Opinion
B336451
09-05-2024
In re A.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. STEPHANIE L. Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP05239)
THE COURT:
Stephanie L. (mother) appeals the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights over her two-year-old daughter A.W. After mother's appointed counsel filed an opening brief stating that he found no arguable issues (see In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835 (Phoenix H.)), mother filed a supplemental letter on her own behalf. We have evaluated the record as well as the arguments presented in mother's supplemental letter, conclude there was no error, and dismiss this appeal pursuant to Phoenix H. and In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952 (Sade C.).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
Mother and C.W. (father) started dating when they were both 17 years old. Just after turning 19 years old, Mother gave birth to A.W. in September 2021. Mother and A.W. lived with maternal grandmother (MGM); father was homeless but occasionally spent nights at MGM's home.
Mother has a history of depression and anxiety, and felt depressed for a few days after giving birth. She did not want the baby, and spanked the newborn on the bottom when the baby would not quit crying. Mother and father regularly fought with each other and police were called to intervene. On other occasions, police were called because mother engaged in violent altercations with MGM. Mother spent most of the time in her room either sleeping or arguing on the phone with father, while MGM, MGM's friend, and maternal great grandmother (MGGM) took care of A.W.
II. Procedural History A. Assertion of Dependency Jurisdiction
On November 15, 2021, the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over A.W. due to (1) mother and father's "history of engaging in violent altercations in [A.W.'s presence]," which placed A.W. at substantial risk of serious physical harm (thereby warranting the exercise of dependency jurisdiction under subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) of section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code); (2) mother and MGM's "history of engaging in violent altercations in [A.W.'s presence]," which placed A.W. at substantial risk of serious physical harm (thereby warranting the exercise of dependency jurisdiction under subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) of section 300); (3) mother's "mental and emotional problems," which also render her "incapable of providing regular care and appropriate supervision for [A.W.]" and place A.W. at substantial risk of serious physical harm (thereby warranting the exercise of jurisdiction under subdivision (b)(1) of section 300); and (4) father's "history of substance abuse," which renders him "unable to provide regular care and supervision" over A.W. and thus places A.W. at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to her "young age" (thereby warranting the exercise of jurisdiction under subdivision (b)(1) of section 300).
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
On March 2, 2022, the juvenile court dismissed the allegation of non-accidental harm to A.W. based on mother and father's domestic violence and sustained all the other counts as alleged. The court removed A.W. from mother and father's custody, and ordered the Department to provide mother and father with reunification services.
B. Reunification Period
Mother was hospitalized in early April after reporting she heard voices telling her to hurt herself. Since her hospitalization, mother did not interact with A.W. and left any visits with A.W. early. MGGM reported that "father does not care [about A.W.] and mother only cares about father . . . mother's priority is father." Mother completed parenting classes but missed some therapy appointments because she was sleeping. At the six-month review hearing in August 2022, the court expressed concern about mother's "inconsistent visitations" but ordered an additional six months of reunification services.
During the next six months of reunification, mother's therapy sessions became more problematic. Mother logged into the sessions late and sometimes while still in bed. Most of the time father was present with mother during the sessions even though the therapist asked to speak to mother alone. Mother refused the therapist's requests to ask father to leave and told the therapist she "d[id]n't feel like it," "d[id]n't want to talk about it," and wanted to go back to bed. MGM set up and monitored mother's visits with A.W. Mother needed guidance on how to feed A.W. and change her diaper. During some of the visits, mother went to the bedroom to spend time with father and left MGM and MGGM to care for A.W. At the 12-month review hearing in January 2023, the court provided mother with an opportunity to demonstrate she learned from her parenting and anger management classes, and ordered another six months of reunification services for mother.
The court terminated father's reunification services.
In the ensuing months, father stayed overnight in mother's room two or three times a week even though mother insisted that A.W. was her priority, and that her relationship with father was over. Mother fed A.W. and played with her, but left one hour into the scheduled three-hour visits because mother was tired. A.W. recognized mother but sought out MGM or MGGM for comfort. The Department recommended that mother's reunification services be terminated because (1) mother still needed guidance on how to care for a young child (as reported by the maternal relatives), (2) mother's processing disorder and sleepiness affected her ability to care for A.W., and (3) mother gave her unhealthy relationship with father priority over caring for A.W.
In May 2023, at an 18-month review hearing, the court terminated mother's reunification services, citing "serious concerns about mother's protective capacity," and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing.
C. Termination of Parental Rights
On April 8, 2024, the juvenile court held a permanency planning hearing. Mother testified and asked that her parental rights not be terminated under the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. The court found A.W. to be adoptable, identified the caregivers as her prospective adopters, and terminated mother's (and father's) parental rights. The court expressly found that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply to bar termination because, although mother had "more consistent visitation" with A.W. as "the case wore on," mother could not prove a "substantial positive emotional attachment with [A.W.], the continuation of which would benefit [A.W.]." Mother's "good and brief visits" did not overcome mother's inability to articulate in clear terms any emotional bond or attachment with A.W. The court further found that mother had not demonstrated that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to A.W.
D. Appeal
Mother filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
This court presumes a trial court judgment is correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) An appellant bears the burden of establishing error. Where an appellant does not establish an error, we may dismiss the appeal. (Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994.)
After examining the record, mother's appellate counsel filed an opening brief which raised no issues, and advised mother that she could request permission from this court to file a supplemental brief upon a showing of good cause that an arguable issue exists. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 843-844.) On July 31, 2024, mother filed a one-page letter brief consisting of one short paragraph in which she states she has a "connection" with A.W., lists the activities she partakes in with A.W. during visits and the classes she has completed or enrolled in, and promises she will "mak[e] sure [A.W.] has her essential necessities."
At a termination hearing, the juvenile court is presumptively required to terminate parental rights over any child the court finds likely to be adopted unless the parent proves that the termination of those rights will be detrimental to the child under the circumstances set forth in one of six statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)
Mother does not argue the juvenile court erred in finding A.W. was likely to be adopted or that the court should have found that any statutory exception to adoption applied. Rather, she expresses her belief that she can provide A.W. the "essential necessities" she needs. This expression in no way calls into question the correctness of the juvenile court's order. Because mother has not raised any arguable issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court's findings and orders, we dismiss mother's appeal. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 846; Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
LUI, P.J., CHAVEZ, J., HOFFSTADT, J.