Opinion
B314450
03-15-2022
In re C.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. M.W., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 20CCJP06842, Hernan D. Vera, Judge. Affirmed.
Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
EDMON, P.J.
M.W. (mother) challenges orders of the juvenile court denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and terminating her parental rights as to her daughter C.Mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her section 388 petition because she demonstrated changed circumstances and continuing her reunification services was in C.'s best interests. Mother also contends the juvenile court erred by terminating her parental rights because the beneficial parental relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) applied. We find no abuse of discretion, and thus we will affirm.
All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
C.'s father waived reunification services and is not a party to this appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Detention and petition.
C. was born in March 2019. In September 2019, the Yolo County Health and Human Services Agency (HHSA) received a report that mother had been placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold because she was having thoughts of killing five-month-old C. A children's social worker (CSW) interviewed mother, who said she had been having thoughts about hurting C. since her birth. The thoughts were increasing in frequency as C. became more physically demanding. Mother called law enforcement because she had not been able to get the thoughts out of her head. The following day, mother said she had thoughts of wanting to harm herself.
Mother reported that she and C.'s father had dated very briefly before she got pregnant. Father wanted mother to have an abortion, but she refused. He had obtained no-contact and restraining orders against her after she contacted him more than 50 times and repeatedly showed up at his workplace. Father was not available to care for C. and did not want to be involved in her life. C. therefore was detained from her parents and placed in foster care.
HHSA filed a juvenile dependency petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) in September 2019. As subsequently amended, the petition alleged that mother had untreated mental health issues that impeded her ability to safely care for five-month-old C. The juvenile court ordered C. detained.
B. Jurisdiction and disposition.
Mother was released from the involuntary psychiatric hold in late September. Her therapist reported that she had been diagnosed with an adjustment disorder but was not taking any medication.
In the November 2019 jurisdiction/disposition report, HHSA reported that mother's behavior remained erratic and she was not adequately addressing her mental health needs. The agency recommended that mother participate in therapy and complete a medication assessment, and that mother's visits with C. be supervised until her mental health stabilized.
On November 27, 2019, the juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petition as amended, ordered C. removed from her parents, and set a 60-day review hearing. Mother was granted 10 hours of supervised visitation per week and ordered to participate in individual counseling, anger management, and parenting classes.
C. Six-month review (May 2020).
In January 2020, HHSA reported that C. was doing well in her foster home. Mother visited C. regularly, but she had not participated in services or demonstrated any change in behavior since the case began. HHSA therefore recommended that C. remain in foster care and that mother participate in an attachment and bonding group with C. before being permitted overnight visits.
By May 2020, mother had participated in some half-hour therapy sessions and had begun parenting education classes, but had not completed them. Mother and C. had begun having virtual visits due to the pandemic. HHSA continued to recommend that mother's visits remain supervised until mother completed a psychological evaluation and worked on her mental health issues, noting that mother "has a limited support system and has gained very little insight as to the issues that led to Child Welfare involvement. She continues to blame and argue with the assigned social worker about every item presented and continues to show that she cannot be redirected or follow instructions during visitation." Further, HHSA "is concerned that even though mother is participating in therapy and [parenting classes], the minimal services she is in are not adequately addressing the issues which led to Agency intervention and she is not demonstrating that she has acquired adequate coping skills to reduce the risk of harm to her child. Mother's denial that there is a risk[, ] and [her] frustration with the Agency's worries indicates a lack of insight into the severity of the risk that her mental health symptoms have posed to her child."
At the May 2020 six-month review hearing, the juvenile court found mother's progress to be "adequate" and ordered an additional six months of reunification services.
D. Psychological evaluation (June 2020).
In June 2020, Scripps Psychological Associates conducted a psychological evaluation of mother. The report of that evaluation stated as follows:
Mother reported that she experienced depression during her pregnancy and after C.'s birth, but her symptoms had substantially resolved and she wished to have C. returned to her care. She had sought out counseling during her pregnancy and had been prescribed antidepression medication, but she had not taken it out of concern that it could have harmful effects on her then unborn child. She denied ever having had thoughts of harming C., saying that she had told law enforcement that she was concerned her depression might compromise her ability to care for her child.
