keep N.W. in protective custody and provide reunification services. Appellants belittle N.W.'s character, laugh about his suicidal thoughts, are accused of hitting him, and are ambivalent about having N.W. in their home. They did not obtain appropriate mental health treatment for him. DCFS felt the risk of possible abuse or neglect is "high." Appellants' discipline is "rigid and punitive," they do not use community resources to meet N.W.'s needs, and are unwilling to supervise N.W. due to the allegations he made against them. He is at risk of "extreme isolation" in the parental home, uses his bedroom as a toilet, and has a history of running away.
During a visit with N.W. in May 2018, appellants sternly demanded that he return a jacket and look at them. He "shut down." Appellants became angry that N.W. wanted to shorten the visit. Rheta complained, "He didn't even say hello to me." Appellants left after spending five minutes with N.W. N.W. told the CSW that appellants make him feel "bad" and he does not want to see them again. N.W. smiled and hugged the foster parent who arrived to take him home. He refused to attend his next visit with appellants.
For four months, the foster parent did not report any issues with N.W.'s behavior that would require a more restrictive environment. N.W. was taken to see a therapist weekly. In August 2018, N.W. was moved from his foster placement after he punched a hole in a wall of the home with his fist. N.W. was upset about his chores, and his aggression was increasing. He fixated on video games.
The petition was adjudicated over the course of eight months in 2018-2019. Anna testified that she disciplines N.W. by limiting his access to electronics, making him write essays or phrases, or keeping him in the house for a week. Appellants did not use physical discipline or inflict injuries on N.W.
N.W. has run away from home five or six times since June 2017 to avoid doing chores or schoolwork. N.W. went to a mental hospital after he was found digging through trash in a neighbor's yard. He was diagnosed with oppositional defiant disorder. He had multiple hospitalizations and was prescribed psychotropic medication. When he was home, Anna monitored him "almost 24/7"; she put a metal pole in his bedroom window to keep him from climbing out and an alarm on his door to alert her if he was leaving. Though Anna called police the first few times N.W. ran away, she stopped because "he really wasn't running away like . . . forever."
Anna has sought "for years" to place N.W. in a residential treatment center to address "serious behavioral problems" such as stealing, lying, fighting, bullying, and hurting animals. She wanted a Christian based military-type academy for him and had found a facility in Northern California when DCFS intervened.
Rheta stated that N.W. "will do things to endanger himself," such as drinking cough syrup, or screaming and jumping from the second story roof. He steals, lies, and hurts animals.
Anna homeschools N.W. because he failed his state exams, has behavioral issues, and she can help him get into a prestigious university by helping him learn. He did not enjoy homeschooling. On a typical day, he is allowed to leave his bedroom to exercise, eat, study with appellants, and do household chores. She stands in the hall when he leaves his bedroom to use the bathroom.
Anna told the CSW "you should just take him" because she was upset that he made accusations against her. She wants him to achieve his dreams. She could enroll him in a residential treatment program, followed by boarding school, and have family counseling to mend the rift between them. However, her preference is to keep N.W. at home, under close scrutiny. She believes that appellants found a way to manage him at the time of his detention "and it was working." She does not feel she would benefit from parenting classes.
Anna looked at treatment centers and boarding schools for N.W., to help develop his character, even before she came to believe he had serious mental issues. He defecated on the carpet, smeared feces on bathroom towels, and constantly urinated in his bedroom. Despite her concerns, Anna did not seek family counseling: She explained that her family resolves problems with talk and prayer.
Rheta disagreed that appellants cannot control N.W. She testified that he "needs to learn to control himself. We are the best parents that can help him get there." They have been effective in modifying his behavior. He cannot escape because his bedroom window is glued shut, with a two-inch gap for air. She said the only reason appellants looked at treatment centers or boarding schools was to placate the CSW, once DCFS intervened.
N.W. testified that Anna struck him on multiple occasions with a brown extension cord and left a mark on his leg. She also hit his face and chest with her hand and fist. Appellants later made him write that he lied about the physical abuse.
He testified that appellants usually keep him locked in his bedroom. Sometimes, after many hours, he escaped through the window. They later glued his window shut. They let him out of the bedroom to eat, do chores, or study. They force him to wear only underpants at home, to deter him from leaving. N.W. admitted to punching a hole in the wall at his foster home, saying he was "upset."
After testifying, N.W. did not want to visit with appellants because he felt emotionally unstable. Appellants believed N.W. felt guilty for perjuring himself. They felt he was not studying enough in foster care. They did not plan to let N.W. come home right away, if they get custody, but will send him to a facility for education and guidance.
N.W. told the CSW he could not believe appellants hit him, then pretended nothing happened. Tears rolled down his cheeks. When informed that N.W. was upset, Anna said, "Well, he should be uncomfortable. Lying on us like that."
