Opinion
B326918 B330760
01-31-2024
In re N. V., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. S.A., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeals from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP00783 Debra Archuleta, Judge.
Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
In these consolidated appeals, S.A. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court's summary denials of Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions Mother filed in January 2023 and May 2023, each of which asked the court to change its December 2021 order to reinstate Mother's reunification services regarding her two youngest sons, N.V. (born February 2017) and N.C. (born November 2019), grant her unmonitored visits with them, or return them to her custody. Mother's petitions rely on her extensive- and mostly successful-participation in mental health services and parenting classes and the stability and insight Mother alleges she has gained thereby. She argues these are significant changes that render it in the children's best interests to grant her petitions, and that the court abused its discretion in denying her a hearing thereon. We disagree. Considered in the context of the entire dependency proceedings, the court acted within its discretion in concluding that Mother had not made a prima facie showing that the requested relief would be in the best interests of the children, now ages 6 and 4.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Mother also argues, and respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) agrees, that DCFS did not satisfy its initial duty of inquiry under California law implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA). Mother seeks, and DCFS does not oppose, that we order the court to require DCFS to fulfill this obligation by inquiring of certain extended family members. Because ICWA obligations are ongoing throughout dependency proceedings and the instant proceedings are ongoing, it is premature for us to consider whether DCFS has fulfilled its duties. We thus need not reach the issue-currently pending before the California Supreme Court-of whether the initial duty of inquiry includes questioning extended family members in the manner the parties agree it does.
Accordingly, we affirm the orders.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Family Background and Child Welfare History
Mother has five children. "The oldest child, T.A., was born to Mother when she was 13 years old....In February 2004, the juvenile court sustained a petition filed by DCFS on behalf of T.A. when the court found true the allegation that T.A. was hospitalized with severe second degree burns on his foot and an injury to his head. T.A.'s injuries were sustained when Mother was involved in a violent altercation with the grandmother while Mother was holding T.A. Eventually, the court terminated Mother's reunification services and T.A. was released to his father's custody."
Mother's second and third eldest children, N.G. and Ni.V., were the subject of an April 2012 general neglect referral leading to Mother participating in voluntary family maintenance services. In August 2012, while Mother was still receiving family maintenance services and was fully compliant with her case plan, DCFS substantiated a general neglect referral based on Mother leaving N.G. and Ni.V. unattended in a closed vehicle on a warm day. This led to dependency proceedings, based in part on the neglect referral and in part on Mother having mental health conditions for which she had been prescribed psychotropic medication and psychiatrically hospitalized. The court ultimately released N.G. to his father's sole custody and terminated Mother's parental rights to Ni.V., who was adopted in 2016.
Mother has a criminal history that includes an arrest for child cruelty in 2013 (in connection with her leaving N.G. and Ni.V. in a vehicle unattended) and two different arrests for domestic violence and driving under the influence in 2013.
Only Mother's two youngest children, N.V. and N.C., are the subject of the instant appeal and dependency proceedings below.
B. Section 300 Petition and Disposition
In August 2020, the juvenile court sustained, as amended, a section 300 petition seeking to declare N.V. and N.C. (collectively, the children or the boys) dependents of the court based on a history of domestic violence between Mother and a male companion and between Mother and the children's father, as well as on Mother permitting these men to have access to the children.
At the disposition phase, the court considered DCFS reports reflecting that Mother had "initially identified the grandmother (i.e., her own mother) as her support system, but later recanted and named two other relatives. She stated her plan was to have the baby 'under her [own] care [for] "some time"' and then transfer his care to the grandmother. [¶] With regard to the grandmother, Mother stated she (Mother) had been physically abused by the grandmother, who had inflicted a head injury to her that rendered her disabled and unable to work. Mother also admitted that she was physically and emotionally abused by her former husband, C.G., father of her son N.G. Mother denied having any conflict with anyone residing at her home and that, while she had a DCFS case history primarily related to domestic violence, she declined to provide further details as she did not understand why that subject was relevant.... [¶] In regard to her mental health, Mother reported having 'nightmares' related to being raped, and disclosed that she had been diagnosed with depression and 'something else' she could not recall. She received therapy or counseling once a month but did not take any psychotropic medication. Mother's on-demand drug test was negative for all substances."