Mother reported that she currently was seeing a therapist and was taking an antidepressant (Zoloft). She was not under the care of a psychiatrist. On her own, mother had increased her dosage of Zoloft from 50 milligrams to 150 milligrams. She was not participating in any other services. She had been referred to an online parenting class, but she had stopped attending because she had already read the materials and did not find them helpful. She had not had face-to-face visits with C. in three months because of the Covid-19 pandemic, but she was having some visits remotely.
Mother reported not having been close with her own mother, who died when mother was about 13 years old, and not having known her father. She lived with her older sisters until she graduated high school. She recalled often being angry as a child. She currently had somewhat regular contact with only one of her three older sisters, and she was not in touch with any other family members.
Mother said she became depressed after C.'s father refused to be involved with the pregnancy in any way. She moved back to Southern California before C.'s birth in hopes of moving in with her aunt, but her aunt did not support that plan and so mother moved in with a friend. Mother continued suffering from depression during the first six months of C.'s life.
The psychologist diagnosed mother with an "[a]djustment [d]isorder with a mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct." Although mother's acute depressive symptoms had resolved, she "continued to exhibit a pattern of impulsive behavior and evidence of a deficit in coping skills that suggests the presence of more longstanding characterological issues that would be expected to be rather resistant to change. While I did not assign her a diagnosis for full-blown personality disorder, her behavior reflects the presence of some prominent dysfunctional personality attributes that are likely to 'heat up' under conditions of increased psychosocial stress and are thought to merit psychotherapeutic intervention."
Based on this evaluation, the psychologist recommended that mother engage in the following: (1) individual counseling or psychotherapy with a therapist experienced at working with patients who exhibit prominent borderline personality traits and conversant with dialectical behavior therapy; (2) group counseling; (3) parenting education or counseling that focuses specifically on issues related to parent-child bonding and attachment; (4) anger management classes; (5) a psychiatric evaluation; and (6) regular meetings with a psychiatric specialist.
E. 12-Month Review (November 2020).
In October 2020, mother told HHSA that she intended to move to Los Angeles County and she requested that C. be placed with a member of her family. Mother's great aunt, Ms. B., agreed to foster C., and HHSA said the case would be transferred to Los Angeles once mother moved there.
In November 2020, mother's therapist reported that mother had attended 19 sessions and participated positively. She had begun attending parenting classes virtually in May 2020, but was reported to be" 'present but not participating.'" The parenting coach noted that mother did not regularly turn in homework, often lay down in bed during class sessions, and frequently did not have her technology sufficiently charged to participate for the full class time. Thus, while mother had joined some classes, she had "not completed the classes fully and service providers report a clear lack of engagement."
Mother had enrolled in a remote anger management class but, as with her parenting class, often arrived late, left early, or failed to have her technology fully charged. The anger management coach reported that mother often "stretches the truth," " 'hijacks' the class," and "intentionally tries to pit other classmates against each other." Further, mother was expelled from the anger management class for being disruptive, talking out of turn, and getting a body piercing during class.
HHSA reported that mother's visits with C. were overwhelmingly positive. However, mother continued to have a limited support system and had gained very little insight into the issues that led to the agency's involvement. She recently had ceased taking her medication.
HHSA noted that when mother did not receive the information she wanted, she "attempt[s] [to] triangulate service providers and the Agency against one another and begins to engage in attention seeking behavior. The mother appears to need to be the center of attention in group like settings such as parenting classes or anger management and when things do not go her way she demonstrates with the above mentioned behaviors as indicated by the parenting and anger management coaches. It has further been reported that mother does not take her Court ordered services seriously. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . The agency feels that these are serious red flags and warnings for how the mother would plan and prioritize for safety with regards to the minor. Because the mother engages in such behaviors when she becomes upset or does not get the outcome she wants, the Agency fears that if presented with a similar set of circumstances with regards to her child that the mother may not . . . prioritize her child's needs first . . . . A growing child requires a parent to be vigilant, patient, understanding, have the energy to perform the role and plan ahead of the child. While the mother shows she can do this for a small amount of time, the fact that she can't participate or act appropriately in a group setting for an hour's time is alarming."
As a result, the agency opined that it would be unsafe for C. to return home to mother. It recommended that C. remain in foster care and that mother continue to receive reunification services, noting that it was "hopeful that the mother will begin to learn and have greater insight into why this case was open and better safe parenting and coping skills."
At the November 2020 twelve-month review hearing, the court ordered reunification services to be continued for six months.
