"[T]he jurisdiction necessary to empower a court to render a valid judgment is of three types: (1) Jurisdiction of the parties; (2) jurisdiction of the general subject matter; and (3) jurisdiction of the particular matter which the judgment professes to decide." La Bellman v. Gleason Sanders, Inc., 1966 OK 183, ¶ 8, 418 P.2d 949, 953. The trial court reserved a ruling on the double jeopardy defense insofar as it related to nonpayment of child support for the period of time already covered by the judgment in the first contempt proceeding — from the date of the divorce decree through 28 April 1997.

A court's judgment must be based upon the three well known jurisdictional elements: personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and jurisdiction to render the particular judgment. La Bellman v. Gleason Sanders, Inc., 418 P.2d 949, 953 (Okla. 1966). In La Bellman we reviewed the action of the trial court in declining to vacate a default judgment.

If a judgment debtor is not properly served with the garnishment summons and does not enter a general appearance in the garnishment action, then the proceeding is a nullity. La Bellman v. Gleason Sanders, Inc., 1966 OK 183, ¶ 22, 418 P.2d 949, 955.

COCA is correct that a default judgment awarding relief at variance (in type or quantum) with that sought in the pleadings offends due process for lack of adequate notice to the defaulting party. La Bellman v. Gleason Sanders, Inc., 1966 OK 183, ¶¶ 11-13, 418 P.2d 949, 953-54; Davenport v. Jamison, 1918 OK 754, ¶ 10, 177 P. 550, 551-52. The relevant pleading before the probate court here — the final account — sought asset distribution in accordance with the will's terms but subject to outstanding personal representative's and attorney's fees.

¶ 15 Fundamental notions of due process assure that a litigant receive notice of the issues in controversy, and an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Booth v. McKnight, 2003 OK 49, ¶ 18, 70 P.3d 855, 862. Indeed, it has been recognized that "a judgment outside the scope of the issues presented for determination by the Court is of no force and effect, or coram non judice, and void at least insofar as it goes beyond the issues." Union Oil Co. of California v. Brown, 1981 OK 112, ¶ 7, 641 P.2d 1106, 1108; La Bellman v. Gleason Sanders, Inc., 1966 OK 183, ¶¶ 11-12, 418 P.2d 949, 953-954. (Citations omitted.)

"[U]nless the garnishee summons is properly served upon the defendant, or he enters a general appearance, the proceeding is a nullity." La Bellman v. Gleason Sanders, Inc., 1966 OK 183, ¶ 22, 418 P.2d 949, 955; Service Printing Co. v. Wallace, 1937 OK 54, ¶ 0(1), 64 P.2d 863. However, where the defendant/judgment debtor enters an appearance and asserts an exemption from garnishment, the judgment debtor submits to the jurisdiction of the court and waives any objection for failure of statutory notice.

¶ 12 The question thus becomes whether the entry of appearance by Appellants' counsel, Appellants' motion to set aside, and their attorney's attendance at the September 14, 2001 hearing on that motion, operated to waive lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense and validate the default judgment against them. It is well settled that assertion of nonjurisdictional as well as jurisdictional grounds in a motion to vacate judgment constitutes a general appearance and a waiver of defects in the judgment relating to jurisdiction over the person of defendant. La Bellman v. Gleason Sanders, 1966 OK 183, ¶ 9, 418 P.2d 949, 953; Gaghagen v. Lehmer, 1935 OK 66, ¶ 4, 40 P.2d 1046, 1047. "Notwithstanding this fact, it is the duty of the court to investigate and ascertain whether or not the proceedings resulting in the judgment and the judgment itself are so irregular that they would be held to be fatal upon appeal direct from the judgment, and that in case injustice has been done, and it is clear the judgment is inequitable, it should be vacated, to the end that the controversy may be heard upon the merits in the interest of justice." Griffin v. Jones, 1914 OK 615, 147 P.2d 1024, 1028.

Ct. App. 2006) (citing Johnson v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Okla. 1972) (citing La Bellman v. Gleason & Sanders, Inc., 418 P.2d 949 (Okla. 1966) )). The judgment creditor, as the garnishor, stands in the shoes of the judgment debtor to enforce a liability owed to the latter by a third party, i.e. the garnishee, and can claim no greater rights against the garnishee than the judgment debtor possesses.

Okla. Const. Art. 2 § 7 : "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."La Bellman v. Gleason & Sanders, Inc. , 1966 OK 183, 418 P.2d 949, 953 ("The jurisdiction of the trial court is limited to the particular subject matter presented by the pleadings, and any judgment which is beyond the issues framed by the pleadings and proof is in excess of the court's jurisdiction and is void.") (emphasis added). See also Oklahoma City v. Robinson , 1937 OK 16, 179 Okla. 309, 65 P.2d 531, quoting Gille v. Emmons , 58 Kan. 118, 48 P. 569, 570 (1897) in turn quoting Munday v. Vail , 34 N.J.L. 418, 422 (1871) (A judgment upon a matter outside of the issues pled and tried of record must, of necessity, be altogether arbitrary and unjust, as it concludes a point upon which the parties have not been heard.).

Okla. Const. Art. 2 § 7 : "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."La B ellman v. Gleason & Sanders, Inc., 1966 OK 183 , 418 P.2d 949 , 953 ("The jurisdiction of the trial court is limited to the particular subject matter presented by the pleadings, and any judgment which is beyond the issues framed by the pleadings and proof is in excess of the court's jurisdiction and is void.") (emphasis added). See alsoOklahoma City v. Robinson, 1937 OK 16, 179 Okla. 309, 65 P.2d 531, quoting Gille v. Emmons, 58 Kan. 118, 48 P. 569, 570 (1897) in turn quoting Munday v. Vail, 34 N.J.L. 418, 422 (1871) (A judgment upon a matter outside of the issues pled and tried of record must, of necessity, be altogether arbitrary and unjust, as it concludes a point upon which the parties have not been heard.).