Opinion
B303476
10-20-2020
In re M.T. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. T.G., Defendant and Appellant.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Acting Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Nos. 19CCJP05090A, 19CCJP05090B, 19CCJP05090C APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Kristen Byrdsong, Judge Pro Tempore of the Juvenile Court. Affirmed. Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Acting Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
The juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over mother's three children, finding the parents neglected the children's medical needs. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)(1).) The evidence showed each child had diagnosed medical conditions or developmental delays, but the parents neglected to ensure they received consistent medical care and therapeutic services. The youngest child, two-year-old G.T., suffered a seizure after the parents canceled medical appointments to assess his genetic and neurological condition. Mother contends the evidence is insufficient to support dependency jurisdiction, and she argues the juvenile court should, at most, have ordered informal supervision under section 360, subdivision (b). There was sufficient evidence to declare the children dependents. We affirm.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Consistent with our standard of review, we state the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's findings, resolving all conflicts and drawing all reasonable inferences to uphold the court's order, if possible. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633 (R.T.).)
The family consists of mother, father, and their three children: M.T. (born September 2014), S.T. (born March 2016), and G.T. (born June 2017).
In May 2017, child protective services (CPS) in Nevada received a referral alleging mother had struck M.T., leaving the child with a black eye, and father had pulled the child's hair. After an initial contact with CPS, the family moved to Tucson, Arizona.
In June 2017, the family agreed to voluntary services with CPS in Arizona, after G.T. tested positive for opiates and barbiturates at birth. In August 2017, CPS reported the family was not following through with services, the condition of their home had deteriorated, there was dog feces on the floor, no running water, pipes and wires were exposed, and the children were extremely dirty. Arizona CPS was in the process of removing the children from the home when the family fled the state.
In September 2017, CPS in Montana removed the children from the parents due to concerns regarding mother's drug use, the family's unsanitary home, and the CPS action in Arizona. Montana CPS also received an allegation that the infant, G.T., had seizures due to epilepsy, but the parents had refused to seek treatment because they were trying to avoid protective services. The children remained in foster care for 10 months. In July 2018, Montana CPS returned the children to the parents' custody and, in November 2018, it closed the case. A report on the parents' progress noted they had largely complied with the prescribed protective orders; however, they were only in partial compliance with an order to attend all medical and dental appointments for the children.
On January 17, 2019, Dr. Kristopher Yoon at UCLA Health Services saw G.T. for an 18-month wellness check. Mother advised Dr. Yoon that G.T. had a "diagnosis of seizures due to KNCQ2 genetic defect." Dr. Yoon noted G.T. had been prescribed an antiepileptic drug regimen, but he cautioned G.T. may be "underdosed" as the baby's "last visit with [a] neurologist was nearly 2 years ago." Test results also showed the baby was developmentally delayed. Dr. Yoon placed an urgent referral to neurology, genetics, and developmental pediatrics for the baby. On February 19, 2019, Dr. Danilo Bernardo, a neurologist at UCLA Health Services, diagnosed G.T. with epilepsy.
On February 21, 2019, Dr. Yoon saw all three children. After his examinations, the doctor scheduled the children for a genetics appointment on June 10, 2019.
Dr. Yoon reported G.T. had a "medical history significant for seizures and possible genetic disorder." He wanted the baby to have an electroencephalogram to "evaluate for subclinical seizures."
Dr. Yoon evaluated M.T. for a suspected urinary tract infection. Mother also reported the child had mild autism. The doctor noted M.T. had a possible speech delay and advised the parents to make an appointment for speech therapy and neurodevelopmental therapy.
Dr. Yoon saw S.T. for an "incidentally-detected heart murmur." The doctor noted the parents had not brought the child in for an echocardiogram that had been ordered to evaluate the condition. He also noted the parents had not made an appointment with developmental pediatrics or neurodevelopmental therapy, despite mother's concerns about S.T.'s behavioral issues, autism, and fine motor skills delays.
The parents cancelled a follow up neurological appointment for G.T. that had been scheduled for April 9, 2019. On April 18, 2019, G.T. had a seizure and was admitted to the emergency department for treatment.
The family failed to show for the genetics appointment on June 10, 2019. On June 18, 2019, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) received a referral alleging each of the children had medical conditions that required consistent monitoring and treatment, but the parents regularly failed to bring the children to their respective medical appointments. The reporting party said the missed appointments had been an ongoing concern since November 2018.