F. Transfer to Los Angeles County.
C. was placed with her maternal great aunt and uncle, Mr. and Mrs. B. (caregivers), in Pomona in November 2020, and mother moved to Los Angeles in early December 2020. In late December 2020, the Yolo County juvenile court ordered the family's dependency case transferred to Los Angeles County, under the supervision of Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
G. 18-Month Review (April 2021).
C.'s new caregiver expressed concern about her development and had her evaluated by the Regional Center. C. was found to be developmentally delayed and began receiving services through the Regional Center. She was reported to have bonded with her caregivers, who had created a loving environment for her, and to turn to them for comfort. The caregivers expressed interest in adopting C. if mother failed to reunify with her.
Mother visited C. regularly, and her visitation initially was increased to 18 hours per week with overnight visits. However, visitation was soon decreased to 10 hours per week "due to [mother's] inappropriate behavior, inability to respond appropriately to feedback, and threats to the caregivers. The caregivers . . . asked to no longer monitor visitation due to their concern around [mother's behavior] and their safety." As of March, mother was not visiting for the full ten hours per week, indicating that she would prefer shorter visits while she stabilized herself. DCFS reported that C. appeared happy to see mother, smiling and calling out to her.
The report does not provide any detail about these incidents.
In April 2021, mother reported that she had left the Salvation Army Emergency Shelter and was living in her car. Also in April, mother insisted that a visit occur at the beach and threatened to" 'cause a scene'" at DCFS's office if that did not occur. Ultimately, she agreed to visit with C. at a park near the caregivers' home. At the end of the visit, it took mother 20 minutes to return C. to her caregiver, and mother created conflict with the caregiver while holding C., causing C. to cry. Ultimately, the caregiver had to threaten to call law enforcement to get mother to return C. Based on this incident, DCFS said it "continues to have concerns with [mother's] ability to manage her emotions, specifically in the child's presence. . . . [Mother] has continued to show and express that even seeing the caregiver, Ms. [B.], 'emotionally triggers' her. Each week this CSW continues to attempt to facilitate visitation, however each week [mother] has concerns ranging from asking visitation be at a church in North Hollywood where a new friend of hers is a member, to most recently needing the visit to occur at the beach. [Mother] continues to show a pattern of being unable to appropriately manage her emotions. The Department's concerns around [mother's] borderline personality traits that can 'heat up' in times of distress continue to stay relevant, as shown in the most recent visitation issue."
In its 18-month status review report, DCFS noted that mother had shown a willingness to participate in services and a desire to reunify with C. However, she had not been fully compliant with her case plan, had created conflict with C.'s caregivers, did not have stable housing, did not understand the severity of C.'s delays, and had not addressed her own borderline personality traits. Further, DCFS expressed concern that mother lacked the ability to appropriately nurture C. and meet her needs. DCFS thus urged that it would be detrimental for C. to be returned to mother's care, and it recommended that her reunification services be terminated.
At the 18-month review hearing on April 15, 2021, the court found that the issues that brought the family to the attention of DCFS had not been fully addressed and that it would be detrimental to return C. to mother. The court therefore terminated mother's reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
H. Mother's section 388 petition.
Mother filed a section 388 petition to change court order on July 29, 2021 requesting that C. be returned to her care or, in the alternative, that her reunification services be reinstated. In support, mother stated that she had enrolled in a 12-week anger management program and received a psychological evaluation from a privately retained clinical/forensic psychologist. She attached the psychologist's July 2021 report, which concluded that mother "does not exhibit symptoms of any serious or significant psychological/emotional and/or personality issues that get in the way of her overall functioning." Mother believed it would be in C.'s best interests to be returned to her care because "children raised by their biological parents experience better lifelong outcomes compared to children who do not. Mother is confident that she can provide her daughter with the love and support necessary for her to have a positive future. Mother maintains reunification is in her daughter's best interest because she can facilitate her emotional spiritual, intellectual growth, which is uniquely associated with the mother-daughter bond."
