Opinion
B226582
08-04-2011
In re MARQUIS T., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANGELA P., Defendant and Appellant.
Cameryn Schmidt, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK81002)
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Cameryn Schmidt, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Angela P. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's orders declaring three of her five children to be dependents of the court and removing one of her daughters from her custody. At the core of the juvenile court's order was its finding that Mother knew for a significant time period that her husband was sexually abusing two of her three daughters but did nothing to protect them. In addition, the juvenile court found that Mother had physically abused those two daughters.
In this appeal, Mother does not contest the assertion of juvenile court jurisdiction over her two daughters who were the victims of Mother's physical abuse and her husband's ongoing sexual abuse. Instead, Mother contends primarily that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that her two teenage sons were at risk. On that basis, she seeks reversal of the order declaring them dependents of the court. We do not reach the merits of that contention. We agree with Department that the issue is moot because the juvenile court subsequently terminated jurisdiction over the two boys.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services.
Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred in declaring her youngest daughter a dependent of the court and removing her from her custody. We conclude that substantial evidence supports both orders.
Department, in its cross-appeal, urges that the juvenile court erred in dismissing two allegations that Mother had physically abused two of her daughters. Department's contention overlooks the facts that the juvenile court sustained these identical allegations in two other portions of the petition and that Department essentially asked the juvenile court to dismiss the allegations. Consequently, we do not reach this issue.
We therefore affirm the orders (jurisdictional and dispositional) from which Mother appeals.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother has three biological children and two adopted children. The biological children are Marquis (born in 1993), D. (born in 1996), and Tierra (born in 2006). Mother's adopted children are biological sisters: Ron. (born in 1997) and Sh. (born in 1999). Terrence A. married Mother in 2005 and is the father of Tierra. Prior to his arrest, Terrence A. lived with Mother and the five children. Fentris T. is the father of Marquis and D. Fentris T. and Mother divorced in 2002.
In portions of the record and the briefs, Fentris T. is incorrectly referred to as Sentris T.
None of the children's fathers are a party to this appeal.
On April 8, 2010, Ron. and Sh. informed law enforcement that Terrence A. had sexually abused them. Sh., then 11 years old, stated that Terrence A. had molested her since she was five years old. Ron., then 12 years old, stated that Terrence A. had molested her twice in the last six months and that during the prior week she had seen him sexually abuse Sh. When asked why they had not previously disclosed the abuse, each girl explained she believed "she would get in trouble." Terrence A. was arrested that day and denied the sexual abuse.
The police report states that after advisement and waiver of his Miranda rights, he was asked "if he knew why [the arresting officer] was at his house. He said, 'probably one of my daughters are saying I touched them. But I have never touched any of them.' When [the officer] asked him why he thinks that, he told [him] one of them accused him of touching her. He would not give . . . any details about that incident. [When asked] if he had ever touched the victims in an inappropriate way[, he replied:] 'No, if I did it was [an] accident. I don't know why they are saying these things.'"
The next day (April 9), Detective Bruner interviewed the two girls. Each gave a very detailed account of Terrence A.'s molestation. His conduct included orally and manually copulating them, forcing Sh. to orally copulate him, rubbing his penis against them, and fondling their breasts, vagina and buttocks. The detective then conducted a recorded interview with Terrence A. After advisement and waiver of his Miranda rights, Terrence A. admitted that he had engaged in inappropriate conduct with Ron. but denied touching Sh. Terrence A. was charged with committing lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) (The record does not indicate the outcome of that prosecution.)
In relevant part, Detective Bruner's report, which was submitted to the juvenile court and furnished to Mother, stated the following. "[Terrence A.] admitted he asked [Ron.] to lay on the bed and pull down her pants, which she did. [He] said he was sexually excited and wanted to do more but knew it was wrong. He said he looked at her vagina, but before anything else happened he said he stopped himself. [He] began to cry and told me he was intoxicated and was sexually excited. He said he was sorry and knew it was wrong and believed he would have touched her if he had not stopped himself. [Terrence A.] denied ever doing anything to [Sh.]. He admitted to walking in on her in the bathroom but never touching her inappropriately."