The Department interviewed the parents. They confirmed G.T. suffered seizures and took medication for the condition. Mother disclosed the baby was behind on his immunization shots. She said S.T. had seen a cardiologist in Montana, but had not seen one in Los Angeles because the child's doctor cancelled four appointments. S.T. had been diagnosed with autism and the parents intended to obtain services for him. Mother reported M.T. had severe separation anxiety, a speech delay, and recurrent urinary tract infections. She also believed M.T. may have mild autism.
Mother said she was not happy with the care G.T. received at UCLA Health Services. She believed Dr. Yoon lacked experience and he had not conducted a "good assessment." She reported G.T. had another seizure in June 2019 when the family was in Iowa for a funeral. In July 2019, she took the baby to Kids and Teens medical group for a second opinion. The doctor there referred G.T. to neurology for an assessment of his seizures and to a developmental regional center for assessment of his developmental delays and mild cerebral palsy.
On July 27, 2019, the Department received another referral, this time concerning the unsanitary condition of the family's motel room. When the social worker visited the motel, she found the family's things packed in boxes in anticipation of an upcoming move to new housing. There was a slight smell of urine, apparently from the family dog peeing on a pad in the room, but it was not overpowering. Father acknowledged the children were sometimes dirty, and attributed it to difficulty bathing S.T. and M.T. due to their autism and anxiety.
On August 2, 2019, the Department received another referral about four-year-old M.T. selling jewelry at the train station. Mother acknowledged M.T. made jewelry by braiding strings together, but she claimed the family only sold it online.
The Department determined the children were at risk due to their young age and the parents' recurring failure to keep their medical and therapy appointments. It attempted to explore the option of opening a Voluntary Family Maintenance case, but the parents opposed the suggestion. The Department also noted the parents were not cooperative and frequently inhibited the Department's ability to conduct home visits.
On August 9, 2019, the Department filed a dependency petition alleging all three children had medical or developmental conditions and the parents neglected these conditions by failing to consistently take the children to their medical and therapeutic appointments. The juvenile court determined a prima case for jurisdiction had been made, noting this was the third jurisdiction where CPS had become involved with the family due to apparent neglect. The court released the children to the parents' custody.
With respect to G.T., the Department's investigation showed the parents had cancelled an appointment with the regional center on March 28, neurology appointments on April 5 and 9, a developmental therapy appointment on April 10, genetic appointments on April 22 and June 10, and a medical appointment on May 21, 2019. The baby had also qualified for Early Start Services through the regional center, but father terminated the services. During this period, G.T. suffered at least two seizures, one of which required his admission to the emergency department and an adjustment to his medication.
As for M.T., mother said the child's urinary tract infections were caused by improper wiping and had resolved. She said M.T. received speech therapy in Montana, but reported nothing about current efforts to obtain developmental services for the child.
Mother said she was waiting for S.T. to be referred for speech therapy. She claimed another doctor deemed the child's heart murmur "innocent," but did not provide documentation to support the claim. Medical records from UCLA Health Services showed a heart murmur was detected in June 2019 and the child was referred for an echocardiogram.
All three children missed medical appointments at UCLA Harbor Medical HUB in October 2019. Although UCLA offered to send a car for the family, the parents refused because they did not have car seats.
The parents claimed they missed medical appointments only because they either had to leave town for family emergencies or they were unable to take public transit due to inclement weather. Father also complained the Department had failed to provide the family with certain necessities.
On November 15, 2019, the juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The court received the Department's reports into evidence. Father and mother testified, largely repeating the reasons they had given the Department for missing the children's medical appointments. Mother also testified that she did not believe any of the children needed developmental or speech therapy.
Father's counsel argued the missed medical appointments did not support jurisdiction. He asserted the Department had offered the family inadequate support—it had failed to supply car seats or transportation funds, and it had not helped the family with appointments. He also said the parents wanted the case dismissed so they could move to Nevada, where they believed they could find work. Mother joined father's argument. Her counsel added that there was no evidence the missed medical appointments had caused the children harm.
The children's counsel asked the court to sustain the petition. She said her investigator had "confirmed," consistent with the Department's reports, that the children needed "occupational therapy, speech therapy and physical therapy." She emphasized the children were at a crucial age and she expressed concern about the parents' plan to move to Nevada. She insisted it was detrimental for the children to be moved from place to place, arguing the parent's unwillingness to establish a fixed home for their three young children reflected a lack of parental judgment: "[W]e have a family that keeps moving and is not stable. They seem to have a lack of resources and maybe a lack of understanding of the needs that their children have." The children's counsel proposed amended language to the dependency petition's allegations for each child, reading: "Due to parents' lack of resources and transportation, the parents were unable to follow through on the necessary medical appointments, which endangers the child's physical health and safety and places the child and siblings . . . at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger and medical neglect."