In March 2019, the family counseling therapist informed the CSW that sessions were "counterproductive." She spends N.W.'s individual sessions preparing him for family therapy. Appellants "have one truth and [N.W.] has another truth—so there is no common ground." N.W. wanted appellants to call him daily; they suggested that he needs to call them. The foster mother reported that appellants never call N.W. to talk or check on him. He was doing poorly in school. Appellants registered N.W. for a private psychiatric boarding school.
When the adjudication hearing resumed, N.W. testified that Anna tied him to his bed. Appellants locked him in his bedroom, put an alarm on his door, and removed almost everything: He had no books, toys, puzzles, computer, or phone. Rheta hits him in the face. He urinated in his room to get back at them, or because he had no access to a bathroom while locked in his bedroom. He ran away from home "to not get in trouble, and just to get away." He got in trouble for small things like talking back or not paying attention. He was not allowed to go in the garage because he lit papers on fire there. He was homeschooled because he misbehaved in public school.
N.W. is not afraid of appellants. He is unsure whether he will kill himself if he is sent back to appellants' home. He feels that everything he does is not good enough for Anna. In foster care, N.W. gets in trouble for talking back or not paying attention. He does chores and enjoys them. He has not tried to run away from his foster homes and is not locked in his bedroom. He has not urinated in his room or been sent to a mental hospital while in foster care.
Anna testified that N.W. was not locked in his bedroom. Instead, she put an alarm on his bedroom door to know where he was at all times because he was prone to starting fires, ate unhealthy things, and might run away. She removed everything from his bedroom except a desk, a mattress (aired in the garage daily because it smelled of urine), and pencils and paper. If he woke at night, he would open his door, the alarm would ring, and she would go and see what he needed.
On May 8, 2019, the court ruled on the petition. It sustained an allegation that appellants "are unable to provide the child with appropriate parental supervision due to the child's runaway and behavioral issues. Said inability of the mothers to provide appropriate parental supervision of the child endangers the child's physical health and safety, placing the child at substantial risk of physical harm and damage." The court dismissed as untrue allegations of physical abuse and failure to obtain mental health care for N.W.
Appellants requested custody of N.W., but he was opposed to returning to their home. DCFS argued that appellants have not cooperated. They refused to accept a voluntary case plan and said they do not want N.W. in their home. Recently, a therapist deemed counseling "counterproductive" because appellants have no common ground with N.W. Appellants want to send N.W. to a psychiatric facility, yet he is fine in foster care with no need for hospitalization.
The court declared N.W. a dependent. It did not approve of appellants' plan to send N.W. to a boarding school. Keeping N.W. confined to a bedroom, either locked or equipped with an alarm, is "not an appropriate parenting situation" and "it's clear to me that the minor cannot be returned to this situation." The court removed N.W. because there is a substantial danger to his physical health, safety or physical and emotional well-being and a detriment if he is returned to appellants' custody and care. Appellants were given reunification services, including a parenting education program, and individual and family counseling to address case issues. They are allowed monitored visits with N.W.
DISCUSSION
Appellants argue that insufficient evidence supports the court's exercise of jurisdiction and removal of N.W. from their care. On appeal, we must uphold the rulings unless, after reviewing the entire record and resolving all conflicts in favor of the respondent and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment, we determine that no substantial evidence supports the findings. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633; In re Israel T. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 47, 51.)
The court based its ruling on language in section 300, subdivision (b)(1) stating that jurisdiction is proper if "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child. . . ." This language "authorizes dependency jurisdiction without a finding that a parent is at fault or blameworthy for her failure or inability to supervise or protect her child." (In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 624.) A parent need not be "neglectful" or "unfit." (Id. at p. 627.) "[T]he omission of a culpability requirement in the first clause of section 300(b)(1) 'was purposeful.' " (Id. at p. 630.)
The evidence shows that N.W. cannot be controlled while living in appellants' home. He ran away five or six times. He jumped from a second story bedroom window and was living in a neighbor's shed. He urinates and defecates on himself and in his bedroom "to get back at" appellants. He accuses appellants of physical abuse and threatens to commit suicide, hoping to be taken to a mental hospital to get away from them.
"[T]he record reveals [appellants'] concerted (and at times desperate) efforts to protect and discipline [N.W.]." (In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633.) They felt obliged "to keep 24/7 eyes on him." They kept N.W. in his bedroom by installing an alarm on his door and gluing his window to prevent him from climbing out. They locked up his clothing, leaving him garbed in underpants to deter him from going outdoors. They stand guard in the hallway when he leaves his bedroom to use the toilet.