A social worker separately interviewed Ron. and Sh. Each girl gave detailed descriptions very similar to those they gave to the police of multiple acts of sexual abuse by Terrence A. In addition, each girl said that Mother had physically abused her by striking her on the buttocks with a belt. Sh. also claimed that Mother had once struck her on the head with a belt. (In a subsequent interview, Ron. said Mother hit her and Sh. "with a belt for no reason, sometimes for stupid stuff." The beatings left marks that eventually healed.) As for Mother's knowledge of Terrence A.'s sexual abuse, Sh. had told her about it when she was six or seven years old but Mother had simply replied: "'Don't let it happen again. . . . I don't know who to believe. You or him. You're only 7. He's saying no and you're telling me yes.'" Ron. had told Mother about the abuse approximately six months earlier but the abuse continued. Marquis and D. told the social worker that they had never been "touched inappropriately" by Terrence A. and they had been unaware of his abuse of Ron. and Sh.
The social worked also interviewed Mother. Mother said she had only very recently learned about the sexual abuse and that she had "told the girls that if she's not home, they should protect themselves." Mother said she did not remember that Sh. had previously told her about the sexual abuse. Mother was reluctant to take Tierra to a clinic for examination of evidence of sexual abuse, was reticent to obtain a restraining order against Terrence A., was hesitant to require that any visits between Terrence A. and Tierra be monitored, and was concerned that if Terrence A. were incarcerated, "she could not afford to live there and would need to move."
Department filed a section 300 petition seeking a declaration of juvenile court jurisdiction over all five children. The petition alleged infliction of serious physical harm (§ 300, subd. (a)), failure to protect (§ 300, subd. (b)), sexual abuse (§ 300, subd. (d)), and abuse of a sibling (§ 300, subd. (j)) based upon the claims that Mother had inflicted serious physical harm on Ron. and Sh. by hitting Ron. on the buttocks with a belt and by hitting Sh. on the head and buttocks with a belt; that Terrence A. had sexually abused Ron. and Sh. since 2004; and that Mother had known of the sexual abuse but had failed to protect Ron. and Sh. from Terrence A. The petition also alleged failure to support (§ 300, subd. (g)) based upon Mother's statement that Fentris T., father of Marquis and D., lived in Utah and had had no contact with his sons "for many years."
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
At the detention hearing, Mother submitted letters from Ron. and Sh. The letters, written in almost identical language, recanted the girls' allegations of sexual abuse. The two girls later told Department that Mother had pressured them into writing the letters and that Terrence A. had, in fact, molested them.
In May 2010, Terrence A. admitted to Detective Bruner that he had touched Ron.
Mother testified at the jurisdictional hearing conducted in July 2010. As for the physical abuse allegations, Mother denied Sh.'s statement that she had struck her in the head with a belt. Mother conceded that she had spanked Ron. and Sh. on the buttocks with a belt while each was clothed but claimed she had done so only because the girls had disobeyed her instructions not to enter a neighbor's home. According to Mother, she had never hit Marquis, D., or Tierra with a belt.
In regard to Terrence A.'s sexual abuse of Ron. and Sh., Mother denied that either girl had ever told her about the abuse. She claimed that she first learned about it when Terrence A. was arrested. She admitted that after Terrence A.'s arrest, she told Ron. and Sh. that she did not believe them. Although she had read Department's report containing her daughters' statements about the sexual abuse, she had "reservations" whether their claims were true. She explained: "I'm still learning as we go along." She thought it possible that Ron. had fabricated the claim because a classmate had accused her of stealing an IPod. When asked "What will make you change your having reservations and start believing the girls?", she answered: "Time, as progress happens." She was unaware that Terrence A. had admitted to the police that he had engaged in improper conduct with Ron.
When asked if she and the incarcerated Terrence A. were "still a couple," Mother replied: "We are in communication with regards to Tierra only. . . . I will write from time to time regarding Tierra." She did not believe Terrence A. was a risk to any of her five children because he was incarcerated. She did not know if she would have a relationship with Terrence A. in the future. She explained: "As this case unravels at that time a decision will be made."