"Mother testified that she [had] voluntarily participated in and completed a parenting program, maintained counseling sessions, attended domestic violence classes, and participated in a domestic violence support group. At the conclusion of her testimony, Mother's counsel asked the court to return the children to Mother or, alternatively, to grant Mother unmonitored visits. Counsel for the children joined counsel for DCFS in arguing that Mother needed more domestic violence counseling before releasing the children to her." The court made the necessary detriment findings and removed the children from Mother. "The court recognized Mother's efforts in her educational programs, but found her insight regarding domestic violence was still limited and it would be premature to release her young sons to her. The court ordered Mother to undergo a psychiatric evaluation, to continue to attend domestic violence support group sessions, and to receive individual counseling. The court granted her monitored visits, giving DCFS authorization to liberalize the visits."
Mother appealed, and in an unpublished opinion, we affirmed the orders removing the children from Mother's custody and restricting her to monitored visits.
In re N.V. et al. (Mar. 1, 2021, B307546) [nonpub. opn.]. Many of the facts we recite in the Factual Background ante, part B, are from the factual summary in that opinion.
C. Reunification Period
1. Mother's Initial Progress and Participation in Services
Almost a year later, in a January 2021 status report, DCFS reported Mother had completed all court-ordered services, including a parenting program and domestic violence program, and was participating in individual therapy. Mother completed the court-ordered psychiatric evaluation, although she did not authorize release of the evaluation to DCFS.
DCFS further reported Mother was "putting into practice the skills that she had obtained from her resources and completed services" and that she "independently [took] the initiative to research and complete an additional parenting class in [an] effort to reinforce her skills." The report described how Mother initially "struggled to use her visits to bond with . . . N.V," who has a speech delay and was at the time nonverbal, and to visit consistently with the children. Around September 2020, however, Mother became receptive to DCFS suggestions to address these concerns, and began "approach[ing] her visits determined to demonstrate her appropriate parenting style[,]" "show[ing] a noticeable effort to maintain regular weekly visits with both children" and "that bonding with her children is goal." DCFS reported that, since this change, Mother was consistent and punctual with visits, brought "age[-]appropriate toys and snacks" and "demonstrate[ed] a caring and nurturing attitude to both children." Mother also "participated in every Child Family Team [(CFT)] meeting and . . . attended [N.V.'s] first school [individualized education plan] IEP [meeting]."
The term "individualized education program" or "individualized education plan" "means a written statement for each child with a disability developed, reviewed, and revised" on a regular basis by a team of the child's educators and parents or caregivers that sets forth the accommodations and special education services necessary for children with certain recognized disabilities to receive a free and appropriate public education. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1401; County of Los Angeles v. Smith (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 500, 508.) Federal law "requires a school district to meet with a parent in order to formulate an individualized education plan." (County of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 509.)
In late January 2021, DCFS liberalized Mother's visits to allow overnight and unmonitored visits. At the conclusion of the applicable statutory reunification period in February 2021, the court continued services for Mother.
2. Mother's Visitation Reverted to Monitored
In March 2021, however, DCFS began reporting concerns regarding Mother's time with the children. Mother had returned N.C. from a February 2021 overnight visit with a severe diaper rash covering his scrotum and entire buttocks, as well as unexplained markings on his arms and buttocks. In April 2021, Mother refused to comply with the treatment plan provided by DCFS for N.C. 's cough and eczema, and only complied when her therapist intervened. N.V.'s teacher reported that during virtual class, Mother was often seen on camera with inappropriate body parts exposed, and on multiple occasions there was an unknown man seen in Mother's home. The teacher had also witnessed N.V. unsupervised with tools in his hand, and further reported that N.V. seemed exhausted and had difficulty staying awake during class.