DCFS urged the juvenile court to deny mother's petition, noting that mother still had not completed all court-ordered services, and there continued to be significant issues during visits, as follows:
Prior to May 13, 2021, mother and C.'s caregivers had agreed that mother's monitor would pick up C. and bring her to a church in Hollywood, where she would meet mother. DCFS had told both mother and the monitor that mother was not allowed to be around the caregivers or at their home due to the conflict between them. The morning of the scheduled visit, however, the monitor reported she was having car trouble, and the CSW therefore requested that the visit take place at a park near the caregivers' home. Mother refused and demanded that the visit be at her church. When the CSW did not agree, mother said she was going to get her daughter regardless of what DCFS and the caregiver said and bring her to church. The CSW then cancelled the visit. Mother refused to have her visit cancelled and texted the CSW that she would" 'continue with her plans for the visit'" and" 'I'm getting my daughter.'" Mother and the monitor drove to the caregivers' home, where mother banged on the caregivers' doors and yelled. Mother then went around to the back fence and reached into the backyard yelling, "Give me my baby" and" 'I'ma f*ck you up.'" Mother left only when the caregivers called law enforcement.
As a result of this incident, and pending further order of the court, DCFS temporarily suspended mother's visits and advised her that visits would be monitored by a DCFS worker at a DCFS office. Nonetheless, mother called the caregivers' adult son to attempt to set up a visit; she also asked the caregivers' son to contact the CSW to "inform her that a visit was to occur" that weekend.
Mother's visits resumed on June 21, 2021. That day, mother repeatedly tried to persuade the CSW to move the visit to a Carl's Jr. restaurant despite having been told the visit had to occur at the DCFS office. After the visit ended and mother left the building, she asked to go back inside to get water. The CSW asked mother to wait outside to avoid upsetting C. Instead, mother followed the CSW into the building and "created a scene in the office by yelling to [C.] that she is there," causing C. to cry. Mother then followed the CSW and stood nearby while the CSW handed C. off to the caregiver.
On June 28 and July 5, 2021, the CSW monitored visits along with mother's new monitors. The CSW observed that both mother and the monitors appeared exhausted at the end of the visits, and C. would fall asleep or become easily upset when the visits ended.
On August 9, 2021, mother was permitted a visit away from the DCFS office with the understanding that mother's monitor would bring C. back to the office when the visit was over. The monitor forgot to bring a car seat, however, and so the caregiver agreed to pick up C. The monitor was told, however, that mother's visit could not be extended, and so he would have to supervise C. for the hour it would take the caregiver to get to his location. When the caregiver arrived, mother "abruptly picked [C.] up and rushed to the back area of the facility," presumably to avoid being seen by the caregiver. A few minutes later, the monitor carried C. to the car; C. was extremely upset and hit him on the head. C. then hit the caregiver. The caregiver said C. was extremely upset and did not understand what was happening. The caregiver reported: "[D]ue to the tumultuous and inconsistent visits, along with the numerous personal monitors, [C.'s] tantrums have become increasingly difficult resulting in intense meltdowns, hitting, kicking, biting, and screaming. After visits [C.] also appears to become emotionally exhausted falling asleep immediately once we receive her. [¶] With the most recent visits, [C.] displays these above mentioned behaviors not only at home after visitation but also in school. These meltdowns have resulted in [C.] harming other kids at school . . . biting the hand of one child and scratching the face of another. These behaviors were not present prior to the recent visits. [¶] Moreover, . . . this recent visit . . . raises concerns about the quality of visitation and what has been taking place when visitation is monitored by personal [m]onitors. There has been a history of blow-ups with [m]onitors during transitions which cause emotional distress for [C.]. . . . [W]ith each visit, there is an emotional setback that doesn't regulate itself until one to two days later. . . . This is very sad, stressful and disheartening to watch this little life go through so much stress at only two years of age."
DCFS stated it was concerned with C.'s emotional well-being because both the caregiver and C.'s daycare provider reported that after visits with mother, C. has tantrums that included yelling, throwing, hitting, and biting. The caregiver reported that these incidents typically occurred for two days after each visit, and then C. "goes back to her normal self with no behavioral issues."
Based on the foregoing, DCFS recommended that the court deny mother's section 388 petition.
I. Section 366.26 report.
The section 366.26 report, filed July 22, 2021, stated that C. continued to thrive in the home of her caregivers, who wished to adopt her. C.'s case was said to be "adoption ready."