Mother testified that Fentris T. had not provided court-ordered child support for Marquis and D. and had "failed to provide [his sons] with the necessities of life."
Before setting forth the juvenile court's ruling, we note that paragraphs a-1 and a-2 (infliction of serious physical harm), paragraphs b-3 and b-4 (failure to protect), and paragraphs j-3 and j-4 (abuse of sibling) of the section 300 petition contained identical allegations that Mother had physically abused Sh. and Ron. by striking them with a belt. To a certain extent, Department recognized this redundancy because, in presenting argument at the jurisdictional hearing, its attorney stated: "I would submit that the b counts that are in conjunction, b-3 and b-4, should be dismissed. I believe it's more appropriately pled as an 'a.'" The juvenile court sustained the petition except for the subdivision (a) allegations (infliction of serious physical harm) which it dismissed. At the hearing, the juvenile court did not explain the reason(s) for this dismissal. Its minute order simply states: "Reason: Interest of Justice." In any event, the court declared all five children dependents of the court.
In the dispositional portion of the hearing, the court ordered continued placement of Ron. and Sh. in foster care and placed Tierra in her aunt's custody. The court ordered reunification services for Mother and required that her visits with her daughters be monitored. In regard to Marquis and D., the court ruled they could live with Mother but stated: "[I am] going to keep a close eye on this because I have to tell you I think [that Mother's testimony] stunk. . . . Her willingness to protect her children given both the detailed statements of Ron. and Sh. as well as the admissions from [Terrence A.] cause this court a whole lot of concern about whether she would be willing and able to protect her children from anything in their life. And that we have been [in this proceeding for three months] and Mother's denial to this day given everything is extraordinary. . . . I am within a hair's breath of a suitable placement order for them as well."
Mother filed an appeal to contest the juvenile court's orders. Department filed a cross-appeal to challenge the dismissal of the section 300, subdivision (a) allegations.
Thereafter, the juvenile court conducted a six-month review hearing on January 25, 2011 at which it terminated juvenile court jurisdiction over Marquis and D. (§ 364.) The court's minute order states: "The court finds that those conditions which would justify the initial assumption of jurisdiction under WIC Section 300 no longer exist and are not likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn and the court terminates jurisdiction." The record, however, contains no further explanation for this ruling.
Neither the report that Department submitted for the January 25, 2011 hearing nor a reporter's transcript of the hearing is included in the record.
DISCUSSION OF MOTHER'S APPEAL
A. Jurisdictional Findings as to Marquis and D.
Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's assertion of dependency court jurisdiction over either Sh. or Ron. or its findings that Terrence A. sexually abused them; that she failed to protect them from the abuse; and that she physically abused them. Instead, she writes: "Assuming without conceding that [Mother] physically abused Ron. and Sh. and failed to protect them from sexual abuse, there nevertheless was insufficient evidence that Marquis or D. were at substantial risk of being sexually abused [or] at risk of being seriously physically harmed." Department urges that this challenge is moot because the juvenile court subsequently terminated juvenile court jurisdiction over Marquis and D. We agree with Department.
"As a general rule, appellate courts decide only actual controversies. Thus, 'it has been said that an action which originally was based upon a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if the questions raised therein have become moot by subsequent acts or events.' [Citation.]" (In re Christina A. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1158.) In particular, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceeding moot. (In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 328-329.) "However, dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, but 'must be decided on a case-by-case basis.' [Citations.]" (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) "An issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings." (In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 769.)
In this case, the purported error—assertion of juvenile court jurisdiction over Marquis and D.—does not infect subsequent proceedings. The linchpin of the juvenile court's assertion of jurisdiction was its finding that Mother failed to protect Ron. and Sh. from Terrence A.'s predatory sexual conduct. Mother has not challenged that finding, the assertion of jurisdiction over Ron. and Sh. or any of the orders made in regard to those two girls. Thus, even were we to find that the juvenile court's assertion of jurisdiction over Marquis and D. was improper (a finding we do not make), our finding would not affect the ongoing proceeding affecting Ron. or Sh. And since, as will be explained in the next portion of this opinion, we reject Mother's claims of error in regard to Tierra, finding error as to the jurisdictional finding for her brothers would not affect Tierra's ongoing dependency proceeding.