During an unannounced visit to Mother's home in April 2021, the social worker observed Mother putting a bottle of liquor into her kitchen trash can while N.C. was in his crib with no diaper on and tears running down his face. The social worker also observed an unknown female sleeping face down on the floor in one of the bedrooms, where she remained for the duration of the DCFS visit. In the master bedroom, the social worker observed an empty wine bottle next to the bed, which Mother stated belonged to the sleeping "friend." The social worker observed a bucket of tools in the laundry room within the children's reach. On April 15, 2021, Mother agreed to submit to an on-demand drug and alcohol test, but she failed to follow through. Mother was repeatedly observed using a car seat incorrectly. On June 17, 2021, DCFS reverted Mother's visits back to monitored.
3. Mother's Visits Become Inconsistent and DCFS Recommends Terminating Services
Also in June 2021, the court continued Mother's reunification services for another six months. During this extended reunification period, Mother's monitored visits became inconsistent, and she had difficulty staying awake and ensuring that hazards were out of the children's reach during visits. She was observed sleeping during multiple visits.
In July 2021, DCFS observed ashes and broken glass on the desk of N.V.'s bedroom. Mother continued to use a car seat incorrectly after having been instructed numerous times on its proper use and receiving a certificate attesting to her having been educated on proper car seat installation by a certified instructor. Mother missed multiple CFT meetings. During meetings with her service providers, Mother continued to get upset and defensive instead of being receptive to their guidance. Mother was unable to identify anyone who could provide Mother support with caring for the children.
DCFS reports regarding this period also acknowledge that Mother had "made more effort to engage with the children," had gotten a job, and played well with the children, who were happy to see Mother during visits. DCFS nevertheless recommended terminating services for Mother. DCFS expressed concern Mother "[did] not have [the] social or emotional competence . . . to support the . . . well[-]being of her children" and continued to deny that her past behavior had traumatized them or that family therapy could help them work through that trauma.
As of December 2021, Mother still had not executed the necessary paperwork for DCFS to obtain her psychiatric evaluation. A December 3, 2021 letter filed with the court did confirm that "she had a full psychiatric evaluation [at Women's Community Reintegration Program] in March 2020 and has displayed full and meaningful participation on a monthly basis for medication management visits . . . [¶] . . . [and] receives ongoing treatment for her diagnosis of post[-]traumatic stress disorder, chronic, complex variant." (Capitalization omitted.) The letter further confirmed Mother was "adherent with [her psychiatric] medication . . . regimen."
D. Termination of Reunification Services
Almost two years after the children had first been detained, at a review hearing on December 7, 2021, the court agreed with DCFS and the children's counsel and terminated Mother's reunification services. Although Mother had completed all court-ordered services, which included two parenting programs, individual therapy, and a domestic violence program, her "progress . . . toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement . . . [was] fair at best." The court found that, despite receiving almost two years of services, Mother still lacked the capacity to ensure the safety of her "very young" children (then ages 2 and 4), continued to be inconsistent with visits, and did not have a sufficient support system.
The court scheduled a section 366.26 hearing, which it later continued several times, in part based on difficulties finding an adoptive family for the boys after their current caregivers indicated they were no longer interested in adoption.
E. Mother's January 2023 Section 388 Petitions
1. Petitions and Supporting Documentation
On January 24, 2023, Mother filed two section 388 petitions, one for each child, asking that reunification services be restored, that the children be returned to her custody, or that her visits be liberalized to unmonitored. Mother's petitions alleged that her progress in various programs and services, resulting improvements in her mental health, and her regular continuing visits with the children constituted changed circumstances justifying the requested relief.
Mother attached several letters from the Women's Community Reintegration Program (WCRP) and a January 22, 2022 letter from the Department of Mental Health. These letters described how Mother had consistently participated in regular counseling sessions with the WCRP beginning in March 2015, and in psychiatric and medication management services beginning in May 2020. They attested to Mother having demonstrated an improved ability to cope with psychological stressors, and making so much progress that her WCRP treatment team recommended transitioning her to the Women's Wellbeing Center, which offered a lower level of care tailored for clients who "have demonstrated long term mental health stability."