J. Combined section 388 and permanency planning hearing.
The juvenile court held a combined section 388 and permanency planning hearing on August 12 and 20, 2021. Mother testified that C. was always very happy at the beginning of visits. When the visits ended, C. "pushes people away, . . . acts more aggressive toward them, and she clings on to me." Visits had been taking place at an indoor playground, where mother said she was "very active with [C.]. . . . I meet her energy level. . . . I engage with her, I go down the slides with her, I cheer her if she does something remarkable. . . . [¶] Also I do step back, sometimes, not far, but I step back and watch her how she plays with other kids as well." C. would "be all over me, and try to climb on me. She loves to have that assurance that I'm still there. And when she doesn't see me, if I'm not in her view, she goes, 'Momma. Momma.' "
Mother said she had learned a great deal from her anger management classes, including how to control her reactions and to step away from difficult situations. She was working and had obtained housing.
Mother's counsel urged the court to grant her section 388 petition, arguing that mother's mental health had stabilized, she had restarted anger management classes, there was an established bond between mother and child, and mother was capable of taking on a parental role.
Minor's counsel urged the court to deny mother's petition. Counsel noted that mother still had not completed her anger management classes and had not enrolled in individual counseling in Los Angeles. Further, the case was nearly two years old and mother still could not offer C. permanency. Finally, counsel urged that C.'s distress at the end of visits was not due to the strong bond between mother and C., but because of the inappropriateness of the visits. DCFS joined minor's counsel's request to deny the section 388 petition.
After taking the petition under submission, the court denied it. It explained: "I'm finding that circumstances have not changed, and that the report filed by mother's forensic psychologist does point out that mother still would require at least a year of psychiatric care. This matter has been open for more than two years, and the court finds that it would not be in the minor's best interest, given how long the case has been open and the minor's right to permanency as well. [¶] So the court for those reasons is denying the [section 388 petition]."
The court next considered DCFS's request to terminate parental rights. Mother objected to termination, urging that the beneficial parental relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) applied. Mother's counsel noted that mother regularly visited with C. and had demonstrated the ability to take on a parental role. Further, counsel said, terminating parental rights would be detrimental to C. because of the strong bond between mother and child. Counsel for DCFS, C., and father all contended the exception did not apply and urged the court to terminate parental rights.
The court concluded that the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply and it ordered parental rights terminated. It explained: "The court feels compelled to follow California law and the . . . elements and standards that it has set forth in a case like this where family reunification has been terminated. The case has been open for two years. And the court does not see that reunification is possible under the standards, and that is why I denied the 388. But I also do not see that an exception to adoption applies. . . . [¶] The court does find that mother has regularly visited, but the court doesn't believe that mother has played a sufficient parental role during this time to satisfy the parental benefit exception. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [A]ny benefit accruing to the child from the relationship with the parents is outweighed by the physical and emotional benefit that the child will receive through the permanency and stability of adoption. . . . So for that reason, the court rejects as [inapplicable] the parental benefit exception."
Mother timely appealed from the order terminating parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the trial court erred by denying her section 388 petition and terminating her parental rights. We disagree and affirm.
I. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying mother's section 388 petition.
A party may petition the court under section 388 to change, modify, or set aside a previous court order. The petitioning party has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) there is a change of circumstances or new evidence, and (2) the proposed change is in the child's best interests. (§ 388.)
"Whether the juvenile court should modify a previously made order rests within its discretion, and its determination may not be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318).) '. . . "[']The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.'"' (Id. at pp. 318-319.)" (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 525-526.)
A. New evidence or changed circumstances.
Mother contends that her section 388 petition presented evidence of changed circumstances--namely, that a new psychological evaluation by a privately retained psychologist established that mother was not exhibiting any clinically significant psychological, emotional, or personality concerns that would interfere with her overall functioning. Based on this evaluation, mother contends she "did not now have any mental health diagnosis, there were no longer any safety concerns, and the reasons for dependency had been ameliorated."
We note that for purposes of evaluating whether C. should remain in an out-of-home placement, the relevant facts were not mother's diagnosis, but her behavior--and, specifically, whether that behavior placed C. at risk of harm. (See § 366.21, subds. (e), (f) [child shall be returned to parent unless return would create substantial risk of detriment to child]; compare In re A.L. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1050 ["harm may not be presumed from the mere fact of a parent's mental illness"].) The proper focus with regard to changed circumstances, therefore, was not whether mother had obtained a new psychiatric diagnosis, but whether she had ceased acting in ways that endangered C.