Furthermore, Mother's contention that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional order re D. and Marquis does not pose any general issue of continuing public interest likely to recur. Instead, it is a fact-specific argument peculiar to this case. This is insufficient to avoid the bar of mootness. (Compare Laurie S. v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 195, 199 [appeal was not moot because it raised the important issue whether the dependency court has the authority to order a parent to undergo a psychological evaluation before it makes its jurisdictional finding(s)].)
To support a contrary conclusion, Mother argues: "[B]ecause the jurisdictional findings may have negative consequences for [her] in future dependency or family court proceedings, the issue is not moot." (Italics added.) We are not persuaded.
Her argument that the jurisdictional findings could negatively affect her in a future custody proceeding is far too speculative in light of Fentris T.'s (the two boys' father) failures to attend or in any way participate in the dependency proceeding, to pay court-ordered child support or to have any contact with his sons and the boys' present ages (Marquis is 18 years old and D. is 14 and 1/2 years old.)
Department conducted a due diligence search for Fentris T. and sent notice of the proceedings to his last known addresses but he never came forward.
Mother's claim that these jurisdictional findings could negatively affect her in future dependency proceedings ignores two important points. The first is that the most damning findings that could affect her in the future are the findings she has not challenged: she permitted Terrence A. to engage in ongoing sexual molestation of two of her daughters, and that she physically abused those daughters. The second point is that even if the jurisdictional findings about her two sons are raised in a future proceeding, she can correctly note that six months after the findings were made, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over them because it found that the conditions that warranted jurisdiction no longer existed. Consequently, Mother's claim that that the initial jurisdictional findings could prejudice her in further proceedings is far too speculative to persuade us that we should exercise our discretion to consider and decide her fact-specific claim.
B. Jurisdictional Finding as to Tierra
Mother next contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's assertion of dependency jurisdiction over Tierra. We disagree.
Although the core of the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding was Mother's knowledge of Terrence A.'s ongoing sexual abuse of Sh. and Ron. and her concomitant failure to protect them from this conduct, it sustained the section 300 petition alleging that Tierra came within its jurisdiction on three separate bases: failure to protect (§ 300, subd. (b)), substantial risk of sexual abuse (§ 300, subd. (d)), and substantial risk of abuse or neglect based upon abuse of a sibling (§ 300, subd. (j)). On this appeal, Mother does not specifically attack any of these findings. Instead, she argues only that there "was insufficient evidence" that Tierra was "at risk of being seriously physically harmed." This limited argument constitutes a forfeiture of any claim that the evidence does not support the findings that Terrence A. sexually molested Sh. and Ron. over an extended time period; that Mother knew about that abuse; that Mother failed to protect Sh. and Ron. from Terrence A.; and that Mother physically abused Sh. and Ron. (See In re Daniel M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 708.) Consequently, we assume the truth of those findings and limit our inquiry to whether those findings constitute substantial evidence that Tierra was at substantial risk of serious physical harm.
"In determining whether [a child] would be at risk from parental abuse or neglect, the court considers the circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. [Citations.]" (In re Maria R. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 48, 60.) We review that determination under the deferential substantial evidence rule. (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.) In this case, the record established that Terrence A.'s abuse of Sh. and Ron., pre-pubescent girls, had occurred over a four-year period. In particular, he had been molesting Sh. since she was five years old. When the juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition, Tierra was almost four years old. Given the depraved and callous nature of Terrence A.'s sexual abuse, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that Tierra, who was almost the same age as Sh. when Terrence A. had begun to abuse her, was at risk of serious physical harm, to wit, sexual abuse.