Letters from providers also supported that Mother began the program at the Women's Wellbeing Center in November 2022. As part of the program, Mother was required to attend monthly case-management sessions, and biweekly individual therapy sessions. As of January 20, 2023, Mother had attended three therapy sessions, one case management session, and one medication session.
Also attached to the petition were progress reports and a certificate indicating that as of August 31, 2022, Mother had completed 11 hours of a 16-hour parenting program and her own declaration. The declaration described the quality of her visits with the children, her recognition of and resolve to address the trauma they experienced as a result of her prior behavior, and her commitment to her own mental health and to being a strong, loving parent. Mother declared that her Women's Wellbeing Center counselor could provide the support system the court had previously indicated was lacking because "[w]hen [she is] experiencing difficult or overwhelming emotions, [she] can call [her] counselor to process [her] emotions and discuss how to respond." She further declared: "I believe my efforts to participate in this crucial and intensive therapy displays my dedication not only to my own improved well[-]being, but also the well[-]being and stability of my [sons'] lives."
Also attached to the petition were certificates reflecting that Mother completed parenting and domestic violence programs in 2020-that is, before reunification services were terminated.
2. 2022 DCFS Reports Before the Court in Assessing the Petitions
At the time Mother filed her January 2023 petitions, the court had before it not just the documents supporting the petition, but also the entire case record. This record included the DCFS reports summarized above, as well as several other DCFS reports from the year between the termination of Mother's reunification services and her section 388 petitions.
According to a March 2022 report, Mother was having regular and appropriate visits with the children, during which they appeared bonded and loving with Mother, and Mother engaged in age-appropriate interactions. DCFS further reported that Mother still lacked any reliable system of support to assist her with the children and failed to attend several IEP meetings for N.V., who continued to struggle with speech delays. DCFS reported concerns that Mother did not understand N.V.'s special needs.
According to a May 2022 report, Mother's contact with the children had become inconsistent. Despite DCFS changing the regular weekly visit day at Mother's request, Mother frequently cancelled, explaining she was "ill, ha[d] a sprain[ed] ankle, hurt knee or a sick child. Often times, these [were] the reasons why [Mother] [stated she] [could not] call the children on the phone" as well. The boys' caregiver reported that when Mother cancelled in person and virtual visits, N.V. would "defecate[ ] himself while sleeping."
According to a September 22, 2022 report, Mother's visits with the children continued to be "inconsistent" and involved "minimal interaction . . . as [M]other is reported to be on a laptop while the children played."
According to a November 2022 report, Mother "continue[d] to have inconsistent contact" with the children, confirming visits and then cancelling the day of the visits. Mother, however, did consistently check on the children's well-being via texts with the caregivers. DCFS further reported that Mother "continue[d] to demonstrate challenges with having consistent and routine contact" in that she frequently gave the children a tablet to watch during visits while she used her cell phone, rather than interacting with them.
Throughout 2022, DCFS continued to recommend adoption as the permanent plan for the children, although the children's caregivers indicated that they were not willing to provide an adoptive home for the boys, and a potential adoptive placement DCFS identified in November 2022 ultimately fell through in early 2023. DCFS reported continued efforts to find an adoptive placement.
3. The Court's Ruling
On January 26, 2023, the juvenile court denied Mother's January 2023 petitions without a hearing, finding that Mother failed to demonstrate a prima facie showing that her circumstances had changed or her requests were in the children's best interests. On February 7, 2023, Mother timely appealed the denials.