The Department joined with the children's counsel, reiterating that the parents' lack of resources and unwillingness to stay in one place prevented them from providing consistent medical care for the children. Counsel focused specifically on G.T., Dr. Yoon's urgent referrals for genetic and neurological consultations, the parents' cancellation of the neurological appointment, and the baby's subsequent seizure. The Department submitted on the children's counsel's proposed amended allegations.
The court sustained the petition and declared the children dependents, amending the petition's allegations to conform to the children's counsel's proposed language. On disposition, the court concluded informal supervision under section 360, subdivision (b) was inadequate given the parents' testimony that the children did not need developmental therapy. The court ordered the children to remain in the parents' custody while the parents participated in family preservation services.
Mother filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the juvenile dependency laws "is to provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently . . . being neglected, . . . and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm." (§ 300.2; see In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215 (Christopher R.).) To achieve this purpose, the third clause of section 300, subdivision (b)(1), authorizes juvenile court jurisdiction when a "child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment." (§ 300, subd. (b)(1), italics added; see R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 630.)
A jurisdictional finding under the third clause of section 300, subdivision (b)(1) requires "three elements: (1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms [such as failure to provide medical treatment]; (2) causation; and (3) 'serious physical harm or illness' to the minor, or a 'substantial risk' of such harm or illness." (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820; cf. R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 627-630 [disapproving Rocco M. formulation of first element with respect to "first clause" of § 300, subd. (b)(1), which "does not include words like 'neglectful,' 'blameworthy,' or 'unfit' to characterize a parent's conduct," but contrasting first clause with "third clause; [requiring] parent's 'willful or negligent failure . . . to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment' " (italics added)].)
"Although section 300 generally requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child. [Citation.] The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court's protection. [Citation.] A parent's ' "[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions" if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.' " (Christopher R., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1215.)
" 'In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.' " (R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
As we will discuss, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support jurisdiction because the parents' negligent failure to ensure these young and medically vulnerable children received consistent therapeutic care placed the children at risk of serious physical harm or illness. However, we must first address a deficiency in the sustained allegations, even though we ultimately conclude the deficiency is harmless.
As amended at the urging of the children's counsel, the sustained allegation for each child reads: "On multiple occasions, due to parents' lack of resources and transportation, parents were unable to follow through on necessary medical appointments which endangers the child's physical health and safety and places the child and siblings . . . at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger and medical neglect." (Italics added.) As our Supreme Court clarified in R.T., although the "first clause" of section 300, subdivision (b) "requires no more than the parent's 'failure or inability . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child' " (R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 629, italics added), under the "third clause" the parent's " 'willful or negligent failure . . . to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment' " is required (id. at p. 630, italics added). Consistent with the parental culpability requirement, our courts have consistently held that "poverty alone, even abject poverty resulting in homelessness, is not a valid basis for assertion of juvenile court jurisdiction" under the third clause of section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (In re G.S.R. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1212; accord In re P.C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 98, 104.) An allegation that the parents were merely "unable to follow through on necessary medical appointments" due to their "lack of resources and transportation" is insufficient to support jurisdiction.
The first sentence of section 300(b)(1) provides: "The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of [1] the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or [2] the willful or negligent failure of the child's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or [3] by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or [4] by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse." (See R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 626, fn. 3.)
While we highlight this deficiency for the juvenile court's and counsels' guidance, we conclude amending the petition was harmless error. Mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the allegations and, even if she had, the deficiency is "moot" at this stage. (In re John M. (2006) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123 (John M.).) " ' "[I]f the jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial evidence, the adequacy of the petition is irrelevant." ' " (Ibid. [challenge to sufficiency of amended allegation that mother had " 'limited ability' " to deal with child's disabilities was moot where substantial evidence supported jurisdiction under § 300, subd. (b)(1)].) "The only exception occurs when a parent claims a petition fails to provide actual notice of the factual allegations. Unless the alleged factual deficiencies result in a miscarriage of justice, the reversal of a jurisdictional order supported by substantial evidence is unwarranted." (In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 458-459; John M., at p. 1123.) Here, the petition originally alleged the parents' conduct amounted to "medical neglect," and the parents' testimony at the jurisdiction hearing was necessarily directed at that allegation. The decision to amend the language after all parties submitted on the evidence did not result in a miscarriage of justice. (See John M., at p. 1123 [mother did not have "prejudicially inadequate notice" where "court amended the petition at a fairly late stage in the proceedings" and, "[a]lthough the language became less specific, by the time of the hearing the petition was accompanied by several DCFS reports"].)