Appellants repeatedly asked DCFS to take N.W. They were at their wit's end. Anna tearfully told the CSW, "Honestly, I cannot help him anymore," and, "You keep him, I'm done." He has made her life "a living hell." Appellants described him as "a mean little boy," "so sick," "a monster," an "egomaniac," and "a master manipulator." Appellants in effect conceded that they cannot control N.W.
Appellants say they could send N.W. to a military-style boarding school or psychiatric treatment facility. However, Anna told DCFS her preference is to keep him at home under close scrutiny, believing that she has a way to manage him "and it was working." Rheta likewise felt appellants are the "best parents" to help N.W. and were effective in modifying his behavior.
Appellants demand high achievement from N.W. despite his emotional problems. He reacted poorly to their demands and to the strict structure of their home, where he is at risk of isolation. Anna argues that appellants "created a structured environment that gave the child an opportunity to thrive without [DCFS] involvement." The court found that N.W. is not thriving. Thriving does not reasonably include smearing excrement on the wall, living in the stench with the window glued shut, jumping from the second floor, or threatening suicide.
The record shows that N.W.'s behavioral problems—running away from home, using his bedroom as a toilet, threatening suicide, refusing to do chores—stopped when he was placed in foster care. At Kedren he was "everyone's favorite." During his psychological assessment he got along well with peers, had good coping skills, and was "a model patient, cooperative, respectful, appreciative of being here." By contrast, his contacts with appellants were so fraught that a therapist deemed family counseling sessions "counterproductive."
We need not assign responsibility for family dynamics to either appellants or N.W. " 'The loss of parental control is rarely if ever attributable solely to the parent or the child. It is instead the result of a long and complicated chain of actions and reactions culminating in the child's refusal to submit to parental authority.' " (In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 635.) The courts need not wait for actual harm to occur before taking necessary steps to protect a child from the risk of harm. (In re I. J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Without assessing blame, it is clear from the record that dependency jurisdiction is necessary. N.W.'s behavior was extreme. Nonetheless, it is untenable that he should spend his childhood isolated, unclothed, and sealed in his bedroom with an alarm on his door, monitored 24 hours a day. As N.W. becomes older and stronger, the risk of conflict will grow.
Nor did the court have to forgo jurisdiction and allow appellants to send N.W. to a psychiatric facility or military academy. It is unclear if N.W. would be accepted at such a place, if appellants could afford it, or if he would benefit. Though appellants say they could send N.W. away, they testified that their true intent is to keep N.W. at home because they believe they have found a way to control him.
The court dismissed allegations that N.W. has mental health issues requiring treatment. It could reasonably find that what N.W. needed was a home where he would behave and not be suicidal, and that he should not trade one prison-like setting (appellants' home) for another (a mental facility). After hearing the testimony, the court decided that the problem was N.W.'s reaction to appellants' parenting techniques, not an organic illness requiring commitment to a psychiatric facility.
A child who resides with his parents when the petition is filed may be removed from their custody if the court finds that returning the child poses a substantial danger to his physical health, safety, or emotional well-being, and there is no reasonable means to protect him without removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
The record shows that N.W. repeatedly threatened suicide if returned to appellants' home. Appellants deemed his threats laughable, saying he is too much of an "egomaniac" to kill himself. Though appellants did not credit N.W.'s threats of suicide, that did not prevent the trial court from doing so. The court saw N.W. testify and could gauge his emotional state. The court knew N.W. feared appellants' wrath; it heard N.W. voice distress about being closed in his fetid bedroom with nothing to do, monitored 24 hours a day, while eating, studying, exercising, and using the toilet. A doctor at Kedren placed N.W. on an involuntary hold as a danger to himself.
Appellants argue that their vigilance is commendable. The court called it inappropriate parenting. We cannot reweigh on appeal the court's assessment of family dynamics.
Rheta asserts that the disposition order is unreasonable. The court has broad discretion to make an appropriate order to protect a child under its jurisdiction. (In re Brianna V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311; § 358.) The order must be reasonable and designed to eliminate the conditions that led to the sustained petition; it "may include a direction to participate in a counseling or education program." (§ 362, subd. (d); In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1229.) A plan formulated to create a suitable home is not an abuse of discretion. (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1005-1008.) We uphold the disposition unless it exceeds the bounds of reason. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 851.)
The court ordered a parenting program and counseling. Appellants disagreed, saying they have their own "parenting style" and do not need parenting education. The court exercised jurisdiction because it found appellants' parenting style was "not appropriate." The parenting program requirement was within the court's discretion. It was designed to create a suitable home and eliminate conditions leading to dependency jurisdiction. The court's counseling order was sufficiently specific because it instructed appellants to address case issues. The court did not need to detail the exact type of counseling, which will be determined by the therapist.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J. We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
HOFFSTADT, J.