F. Mother's May 2023 Section 388 Petitions
On May 25, 2023, Mother again filed two section 388 petitions, one for each child, seeking the same relief as had her January 2023 petitions and alleging the same bases justifying that relief, updated to include additional parenting classes and continuing mental health services in which Mother had participated since filing her earlier petitions. Mother again included her declaration, which largely mirrored her earlier declaration, but added a description of her parenting courses as "allow[ing] [her] to address the mistakes [she] made in the past and encourage[ing] [her] to rework [her] sense of identity as a parent-who [she] would like to be from here on out and who [she] will be in the future for [her] sons." According to the supporting documents attached to the petition, Mother continued to see a therapist twice a month and a psychiatrist once a month. She provided recent progress letters covering the new time frame from the Department of Mental Health and her mental health service providers, all attesting to her continuing participation and progress in counseling and psychiatric treatment. Mother provided a monitor's letter stating that the monitor had monitored a visit between Mother and the children on May 14, 2023, that Mother had been "caring" and "loving" with the children and met their needs, and that the monitor had not observed any "hazards" during the visit. Finally, the petition attached letters from friends and family attesting to Mother's love for her children and that she is a good mother. DCFS reports filed between the filing of Mother's two sets of section 388 petitions did not provide additional detail regarding Mother's visits or services, and instead focused on efforts to secure the boys a prospective adoptive placement in advance of the upcoming section 366.26 hearing. As of a May 5, 2023 report, DCFS was still looking for a prospective adoptive family.
In response to Mother's arguments that one of the factors weighing in favor of granting her petitions was that, at the time the petitions were denied, the boys did not have a potential adoptive home, DCFS filed with this court a motion to accept additional evidence pertaining to the current status of DCFS efforts to find an adoptive placement for the boys. We review the court's denial of Mother's petitions based on the evidence and circumstances before it at the time it denied them. We therefore deny DCFS's motion.
On June 1, 2023, the court summarily denied Mother's second set of section 388 petitions. Mother timely appealed those denials, and we consolidated that appeal with her appeal from the January 2023 petition denials.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 388 Petitions
On appeal, Mother argues the court erred in denying her hearings on her section 388 petitions.
"A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 316-317.) A parent need only make a prima facie showing of these elements to trigger the right to a hearing on a section 388 petition and the petition should be liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consider the parent's request. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309-310.) [¶] However, if the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child, the court need not order a hearing on the petition. (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 592-594; In re Jamika W. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1450-1451.)" (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806 (Zachary G.).) We review a court's decision for an abuse of discretion. (In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1079.) "A proper exercise of discretion is '" . . . an impartial discretion, guided and controlled by fixed legal principles, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law, and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice."' [Citation.] Exercises of discretion must be' "grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue." '" (People v. Diaz (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 362, 377.) Because the two sets of petitions rely on effectively the same evidence and were filed within four months of each other, our analysis below applies to the denial of both sets of petitions.
The prima facie requirement necessitating a section 388 hearing "is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition." (Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.) Here, even if we accept as true the developments alleged in Mother's petitions and reflected in the documentation supporting those petitions, and even assuming these developments reflect a sufficient change in circumstances under section 388 (Ansley v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477, 485 [under section 388, "the change of circumstances or new evidence must be of such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged prior order"]), the court still would have been acting within the scope of its discretion to conclude that these developments did not render the requested relief in the children's best interests.
Mother claims her progress required the court to change its December 2021 order. That order includes the court's finding that it would not be in the children's best interests to continue Mother's reunification services, return them to her care, or permit her unmonitored visits, even though Mother had completed the required domestic violence and parenting programming, additional parenting classes, and multiple years of counseling. The court reasoned that, these efforts notwithstanding, she still lacked a support system, failed to consistently visit with the children, continued to struggle with basic safety issues, and lacked insight into her past behavior.
Even accepting, as we must for the purposes of review, that Mother can show she has made significant progress as a result of her continuing efforts and is genuinely committed to maintaining more stability in her life and her sons' lives, this does not show error in the juvenile court's denial of her section 388 petitions. First, her petitions do not explain how her progress in programs has improved or changed her actual interactions with the children, nor does her record of visits since the court's December 2021 order reflect an overall improvement in those interactions. In the year leading up to Mother filing her section 388 petitions, DCFS reported that many of the same issues persisted-most notably, that Mother continued to have inconsistent visits with the children.