Substantial evidence proves the parents failed to ensure the children received consistent medical and therapeutic services, not merely due to a lack of resources and transportation, but rather, because they neglected the children's known medical needs. Neglect, as the word is commonly understood in the dependency context, is " '[t]he failure to give proper attention, supervision, or necessities . . . to a child, to such an extent that harm results or is likely to result.' " (In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 627-629, italics omitted [holding "neglect" in § 300, subd. (f) is unambiguous and not limited to criminal negligence]; R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 629.)
The record shows each of the children has a diagnosed medical or developmental condition that requires treatment, testing, or therapy. The parents were aware of these conditions before Dr. Yoon saw the children in February 2019. Indeed, they learned of G.T.'s epileptic condition nearly two years earlier, when the baby had last seen a neurologist according to Dr. Yoon's report. During that period, Montana CPS reported the parents had refused to seek treatment for G.T.'s epileptic seizures because they were trying to avoid protective services. Before Montana CPS began monitoring the family, the parents had left Nevada and Arizona in the midst of CPS investigations in those jurisdictions. When they left Arizona for Montana, CPS was in the process of removing the children from the parents' custody. The children were removed in Montana, and eventually returned after 10 months of reunification services. Even then, however, Montana CPS reported the parents had only partially complied with an order to attend all medical and dental appointments for the children.
When Dr. Yoon saw the children in February 2019, he prescribed a course of testing and therapy for each child. He had already made urgent referrals for G.T. to neurology, genetics, and developmental pediatrics to assess the baby's epilepsy and developmental delays. He also prescribed an electroencephalogram for G.T. to "evaluate for subclinical seizures" that might be going undetected, but which could impair the child's cognitive development without a proper antiepileptic drug regimen. The parents cancelled G.T.'s neurological appointment in April 2019, and two weeks later the baby had a seizure requiring emergency medical attention. After another seizure, G.T.'s medication was adjusted. Even after they received a second opinion confirming G.T. needed neurological testing and services for his developmental delays, the parents missed G.T.'s medical appointment in October 2019, and father cancelled the child's developmental services through the regional center. At the time of the November 2019 adjudication hearing, G.T. remained on a waiting list to see a neurologist.
Dr. Yoon had referred M.T. for genetic testing and advised the parents to make an appointment for speech and neurological developmental therapy, after mother reported M.T. had mild autism, a speech delay, and severe separation anxiety. The parents missed M.T.'s genetic appointment, and failed to enroll the child for speech therapy or developmental services.
Dr. Yoon had scheduled S.T. for an echocardiogram to investigate an "incidentally-detected heart murmur." The parents failed to bring the child for the scheduled test, they also missed an appointment for genetic testing, and Dr. Yoon's notes indicated they had neglected to make an appointment with developmental pediatrics, despite concerns about S.T.'s behavioral issues, autism, and fine motor skills delays. Mother insisted S.T.'s heart murmur had been deemed "innocent" by another doctor, but she failed to offer proof to support the assertion. When they were interviewed in September 2019 in advance of the adjudication hearing, the parents claimed they were still waiting to be referred to a regional center for the speech and developmental services that Dr. Yoon had urged them to obtain for S.T. in February.
The parents' neglect of G.T.'s medical needs is most disconcerting, given the baby's especially fragile condition. But the other children had significant developmental and medical concerns too, and the parents' response to their therapeutic needs, coupled with the troubling neglect of G.T.'s medical condition, was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that all three children were at risk of medical neglect under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (See John M., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1126 [where autistic child had "very limited speech," mother's "failure to ensure that he attended his specialized school" and her resistance to "procuring appropriate services for [child]," coupled with other evidence of neglect, "placed him at substantial risk of serious harm" and supported jurisdiction under § 300, subd. (b)].)
Mother argues the Department failed to show the missed medical appointments were "urgent" or that the children were harmed by any delay in receiving care. She contends the Department's approach to the case proves her point, emphasizing "[t]ransportation had long been an issue for [the] family, yet the department did not act [urgently] to ensure the parents were able to safely get their children to appointments." The contention has no merit.