Here, prior to the termination of mother's reunification services, DCFS noted that mother exhibited a number of troubling behaviors--namely, she was impulsive, demonstrated a deficit of coping skills, engaged in attention-seeking behaviors, and acted out when she did not get the outcome she wanted. DCFS expressed concern that because mother engaged in such behaviors when things did not go her way, "if presented with a similar set of circumstances with regard[] to her child[, ] . . . mother may not . . . prioritize her child's needs first."
Mother continued to exhibit these maladaptive behaviors after her reunification services were terminated. As described above, when mother was told in May 2021 that the location of her visit had to be changed because her monitor had car problems, mother insisted that she would" 'continue with her plans for the visit'" and" 'I'm getting my daughter.'" Mother then drove to the caregivers' home and, in C.'s presence, banged on their doors and threated to" 'f*ck [them] up.'" Mother ultimately left the caregivers' home only when law enforcement arrived. During a subsequent visit, mother insisted on going back into the DCFS office after saying goodbye to C. and creating a scene by yelling to C. that she was there, causing C. to cry.
As these examples demonstrate, mother continued to engage in the same impulsive, aggressive, and attention-seeking behaviors after services were terminated that she had exhibited before termination. The juvenile court therefore did not abuse its discretion by concluding that mother failed to demonstrate a change of circumstances.
Mother minimizes these incidents, contending that they demonstrate merely an inability to get along with social services, which is not relevant to child safety. Not so. While mother is correct that a parent's unwillingness to cooperate with a social worker generally will not, by itself, support a removal order, the juvenile court was well within its discretion in concluding that mother's behavior during these incidents revealed a tendency to respond explosively when things did not go as mother wished, and a willingness to put her own needs above those of her child. These qualities were relevant to mother's section 388 petition and supported the juvenile court's conclusion that mother failed to demonstrate changed circumstances.
B. Child's best interests.
Mother contends that the trial court erred by concluding that the change of order she sought--reinstating mother's reunification services or returning C. to her care--was not in C.'s best interests. In support, mother notes that she visited consistently, C. was bonded to her, and C. had tantrums when visits ended.
The Legislature has determined that when a child under three years of age is removed from her parents' custody, reunification services are "are presumptively limited to six months" (Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 843), and shall be "no longer than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care" (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B)). This is because the" 'unique developmental needs of infants and toddlers'" (Daria D. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 606, 612) justify a greater emphasis on establishing permanency and stability earlier in the dependency process (M.V. v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 166, 175).
In the present case, mother was provided more than 18 months of reunification services before services were terminated in April 2021--well more than the 12 months intended by the Legislature. The juvenile court therefore was well within its discretion in concluding that ordering additional services, which necessarily would have the effect of extending the reunification period and delaying permanency for C. beyond the two-year mark, was not in C.'s best interest.
The juvenile court similarly was within its discretion in concluding that it was not in C.'s best interest to be placed with mother. Although nearly two years had passed since C. entered foster care, mother still had not completed all of her court-ordered services and was not permitted unmonitored visits with C. Significantly, mother had not completed her anger management classes, and although she recently had re-enrolled in an anger management program, she had completed only one session as of the date of the section 388 hearing. Similarly, mother had only very recently enrolled in individual counseling, and she refused to say how many sessions she had attended.
Further, it is not clear from the record whether mother had the ability to safely house C. In June 2021, mother told the CSW that she had moved from the Salvation Army Emergency Shelter to another shelter, but she refused to provide an address. In August, mother testified that she was living in a two-bedroom townhouse, but she did not provide DCFS with any documentation to substantiate her testimony.
Finally, and of greatest concern, mother continued to behave unpredictably and to have frequent angry outbursts in C.'s presence. More than once, the caregivers had to call law enforcement to intervene when mother became abusive or refused to return C. to their care. Such outbursts plainly were emotionally taxing for C.: DCFS noted that C. would fall asleep or become easily upset after visits with mother, and the caregivers reported that C. had melt-downs and was aggressive with other children for a day or two after visits with mother.
Mother suggests that C.'s tantrums were "a sign of separation anxiety" from mother, and thus were evidence that it "was . . . in [C.'s] best interests to maintain her relationship with Mother." While the juvenile court could reasonably have concluded that C.'s tantrums stemmed from separation anxiety, it also could reasonably have concluded that her tantrums had other sources, including anxiety over the transitions between caregivers and mother, insecurity stemming from the tension between mother and caregivers, or discomfort with mother's monitors. In the absence of other evidence, the juvenile court was not required to conclude, as mother suggests, that C.'s tantrums were evidence of her strong bond with mother.