Further the juvenile court could reasonably infer that Mother would fail to protect Tierra from Terrence A. Sh. had told Mother about the abuse many years earlier, but Mother refused to believe her daughter. Ron. told her about the abuse six months before Terrence A.'s arrest but the abuse continued. When Terrence A. was arrested, Mother did not believe either of her daughters, was more concerned about preserving her relationship with Terrence A., and pressured both girls into writing letters falsely recanting their allegations against Terrence A. Department thoroughly investigated the matter and presented Mother with its reports containing detailed statements from Sh. and Ron. about the abuse as well as Terrence A.'s admission that he had touched Ron. Nonetheless, Mother testified at the jurisdictional hearing that she still had "reservations" whether the sexual abuse had occurred. In light of all these facts, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that Mother would not protect Tierra from Terrence A.'s sexual abuse. (See, e. g., In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, 197 ["Sexual abuse of one's sibling can support a juvenile court's determination that there is substantial risk to the remaining siblings."]; In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347 ["[W]here, as here, a child has been sexually abused, any younger sibling who is approaching the age at which the child was abused, may be found to be at risk of sexual abuse."]; and In re Maria R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 61 ["The record clearly establishes that [Mother] was not a protective parent. Instead of attempting to protect her children, [she] sought to protect her husband—the perpetrator of the abuse. Based on [her] denials that the girls had been sexually abused and her refusal to cooperate with the Agency, the trial court could reasonably have found that [she] failed to protect [her daughters] from sexual abuse."].)
In addition, Mother's physical abuse of Ron. and Sh. constitutes substantial evidence to support the finding that there was a substantial risk Tierra would be similarly abused by Mother. (See In re Y.G. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 109, 115-116.)
C. Removal of Tierra from Mother's Custody
Lastly, Mother attacks the juvenile court's order, made at the dispositional portion of the hearing, removing Tierra from her custody and placing her with her aunt. Mother contends that "there was insufficient evidence that Tierra would be at substantial risk of physical or emotional harm in [her] custody and that no less drastic alternatives to removal existed. As long as [Terrence A.] remained out of the home, any risk to Tierra was minimal."
Department first contends that Mother is estopped from raising this claim on appeal because she had asked the juvenile court to place Tierra with her aunt. In that regard, the relevant chronology is the following.
During the jurisdictional portion of the hearing, Mother argued that Tierra should "be dismissed from the petition in its entirety as the Department has failed to meet its burden." Before the court made its ruling, Mother's attorney stated that she would like to be heard "as to disposition only as to . . . Tierra." She explained that Tierra was then living in a foster home but that "there is an appropriate relative that's been properly assessed and I would like her to go to the relative if possible." The court took the entire matter under submission.
When proceedings resumed several days later, Department confirmed that Tierra was currently placed in a foster home but that "Department for quite a while has been asking for the court to allow [it] to place Tierra with the aunt. [¶] The Department has now approved the home of the aunt [and] we absolutely believe that she will protect Tierra from family members." Department filed a full report on the issue with the court. Tierra's attorney agreed with the suggestion, stating that the aunt is "not on the side of [Terrence A.] and is willing to comply with what's in Tierra's best interest and with court orders." The court agreed to place Tierra with her aunt.
Eight days later, the court conducted the joint jurisdictional-dispositional hearing. After sustaining the petition, it removed Tierra from Mother's custody and placed her in Department's care for suitable placement (e.g., in the aunt's home).
Read in context, the preceding facts do not support Department's argument that Mother "did not request Tierra be returned to [her] custody; rather, she asked that Tierra be placed with her aunt. . . . The juvenile court obliged. . . . Thus, mother cannot now challenge the out-of-home placement when the court made orders consistent with mother's request." Rather, the record indicates that Mother—who challenged the section 300 petition allegations regarding Tierra by moving for their dismissal—was simply asking the juvenile court to place Tierra with her aunt as opposed to leaving her in foster care. Mother never agreed that Tierra should be placed with her aunt as opposed to Mother. Thus, Mother is not estopped to assign the removal order as error. We therefore turn to the merits of the contention.