Second, in determining whether circumstances have changed, a court has to consider the entire record before it. The record here reflects that Mother had success learning from services in the past-initially doing so well that she obtained unmonitored visits. The record, however, also reflects this success was short lived, and the court later reinstated monitored visitation. Similarly, Mother was also in full compliance with a voluntary family maintenance services case plan at the time dependency proceedings regarding her two older children, N.G. and Ni.V., commenced- proceedings that ended in the father receiving sole custody of one child and the termination of Mother's parental rights to another. Based on the entire record, Mother's compliance with and even progress in services is thus not alone a predictor of longstanding improvement in her interactions with her children. The court acted within its discretion in concluding the showing Mother made in support of her petitions was insufficient to demonstrate that reinstating reunification services would be in the children's best interests. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitions. (See Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 807 ["a court need not order a hearing if this [best interests] element is absent from the showing made by the petition"]; accord, In re Josiah S (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403, 419.)
Mother also argues that the lack of a prospective adoptive home for the boys at the time Mother filed her petitions is a basis on which to conclude that further reunification services for Mother would be in the children's best interests. Even accepting that a change in the boys' prospects of being adopted constitutes a change bearing on whether it would be in their best interests to try and reunify with Mother, this is insufficient to render unreasonable the court's continuing concerns about the boys' contact with Mother, as set forth above.
B. ICWA
When DCFS files a petition under section 300 concerning a child, it has "an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether [the] child . . . is or may be an Indian child" within the meaning of ICWA. (§ 224.2, subd. (a); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9.) "This duty to inquire consists of two phases-the duty of initial inquiry and the duty of further inquiry." (In re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 566.)
1. Relevant Facts
Mother and maternal grandmother denied that the children had Indian ancestry. Mother signed a parental notification of Indian ancestry form (Judicial Council Forms, form ICWA-020) (ICWA-020 form) reporting that she did not have Indian ancestry as far as she knew. On February 10, 2020, the juvenile court asked Mother if she had Native American ancestry and Mother responded that she did not know what that meant and was unfamiliar with the terms" 'Native American'" and" 'Indian American,'" but that no one had ever told her she had Native American ancestry. Mother also did not think that N.C. 's father had Native American ancestry. The court found: "[G]iven that the mother has testified she's not familiar with the concept of a Native American tribe or anything to that sort, I think it's safe to say she has no reason to know that she has any Native American ancestry."
The detention report repeated the information contained in the ICWA-020 form and also stated that the children's fathers were not questioned about possible Indian ancestry. Thereafter, the DCFS reports stated ICWA was not applicable.
DCFS had contact with four maternal relatives, but there is no indication they were asked if the children were or could be Indian children. These individuals included a maternal great grandmother, a maternal uncle, and two maternal cousins.
2. Mother's ICWA Argument Is Premature
Mother argues that DCFS failed to satisfy its initial duty of inquiry under ICWA and implementing California law by failing to inquire of these extended relatives. (See § 224.2, subd. (b).) DCFS agrees and "does not oppose a remand with direction to the juvenile court to ensure DCFS asks the maternal relatives identified in Mother's opening brief." Given that dependency proceedings are ongoing, and given DCFS's stated view that it believes it is required to inquire of the identified additional extended family members-and thus presumably intends to do so (if it has not already)-it is unclear what an order from the juvenile court to this effect would accomplish. "[A]ny perceived deficiencies with ICWA inquiry and noticing may still be resolved during the normal course of the ongoing dependency proceedings" (J.J. v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 447, 461), because "ICWA-related obligations are continuing duties" and" ICWA-related findings are subject to change." (In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635, 639, fn. 2; see In re S.H. (2002) 82 Cal.App.5th 166, 179 ["[s]o long as proceedings are ongoing and all parties recognize the continuing duty of ICWA inquiry, both [DCFS] and the juvenile court have an adequate opportunity to fulfill those statutory duties"].) For these reasons, we consider Mother's ICWA argument to be premature. (See J.J. v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 461 [concluding ICWA issue not yet ripe for review where record suggested inquiry was ongoing].) Accordingly, we do not reach the issue of whether DCFS fulfilled its initial duty of inquiry, the scope of which is the subject of disagreement among the Courts of Appeal and is currently being considered by our state Supreme Court. (See, e.g., In re Andres R. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 828, 853, review granted Nov. 15, 2023, S282054 &In re C.L. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 377, 386.)
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
We concur: BENDIX, J. WEINGART, J.