For all of these reasons, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that C.'s best interests would not be served by reinstating mother's reunification services or returning C. to mother's care.
II. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply.
If the juvenile court cannot safely return a dependent child to a parent's custody within statutory time limits, the court must set a hearing under section 366.26 to select a permanent plan for the child. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).) "To guide the court in selecting the most suitable permanent arrangement, the statute lists plans in order of preference and provides a detailed procedure for choosing among them. (See § 366.26, subd. (b) [In choosing among the alternatives in this subdivision, the court shall proceed pursuant to subdivision (c)'].) According to that procedure, the court must first determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the child is likely to be adopted. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If so, and if the court finds that there has been a previous determination that reunification services be terminated, then the court shall terminate parental rights to allow for adoption. (See Cynthia D. [v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242], 249-250.) But if the parent shows that termination would be detrimental to the child for at least one specifically enumerated reason, the court should decline to terminate parental rights and select another permanent plan. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)-(vi), (4)(A).)" (Caden C, at pp. 630-631.)
One such enumerated reason is the beneficial parental relationship exception. This exception applies when a child cannot be in a parent's custody, but severing the child's relationship with the parent, even when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home, would be harmful for the child. (Caden C, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 630.) In considering whether this exception applies, a juvenile court must consider whether the parent has proven three elements: "(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child." (Id. at p. 631.) Ultimately, the court must decide "whether the harm from severing the child's relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home." (Id. at p. 632.)
The first element, regular visitation and contact, considers whether" 'parents visit consistently,' taking into account 'the extent permitted by court orders.'" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) As to the second element, courts assess whether" 'the child would benefit from continuing the relationship, '" considering "a slew of factors, such as '[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the "positive" or "negative" effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs.'" (Ibid.) Finally, with regard to the third factor, "the court must decide whether it would be harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose adoption. [Citations.] Because terminating parental rights eliminates any legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts must assume that terminating parental rights terminates the relationship. [Citations.] What courts need to determine, therefore, is how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship-in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child's life." (Id. at p. 633.) In considering these factors, the juvenile court "acts in the child's best interest in a specific way: it decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs 'the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.'" (Ibid.)
"What this means is that the parent asserting the parental benefit exception must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, three things. The parent must show regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation permitted. Moreover, the parent must show that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent-the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. And the parent must show that terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home. When the parent has met that burden, the parental-benefit exception applies such that it would not be in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights, and the court should select a permanent plan other than adoption. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(A).)" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636-637.) While application of the beneficial parental relationship exception rests on a variety of factual determinations properly reviewed for substantial evidence, the ultimate decision that termination would be harmful is subject to review for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 630.)
There is no question in the present case that mother demonstrated regular visitation and a bond with C. As we have described, mother visited C. regularly throughout the dependency proceedings, and C. appeared happy in mother's presence. Arguably, therefore, mother satisfied the first two prongs of the Caden C. test.
As the court made clear in Caden C., however, it was not enough for mother to demonstrate regular visitation and a positive emotional attachment with C.-she also had to show that the "harm of severing the relationship outweighs 'the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.'" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The juvenile court manifestly did not abuse its discretion by concluding that mother did not satisfy this final prong of the Caden C. test. C. was removed from mother's custody when she was just five months old, and she spent the next two years in foster care. She has developed a positive emotional attachment to her caregivers, the B.'s, with whom she had lived for nearly a year by the time of the section 366.26 hearing. The B.'s wished to adopt C. and were demonstrably able to meet her physical and emotional needs. Indeed, it was the B.'s who identified C.'s developmental delays and obtained services to address them. And, in view of the conflict between mother and the B.'s, it seems unlikely that the B.'s would be willing to provide permanency to C. were they unable to adopt her.
In short, maintaining the legal relationship between mother and C. likely would come at a high price for C.--namely, separation from the B.'s and the prospect of a childhood spent in foster care. Under these circumstances, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that mother had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that terminating the relationship between mother and C. "would be detrimental to [C.] even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
DISPOSITION
The orders denying mother's section 388 petition and terminating parental rights are affirmed.
We concur: LAVIN, J., LIPNER, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.