"'The governing statute, section 361, subdivision (c), is clear and specific: Even though children may be dependents of the juvenile court, they shall not be removed from the home in which they are residing at the time of the petition unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a substantial danger to the child's physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being and there are no "reasonable means" by which the child can be protected with removal. [Citation.]'" (In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 528.) But "[t]he parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child." (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136.) The juvenile court can consider a parent's past conduct as well as present circumstances. (In re Troy D. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 889, 900.) "The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interest and to fashion a dispositional order. [Citation.] On a challenge to an order removing a dependent child from his or her parent, we 'view the record in the light most favorable to the order and decide if the evidence is reasonable, credible and of solid value.' [Citation.] We draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court. [Citation.]" (In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 462-463.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's decision to remove Tierra from Mother's custody. As explained above, her two sisters were subject to horrendous sexual abuse from Terrence A. Mother knew of the abuse but did nothing to stop it. At the time of the dispositional hearing, Tierra was just slightly younger than Sh. was when Terrence A. began to abuse her. Tierra, less than four years old, was unable to protect herself and would be completely dependent upon Mother for protection. But up to and including at the joint jurisdictional-dispositional hearing, Mother refused to believe Sh. and Ron.'s claims that Terrence A. had sexually abused them and refused to terminate her relationship with Terrence A. These facts constitute substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's findings that living with Mother presented a substantial danger to Tierra because Mother would fail to protect her from Terrence A.
Mother's contrary arguments are not persuasive. First, relying upon the fact that at the time of the hearing, Terrence A. was incarcerated, Mother argues that "[s]o long as he remained out of the home, Tierra was not at risk of sexual abuse."This argument begs the question. At some point Terrence A. will be released from custody and it is clear from Mother's testimony that she has not ruled out living with him. Thus, Tierra could be at risk as soon as he is free. Next, Mother relies upon her testimony that "[i]f [Terrence A.] was released today he would not come home" and would be required to follow Department's "orders, whatever they are for Tierra." The juvenile court was not required to believe Mother's testimony on these points. In light of her refusal to protect Ron. and Sh. and her overarching concern about preserving her relationship with Terrence A., the court did not abuse its discretion in not crediting this self-serving testimony. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53 [it is the juvenile court's exclusive role to assess and decide the credibility of a witness].) Essentially, Mother is asking us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. We decline to do so.
Department's argument that Terrence A. was no longer in custody is not supported by the record.
DISCUSSION OF DEPARTMENT'S CROSS-APPEAL
Department's cross-appeal challenges the juvenile court's dismissal of the section 300, subdivision (a) allegations of the petition.
The petition contained two paragraphs alleging physical harm pursuant to section 300, subdivision (a). Paragraph a-1 alleged that Mother had struck Sh. with a belt on the head and the buttocks. Paragraph a-2 alleged that Mother had struck Ron.with a belt on the buttocks. As set forth earlier, the juvenile court dismissed these two allegations. Although it did not explain its reasons at the hearing, the juvenile court's minute order states the dismissal was in the interests of justice.
Department's attack on this order overlooks the fact that the juvenile court sustained identical physical harm allegations when it sustained the section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect) and subdivision (j) (abuse of sibling) allegations. As previously explained, paragraphs b-3 and b-4 as well as j-3 and j-4 contained verbatim the same allegations as found in paragraphs a-1 and a-2. Department partially recognized this redundancy of filing because, in presenting argument at the jurisdictional hearing, its attorney stated: "I would submit that the b counts that are in conjunction, b-3 and b-4, should be dismissed. I believe it's more appropriately pled as an 'a.'" For reasons not explained in the record, the juvenile court took the opposite approach: it dismissed the a-1 and a-2 allegations and sustained the b-3, b-4, j-3 and j-4 allegations. But since the juvenile court's ruling essentially gave Department what it had requested (albeit in a different form), Department is precluded from pursuing this issue on appeal. (See, e.g., Sperber v. Robinson (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 736, 742-743 [a party's acquiescence in or contribution to a trial court ruling constitutes a waiver of the right to assign the ruling as error on appeal] and Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 403 [when a party induces a trial court to make a particular ruling, the party is estopped to claim on appeal that the ruling was error].)
DISPOSITION
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
WILLHITE, Acting P. J. We concur: MANELLA, J. SUZUKAWA, J.