The juvenile court could reasonably infer that G.T. was harmed by the parents' neglect. As discussed, when Dr. Yoon saw the baby in early 2019, he requested urgent consultations with neurology, genetics, and developmental pediatrics, noting G.T. may be "underdosed" on his antiepileptic drug regimen as his "last visit with [a] neurologist was nearly 2 years ago." The parents cancelled a neurological appointment on April 9, and on April 18, 2019, G.T. had a seizure that required emergency care. After another seizure, G.T.'s medication was adjusted.
While the other children did not experience the same acute harm, there was substantial evidence of an ongoing risk from the parents' neglect of their medical and therapeutic needs. S.T. had a potential heart condition that Dr. Yoon determined warranted further testing. The children also showed signs of autism and exhibited developmental delays that, especially given their young ages, demanded timely therapeutic intervention. However, at the adjudication hearing, the parents claimed other medical professionals had told them the conditions were not serious, but they offered nothing beyond their own testimony to substantiate the claim. And the parents maintained the children did not need developmental therapy, despite the consistent advice of medical professionals. It was the juvenile court's province to assess the credibility of the parents' claims in light of all the evidence, including their past failures to seek medical care for the children when they were trying to avoid CPS in Montana and Arizona. (See R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633; In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849, 859-860.) The parents' denials of S.T.'s heart condition, coupled with their evident apathy about securing timely therapeutic aid for the children, was sufficient to find an ongoing risk of harm from medical neglect. (See In re Petra B. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1170 [parents' testimony at adjudication hearing about efficacy of herbal remedies demonstrated an "attitude . . . and confusion about proper medical treatment [that] posed a then existing threat to [child's] well-being and justified the court's assumption of jurisdiction"].)
As for the contention that a lack of transportation was the only problem, the record disproves mother's argument. The parents missed or cancelled several of the children's medical appointments because they travelled out of state for purported family emergencies. They were able to travel from Montana to Nevada to Los Angeles to Fresno to Iowa and back to Los Angeles with no apparent problem. They also told the Department they had reduced-fare bus passes and used ride sharing services when they had the money to do so. It was only when UCLA offered to send a car to bring the children to their medical appointments that the lack of car seats (and the Department's supposed failure to secure them for the family) posed a problem for the parents' travel plans. The juvenile court could reasonably find the parents' lack of judgment, not just their lack of transportation, led to neglect of the children's medical needs, and the Department's purported lack of urgency was not a sound basis to refuse jurisdiction given the risk of harm to the children.
Finally, mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by declaring the children dependents instead of ordering informal supervision under section 360, subdivision (b). She maintains the parents were already in the process of resolving their "transportation issue" and the juvenile court "should not [have] impose[d] more than [was] required to address the protective issues." We find no abuse of discretion.
Under section 360, subdivision (b), "[i]f the court finds that the child is a person described by Section 300, it may, without adjudicating the child a dependent child of the court, order that services be provided to keep the family together and place the child and the child's parent or guardian under the supervision of the social worker" for six to 12 months. If the court orders a program of informal supervision, " 'it does not dismiss the dependency petition or otherwise set it aside. The true finding of jurisdiction remains. It is only the dispositional alternative of declaring the child a dependent that is not made.' " (In re Adam D. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1260.)
"Whether to exercise this option under section 360, subdivision (b), is a discretionary call for the juvenile court to make; it may opt to do so, but it need not. 'The court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this discretion.' [Citation.] As an appellate court, we cannot reverse the court's dispositional order absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.] A court exceeds the limits of legal discretion if its determination is arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd. The appropriate test is whether the court exceeded the bounds of reason." (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 171 (N.M.).)
As we have discussed, the parents' neglect of the children's medical needs was not solely due to a lack of transportation or poverty. As the juvenile court observed in rejecting the request for informal supervision, the most critical concern was "mother['s] and father's failure to acknowledge the children do need occupational therapy, physical therapy and speech therapy" in addition to other medical aid. The court reasonably found, from the parents' own testimony, that they needed counseling to appreciate the danger their children faced without consistent therapy and medical attention. And the court reasonably concluded that placing the family under the social worker's supervision would be inadequate, since the parents had already demonstrated their resistance to voluntarily working with the Department. Based on this record, we cannot say the juvenile court's decision to declare the children dependents exceeded the bounds of reason. (N.M., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 171.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J. We concur:
LAVIN, Acting P. J.
DHANIDINA, J.